Since the last pandemic, there has been a resurgence of the term solidarity as a call for collective action and mutual support in response to global health challenges and social inequities.Footnote 1 While this resurgence reflects a global effort to inspire commitment to reducing persistent health inequities, it has also called for critical reflections on how we think of solidarity in today’s world. The term solidarity carries significant historical and political weight, having been associated with powerful social and labour movements, anti-colonial resistance, and transnational feminist activism.Footnote 2 In these contexts, solidarity manifests as both a moral and political principle focusing on invoking shared goals and shared commitment to systemic changes. As such, using solidarity today brings with it a legacy of ethical and political significance—one that demands thoughtful reflection given the current shifting power dynamic, particularly in global health.
Our aim is not to replace solidarity, nor to diminish its historical or political importance. Rather, we argue that convergence provides an additional conceptual lens for understanding collaboration in contexts where solidarity is aspirational, incomplete, or contested. In increasingly interconnected global settings, collaboration often emerges among actors whose motivations, experiences, or priorities do not fully align. Naming convergence helps to account for these forms of cooperation without requiring that participants share identities, undergo transformative alignment, or arrive at consensus before acting together. In this sense, convergence can function as a practical and ethical framework for collaboration across difference, particularly in global health contexts marked by uneven power relations and plural perspectives. This paper does not argue that solidarity requires sameness but examines how certain influential formulations have privileged it.
In this paper, we use solidarity to refer to a normatively charged relation of mutual support that can motivate collective action and, in some accounts, involves forms of shared commitment and responsibility to others. We use convergence to refer to coordinated co-action among actors who may not share identities, values, or end-goals, but who align on a bounded objective or practice for strategic or pragmatic reasons. We argue that naming convergence matters because many collaborations, particularly in global health, are initiated and sustained under conditions of unresolved disagreement. Finally, by solidaristic convergence, we mean convergence constrained by solidaristic ethical commitments, including attention to power asymmetries, accountability to affected communities, and resistance to domination, even when deep identity or value alignment is absent. Our central claim is not that convergence replaces solidarity, but that the two concepts illuminate different logics of cooperation and can be jointly mobilized to better describe, evaluate, and design collaborative action across difference. To clarify the contribution of convergence, the following sections examine several influential ways in which solidarity has been conceptualized in the literature, particularly those that ground collective action in shared identities or interests. These accounts are not exhaustive of solidarity as such, but they illustrate tensions that arise when cooperation across difference is framed primarily through shared belonging.
In some historical and political usages, solidarity often implies standing together against an external force or a common adversary, which can inadvertently create an “us versus them” mentality.Footnote 3 This view can make it difficult to foster a truly inclusive spirit of collaboration, especially when issues are complex or require support from diverse parties, including those with different viewpoints. Such contemporary usage raises questions about the term’s ability to stand for collective action across differences, particularly in a globalized and increasingly interconnected world.
Here, we examine how certain conceptualizations of solidarity have been critiqued for insufficiently addressing the complexity of social relations animating collective action, particularly where solidaristic discourse is framed through narrow forms of sameness. Rather than treating these critiques as evidence of solidarity’s failure, we read them as indicating where additional conceptual tools may help describe cooperation across difference.
We align our position on solidarity to definitions of solidarity as a transformative and dynamic process that not only unites groups across differences but also creates personal and social transformations.Footnote 4 In Hunt-Hendrix and Taylor’s transformative solidarity, we are invited to expand our sense of selves to include others and create new communities that defy normative communities. They challenge superficial forms of solidarity, advocating for a transformation that restructures relations, institutions of power, and redistributes power. However, their form of transformative solidarity calls for a deeper relational transformation and expanding identities across differences. While such accounts offer an important transformative vision for social change, they also presuppose forms of relational and moral transformation that may not always be achievable or necessary for collective action to occur.
Convergence, as we use it as a complementary term, does not require shared identities, values, ideological agreement, mutual identities, or mutual transformations. Instead, it emphasizes co-action among actors with different commitments, so they can work together while recognizing a practical basis for collaboration. In this way, convergence can enable collaboration in contexts where solidarity has not emerged, or actors deliberately choose to work together without having an ideological alignment. We, therefore, do not propose convergence to rival transformative solidarity or replace solidarity; instead, we propose it as a complementary concept to encourage cooperation in places where solidarity is hoped for and not yet present.
1. Problem 1: Solidarity depends on valued shared identity or interests
One influential strand of solidarity theory grounds collective action in shared identities or shared interests, treating these as important foundations for solidaristic commitment and cooperation.Footnote 5 While this account represents only one way of understanding solidarity, examining it helps illuminate tensions that can arise when collective action across difference is framed primarily through shared belonging. Our intention here is not to challenge solidarity as such, but to examine how particular formulations and uses of solidarity can encounter difficulties when cooperation across difference is framed primarily through sameness.
Many theorists posit shared identity or interests as the foundation for collective action, with which they associate solidarity.Footnote 6 In this first section, we draw attention to a tension implied and also sometimes obscured by this conceptualization. This is the tension that arises through implications that “shared identity” and solidarity are for the collective good, when, in the affirmation of what is shared, there is always a risk and likelihood that some will be excluded. This is a recognized limitation of “shared identity” and solidarity as defined in early writings on the topic by Emile Durkheim.
Durkheim discusses solidarity within broader sociological writing on the social impacts of urbanization in 19th-century Europe. While casting shared identity as foundational to feelings of solidarity, he proposes significant contextual differences in bases and processes for the development of solidarity between what he dubs “traditional” and “modern” society. In “traditional” meaning pre-urban and tightly-knit societies, Durkheim suggests “mechanical” solidarity arises with minimal effort. In populations marked by homogeneity, cultural likeness, and social as well as economic inter-dependency, solidarity is almost inevitable. Solidarity can be observed in complex urban settings, Durkheim notes, but this solidarity does not share the same processes of emergence as its historical antecedent.
In the modern European city of 19th century, inhabitants can and do experience feelings of shared identity, but these feelings exist despite cultural differences, rather than because of homogeneity.Footnote 7 For Durkheim, within a society featuring organic solidarity, which he attributes to an intensified division of labour linked to industrialization, collective conscience is less dominant, and social integration is achieved through the recognition of individual differences and the need for cooperation.Footnote 8 The existence of solidarity in both traditional and “modern” urban Europe represents, for Durkheim, evidence that every human thrives on mutual reliance or inter-dependence. The presence of solidarity within culturally diverse populations serves as strong evidence for this argument.
However, this very persistence raises critical questions about the nature and boundaries of solidarity itself. If solidarity can emerge under such differing conditions, what ensures its inclusivity? While Durkheim presents organic solidarity as adaptive and unifying in modern, differentiated societies, its mechanisms are not immune to exclusionary dynamics.
As Durkheim himself cautioned, solidarity that arises from interdependence, while promoting differentiations and freedom, can exclude certain individuals and restrict their sense of belonging.Footnote 9 Wherever solidarity expects people to conform, fit in, or be “normal,” and whenever options for shared identity are constrained by norms, the emancipatory potential of coming together can be undermined. Even in settings where one might have access to more and multiple bases for shared identities, solidarity will involve exclusions. Acknowledging that options for recognized “shared identities” and “shared interests” are themselves limited represents an important first step in deepening understanding of the complexities and potential conditional implications of solidarity discourses.
Recent examples show that when people try to build solidarity around shared identity, problems can arise if the group ignores the differences within. For example, within contemporary LGBTQ+ movements, appeals to a shared queer identity have at times obscured racialized and cultural differences within the community. Research on sexual and gender diverse youths of colour suggests that the dominant articulation of shared identity may reflect the experiences of more privileged members, requiring others to negotiate competing forms of belonging or to establish alternative spaces of collective support.Footnote 10 In such cases, solidarity organized around a single axis of identity risks suppressing internal plurality to maintain cohesion, producing what has been described as a “double-edged” dynamic of inclusion and exclusion.Footnote 11 This example does not suggest that solidarity necessarily produces exclusion. Rather, it illustrates how solidaristic formations grounded primarily in shared identity or shared experience can encounter difficulties when differences in power, history, and social positioning remain. In highlighting this tension, there is a bit more clarity on why additional conceptual tools may be needed to describe forms of cooperation that allow collective action without presuming uniformity of identity or experience. The concern raised here is not primarily about unequal power within solidaristic relations, it is about how the boundaries of solidaristic belonging are drawn in the first place. The following section turns to a related but distinct issue: how power asymmetries persist and operate within solidarity formations once a group establishes collective identity or alignment.
2. Problem 2: Superficial sameness—the thick and thin of it
A recurring critique of contemporary solidarity across political and social theorists, feminist and economic scholars, and cultural critics centres on its potential to obscure existing power dynamics and inequalities, particularly within hierarchical structures. For instance, authors argue that some formulations of solidarity often fail to address the power differences within social movements.Footnote 12 They say that solidarity is not just about superficial support, that is, “we stand with you in solidarity”; instead, it should involve a conscious engagement with those actual imbalances within the group and recognizing and addressing these power differentials. Mavin’s and Liu and Shange’s criticism of this form of solidarity is grounded in a detailed analysis of specific organizational and social contexts where power imbalance and differences in group experiences undermine genuine solidarity.
Mavin’s concept of “venus envy” and her examination of the “queen bee” phenomenon, where women in positions of authority may consciously or unconsciously reinforce gender hierarchies, shows the intra-group complexities that exist within feminist movements. While Mavin’s conceptualization is rooted in the corporate world, it is relevant in the context of feminist social movements where the assumption that some forms of solidarity are based on shared gender identity can mask power imbalances and reproduce dominant narratives. For example, any power-neutral framing of solidarity within feminist movements obscures how hierarchies of privilege still operate within such movements. This assumption undermines genuine solidarity and highlights how the rhetoric of solidarity can be strategically employed to maintain the status quo rather than challenge oppressive systems. Her qualitative study, using feminist standpoint epistemology, further reveals how assumptions about solidaristic behaviour in management often negatively impact women, reinforcing a “blame the woman” perspective. Blotta’s exploration of “selective solidarity” in Brazilian public discourse further emphasizes this critique. Examining the role of political figures, media actors, and civil society, Blotta delves into the Brazilian public discourse on how, in certain contexts, solidarity is constructed and modulated across different actors. He argues that solidarity, in this enactment, is not universally applied but selectively deployed based on pre-existing biases, social hierarchies, and power relations, thus failing to address underlying systemic inequalities.
As Mavin and Blotta illustrate, and others argue that solidaristic behaviour can create divisions and polarization of societies, reinforcing existing power structures and marginalizing those who do not fit the dominant definition of who deserves solidarity, on what bases.Footnote 13 Liu and Shange opine that in such cases, this form of solidarity is rooted in the superficial sharing of suffering or experiences rather than a deep desire to support and critically engage with structural forces—anti-Asian and anti-Black. The authors’ position is based on personal experiences of a contested call for solidarity. On November 20, 2014, Akai Gurley, a 28-year-old Black man, was fatally shot by an Asian-American New York City police officer, Peter Liang. Officer Liang and his partner were sweeping the building’s stairwell. Liang was reported to have his gun out and his finger on the trigger when he opened the door to the stairs. At the exact moment, Gurley and his girlfriend entered the stairwell through the same door. Liang will discharge his gun on the wall, which will ricochet, striking Gurley on the head. Gurley was unarmed and would later die from his injuries.
Liu and Shange question the rationale of supporting a group cause when it is against one’s principles and benefits. The authors, Asian and Black, reflecting on their personal experience dealing with the aftermath of the death of Akai Gurley, argue that “thin solidarity” emerges from surface-level similarities. They note that while both the victim and police officer were minorities, their respective levels of exposure to systemic violence differ. As such, when Liang’s supporters argued that he was as much a victim as Akai, it created a problematic false equivalent, equating the experiences of one Black man to all Asians. For Liu and Shange, focusing on shared experiences like marginalization, without acknowledging the unique and disproportionate marginalization of systemic violence on Blacks, fails to recognize anti-Blackness in the United States. They argue that expecting those calling for justice following Akai Gurley to express solidarity with the Asian American police officer responsible for his death represents a misunderstanding and misuse of solidarity. Such expectations gloss over the issues of historical violence, differential access to social protections, and different social positions.
The Akai Gurley example is presented by Liu and Shange as a misunderstanding and misuse of solidarity, a term that, for the authors, should imply understanding and engaging with social structures, specific lived experiences, and power relations. Reducing diverse experiences within structures and systems of racial violence to shared victimhood silences some and excuses others’ complicity in the system. Moreover, the exclusionary practices that ensue, following how power connects to the production of truth, will marginalize those whose experiences do not perfectly align with the dominant narrative supposedly representative of one undifferentiated “minority/marginalized/victimized” group. Liu and Shange directly address this limitation with their argument that empathy-based solidarity focusing solely on shared suffering, can mask the unique nuances of different forms of oppression. They argue that relying on shared suffering as the basis for solidarity cannot intentionally minimize the significance of distinct experiences of marginalization and oppression. The authors propose a form of “thick solidarity” that acknowledges and embraces the “specificity, irreducibility, and incommensurability” of different experiences.
3. Problem 3: Political and corporate co-optation of solidarity
Certain forms of solidarity are not immune to political and corporate manipulation.Footnote 14 Much has been said about the misuse, misinterpretation, and co-optation of solidarity across academics, politics, economics, and health. For instance, analysis of the Polish Round Table exemplifies how agreements reached under the banner of solidarity can be utilized to consolidate elite power and maintain existing inequalities.Footnote 15 Elites can exploit the seemingly unifying nature of solidarity to mask self-serving political agendas and reinforce existing power structures. While Polak and Galij-Skarbińska laud the role of solidarność (solidarity) in ending communist rule in Poland and the complex dynamics and criticisms surrounding the political transition, they criticized the Round Table Agreement that it was a form of unification of the elite for financial and political benefits. It is claimed that the agreement allowed Communists to retain significant influence in various sectors and that some solidarność elites were too conciliatory towards the Communists.
Serntedakis revealed that during the European refugee crisis, solidarity discourse was deployed in Greece to mobilize resources for refugees, challenge austerity measures, and reinforce boundaries between Greek nationals and refugees. Many Greek informal and more formal organizations emerged “in solidarity” to respond to and provide for the needs of thousands of refugees landing on the shores of Lesvos, even in the face of a broader economic crisis. At around the same time, solidarity economies such as the one promoted by the anti-middleman movement emerged to address immediate crisis effects and challenge the prevailing economic system. The activists involved in these movements aimed to create an alternative economic model foregrounding cooperation and mutual support, contrasting with the dominant market-driven economy. They envisioned creating a cooperative and supportive economic system that would benefit producers and consumers, particularly those struggling due to austerity measures. Rakopoulos, who studied both those movements and community responses to refugees in Lesvos, found that the actions of such groups contrasted with those of other community organizations that also spoke of solidarity as they organized food distributions restricted to Greek citizens, excluding migrants and foreigners. In one place, in the face of the same conditions, solidarity could be critical and inclusive or exclusionary and discriminatory.
The contested nature of solidarity as an organizing principle for social change movements is apparent in discussions such as those above, and points to the difficulty in establishing and maintaining true solidarity. If contemporary criticism of solidarity has shown anything, it is that some solidarity movements can at times deliver hollow promises of greater social justice, reproducing the very hierarchies it seeks to dismantle. At best, it offers symbolic gestures of inclusion, while reinforcing exclusionary practices that further marginalize, those outside dominant coalitions. Thus, Furtado et al. argue that in some contexts, appeals to solidarity can impose a false consensus that masks power imbalances, suppressing diversity, contrary debates, and alternative solutions. In their criticism of the global health practice of solidarity, they argue that solidarity manifests as charity or humanitarian aid, where wealthy countries position themselves as bearers of a gift to poorer countries. For Furtado et al., such an approach to solidarity reinforces dependency rather than empowering such communities. Klein and Furtado et al. criticize solidarity as a mask for neoliberalism, specifically how organizations invoke solidarity yet remain true to neoliberal interests.
Considering these criticisms, it becomes clear that solidarity, while solidarity can be emancipatory, its transformative potential depends on the inclusivity, reflexivity, and ethical foundations upon which it is built. Given that its meanings and practices are shaped by contexts where it is used or enacted, it is vulnerable to appropriation by elites who seek to legitimize their agendas. As such, solidarity must continuously be reimagined—detached from co-opted actions and grounded in actions that resist control and surface-level agreements.
These problems do not undermine the importance of solidarity as a moral and political commitment. Rather, they reveal the difficulty of sustaining collective action under conditions marked by disagreement, unequal power, and divergent interests. When actors differ in their identities, experiences, and power, these problems do not prevent collective action from occurring in practice. Rather, they raise a further question: How can cooperation occur when agreement about identities, experiences, and power remains incomplete? The following section introduces convergence as a complementary concept for understanding and guiding such forms of collaboration.
4. A proposal for solidaristic convergence
The aim of introducing convergence is not to resolve the shortcomings of solidarity, but to name and strengthen a form of cooperation that already operates in many collective settings. Across social movements, global health collaborations, and research partnerships, actors frequently act together despite ongoing disagreement about identities, values, or long-term goals. Convergence captures this cooperative logic directly, describing how coordinated action can emerge without requiring full alignment or shared belonging. Solidaristic convergence, in turn, specifies the ethical conditions under which such cooperation remains attentive to power asymmetries, responsibility, and inclusion. In contexts where appeals to solidarity alone do not fully capture how cooperation occurs across difference, introducing an additional conceptual language, such as convergence, may help describe and guide collaborative action more precisely.
Calls for transformative solidarity highlight forms of alliance that challenge and expand traditional notions of belonging.Footnote 16 The world is undergoing rapid and ongoing change, with nations historically regarded as less developed beginning to assert greater influence and agency. In this context, rethinking the concept of solidarity is vital—not as a reason to retreat from collaboration, but as an opportunity to reimagine how we live and work together across diverse cultures and unequal histories.
While solidarity will always hold historical significance and remain a powerful rhetorical tool, its ambiguity and susceptibility to misuse necessitate careful consideration of how the term might be rescued from its own historically established shortcomings. Moving forward requires a context-sensitive approach, ensuring that the words used come as close to capturing the specific goals, actions, and power dynamics involved. For instance, imagine if we used a new word like convergence in addition to solidarity to describe collective support? In this paper, in proposing convergence be used “in addition” to solidarity, our aim is not to replace the term solidarity; instead, we aim to add another conceptual layer that enriches the practice of collective action or support. This move also acknowledges that no single idea or term can capture the multidimensional perspectives present within groups, hence our proposal of convergence.
Convergence is a simple yet powerful term that translates without a loss or change in meaning into at least two other widely used languages in which the authors are fluent, French and Spanish. Convergence suggests coming together from diverse backgrounds, perspectives, or points of view to pursue shared goals, regardless of differences. The word convergence implies movement, where solidarity reflects a shared commitment to unity. While solidarity appears to be stable, it often requires active and deliberate effort to maintain unity within a group. As such, solidarity must be fought for, constantly negotiated, and often redefined to fit into given situations. Convergence emphasizes collaboration and multiplicity, helping to describe situations where cooperation occurs without requiring binary alignment for or against a cause.
Thinking solidarity alongside convergence makes it easier to look beyond some current practices and to envision a future where shared structures, such as global health, do not erase differences but become a platform for inclusion. This paper argues that thinking solidarity alongside convergence can reshape how global communities understand and organize cooperation. This distinction may help international groups, from research collaborations to humanitarian aid organizations, better describe and organize cooperation. In academia, for instance, expectations and aspirations for convergence could foster a research culture that welcomes diversity of thought, interdisciplinary partnerships, and innovative solutions from diverse fields and backgrounds. Solidaristic convergence is not about creating a single identity through shared values and objectives; instead, it is about embracing plurality and multiculturalism. It recognizes the need to maintain cultural identities while coming together to collaborate on issues concerning individual cultures. In a setting like global health, coalitions demanding solidarity may push away some stakeholders with a different worldview. With Convergence, they can align joint action on issues without fully agreeing.
A convergent solidarity is shaped by accepting differences instead of aiming to assimilate to create a new world order. Hosseini elaborates on the strengths of such an approach while examining the dynamics of convergence within global justice movements. In his examination, he introduced the concept of interactive solidarity, which refers to the collaborative engagement among diverse groups striving for social justice. This approach emphasizes the importance of open spaces where various actors can converge, deliberate, and negotiate differences to foster mutual understanding and collective action.Footnote 17 Hosseini argues that such spaces are crucial for building inclusive movements to address complex global challenges. Hosseini’s approach to new ways of connecting indicates the relevance of convergence to solidarity that invites and accepts differences in ways of being, thinking, and acting. Expecting all who share a common goal to understand the need for that goal and the best ways to achieve it denies the truth of multiple positions and perspectives and denies the extent to which differences in opinion can impact group dynamics.Footnote 18 Hodges argues that people do not converge around an idea or belief because they fit in. Instead, they make a choice, evaluate the choice and act on it, sometimes challenging existing beliefs to improve it. If we follow Hodges’s argument, convergence does not mean the absence of divergence (contrary beliefs or views). Instead, it is about balancing social expectations and individual differences with the understanding that biographically and socially emergent thinking, beliefs, opinions, and cultural nuances will always play a role in how people relate. Re-imagining solidarity alongside convergence helps avoid framing cooperation in terms of complete agreement or “all being on the same page.”
In inviting us to create a space for convergence where diverse perspectives and backgrounds can negotiate, Hosseini and Hodges shift the discourse on solidarity to accepting limitations and differences. Thus, it inspires us to work towards a future where support, understanding, and progress are not bound to wealth or power but to the recognition of our unique contributions to the collective. Convergence is not only about standing together; it names how people can act together towards shared ends even when deeper agreement or shared identity remains unfinished, without denying that we come from many walks of life.
This paper has argued that solidarity remains an important ethical and political commitment for collective action, but that it does not always fully describe how cooperation occurs across difference in contemporary global contexts. By introducing convergence as a complementary concept, we have suggested a way of understanding collaboration among actors who do not share identities, values, or long-term goals, yet still act together towards bounded objectives. Recognizing the distinction between solidarity and convergence helps clarify how cooperation can emerge and persist even when agreement remains partial or contested. This perspective allows collective action to be understood without requiring uniformity or the suppression of difference, while maintaining attention to power asymmetries and ethical responsibility through the idea of solidaristic convergence. For policymakers, practitioners, and researchers working in areas such as global health, social movements, or international collaboration, this distinction offers a more realistic framework for designing cooperative efforts in plural and unequal settings. Rather than treating disagreement as a barrier to action, solidaristic convergence reframes it as a condition within which collaboration can still be meaningfully pursued. In doing so, the paper aims to contribute to ongoing discussions about how collective action can remain both practically effective and ethically attentive in an increasingly interconnected world.
Acknowledgements
This paper was supported with funding from Wellcome Trust Inc under the Discovery Award grant number 225230/Z/22/Z. The authors thank Dr. Caesar Atuire, who contributed to the development of this work, particularly in shaping the conceptual approach. The authors are also grateful to the practitioners whose insights informed this paper. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the funder.
Author contribution
Conceptualization: M.N.; Writing - original draft: M.N.; Writing - review & editing: M.N., E.N.
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