This article, as an introduction to the Symposium, discusses the determinants and evolution of attention to defence and foreign policy issues in France. It thereby contributes to existing debates on the relative power of presidents in this area. It then provides a short overview of the different contributions to the symposium. It argues that there is some measure of agreement in the analyses of current relations between France and the US, especially concerning the weight of history. Yet, at the same time, the articles provide a variety of views and approaches to the current state of these relations.

Nicolas Sarkozy's reintegration of NATO's military command in 2009 has been presented as radical, given the traditional Gaullist stance of an arm's length relationship with NATO and the US. This article argues first, the difficulty for any French political leader to alter radically the course of French foreign and defence policy; second, that Sarkozy’ policy is merely conforming to a longer-term trend of negotiating between European and Atlantic positions dating from the beginning of the twentieth century.

With the onset of the Sarkozy presidency, an ‘era of good feeling’ has set in for the often fraught French–American relationship. But it is also a hyper presidency, as there is no way of predicting what surprise initiatives Sarkozy will think up next, and this may create problems, or at least adjustments, in the way Washington views him. Sarkozy's stated aim to bring France fully back into NATO was fulfilled at the NATO summit in April 2009, although his ‘condition’ that the European Security and Defence Policy first be strengthened clearly fell short of his expectations, due in part to the current financial and economic crisis.

More than 40 years after General Charles de Gaulle's historic decision to withdraw France from the integrated military branch of the Atlantic Alliance in 1966, Nicolas Sarkozy has decided to normalize France's NATO ties. Does this decision mark the abandonment of ‘Gaullism’? What will be the impact of France's reintegration and are we likely to see not only an institutional but also a political normalization of France's policies within the Alliance?

The relationship between France and the US is complex and characterised by frictions, which derive from the interests (and not the susceptibilities), of the two partners (Iraq, NATO, Afghanistan, the Middle-East). In order to avoid a return to past suspicions, the two allies need to establish a more structured dialogue, and cope with the new international agenda through more permanent structures. This requires a new culture of cooperation on both sides.

This article argues that the continuity in French approaches to the transatlantic relationship and to the North Atlantic Alliance is structured by deep historical forces and is relatively unaffected by the personal preferences of individual Presidents or other political actors. Nicolas Sarkozy's much discussed ‘return to NATO’ will not affect French foreign policy in any significant way. Indeed, having France inside the tent is likely to generate even greater European-American tension within the Alliance.

Globalization and Americanization have often been intertwined and interchanged in the French political discourse. This article explores whether and how the election of Sarkozy, and then of Obama, are transforming this equation. The French obsession with globalization and Americanization was temporarily appeased at the time of the 2007 election, which enabled Sarkozy to come to power. Yet the French rapprochement with the US, at least on economic issues, is not so clear as has often been portrayed. However, the past couple of years have shown that globalization no longer equals Americanization. This should help mitigate the strains put on the Franco-American relationship by the world financial crisis.

External forces have pushed Central-East Europe's nascent political science disciplines toward convergence: the European Union's educational policies, the funding and training activities of public and private Western players, most prominently the ‘Open Society’ institutes and organizations established by financier George Soros. However, considerable disparities persist regarding national and international cooperation, research quality, and representation of professional interests. These disparities are in large part explained by the fact that the institutionalization of political science has been stunted in places where ‘hybrid’, semi-autocratic political regimes have emerged.

A trans-Atlantic panel of social scientists addresses the question of what social science might offer the new President of the United States in various areas of policy and government action. Andrew Rudalevige's analysis of the scholarship on managing the presidency leads him to state that ‘most of the major happenings of the Bush years were essentially administrative in nature. That is likely to continue. Thus, how and whether presidents achieve the sort of advice and responsiveness they desire from the bureaucracy has important implications not only for the kinds of policy the government implements, but for assessing democratic governance itself’. George Edwards examines presidential strategies for government with the conclusion that ‘Social science shows us that there is no silver bullet’ when a president is trying to obtain the support of the public or Congress. Jenel Virden points out that in 2008 women turned out to vote more than men, voted for Obama more than men, and were strongly hopeful that under the new administration prospects would improve. Having engaged so successfully with this sector of the population, the Obama administration is under pressure to recognize and address its needs. Robert Singh points out that there are necessary reservations about the utility of social science in informing an Obama foreign policy, but nonetheless elaborates propositions and principles that could usefully frame the administration's approach. Dilys Hill provides an overview and draws the debate to a close. The discussion in these pages is based on the 2009 Academy of Social Sciences annual debate, convened by Philip Davies and hosted by the Eccles Centre for American Studies at the British Library (Davies et al, 2009).

Democracies are fragile constructions. The apparently overwhelming expansion of democratic regimes should not, however, hide their intrinsic weaknesses. The paper examines how five (hypo)theses proposed by the author 10 years ago are still valuable instruments of analysis in periods of troubled times. The discrepancy between aspirations, programmes and the harsh reality of today is examined in the background of the Europeanisation and globalisation processes.

The introduction of Education for Citizenship into the Spanish school system has given rise to a strong controversy with the Catholic Church and other conservative actors in Spanish society, who claim that the students’ moral education is an exclusive realm, reserved for families. Challenging these criticisms, this article points to the reasons that justify both the substantive content of the subject and the competence of democratic government with regard to civic education.