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Civil Unrest and Police Reform: Quelling Riots in Prague, 1890-1910

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 February 2026

Martin Klečacký Open the ORCID record for Martin Klečacký [Opens in a new window]
Martin Klečacký*
Affiliation:
Masaryk Institute and Archives, Czech Academy of Sciences, Prague, Czech Republic
*
Email: klecacky@mua.cas.cz
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Abstract

This article examines the institutional evolution and professionalization of the state police in Prague during the final decades of the Habsburg monarchy, arguing that the transformation of the Prague State Police between 1893 and 1910 represents a proactive effort in modern state-building. Drawing on reports from the Prague Police Directorate and the Bohemian Governor’s Office, it analyzes how recurring episodes of mass violence—specifically the unrest of the early 1890s, the riots of December 1897, and the nationalist disturbances of 1908—exposed the structural vulnerabilities of a security apparatus designed for routine policing rather than mass politics.

The article highlights a significant shift in administrative strategy: the movement away from a reliance on military intervention, which was increasingly viewed by civil authorities as a “double defeat” that undermined the legitimacy of the constitutional state. Instead, police directors such as Georg Dörfl and Karel Křikava successfully advocated for a robust, civilian-controlled force characterized by increased manpower, modernized equipment, and the establishment of a dedicated reserve for professional training. By 1910, the Prague Guard had largely expanded, reflecting a fundamental reconceptualization of urban order where protest was accepted as an unavoidable feature of political life to be contained by professional civilian forces rather than crushed by the army.

Keywords

Habsburg monarchyPraguepolice reformcivil unreststate-buildingmass politicsnineteenth centuryurban history

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Central European History , First View , pp. 1 - 19
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© Masaryk Institute and Archives of the Czech Academy of Sciences, 2026. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Central European History Society.

Maintaining order and enforcing the rule of law stood at the core of the nineteenth-century state, and the expanding bureaucracies steadily extended their reach into everyday life.Footnote 1 Nowhere was this more visible than in the growing presence of professional police forces, both in rural landscapes and in urban centers across continental Europe.Footnote 2 This trend was reflected not only in the establishment and consolidation of the gendarmerie as the primary force for maintaining order in sparsely populated countryside areas,Footnote 3 but also in the state authorities gradually taking over policing tasks in urban centers that had typically been carried out by local government. In this process, provincial capitals and major industrial agglomerations became crucial “laboratories” for state power. Here, the monarchy could forge and refine its police forces, testing their effectiveness and modifying their organization, equipment, and training, so that its officers were better able to confront new forms of crime and the protests of an increasingly mobilized civil society.Footnote 4

As a major urban center of the Habsburg monarchy, Prague had witnessed numerous mass demonstrations and street riots since the mid-nineteenth-century revolutionary upheavals. Although the causes varied, these events consistently triggered political changes and administrative adjustments. A common feature of these mass demonstrations was clashes with law enforcement forces, which usually lasted for a relatively long period of time (several days or even weeks). During this time, protests often degenerated into violent riots, threatening the life, health, and property of non-participating residents. When ordinary means failed to ensure the security of law-abiding citizens, the state was compelled to resort to extraordinary measures. The repeated declaration of a state of emergency and imposition of martial law in Prague, occurring five times between 1848 and 1914, clearly demonstrated the failure of the civil authorities.

In this article, I will focus on the role of the state security guard as the executive arm of law enforcement in Prague during the street riots.Footnote 5 This article argues that the repeated episodes of mass protest and riot in Prague during the final decades of the Habsburg monarchy were crucial not only for shaping the local security apparatus but also for redefining the relationship between the civilian administration, the military, and society at large.Footnote 6 The development of the Prague State Police should be understood as part of the wider process of Habsburg state-building in the constitutional era, in which the presence of a professional civilian force became an indispensable marker of state authority in the urban public sphere. Reforms pursued after 1893 and again after 1897 and 1908 were not solely technical adjustments to manpower or equipment; they embodied the conviction that protest was a predictable and even legitimate form of political expression, and that it was therefore the task of a robust yet civilian-controlled police to contain disturbances without resort to the indiscriminate violence associated with military intervention. The Prague case, therefore, reveals that the strengthening of the police was not a symptom of authoritarian centralization but its very opposite: a deliberate strategy to preserve civil administration, prevent military encroachment, and safeguard the fragile legitimacy of the constitutional state.

Recent scholarship on the history of policing in Europe has emphasized the connection between the emergence of professional police forces and the broader processes of state-building in the nineteenth century. Studies of France and the German states have shown how the consolidation of civilian security forces was integral to the expansion of administrative authority and to the creation of a recognizably modern state apparatus.Footnote 7 In the Habsburg lands, however, the historiography remains more fragmentary: while Vienna has been treated as a model of imperial policing,Footnote 8 other crown-land capitals have received far less attention,Footnote 9 and the role of provincial police forces in shaping the monarchy’s authority has not been systematically examined.Footnote 10 Historians of the Habsburg state have often emphasized its limited capacity, its dependence on negotiation with local elites, and its vulnerability to national conflicts,Footnote 11 but the police have rarely been integrated into these debates. This article argues that the transformation of the Prague State Police, driven by recurring episodes of mass protest and riots in the 1890s and 1900s, reveals a shift in Habsburg state-building: a proactive effort to establish a robust, civilian-controlled police force as a means to contain unrest, preserve civil administration, and maintain legitimacy, thereby complicating the traditional image of a weak or merely reactive late Habsburg state.

Drawing on official sources, particularly reports from the Prague Police Directorate and the Bohemian Governor’s Office, this article examines how Prague’s security forces at the turn of the twentieth century managed to control public space and responded to both spontaneous and organized collective violence, including street riots. It further analyzes how these security forces assessed their performance during street riots and strategically adapted their tactics, equipment, and organizational structure in light of these experiences. This approach will also reveal the state’s attitude towards internal security in important urban centers and the changing position of the police since mass protests likely acted as a crucial catalyst for changes to the state-funded security forces.

Prague occupied a distinct position within the Habsburg monarchy with regard to the organization of public security. As the capital of one of Austria’s wealthiest and largest provinces, yet also one of the most ethnically and socially challenging, it had a security guard corps that had been directly subordinate to the Prague Police Directorate since 1868.Footnote 12 In 1869, the state set up a “state police” in Vienna, the capital of the Habsburg empire and seat of the imperial family,Footnote 13 and also in Trieste (later, for example, in Czernowitz), but everywhere else the basic tasks of maintaining public law and order remained the responsibility of the local self-government. Even in the capital cities of the larger crown lands, such as Moravia and Styria, there was a uniformed guard force organized and funded by the municipality, which cooperated closely with the local state police authorities (i.e., police directorates) in administrative matters.Footnote 14 While financially advantageous for the state, this reliance on municipal police proved to be a critical vulnerability. During major nationalist or political disturbances, the local loyalties of the city-based guard rendered them unreliable, exposing the strategic cost of the state’s fiscal prudence.Footnote 15 Consequently, their intervention was often hesitant, if it occurred at all. Conversely, in Brno, for example, the municipal guard controlled by the German nationalist town hall was excessively harsh in its use of force during clashes with Czech demonstrators.Footnote 16 A similar situation prevailed outside the provincial capitals; almost every municipality paid for its own uniformed guard, commanded by the mayor, but its capacity was limited—in numbers, training, and equipment—and it focused only on routine policing.Footnote 17 In the event of major disturbances, the local guards frequently failed, and the restoration of law and order had to be carried out by state forces under the direction of the district chief, with the use of the gendarmerie. If the latter’s numbers were insufficient, the chief was forced to call in military assistance from the nearest garrison headquarters.Footnote 18

Establishment of the State Police Corps in Prague

The establishment of the state-controlled security guard in Prague resulted directly from the turbulence of 1868. The Emperor’s compromise with the Hungarian political representation in the previous year had resulted in a series of protest actions in Bohemia. Czech politicians were stridently opposed to the government and took every opportunity to demonstrate their resistance, including ostentatious indifference to the Emperor’s visit to Prague in June of that year. In August, the opposition deputies adopted the “Declaration of State,” whereupon demonstrations against the government broke out in Prague and the surrounding areas.Footnote 19 The deliberate inaction of the Prague city guard—loyal to the nationalist Czech city council—provided the government with the perfect pretext. Citing the collapse of local control, the state swiftly declared an emergency, dismissed the Governor, and moved to seize direct command of policing in the capital. The new head of the highest civil authority in Bohemia was a soldier, Field-Marshal-Lieutenant Alexander Koller, who was tasked with bringing order to the crown land and its capital.Footnote 20 On the same day that the state of emergency was declared, the Emperor approved the abolition of the limited powers of the Prague Police Directorate, a decision that transferred the responsibility for public order in the city directly to the state. The Mayor of Prague was to hand the city guard’s equipment and weapons over to the new state force and allow its men to join its ranks. The relevant decree also anticipated the possibility of the Prague municipality defying the order, at which point the gendarmerie was to be deployed in Prague not only from Bohemia, but also from Vienna, Brno, and Ljubljana.Footnote 21

Placing the Prague city guard under the control of the state authorities—once “unreliable elements” had been excluded—marked a major turning point in law and order enforcement in the capital. The Police Directorate thus gained an effective executive component, which could be utilized entirely at its discretion. Although the state had deprived the Prague municipality of one of the most important rights of self-government, namely, control over law and order on its own territory, it considerably relieved the financial burden on the city. In 1868, the guard numbered 400 constables (Wachmänner) and thirty sergeants (Postenführer), who were divided into four district inspectorates headed by a district inspector (Bezirksinspektor), and within them into individual departments attached to police commissariats.Footnote 22 However, the area of police control extended beyond the historical core of Prague (Old Town, New Town, Lesser Town, Hradčany, and Josefov) to include economically and socially integrated neighboring municipalities.Footnote 23 Consequently, uniformed officers also patrolled the rapidly expanding suburbs. Due to the relatively large amount of territory and the increasing population of the Prague metropolitan area, especially of working-class people looking for work in the city’s many industrial plants, the guard was reinforced by an additional 100 men as early as 1869. This was instigated by Koller, who feared possible protests after the lifting of the state of emergency.Footnote 24 This established the security guard strength at 500 officers, consisting of 250 junior constables (Wachmänner), 250 senior constables (Oberwachmänner), and thirty sergeants. The latter category was later renamed guard inspector (Wachinspektor) and reduced to twenty-four. In Prague the constables usually served individually either at permanent posts at important buildings, busy intersections, and squares, or in regular patrols within a clearly defined precinct, while two-man patrols prevailed outside Prague. These covered suburban villages and settlements, which, although now part of the capital, retained their rural character, being only gradually transformed by new housing developments.Footnote 25

In 1872 there was a request for a further strengthening of the guard, due to building expansion especially in the suburbs, together with rapid population growth and its accompanying social problems. However, in this case the Ministry of the Interior rejected it for financial reasons.Footnote 26 In the decades that followed, the Ministry’s approach was shaped by a reluctance to increase expenditure on security and by considerations of the state treasury, which was partly due to the unresolved issue of the financial contribution of the municipalities to policing their territory. While this question was partially addressed for the suburbs and surrounding villages by the Provincial Law of 1874, which provided for a 12 percent compulsory contribution to costs related to public security,Footnote 27 no firm principle could be established for Prague. Because it had imposed its security guard on the capital without the municipality’s consent, the state ultimately had to rely on the goodwill of Prague’s political representation when it came to its contribution to maintaining law and order in the city. It was only in 1884, after a personal meeting between the Police Director and the then mayor, Tomáš Černý, that the municipal leaders approved additional funding.Footnote 28 This apparently contributed to the government’s willingness to increase the force by 100 constables and six inspectors.Footnote 29 However, this was only a fraction of what was required to provide a stronger police presence throughout the district.

According to a review from the end of 1884, more than three quarters of the corps was on the streets every day, which clearly shows that even under normal conditions the Prague Guard did not have the numbers to rotate patrols at individual posts or to provide sufficient rest for men off duty.Footnote 30 The Police Director calculated that a constable had only three to seven hours of personal free time per day, with the remainder spent either on direct policing or on secondary activities (Nebendienste). These included a wide range of duties, such as escorting prisoners, guarding barracks, and monitoring beggars, street performers, and prostitutes. They also assisted at public events—balls, festivals, political meetings, rallies, parades, and funerals—that often spanned the entire city. From the mid-1880s onwards, at the request of the courts or superior authorities, officers also had to monitor potentially dangerous persons suspected of being socialist or anarchist sympathizers. At the same time, they reinforced the under-staffed corps of plainclothes detectives who investigated crimes that fell under the jurisdiction of the Police Directorate.Footnote 31 They assisted the State Attorney’s Office in the confiscation of newspapers and magazines, kept a permanent watch at railway stations and bridges, and, in the summer months, checked empty dwellings whose occupants had left for long-term summer residences.Footnote 32

Prague Police in the Era of Emerging Mass Politics (1890s)

Although the guard was reinforced in 1884, part of the new force was immediately used to establish a guard post in Libeň, which had been fully incorporated into the police district only that year.Footnote 33 It was the growth of the suburban communities that kept the force most occupied. Between 1869 and 1884, the population of Prague itself increased by only 5,148, while the other municipalities of the district acquired 64,275 new inhabitants, which necessitated the establishment of a guard post in Žižkov, the relocation of the commissariat from Vyšehrad to Královské Vinohrady, and the transfer of eighty-two constables and four inspectors from Prague to the commissariats outside the city.Footnote 34 This trend continued in the following years, and between 1884 and 1890 the population of the police district increased by a further 55,818.Footnote 35 In 1890 and again in 1891 the chief inspector of the guard asked the Police Director for an additional number of men, which led the Police Director to appeal to the Governor, who then made a request to the Minister of the Interior. However, the state budget reportedly would not allow for the creation of new posts. The Minister of the Interior advised the Police Directorate to seek reserves in its internal operations, with reference to the fact that many officers were serving as typists, on telegraph duty, in plain clothes, or as liaison officers.Footnote 36 Although this was true, the individuals concerned were usually senior members of the guard who could no longer cope with the physical demands of working directly in the field. As they were under oath, the authorities were able to put them to good use as clerical workers, given the confidential content of messages since the scribes on daily wages (diurnists) posed a greater risk of disclosing official correspondence. Out of a force of 600 officers and thirty guard inspectors, more than forty officers were employed to perform work that was not direct service, and dozens more were routinely absent because of escort roles, secondary duties, or sickness.Footnote 37 According to the Police Director, the actual number of officers on the streets was thus significantly lower than the official number, and the suburban municipalities of Královské Vinohrady, Nusle, Libeň, and Žižkov repeatedly complained about the lack of uniformed officers on the streets.Footnote 38 For example, the whole of Žižkov, which then had over 40,000 predominantly working-class residents, was policed by only thirteen officers under a single inspector.Footnote 39

The demonstrations of 1892 and 1893 exposed both the poor security situation in Prague and the chronic shortage of police officers. These events unfolded against the backdrop of mounting political volatility in Bohemia, which had intensified since the late 1880s, when the dominant Czech party, the Old Czechs, entered into a compromise with German liberal politicians. The arrangement, essentially an administrative division of the land and its provincial authorities, was denounced by the national opposition, the Young Czechs, as a betrayal of the nation. The ensuing campaign of denunciation, culminating in the Old Czechs’ electoral defeat of 1891, revealed the deeper political fragmentation of Czech society.Footnote 40

The representatives of various currents of Czech politics, both radically nationalist-minded students and working-class people inclined towards socialism or anarchism, came together in the so-called progressive movement called Omladina. They were united primarily by their opposition to the Austrian government.Footnote 41 Their protests and other public gatherings of students and working-class youth during these years later formed the basis for charges in the orchestrated Omladina trial, which was meant to suppress the potentially dangerous aspiring political leaders involved. From the perspective of the police, the demonstration near Olšany cemetery on June 18, 1893 was particularly embarrassing, during which protesters clashed with officers, scattering their ranks. Some officers fled and hid among the tombstones until reinforcements arrived from distant commissariats.Footnote 42 Moreover, the Prague Guard lacked the manpower to deal with a demonstration that took place two months later, which was even more audacious, given its timing on the eve of the Emperor’s birthday celebration on August 17. Workers marched through the streets of Prague singing the Red Flag, shouting anti-government slogans, and distributing illegal leaflets, while the Police Directorate were powerless to intervene. Not only that but individual officers who encountered the demonstrators ended up injured, having received blows from stones or sticks.Footnote 43

New Police Director Georg Dörfl reiterated the appeals of his predecessors in office for an increase of 150 men and six inspectors, one third of which was to form a mounted unit.Footnote 44 It is clear that Dörfl’s demand was inspired by Vienna, based on the experience of guards in the capital of the empire.Footnote 45 This contingent was envisioned as a mobile force that could move quickly around the police district and intervene at the point of need. Horse-mounted units would also add firepower to the force and restore the authority of the police, especially with crowds of demonstrators. The transformation of part of the guard into a mounted detachment was accompanied by organizational complications, specifically, the need for suitably trained horses and stables in the Prague agglomeration. Above all, it was associated with much higher costs,Footnote 46 for which Dörfl and the Governor managed to obtain the approval of the Ministry. The recent riots and the clear weakness of the guards in suppressing them provided strong support for their arguments.

When a state of emergency was declared in Prague in September 1893, the Police Director used it also as justification for strengthening the equipment of the men and inspectors. Up until that time, the sabre had been the standard armament of officers on duty, but when they were unexpectedly confronted with an aggressive crowd, it had failed as a deterrent; on the contrary, the moment they drew it, the situation escalated. Only officers who were deployed in a closed formation were armed with Wänzel rifles, which were single-shot weapons, optionally equipped with a bayonet. However, even these proved ineffective in dispersing crowds or in struggles with individuals being arrested. Once again, based on the experience of the Vienna Guard, Dörfl managed to persuade the Ministry in 1893 and had the entire Prague Guard equipped with modern six-shot revolvers.Footnote 47 As had been demonstrated in Vienna, attacking a police officer armed with a revolver presented a greater risk, as he was better able to defend himself. Dörfl argued that such equipment would increase the authority of the force, the safety of the officers, and also boost their courage to take action against dangerous criminals in their daily police duties.Footnote 48

The Emperor approved the increase in the number of guards on October 6, 1893, and subsequently the Police Directorate announced an open selection process and appealed to all district captains in Bohemia to publish the Prague Guard vacancies in their bulletins. Between October 1893 and January 1894, 600 people applied for the 150 new posts, but only ninety-nine were accepted,Footnote 49 which the Police Director attributed to the insufficient competence of many applicants. Either they lacked the necessary physical fitness (ein rüstiger Körperbau) or they were not able to speak or write both the official languages of Bohemia as the organizational status of the guard required.Footnote 50

The most serious obstacle to recruitment was pay, which by 1893 had remained unchanged since the establishment of the guard twenty-five years earlier. A provisional constable earned only 1.20 gulden per day—little more than an unskilled laborer—with wages rising only marginally upon permanent appointment. Advancement was slow, and most men remained on this income for a decade or longer before attaining senior constable rank. Entry was restricted to unmarried men aged 24–35, yet the combination of low salaries and restrictive marriage regulations made it difficult to establish families. These conditions deterred applicants from the middle classes and from among retired non-commissioned army officers, leaving the corps dependent on recruits from working-class backgrounds with limited education. The social consequences were evident: junior officers were often forced into unstable living arrangements, while their senior colleagues struggled to secure adequate housing.Footnote 51 As the chief inspector noted, very few sons of bourgeois families or retired NCOs applied for service in Prague, especially when gendarmes after six years could expect 590 gulden annually compared to just 450 for a constable. Most applicants instead came from occupations such as coachmen, journeymen, and grooms, with minimal schooling and little proficiency in the empire’s two official languages.Footnote 52 Such conditions not only eroded the guard’s social standing but also undermined its capacity to command authority in the city.

Training and professional development did little to compensate for these shortcomings. Although newly sworn constables served provisionally for six months and could be dismissed without cause, this probationary period did not involve systematic instruction. As the Police Director repeatedly admitted, the chronic shortage of manpower meant that recruits were sent directly into service after taking the oath, expected to learn informally from more experienced colleagues.Footnote 53 Yet this generational transfer of knowledge was thwarted by the high turnover within the corps. Between January 1892 and June 1895, the Prague Guard lost 267 men—seventeen through death, twenty-six by dismissal, seventy through retirement, and 154 by voluntary resignation without pension rights. In all, more than a third of the force disappeared within three years. Although recruitment replenished the numbers, the constant departures imposed financial burdens for new equipment and, more seriously, eroded the guard’s store of experience and local knowledge, resources that were virtually impossible to replace.Footnote 54

1897 Riots as an Argument for Reinforcing the Police

The Prague Guard thus entered the crisis year of 1897 plagued by systemic weaknesses. Its official strength of 734 men was a hollow figure that masked the grim reality on the streets, which was inevitably lower due to unfilled vacancies, sickness, and officers on other duties. The guard was responsible for a precinct of seventy-two square kilometers with nearly half a million inhabitants. Consequently, individual constables were thinly spread across a vast area, relying solely on walking or public transport for mutual assistance. The mounted detachment, which was able to travel considerably faster, had only been established a few years earlier and numbered fifty men. Constables served at the limits of physical exhaustion, sometimes with only a few hours of rest, and given the restricted manpower and the need to provide basic services, there was no capacity to train them after they were recruited. Especially, they had no preparation on how to face a crowd or how to act in a close formation.Footnote 55 This lack of instruction was exacerbated by the absence of more experienced men who tended to leave the guard after a few years because of low pay and weariness from the rigors of duty.

The aim of Casimir Badeni, who was appointed Prime Minister in October 1895, was to bring about a major change in Austrian inner politics. Although he succeeded, he did so in a different manner from what he had planned. The final year of Badeni’s premiership had demonstrated the limits of Austrian state power in its confrontation with parliament and, above all, with a politically emancipated public which—partly influenced by its political leaders—was not willing to accept government edicts. His vision of a swift and decisive solution to the language question in Bohemia resulted in a long-term crisis in Austrian internal politics, prefaced by the largest protests and subsequent street riots that Vienna, Prague, and other centers of the German and Czech national movements had hitherto experienced.Footnote 56 While in Vienna and other parts of the Austrian lands there were protests against Badeni’s language ordinances, the largest riots in Prague took place after he left office, which the Czech public interpreted as yet another Habsburg betrayal and a breach of the government’s promise.Footnote 57 The street violence in Prague of late November and early December 1897 lasted several days, during which time troops from the Prague garrison, including cavalry and several battalions of infantry (Figure 1), were called out repeatedly. Yet even the considerable military presence in the city did not prevent the looting and atrocities perpetrated against Prague’s German and Jewish minorities in particular.Footnote 58

Figure 1. Cavalry Attacking Protesters after Declaration of Martial Law in Prague on December 2, 1897. Das interessante Blatt 16, no. 49 (9 December 1897), s. 1.

Order was restored only with the declaration of martial law on 2 December 1897—an intervention that politicians and the Ministry of the Interior deemed both belated and politically costly. Governor Karl Coudenhove was blamed for the failure, and his dismissal was seriously considered. In the end, however, he remained in office; removing him would have been perceived as a triumph for the demonstrators and further eroded the already fragile authority of the state in Prague.Footnote 59

The 1897 riots laid bare the structural weakness of Prague’s police: the guard lacked the manpower both to defend vulnerable sites and to concentrate forces where crowds gathered. The December events thus marked a turning point in thinking about the character of the city’s guard, whose size and organization had been designed for routine policing rather than for major political disturbances. Reliance on the army remained the default solution, yet cooperation between civil and military forces repeatedly proved ineffective.Footnote 60 Officials hesitated to summon troops because doing so signaled their own failure; once deployed, however, military commanders acted independently, without regard for civilian instructions.Footnote 61 Determined to show strength, they rarely held back, often resorting to excessive force—an approach that deepened mistrust between the military and civilian authorities.Footnote 62

The practice of calling in Militärassistenz—troops summoned to aid the civil power—underscored these limitations. Regulations gave army commanders full discretion over tactics and force, effectively turning demonstrations into military operations.Footnote 63 The language of “assistance” disguised the fact that soldiers were trained to combat enemies of the state, not to manage unruly crowds. Predictably, their actions frequently produced casualties, property damage, and deep political resentment.Footnote 64 Public memory of 1848, when Prince Windisch-Graetz had ordered the bombardment of Prague, cast a long shadow, ensuring that each military deployment appeared as a betrayal of constitutional rule. For civilian officials, military interventions were therefore a double defeat: they exposed the weakness of the police while simultaneously undermining public confidence in the state’s ability to govern by civilian means. This dilemma led police directors to press Vienna for a stronger, modernized police corps capable of maintaining order without recourse to the army.

Police Director Dörfl advanced this ambitious vision. He argued that only a sufficiently strong guard could restore order independently, even in times of major protest, thereby safeguarding the authority of civil administration and preventing military excesses. For him, the failures of December 1897 stemmed not only from inadequate numbers but also from the dispersal of men across too wide an area and the absence of a reserve force able to intervene quickly and decisively. Drawing on this experience, he proposed sweeping reinforcement: sixteen additional inspectors and 350 constables (including twenty mounted), an increase of almost 50 percent, along with a new system of precinct inspectors responsible for smaller territories who could act decisively in moments of crisis. This was designed to decentralize command, allowing for a more rapid and flexible response to developing unrest without waiting for orders from a central headquarters.Footnote 65 Initially, his plan met with little support. Governor Coudenhove, still operating within the older framework of routine policing, balked at the costs.Footnote 66 Yet the renewed riots of January and spring 1898 altered his stance. Convinced further violence was inevitable, he abandoned his earlier caution and, together with Dörfl, urged Vienna to authorize an urgent increase of 366 men by the summer.Footnote 67

The recent vivid memory of the riots, coupled with a change in the imperial cabinet, strengthened Prague’s proposals. In March 1898, Franz Thun-Hohenstein had become Prime Minister and caretaker of the Ministry of the Interior. As Coudenhove’s predecessor as Governor of Bohemia, he was well acquainted with the situation in the province and with the plight of the Prague Guard. With the Emperor’s approval, the police force was immediately reinforced with fifty constables and three guard inspectors from June 1, 1898, to be followed by a further seventy-five constables and four guard inspectors from January 1, 1899; an identical increase would take effect from New Year’s Day 1900. In total, the force would grow by 200 constables, eleven guard inspectors, and five newly established precinct inspectors. At the same time, Thun encouraged Coudenhove to submit further proposals should this increase prove insufficient.Footnote 68

Indeed, in October 1899, the Police Director requested that the agreed reinforcements officially scheduled for the beginning of 1900 be implemented immediately. The unrest in Prague and the larger Bohemian towns that followed the revocation of the language ordinances by the Clary government prompted the provincial authorities to call for not only the urgent implementation of the already approved reinforcements, but also a further increase in the number of guards. As the police chief explained, the moment patrols were withdrawn and concentrated in a few key places, the mob was able to rampage elsewhere without hindrance or fear of being confronted.Footnote 69 The objects requiring precautionary guard protection during the expected unrest were located primarily in the very center of the city. German casinos, German theatres, German university buildings, and other centers of German social life could easily become targets of nationalist hostility from the Czech-speaking majority. However, this left citizens and buildings in the suburbs unprotected and without the means to summon effective help. The reinforcements originally planned for January 1, 1900, arrived a month earlier and that same year the constables’ pay was significantly increased by the Act of 1899,Footnote 70 but no further reinforcements would be forthcoming in the following years. Despite repeated requests from the Governor in 1904, 1905, 1906, 1907 and again in April 1908, the Ministry of the Interior consistently invoked fiscal restraint and the need to avoid burdening the budget.Footnote 71 The response was the same in July 1908, which referred the Governor to the following year, with the hope that new funds could be found in the 1910 budget.Footnote 72

1908 Riots as an Argument for Police Reform

Over the years, police jurisdiction expanded, the population grew, and social and national tensions persisted. In addition to policing recurring public events, parades, demonstrations, and national and occupational celebrations, the guard also had to respond to riots and protests arising from the gradual nationalization of the public space. The Czech majority perceived Slavic Prague as their territory and reacted with hostility to overt nationalist displays by the German minority. Both students, especially members of German student organizations such as the Burschenschaften, and politicians played a key role in escalating these national tensions. The first decade of the twentieth century witnessed the rise of new Czech and German party formations, whose strategies aimed at mobilizing the broadened electorate created by universal suffrage—namely, all resident men over the age of twenty-one. Nationalist rhetoric became an important mobilizing tool that even established political parties had to respond to. The possibilities for compromise between the political representations of the two nations of Bohemia were dwindling, and, especially when negotiations ended in stalemate, the “politics” threatened to spill over into the streets.Footnote 73 The street disturbances of the autumn of 1908 were not only fueled by the domestic political situation, in which the Bohemian Land Diet could not properly convene its new institutions after the elections due to obstruction by German deputies, but also by international developments. The so-called Bosnian Crisis, triggered by the Austro-Hungarian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, remained contentious, and the Czech and German publics and their parliamentary representatives adopted completely opposing positions on it.

The first clashes took place in October 1908 and were sparked by the Bummels, which were the Sunday walks of German students in association colors along Na Příkopě Street in Prague’s New Town. This student custom became a demonstrative display of the German nationalist presence in the Czech city around the end of the nineteenth century and was perceived by the Czech public—exacerbated by the Czech press—as an outrageous provocation. From October 18, 1908, weekly brawls erupted between Czech protesters, German students, and the security forces. These often spilled into the following days with lower intensity before flaring up again each Sunday.Footnote 74 Although the deployed security detachments with the aid of mounted officers were able to disperse the protesters and protect exposed areas in the city center, the guard’s forces were insufficient when the protesting crowd began to move very quickly to other parts of the city. The Police Directorate even drew reinforcements from rural districts. At the Governor’s request, 1,000 gendarmes were deployed to patrol the most vulnerable areas.Footnote 75 The police eventually adopted an effective tactic of clearing the street entirely on several Sundays, barring public access to the area. In the following weeks they allowed the students to walk on one side of the street, preventing anyone else entering that space (Figure 2). In the meantime, the sixtieth anniversary of the Emperor’s accession to the throne was approaching, which was to be celebrated with pomp throughout the empire, but the street riots and protests in the Bohemian capital continued. After weeks of hesitation, martial law was declared in Prague and the surrounding districts on December 2, 1908 (Figure 3).Footnote 76 Unlike in 1897, there was no mass looting, and state authorities managed to control public space through repeated military deployments—though they could not prevent recurring disturbances, often instigated by Czech and German nationalist politicians.Footnote 77

Figure 2. Police Cordon Closing Off Na Příkopě Street on Sunday, November 1, 1908. The Line of Foot Guards Is Reinforced by Two Mounted Police Officers in the Foreground. Archiv hlavního města Prahy/Prague City Archives, Photograph collection, I 12966.

Figure 3. Foot Guards Led by an Inspector Closing Off Access to Na Příkopě Street from Havířská Street on Sunday, November 1, 1908. Archiv hlavního města Prahy/Prague City Archives, Photograph collection, I 12977.

A week after the outbreak of the riots, the Governor reflected on the situation in his report to Minister of the Interior and future Prime Minister Richard Bienerth. He pointed out that even if there was calm elsewhere in the police jurisdiction, he could withdraw only 400 officers to threatened areas, who had to both control crowds of several thousand and protect German students. For instance, on Sunday October 25, the guard set up cordons on both sides of Na Příkopě Street, but since 200 officers were assigned to protect the students specifically, the cordon could only consist of a simple chain of men standing shoulder to shoulder. The Governor emphasized that if this chain had not been protected at all times by mounted constables, who kept the rioting crowd at a sufficient distance, the demonstrators could easily have broken through it. He noted that since the guard had to defend more than ninety buildings across the city and suburbs, it was not able to concentrate enough forces to intervene in more than one place at the same time. Given the existing conditions and limited strength of the security forces, he openly admitted he could not guarantee that the situation would not deteriorate further—and his fears were confirmed in the days that followed. At that point Coudenhove stood up for his police chief and reproached the Interior Ministry for failing to understand the complicated situation in Bohemia, especially in Prague. Year after year, the Police Director’s deliberately modest requests for reinforcements were denied, a cycle of official neglect that left the city vulnerable.Footnote 78

It was not until April 1909 that the Police Director Karel Křikava was able to draft a proposal for increasing in the number of officers to a level that would ensure law and order even during large-scale demonstrations and riots.Footnote 79 It provided for two new district inspectors, two precinct inspectors, sixty-three guard inspectors and 390 constables (of whom three inspectors and thirty constables would be assigned to mounted units). The majority (fifty-six inspectors and 280 constables) were to be assigned to reinforce individual precincts and departments, while the remainder was to be kept in reserve. The reserve unit was to be made up of newly recruited officers, who would receive training and education, serving as a rapid response force in the case of unexpected events and as a buffer in the case of prolonged unrest.

Although the Police Director had put forward almost maximalist demands, the memory of the Prague riots, which destroyed the celebration of the imperial jubilee, was so vivid that after several months of negotiations, the government approved them in full.Footnote 80 The expense of this increase was considerable, and the very next month the Minister wrote a strictly confidential letter to the Governor, appealing for his understanding of the situation. He stated that in view of the obstructions in parliament, the government could not expect to pass the bills required to secure the increased revenue for 1910, and therefore only a quarter of the planned increase in the guard would be funded, with the remaining posts postponed pending further developments.Footnote 81

The Governor, however, was not prepared to lose his new posts. Taking advantage of the fact that the letter was addressed to him alone, he apparently withheld this information from the Police Director and had him continue with preparations to accept half of the planned increase from February 1, 1910. When the ministerial decree came on January 28, 1910, confirming the lack of funds and reducing the budget allocation, it was too late.Footnote 82 The Police Director tersely stated that he had already issued the orders for admissions, equipment, and supplies, and had secured new quarters. The Governor’s Office had effectively presented the Ministry with a fait accompli, and, despite considerable resentment, Vienna had no choice but to accept the state of affairs.Footnote 83 The matter was resolved in May 1910, when the government procured a loan for the necessary funds, and by October 1, 1910 the Prague Guard numbered 1,450 members,Footnote 84 an increase of 130 percent over fifteen years. This final expansion allowed a reform of the guard’s organizational model and concept of service. This concerned not only the direct active-duty departments but the newly established reserve detachment in particular. With its creation, new officers received continuous professional training before entering the service for the first time. The Prague police force was now strong enough to deal effectively with mass unrest. Moreover, its material provision was enhanced,Footnote 85 its training was improved, and its discipline was gradually strengthened.Footnote 86 In addition to the rank and file, the number of commanding officers in the guard was also increased—a category of precinct inspector was created (classified as ranks ten and eleven of the state civil service), the number of district inspectors increased to six (class nine) and the commander of the guard, the chief inspector, was promoted to rank class seven with the title of central inspector, with one deputy in class eight reporting to him.

Conclusion

The establishment of the state police guard in the capital of Bohemia primarily aimed to shift policing from municipal administration to the exclusive authority of the central government. From the state’s perspective, the municipal council’s unreliability in directing the police was most evident during nationally or politically motivated unrest, when the Czech-dominated municipality responded only belatedly and without determination. The state-controlled security force created in 1868 was subordinated directly to the Police Directorate; yet its limited strength made military support inevitable when there were major disturbances. Although Prague and its suburbs became one of the most dynamically developing industrial centers in the western Habsburg empire during the latter half of the nineteenth century, with rapid population growth, the number of officers in the guard rose only marginally. The government’s reluctance to expand the Prague Guard’s budget was closely tied to the unresolved question of the municipality’s contribution to financing the city’s policing.

Despite repeated appeals for reinforcements and material improvements, significant reforms in the organization, equipment, and provisioning of the guard were not undertaken until the 1890s. Confronted with the police’s inability to control large-scale protest events, the new Police Director introduced measures modeled on the Vienna Guard. His insistence on increasing the size of the corps reflected a view of protest as a legitimate form of public expression—one that required close surveillance and the capacity for swift, decisive action once legal limits were crossed. The unrest of 1892, and especially the riots of December 1897 and the following months, revealed the guard’s deficiencies in numbers, equipment, and training to manage mass demonstrations and to safeguard the health and property of uninvolved Prague residents. These shortcomings repeatedly compelled military intervention, an outcome the civil administration sought to avoid. Reliance on the army escalated tensions and undermined civil authority, for the Governor’s call for troops openly admitted his inability to manage the crisis.

From this perspective, the Prague Guard needed to be sufficiently numerous, well equipped, armed, and trained not only to carry out routine duties but also to confront protest crowds with confidence. Each effective suppression of unrest and lawful arrest of offenders enhanced the authority of both the guard and the state. At the same time, such demonstrations of strength served as a deterrent to future challenges to public order in a civic space increasingly claimed by political, nationalist, and religious groups.

Therefore, the transformation of the Prague State Police between 1893 and 1910 was not merely a pragmatic response to riot control; it embodied a fundamental reconceptualization of urban order. This new model accepted protest as an unavoidable feature of political life, to be contained by a civilian force rather than crushed by the army. The Prague Guard was repeatedly enlarged and re-equipped in the wake of its failures, but these reinforcements simultaneously strengthened the authority of the civil administration and allowed the military to remain in the barracks. By 1910, the creation of reserve detachments and the professional training of recruits marked a decisive shift in the police’s capacity to act autonomously during mass disturbances. The claim that such reforms prevented the recurrence of riots must, however, be advanced with caution, for only a few years remained before the outbreak of the First World War. The events of the end of June 1912 suggest that the reformed force was indeed able to prevent escalation,Footnote 87 yet the long-term impact of these measures cannot be fully assessed. The reforms of the Prague police thus complicate the image of the late Habsburg state as merely weak or reactive. They illustrate the monarchy’s capacity to innovate in the governance of mass politics, even as national conflicts constrained its authority. In comparative perspective, Prague’s trajectory shows how provincial capitals, no less than imperial centers, were critical sites where the balance between civil authority and military power was tested. After all, the Prague case demonstrates that the expansion of policing was not antithetical to constitutionalism; rather, it was integral to the Habsburg state’s attempt to reconcile the politics of mass protest with the preservation of public order and the legitimacy of civilian authority.

Acknowledgements

This study was supported by project no. 25-17777S of the Czech Science Foundation, “Protest Culture in the Bohemian Lands Between 1890 and 1938.” The author would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers as well as his colleagues from the project team Pavel Horák, Dagmar Hájková, Rudolf Kučera, and David Smrček (all Masaryk Institute and Archives, Czech Academy of Sciences) for their comments and critiques that enhanced the depth and clarity of earlier versions of this article.

Competing interests

The author declares none.

Funding statement

This study was supported by project no. 25-17777S of the Czech Science Foundation, “Protest Culture in the Bohemian Lands Between 1890 and 1938.

Martin Klečacký is a research fellow at the Masaryk Institute and Archives of the Czech Academy of Sciences in Prague. He specializes in the modern political and social history of the Bohemian lands, with a focus on public administration, elite networks, and the social history of civil servants in the late Habsburg empire and interwar Czechoslovakia.

References

1 Cf. Jörg Ganzenmüller and Tatjana Tönsmeyer eds., Vom Vorrücken des Staates in die Fläche. Ein europäisches Phänomen des langen 19. Jahrhunderts (Cologne, Weimar, Vienna: Böhlau Verlag), 7–9.

2 Cf. Clive Emsley and Barbara Weinberger, eds., Policing Western Europe: Politics, Professionalism, and Public Order, 1850–1940 (New York: Greenwood, 1991); for the case of England, cf. David Philips and Robert D. Storch, Policing Provincial England, 1829–1856: The Politics of Reform (London, New York: Leicester University Press, 1999); Clive Emsley, The English Police: A Political and Social History (Harlow: Longman, 1996).

3 Cf. Clive Emsley, Gendarmes and the State in the Nineteenth-Century Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Helmut Gebhardt, Die Gendarmerie in der Steiermark von 1850 bis Heute (Graz: Leykam, 1997).

4 For the typology of police forces, cf. Clive Emsley, “A Typology of Nineteenth-century Police,” Crime, Histoire & Sociétés/Crime, History & Societies (1999): 29–44, in which he distinguishes three types of modern police forces: state civilian police, state military police (primarily gendarmerie), and civilian municipal police.

5 A detailed analysis is only available for some of the riots that took place in Prague in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Cf. especially David Smrček, Grabenbummel. Nacionální souboj o Prahu na přelomu 19. a 20. století [Grabenbummel: The National Struggle for Prague at the Turn of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries] (Prague: Academia, 2022); moreover, there is an extensive monograph on the December riots in 1897 after Badeni’s fall, but mostly oriented toward the inner Austrian lands: Berthold Sutter, Die Badenischen Sprachverordnungen von 1897. Ihre Genesis und ihre Auswirkungen vornehmlich auf die innerösterreichischen Alpenländer, 2 vols. (Graz, Cologne: Böhlau, 1960–65); John W. Boyer, “Badeni and the Revolution of 1897,” in Bananen, Cola, Zeitgeschichte: Oliver Rathkolb und das lange 20. Jahrhundert, Band 1, ed. Lucile Dreidemy (Vienna, Cologne: Böhlau, 2015), 69–84; Markus Krzoska, “Die Peripherie bedrängt das Zentrum. Wien, Prag und Deutschböhmen in den Badeni-Unruhen 1897,” in Grenzregionen der Habsburgermonarchie im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert: Ihre Bedeutung und Funktion aus der Perspektive Wiens, ed. Hans-Christian Maner (Münster: Lit, 2005), 145–65. The riots in Prague were outlined by Nancy M. Wingfield, Flag Wars and Stone Saints: How the Bohemian Lands Became Czech (Cambridge, MA, London: Harvard University Press, 2007), 48–78; Michal Frankl, “Emancipace od židů.” Český antisemitismus na konci 19. století [“Emancipation from the Jews.” Czech Anti-Semitism at the End of the Nineteenth Century] (Litomyšl: Paseka, 2007), 251–62. For the riots of the early 1890s, cf. the popularly conceived monograph by Jiří Pernes, Spiklenci proti Jeho Veličenstvu. Historie tzv. spiknutí Omladiny v Čechách [Conspirators Against His Majesty: History of the So-Called Conspiracy of the Omladina in Bohemia] (Brno: Barrister & Principal, 2002).

6 Hugh LeCaine Agnew, “Demonstrating the Nation: Symbol, Ritual, and Political Protest in Bohemia, 1867–1875,” in The Street as Stage: Protest Marches and Public Rallies Since the Nineteenth Century, ed. Matthias Reiss (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 85–88.

7 Cf. Emsley, Gendarmes and the State; Anja Johansen, Soldiers as Police: The French and Prussian Armies and the Policing of Popular Protest, 1889–1914 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005); Anja Johansen, “Policing and Repression: Military Involvement in the Policing of French and German Industrial Areas, 1889–1914,” European History Quarterly (2004): 69–98.

8 Cf. Engelbert Steinwender, Von der Stadtguardia zur Sicherheitswache. Wiener Polizeiwachen und ihre Zeit. Band 1: Von der Frühzeit bis 1932 (Graz: Weishaupt, 1992); Hermann Oberhummer, Die Wiener Polizei. 200 Jahre Sicherheit in Österreich. Neue Beiträge zur Geschichte des Sicherheitswesens in den Ländern der ehemaligen österreichisch-ungarischen Monarchie, 2 Bände (Vienna: Gerold 1937).

9 On the status of the Police Directorate in Graz, which lacked its own executive force and was therefore dependent on the municipal guard for the enforcement of law and order, see Helmut Gebhardt, “Die Polizei- und Sicherheitsorganisation in Graz von 1867 bis 1919,” Historisches Jahrbuch der Stadt Graz (1998): 145–64.

10 In recent years, a number of scholarly and popular texts have been published on the history of the security forces in the Bohemian lands, but these mostly concern the period after 1918. Cf. Pavel Macek and Lubomír Uhlíř, Dějiny policie a četnictva. I: Habsburská monarchie (1526–1918) [History of Police and Gendarmerie. I: Habsburg Monarchy (1526–1918)] (Prague: Themis, 1997), which, however, contains only general information, while the text lacks referencing. Other literature on the Prague police deals with a different period from the one analyzed in this study: Pavel Macek, Z dějin pražské policie (vybrané kapitoly) [From the History of the Prague Police (selected chapters)] (Prague: Police History, 2009); František Roubík, “Počátky policejního ředitelství v Praze” [Beginnings of the Police Directorate in Prague], in Sborník archivu ministerstva vnitra republiky Československé, vol. 1, ed. Ladislav Klicman (Prague: Ministerstvo vnitra, 1926).

11 Pieter Judson, The Habsburg Empire: A New History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016); John Deak, Forging a Multinational State: State Making in Imperial Austria from the Enlightenment to the First World War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015).

12 In my article I adhere to the terminology of the time, in which “police” referred exclusively to that part of the state bureaucracy which carried out the administrative agenda concerning public and state security (“state police”) and which was represented by purely administrative authorities—police directorates or police commissariats. The executive part of the agenda (enforcing law and order by patrolling and intervening) was not provided by the police, but by a subordinate security guard force (Sicherheitswache) together with a plainclothes civil guard (Civilwache), which was also used by police officials for search tasks and auxiliary duties in criminal investigations. For the term “police” cf. Josef Ulbrich, “Polizei und Polizeistrafrecht,” in Österreichisches Staatswörterbuch: Handbuch des gesamten österreichischen öffentlichen Rechtes, Dritter Band (K–Q), ed. Ernst Mischler and Josef Ulbrich (Vienna: Alfred Hölder, 1907), 934–41.

13 Cf. Steinwender, Von der Stadtguardia, 127–29.

14 Ernst Mayrhofer, Handbuch für den politischen Verwaltungsdienst in den im Reichsrathe vertretenen Königreichen und Ländern, Band 1 (Vienna: Manz’sche k. k. Hofverlag, 1880), 401–2; Dobroslav Krejčí, “Správa mocnářství rakousko-uherského” [Administration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire], in Česká politika: Díl druhý, část druhá, ed. Z. V. Tobolka (Prague: Jan Laichter, 1907), 136–38.

15 Cf. Martin Moll, “Wohltätigkeitsfeste, Fahnenschmuck und Militärmusik: Konfliktfelder zwischen steirischen Deutschnationalismus und kaiserlichen Statthalter um 1900,” Zeitschrift des Historischen Vereines für Steiermark (2004): 255–82, here 267.

16 Cf. Michal Simandl, “Brněnská městská policie od svého založení v roce 1866 až po zestátnění v roce 1923” [Brno Municipal Police from Its Foundation in 1866 to Its Nationalization in 1923], Forum Brunense. Sborník prací Muzea města Brna (2017): 67–74, here 69.

17 Pavel Macek and Lubomír Uhlíř, Dějiny obecních policií [History of Municipal Police], vol. 1 (Prague: Police History, 2004), 28.

18 State Regional Archives in Pilsen [Státní oblastní archiv v Plzni], RA Coudenhove, Box 71, correspondence of K. Coudenhove 1908, letter from the District Captain in Cheb, December 21, 1908.

19 Zdeněk Tobolka, Politické dějiny československého národa od r. 1848 až do dnešní doby: Díl II (1860–1879) [Political History of the Czechoslovak Nation from 1848 to the Present Time: Part II (1860–1879)] (Prague: Československý kompas, 1936), 165–70.

20 Gustav Kolmer, Parlament und Verfassung in Österreich. Erster Band: 1848–1869 (Vienna, Leipzig: Carl Fromme, 1902), 350.

21 National Archives in Prague [Národní archiv, hereinafter NA], Prezidium místodržitelství [Bohemian Governor’s Office Presidium, hereinafter PM], Signature (sig.) 8/2/15/20, Box 832, No. 3206, decree of the Minister of Land Defense and Public Security to the Governor of Bohemia, October 11, 1868.

22 NA, PM, sig. 8/2/15/3, Box 1630, Übersichtliche Darstellung der der k. k. Polizeidirektion in Prag unterstehenden k. k. Polizeikommissariate und der ihnen zugewiesenen Stadtteile und Landgemeinden des Polizeirayons.

23 “Kundmachung des k. k. Statthalters vom 14. Februar 1851, Präs. Z. 1766: Bestimmung des Wirkungskreises der k. k. Stadthauptmannschaft innerhalb des Polizeirayons von Prag,” Landesgesetz- und Regierungsblatt für das Kronland Böhmen (1851): 49–58.

24 NA, PM, sig. 8/2/15/20, Box 832, No. 1350, report of the Governor of Bohemia to the Prime Minister and Acting Minister of Land Defense and Public Security (draft), April 21, 1869.

25 Cf. NA, České místodržitelství [Bohemian Governor’s Office, hereinafter ČM], sig. 31/4/51, Box 4613, No. 50551, report of the Prague Police Director to the Governor of Bohemia, March 25, 1898.

26 NA, PM, sig. 8/2/3/1, Box 1189, No. 4288, decree of the Minister of Interior to the Governor of Bohemia, June 6, 1872.

27 “Gesetz Nr. 4 vom 1. März 1874, betreffend die Beitragsleistung der in den Prager Polizeirayon einbezogenen Gemeinden außerhalb der Stadt Prag zu den Kosten der Civil-Sicherheitswache,” Landesgesetzblatt für das Königreich Böhmen (1874): 5–6.

28 The original contribution of 44,700 Gulden was set by decree of the Ministry of the Interior in 1870 and had not changed since then. Cf. NA, PM, sig. 8/2/15/3, Box 1630, No. 3033, decree of the Minister of Interior to the Governor of Bohemia, March 29, 1884.

29 NA, PM, sig. 8/2/15/3, Box 1630, No. 8354, decree of the Minister of Interior to the Governor of Bohemia, October 2, 1884.

30 Ebenda, No. 312, “Tabelle über das Dienstverhältnis der k. k. Sicherheitswache in Prag mit Ende Dezember 1884,” January 12, 1885.

31 Ebenda, No. 1948, report of the Prague Police Director to the Governor of Bohemia, February 27, 1884.

32 Ebenda, report of the Chief Inspector of Police Guard to the Prague Police Director, March 1, 1884.

33 “Gesetz Nr. 65 vom 9. Dezember 1884, betreffend die Einbeziehung der Ortschaften Klein-Holešowic und Neu-Lieben in den Prager Polizeirayon,” Landesgesetzblatt für das Königreich Böhmen (1885): 141.

34 NA, PM, sig. 8/2/15/3, Box 1630, No. 1948, report of the Chief Inspector of Police Guard to the Prague Police Director, March 1, 1884.

35 NA, ČM, sig. 31/4/51, Box 4613, No. 90104, report of the Prague Police Director to the Governor of Bohemia, August 8, 1891.

36 Ebenda, No. 35171, decree of the Minister of Interior to the Governor of Bohemia, March 29, 1891.

37 Ebenda, No. 113542, report of the Governor of Bohemia to the Minister of Interior, October 12, 1891.

38 Cf. “Městské zastupitelstvo na Královských Vinohradech,” Národní listy (morning edition), December 2, 1892, 3.

39 NA, PM, sig. 8/2/15/3, Box 1630, No. 1948, report of the Chief Inspector of Police Guard to the Prague Police Director, March 1, 1884.

40 Otto Urban, Die tschechische Gesellschaft: 1848 bis 1918, 1 (Vienna: Böhlau, 1994), 573–86; Alexander Jenks, Austria Under the Iron Ring, 1879–1893 (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1965), 239–90.

41 Pernes, Spiklenci, 153–75.

42 Alexandra Špiritová, “Omladináři,” Paginae historiae (1999): 86.

43 Pavel Bělina, Dějiny Prahy, II: Od sloučení pražských měst v roce 1784 do současnosti [History of Prague, II: From the Merging of Prague Towns in 1784 to the Present] (Prague: Paseka, 1998), 160; Jan Galandauer, Franz Fürst Thun: Statthalter des Königreiches Böhmen (Vienna: Böhlau, 2014), 86–87.

44 NA, ČM, sig. 31/4/51, Box 4613, No. 9180, report of the Prague Police Director to the Governor of Bohemia, July 6, 1893. G. Dörfl represented a new type of police chief who, unlike his predecessors, did not emerge directly from police service. Prior to his appointment in 1892, he served in the presidium of the Bohemian Governor’s Office. His transfer to head the police directorate indicates that the governor evidently wanted to place at the helm of this key office an individual whose abilities he knew intimately and in whom he had complete confidence. Dörfl was an exceptional organizer who possessed comprehensive understanding of state administrative operations. His tenure as director was apparently perceived by his superiors as successful, as he was promoted in 1898 to the position of the governor’s first deputy in Bohemia. Although he was a fully bilingual official, his open identification with Prague’s German-speaking minority made him a frequent target of Czech nationalist press and Czech political parties.

45 Steinwender, Von der Stadtguardia, 146–47.

46 NA, PM, sig. 8/2/15/1, Box 2381, No. 10547, decree of the Minister of Interior to the Governor of Bohemia, September 18, 1894; NA, Policejní presidium [Prague Police Directorate Presidium, hereinafter PP], sig. P-77/13, Box 1861, No. 8999, “Darstellung der Gliederung der hiesigen Sicherheitswache,” June 5, 1902.

47 Steinwender, Von der Stadtguardia, 159.

48 Ebenda, No. 7674, report of the Prague Police Director to the Governor of Bohemia, July 11, 1893.

49 NA, PM, sig. 8/2/15/1, Box 2381, No. 724, report of the Prague Police Director to the Governor of Bohemia, January 10, 1894.

50 Organisationsstatut, Ausführungsvorschriften zu demselben und Dienstesinstruktion für die k. k. Sicherheitswache in Prag (Prague: Statthalterei-Buchdruckerei, 1894), 2.

51 NA, PP, sig. P-79/29, Box 1861, No. 10861, “Petition der Inspektoren und Sicherheitswachen der k. k. Prager Sichercheitswache,” September 1, 1893. According to the guardsmen’s petition, an increasing number of junior officers lived in unmarried partnerships and fathered illegitimate children. Senior officers, meanwhile, struggled to afford apartments large enough for their families and frequently took janitorial posts in residential buildings, which left them dependent on landlords.

52 Ebenda, No. 1919, report of the Chief Inspector of Police Guard to the Prague Police Director, September 4, 1893.

53 NA, ČM, sig. 31/4/51, Box 4613, No. 6304, report of the Prague Police Director to the Governor of Bohemia, January 8, 1898.

54 NA, PP, sig. P-79/29, Box 1861, No. 17899, report of the Chief Inspector of Police Guard to the Prague Police Director, July 2, 1895.

55 NA, ČM, sig. 31/4/51, Box 4613, No. 6304, report of the Prague Police Director to the Governor of Bohemia, January 8, 1898; cf. also Organisationsstatut, 58–66.

56 Judson, The Habsburg Empire, 312–16.

57 The goal of the ordinances was to implement a completely bilingual German-Czech state administration in Bohemia, a long-time demand of the Czech political parties.

58 Cf. David Smrček, “Politika ulice, nebo politici v ulicích? Fenomén vůdců davu během pražských nepokojů roku 1897” [Street Politics or Politicians in the Streets? The Phenomenon of Mob Leaders During the Prague Riots of 1897], Moderní dějiny (2020): 103–21, here 105–6.

59 Galandauer, Franz Fürst Thun, 148–50; Martin Klečacký, Český ministr ve Vídni. Ve službách císaře, národa a politické strany [Czech Minister in Vienna: In the Service of the Emperor, the Nation, and the Political Party] (Prague: Academia, 2017), 103.

60 This relation of mistrust and suspicion culminated during the war years 1914–18, cf. John Deak and Jonathan E. Gumz, “How to Break a State: The Habsburg Monarchy’s Internal War, 1914–1918,” The American Historical Review (2017): 1105–36, here 1111–13.

61 Claire Morelon, “State Authorities, Municipal Forces and Military Intervention in the Policing of Strikes in Austria-Hungary, 1890–1914,” in Corporate Policing, Yellow Unionism, and Strikebreaking, 1890–1930: In Defence of Freedom, ed. Matteo Millan and Alessandro Saluppo (London, New York: Routledge, 2021), 87.

62 Morelon, “State Authorities,” 88–89; Anja Johansen, “State Bureaucrats and Local Influence on the Use of Military Troops for Maintenance of Public Order in France and Prussia, 1889–1914,” Crime, Histoire & Sociétés/Crime, History & Societies (2001): 55–56.

63 Cf. Dienstreglement für das kaiserliche und königliche Heer (Vienna: K. k. Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1909), 230–38.

64 For the use of military in policing the social and political protest in France and Germany cf. Johansen, Soldiers as Police; Anja Johansen, “Violent Repression or Modern Strategies of Crowd Management? Soldiers as Riot Police in France and Germany, 1890–1914,” French History (2001): 400–20.

65 NA, ČM, sig. 31/4/51, Box 4613, No. 6304, report of the Prague Police Director to the Governor of Bohemia, January 8, 1898.

66 Ebenda, No. 50551, report of the Prague Police Director to the Governor of Bohemia, March 25, 1898.

67 Ebenda, No. 6304, report of the Governor of Bohemia to the Minister of Interior, April 2, 1898; No. 66684, report of the Governor of Bohemia to the Minister of Interior, April 30, 1898.

68 Ebenda, No. 103637, decree of the Minister of Interior to the Governor of Bohemia, June 22, 1898.

69 Ebenda, No. 183485, report of the Prague Police Director to the Governor of Bohemia, October 29, 1899.

70 “Gesetz Nr. 255 vom 26. Dezember 1899, betreffend die Regelung der Bezüge der in die Kategorie der Dienerschaft gehörigen activen Staatsdiener,” Reichsgesetzblatt für die im Reichsrate vertretenen Königreiche und Länder (1899): 1145–47.

71 NA, ČM, sig. 31/35/28, Box 8009, No. 96590, report of the Governor of Bohemia to the Minister of Interior, April 30, 1908.

72 Ebenda, No. 153900, decree of the Minister of Interior to the Governor of Bohemia, July 2, 1908.

73 Zdeněk Tobolka, Politické dějiny československého národa od r. 1848 až do dnešní doby: Díl III/2 (1891–1914) [Political History of the Czechoslovak Nation from 1848 to the Present Time: Part III/2 (1891–1914)] (Prague: Československý kompas, 1936), 507–9.

74 Smrček, Grabenbummel, 163–202.

75 NA, ČM, sig. 31/35/28, Box 8009, No. 97458, report of the Prague Police Director to the Governor of Bohemia, April 15, 1909.

76 Nancy M. Wingfield, “The Francis Joseph Jubilee of 1908. Commemorating the Emperor in the Bohemian Lands,” in Historik nad šachovnicí dějin. K pětasedmdesátinám Jana Galandauera, ed. Luboš Velek and Dagmar Hájková (Prague: Masarykův ústav a Archiv AV ČR, 2011): 167–95, here 188–94.

77 Cf. T. Mills Kelly, “Taking It to the Streets: Czech National Socialists in 1908,” Austrian History Yearbook (1998): 93–112.

78 NA, PM, sig. 8/2/15, Box 3686, No. 25348, report of the Governor of Bohemia to the Minister of Interior, October 26, 1908.

79 NA, ČM, sig. 31/35/28, Box 8009, No. 97458, report of the Prague Police Director to the Governor of Bohemia, April 15, 1909. In contrast to Georg Dörfl, Karel Křikava embodied the type of career police official who, apart from a few years at the Ministry of the Interior in Vienna, served exclusively at the Prague Police Directorate. He advanced step by step through the lower ranks until his appointment as Police Director in 1902, a position he held until his retirement in 1915. Even Czech political parties regarded Křikava as a “Czech” official, noting his long-standing connections above all with the Young Czech Party.

80 Ebenda, No. 232311, decree of the Minister of Interior to the Governor of Bohemia, October 2, 1909.

81 NA, PM, sig. 8/2/15, Box 3686, No. 10100, letter of the Minister of Interior to the Governor of Bohemia, November 23, 1909.

82 NA, ČM, sig. 31/35/28, Box 8009, No. 29549, report of the Governor of Bohemia to the Minister of Interior, February 6, 1910.

83 Ebenda, No. 67679, decree of the Minister of Interior to the Governor of Bohemia, March 8, 1910.

84 Ebenda, No. 127936, decree of the Minister of Interior to the Governor of Bohemia, May 14, 1910.

85 “Gesetz Nr. 34 vom 19. Februar 1907, womit einige Bestimmungen der Gesetze vom 15. April 1873, R. G. Bl. Nr. 47, vom 19. September 1898, R. G. Bl. Nr. 172, und vom 26. Dezember 1899, R. G. Bl. Nr. 255, sowie des Gesetzes vom 14. Mai 1896, R. G. Bl. Nr. 74, über die Regelung der Bezüge und Dienstesverhältnisse von Staatsangestellten abgeändert werden,” Reichsgesetzblatt für die im Reichsrate vertretenen Königreiche und Länder (1907): 277. Article IV, paragraph 4, of the aforementioned act fulfilled a long-held aspiration of the police guard and put its income and pension provision on a par with that of the gendarmerie.

86 Cf. NA, PP, sig. P-86/3, Box 2328, No. 24751, decree of the Governor of Bohemia to the Prague Police Director, December 9, 1908. The directive issued by the Police Directorate in the early 1900s instructed superiors to prevent members of the Prague guard from joining political associations that might compromise their loyalty. In practice, this warning was aimed above all at organizations linked to the Czech National Socialists, who on several occasions attempted to draw regular constables into their orbit, encouraging them to sympathize with or even participate in their agitation.

87 Smrček, Grabenbummel, 232–33.

Figure 0

Figure 1. Cavalry Attacking Protesters after Declaration of Martial Law in Prague on December 2, 1897. Das interessante Blatt 16, no. 49 (9 December 1897), s. 1.

Figure 1

Figure 2. Police Cordon Closing Off Na Příkopě Street on Sunday, November 1, 1908. The Line of Foot Guards Is Reinforced by Two Mounted Police Officers in the Foreground. Archiv hlavního města Prahy/Prague City Archives, Photograph collection, I 12966.

Figure 2

Figure 3. Foot Guards Led by an Inspector Closing Off Access to Na Příkopě Street from Havířská Street on Sunday, November 1, 1908. Archiv hlavního města Prahy/Prague City Archives, Photograph collection, I 12977.