3.1.1 Enlistment and Terms of Service

While much is known about Philip’s earliest military organization, his first muster of soldiers, immediately upon his accession to the throne in 359, seemingly consisted solely of conscript forces levied from the Macedonian kingdom’s heartland.Footnote ⁹ This first levy is described by Diodorus, who refers to the troops simply as ‘the Macedonians’.Footnote ¹⁰ The latter term is known to have been used as an ethnic, civic, and military denominator, and could therefore denote the inhabitants of Macedonia in general, Macedonian citizens proper, or simply the Macedonian army.Footnote ¹¹ Diodorus’ use of the term therefore need not imply the soldiers’ provenance, yet in this instance, it seems prudent to assume it does refer to soldiers originating from the area then under Philip’s control, not least because there is no indication that Philip possessed the funds to acquire hired soldiers from elsewhere.Footnote ¹² The political climate, furthermore, was one in which Philip was yet to secure his rule in the face of potential rivals, making reliance on soldiers (or supporters) from areas under direct control more probable.

The passage contains no information as to how this levy was accomplished, and there is some debate as to whether a mechanism for mobilization was already in place. A fragment of Anaximenes of Lampsakos (c. 380–320), refers to a mobilization and assembly of soldiers under ‘Alexander’.Footnote ¹³ The crux of the matter naturally lies in the identification of the Alexander mentioned. Some argue it refers to Alexander III, thereby dating such a mobilization in the reign of Philip II at the earliest.Footnote ¹⁴ Others prefer Alexander I (r. 498–454),Footnote ¹⁵ or even Alexander II (r. 371–369).Footnote ¹⁶ However, for our purposes, the onus of proof for the existence of a mechanism of mobilization in 359 need not fall on this fragment. The king’s ability to muster an adequate force when required is indicated by events preceding Philip’s accession, when his predecessor lost his life alongside 4,000 troops – a number of casualties implying a far larger Macedonian army than any attested before.Footnote ¹⁷ It seems clear, therefore, that at least by the time of Philip’s accession, the Macedonian king had the capacity to muster soldiers from his territories.

This mobilization of Macedonians, and later that of subject peoples, was enacted through conscription on a territorial basis: by polis in Lower Macedonia, and later by ethnos in Upper Macedonia.Footnote ¹⁸ The territorial nature of the levy is reflected in the nomenclature of the various squadrons of the cavalry as known from Alexander’s campaign, with five of the eight squadrons’ names referring to Macedonian territory, including newly acquired areas.Footnote ¹⁹ A reference in Arrian to the Macedonians’ ‘bodily duties’ – a phrase referring to military service in the Classical period which continued to be used as such in the Hellenistic period –Footnote ²⁰ is also indicative of the forced nature of service of these troops.

The organization, recruitment, and terms of service of the heavy cavalry, known as the ‘Companions’ or hetairoi (ἑταῖροι), pre-date Philip, and he appears to have left these mostly untouched.Footnote ²¹ The core of the Companion cavalry initially comprised the Macedonian aristocracy, who were mobilized on a territorial or ethnic basis.Footnote ²² Service may have been expected of its members as a civic duty and based on their ability to afford the provision and upkeep of a horse. In this sense, it was akin to the military service of the citizen hoplites of the Greek poleis, enforced through civic institutions and social expectations. Alongside the Companions, a light-armed cavalry division is first attested in Alexander’s Illyrian campaign immediately after Philip’s death, and hence is assumed to have been of Philip’s design.Footnote ²³ It is important to note that both types of cavalry division fought in the so-called wedge formation, which needed extensive training of both horse and rider;Footnote ²⁴ presumably therefore the soldiers were in full-time military service, either on campaign or in training.Footnote ²⁵

However, while the initial levy of 500 cavalry members reported by Diodorus has often been taken as the full number of available horsemen at the time who could afford this rank,Footnote ²⁶ the sharp increase in members of the cavalry, up to at least 1,800 in 334, is in need of explanation.Footnote ²⁷ Hammond and Griffith have argued that the financial requirements may have been lower than traditionally assumed, enabling Philip to recruit from a larger pool of manpower than the landed gentry.Footnote ²⁸ Lowering the assumed requirements of service for recruitment into the Companion cavalry need not be the explanation for the rise in its membership; instead, not capital, but rather skill came to form the basis of selection,Footnote ²⁹ with generous grants given to any individuals in need of financial support to qualify.Footnote ³⁰ While the military service of the Macedonians in the Companion cavalry may therefore have been enforced through social custom and civic duty, a portion of its membership was nonetheless voluntary.

The infantry shows a similar division between regular and elite soldiers, which has implications for the terms of their recruitment and service. Scholarship agrees that the ordinary members of the infantry were levied through conscription when required, and not active year-round.Footnote ³¹ Their conscript status, however, is also where they differed from the infantry’s elite division, known as the pezhetairoi (πεζέταιροι) or ‘Foot Companions’,Footnote ³² who constituted the infantry counterpart to the Companion cavalry. The contemporary historian Theopompus of Chios describes their recruitment as follows:

Thus, the Foot Companions are described as an elite unit enjoying close access to the king, and comprising men chosen for their physique and, presumably, abilities.Footnote ³³ Their different status from the members of the regular infantry is evident from their behaviour during the uprising against Alexander at Opis in 324, when they were the only regiment that did not take part.Footnote ³⁴ Because of their select membership, the Foot Companions are referred to as the infantry’s ‘professional’ division, whose members ‘served for several years and were in constant service’.Footnote ³⁵ Both the infantry and cavalry therefore featured elite divisions in constant military service, at least partially fulfilled on a voluntary basis, and with numbers supplemented with ordinary troops, called up through conscription when required.

As seen above in reference to the troop listing of 334, with time, the conquest and subsequent incorporation of surrounding territories granted the Macedonian state a larger pool of manpower from which to recruit; consequently, troops from the subject areas are continually attested in the army of Alexander, examples of which are listed in Table 3.2.

Much remains unclear about the enlistment and nature of service for these subject troops, and they are viewed either as troops provided under the terms of an alliance, or as forces directly conscripted by Philip and Alexander.Footnote ³⁶ The latter interpretation seems the most likely: it accounts for the rapid and extensive civic incorporation of subjugated areas into the Macedonian kingdom,Footnote ³⁷ and explains why these troops were treated differently from other allied forces by Alexander in 330.Footnote ³⁸

Philip’s diplomatic skills and effective military interventions led to a series of alliances that stipulated the provision of troops on his demand. Such troops were provided by, for instance, cities in Epirus, with which an alliance had been concluded in 357, and from Thrace.Footnote ³⁹ The Greeks supplied further essential allied contingents: first those from Thessaly after 352, and, following the establishment of the Common Peace in 338, from the Greek mainland.

Access to the Thessalian troops came about through Philip’s intervention in a dispute among the members of the Thessalian League, after which he was appointed as the League’s archon for life in 352.Footnote ⁴⁰ Through this appointment, Thessaly in essence became a Macedonian vassal state as well as a virtual recruiting ground, since the archon ‘exercised responsibility over conscription and federal finances’.Footnote ⁴¹ A large contingent of Thessalian cavalry is attested at the outset of the Asiatic campaign in 334, and these troops continued to fulfil a vital function throughout the expedition.Footnote ⁴²

No details about the actual mechanisms of the recruitment of troops from the Thessalian League have survived. Yet we can assume parallels with the supply of troops by members of the League of Corinth, for which more detail is available. Members of this alliance, established after the battle of Chaeronea in 338, abided by the Common Peace. It was the result of Philip’s interventions in the Third and Fourth Sacred Wars that had engulfed much of mainland Greece from 356;Footnote ⁴³ it formed the alliance that offered Philip, and later Alexander, control over the participating poleis through the position of hegemon. An inscription preserves the details of the alliance, and these offer some insight into the military responsibilities.Footnote ⁴⁴ The oath sworn by the individual members stipulates that they were not to act against the kingdom of Philip and his descendants,Footnote ⁴⁵ and that they were to supply to troops when called upon by the hegemon: ‘I shall go in support as called on by those who are wronged […] as decided by the common council and called on by the hegemon.’Footnote ⁴⁶ In theory any one polis could call for aid upon the perception of a breach yet the request had to be approved by the hegemon; in practice, therefore, the agreement was a unilateral alliance, dressed in Greek diplomatic language,Footnote ⁴⁷ by which Philip could call on troops when required.Footnote ⁴⁸ The allied Greeks, then, first appear in the Macedonian army in 334, when they are said to have supplied 6,000 foot and 600 horse.Footnote ⁴⁹ They continued on the Asiatic campaign until they were dismissed, along with the Thessalian cavalry, with the option of re-enlistment as voluntary forces in 330.Footnote ⁵⁰

Although these allied troops were not directly conscripted by Philip, their military service was enforced by their home poleis, who conscripted as demanded by the Macedonian king under the terms of the alliance. Their service appears to have lasted as long as required, which, in the case of the Asiatic campaign, came to four years. Alexander’s early dismissal of these troops and the relatively low number of these forces present at the outset of the Asiatic expedition in 334 indicate that the labour relations under which they served differed from those of troops conscripted from Macedonian territory.

Besides those whose military service was enforced, both Philip and Alexander made ample use of troops who enlisted of their own accord. These appear in the sources in two guises: first, there is the group the sources refer to as misthophoroi, often listed as a separate contingent; the second group consists of non-Macedonians among the ranks of the elite troops of the cavalry and infantry, who are rarely singled out as voluntary forces in the sources.

According to Diodorus, Philip began to recruit volunteer troops after 356, when access to mines rich in precious metals near Crenides – later refounded as Phillipoi – provided him with the required funds.Footnote ⁵¹ Indeed, it is in this year that Macedonian silver and gold coins began to be minted.Footnote ⁵² As detailed in Table 3.3, explicit attestation of misthophoroi noticeably also date to campaigns after 356.Footnote ⁵³

In terms of such brief references’ reliability, one should recognize that Demosthenes especially had a vested interest in an adverse representation of the Macedonian army, which he could achieve by making use of the mercenary trope.Footnote ⁵⁴ Nonetheless, in contexts where the misthophoroi are listed alongside other contingents, such as in Euboea and Megara or at Chaeronea, some credence must be given to their presence. Their numbers are impossible to gauge, but they clearly formed an important part of Philip’s army.

The presence of misthophoroi under Alexander follows a similar pattern: they are attested from 334 onwards, when, at the outset of the campaign, Diodorus lists a contingent of 5,000 troops.Footnote ⁵⁵ Such misthophoroi continued to enlist in the early years of the Asiatic campaign, either as troops who were already in Asia, or new arrivals from Greece. The total number of misthophoroi in Alexander’s army has thus been estimated at 15,000 men, although some scholars put their number as high as 45,000 men,Footnote ⁵⁶ numbers that do not seem surprising considering the active recruitment of these troops, instances of which are listed in Table 3.4.

While Alexander was harsh in his treatment of the misthophoroi who had enlisted in the Persian army after the establishment of the Common Peace in 338,Footnote ⁵⁷ there is no indication that they had any unusual status once they joined Alexander’s army.

Further instances of voluntary service in the armies of both Philip and Alexander can be found among the elite forces. In his somewhat pejorative discussion of Philip’s Companion cavalry, Theopompus reveals the presence of non-Macedonian or subject forces in their ranks:

As shown by the list of examples in Table 3.5, Companions from these areas (and beyond) duly show up in the source material.Footnote ⁵⁸

In essence, therefore, such elite troops were no different from those referred to as misthophoroi: both groups enlisted of their own accord and received reimbursement in exchange. The voluntary soldiers in the elite troops, however, were of a higher rank, and appear to have been treated as Macedonian soldiers.

Precise numbers of voluntary soldiers in the Macedonian army under Alexander and Philip are, of course, impossible to obtain. Nonetheless, those categorized as misthophoroi ostensibly formed a large part of the army from c. 356 onwards, when Philip gained access to new funds through the mines at Crenides. Similarly, under Alexander, misthophoroi were readily employed and formed a crucial group of reinforcements once the Asiatic expedition was underway. In addition to these troops, however, voluntary forces were active among the elite divisions: these men, presumably recruited for their individual skill, have not always been considered in discussions of voluntary service, and yet they served on a voluntary basis in exchange for remuneration.

3.1.2 Alexander’s Reform: Transition to Free Military Labour

The forces that went eastwards with Alexander in 334 essentially comprised the troops assembled by Philip, including Greeks conscripted under the terms of the Common Peace. Evidently, the terms of enlistment and service remained the same. The requirements of Alexander’s campaign, however, were unique in their length and magnitude. As the years went by, the army’s labour relations inevitably began to change: firstly, through reforms enacted by Alexander, and, secondly, through increased opportunity for negotiation between king and troops. The high demands for manpower for the campaign also marked the beginning of the enlistment of what we might term ‘non-Greek’ or locally recruited troops, who would come to form the conscript division of the army.

The first crucial reform affecting the army’s labour relations occurred in Sittacene in 331. Here, Alexander reconfigured the divisions of the cavalry into groups of 1,000 men; these came to be known as chiliarchies.Footnote ⁵⁹ The appointment of the so-called chiliarchs was made on a competitive basis on account of their bravery,Footnote ⁶⁰ and henceforth troops were to be assigned commanders of their choice, rather than by origin.Footnote ⁶¹ Skill, rather than provenance or pedigree, would therefore form the basis of appointments to positions of command, and this is indicative of the Macedonian allowance for career progression.Footnote ⁶²

The next significant reform occurred a year later at Ecbatana,Footnote ⁶³ when the allied forces transitioned from coerced to free military labourers. The reform is described by all extant historiographical sources in varying detail:Footnote ⁶⁴ whereas Plutarch states merely that homesick soldiers could go home, a different picture emerges in the other sources. Diodorus, Arrian, and Curtius indicate that the reform consisted of the dismissal of the allied forces,Footnote ⁶⁵ allegedly because the mission for which they had been recruited – the defeat of Darius – had been accomplished. In brief, this reform therefore concerned the Greek troops supplied under the terms of the Common Peace.

Demobilization, however, was not the end of it. As reported in Arrian, Diodorus, and Curtius, Alexander allowed these troops to re-enlist if they wished,Footnote ⁶⁶ under the same terms as the other voluntary forces, and he incentivized them with a significant bonus.Footnote ⁶⁷ Arrian claims a large number did so,Footnote ⁶⁸ as confirmed across the sources by these troops’ appearance in later battles.Footnote ⁶⁹ Here, we therefore see the transition of troops that carried out enforced military labour to the status of troops engaged in free military labour, on which they embarked voluntarily.

The sources indicate the demobilization of the allied forces happened on account of Darius’ defeat. The conquest of the Achaemenid Empire, however, also meant that Alexander gained a significant new source of manpower from which to draw forces; it was indeed around this time that Alexander began to recruit forces from the subject population.Footnote ⁷⁰ These forces fall into two categories, namely those that were levied by Alexander through the satrapal structure, and those that were recruited as boys and trained in Macedonian ways to join the elite divisions.

As can be seen from the examples in Table 3.6, the first category of soldiers recruited from the former Achaemenid territories appear in large numbers in both the infantry and cavalry.

Such troops were accompanied by their satrap, which confirms the notion that they were levied and trained at the level of the satrapy.Footnote ⁷¹ These forces effectively constituted conscript soldiers in the same way as those of the subjugated territories in northern Greece and were assembled along the same lines as the Greek allies under the rules of the Common Peace: Alexander ordered recruits and conscription occurred locally.Footnote ⁷²

An additional force of local soldiers is found in the so-called Epigonoi.Footnote ⁷³ From Curtius and Diodorus we learn that the forced recruitment of 30,000 young men began in 326.Footnote ⁷⁴ Likely conscripted from the various satrapies of the empire,Footnote ⁷⁵ they joined Alexander in 324 in India, were included among the specialist infantry,Footnote ⁷⁶ and were enlisted in positions of command at Opis.Footnote ⁷⁷

Notably, local soldiers are also attested in the ranks of Alexander’s elite divisions.Footnote ⁷⁸ Arrian lists recruits from across the empire, and emphasizes their rigorous selection by physique and skill.Footnote ⁷⁹ An example of such a soldier is Oxyarthes, Darius’ brother, who was admitted to the rank of Companion,Footnote ⁸⁰ and later given the command of the division of the doryphoroi.Footnote ⁸¹ Iranians are also attested in newly established elite guards from 330 onwards.Footnote ⁸² Given the nature of their selection, it seems pertinent to assume that these Iranians enlisted voluntarily, in much the same way as the non-Macedonians in the Companion cavalry and other specialist divisions before 334.

These forces seem to have been treated no differently from the other troops by Alexander and appear equally in lower and elite divisions.Footnote ⁸³ While the soldiers levied through the satraps and the Epigonoi were at least initially conscripted, those joining the Companions probably did so on a voluntary basis, and thus served in line with the terms of service of other elite troops.

Thus, despite the addition of further conscript forces, the labour relations between employer and king nonetheless started to shift significantly from c. 330. From this point onwards, we can argue that the Macedonian conscript forces began to resemble free hired labourers. This shift in labour relations can certainly be seen in formerly conscript soldiers’ decision to re-enlist on a voluntary basis. This change in balance naturally also affected the attitude and behaviour of soldiers whose service was still officially conscript.Footnote ⁸⁴ In this regard, the distinctions between free and enforced service, as well as between amateur and professional troops, became increasingly blurred during the campaign of Alexander, paving the way for the armies made up of free military labourers under the Successors.

3.2.1 Provenance and Recruitment of Troops

Conscript forces were recruited mainly by Successors who had a relatively stable claim to the region they governed. Yet, despite the availability of such forces, these formed but a small part of the Successors’ armies, partly because they were limited in number, and partly because voluntary ‘professionals’ appear to have been the preferred type of soldier.

The conscript soldiers feature especially in the initial years of the Successor Wars. For instance, Perdikkas, in his capacity as regent, was in control of the King’s Army,Footnote ⁸⁹ as well as the Epigonoi, both of whom were at his disposal at Babylon during the fateful summer of 323. Perdikkas made use of these troops himself and sent them as reinforcements to his supporters: Lysimachus reportedly received 4,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry to suppress a revolt by the Thracian Seuthes;Footnote ⁹⁰ similarly, ‘an appropriate force’ was sent to Eumenes to prevent further expansion by Cassander and Antipater into Asia in 321.Footnote ⁹¹ However, whether these troops were sufficient is doubtful, for despite the provision of troops by Perdikkas, Eumenes of Cardia was nonetheless forced to recruit additional men from his own satrapy.Footnote ⁹²

The enlistment of local forces was a further way of collecting troops speedily and is attested for all Successors with the mandate to do so. Ptolemy, for example, who may have brought a force of Epigonoi to Egypt,Footnote ⁹³ made use of Egyptian recruits, who are attested first in 312 alongside Macedonians and misthophoroi.Footnote ⁹⁴ Perdikkas also supplemented the troops already under his command with recruits from the satrapies: during the revolt of the Greeks in Bactria, for instance, he is said to have sent a force of 3,000 foot and 800 horse from the King’s Army, to which he added 8,000 horse and 10,000 foot from the satrapies.Footnote ⁹⁵ A similar mechanism of recruitment to bolster numbers can be seen in Eumenes’ campaign against Antigonus in 317, since Diodorus describes the arrival of various satraps accompanied by their own troops.Footnote ⁹⁶

At the same time, where alliances were made with communities possessing a citizen militia, the provision of troops was often part of the agreement. The so-called ‘Hellenic League’, an alliance between Antigonus and Demetrius and the Greeks of 303 or 302, can serve as an example: here, it was explicitly required of members to provide troops as requested by the hegemon.Footnote ⁹⁷ Such troops, much like allied forces of earlier periods, were conscripted at the level of the polis, and should thus be seen as non-voluntary forces.

The ability to recruit conscript forces, however, did not mean that this formed a sufficient pool of manpower. The problems associated with conscription in Macedonia illustrate the point. At the start of the Lamian War, Antipater, who should have had access to conscript forces, is said to have been unable to muster enough troops from Macedonia;Footnote ⁹⁸ in 323, after a similar effort, Lysimachus found himself in charge of a mere 4,000 foot and 2,000 horse in Thrace.Footnote ⁹⁹ Antipater’s solution was to recruit Thessalians, who arrived in high numbers only to desert to the Athenians subsequently.Footnote ¹⁰⁰ Diodorus attributes the shortage in Macedonia to an actual decline in manpower on account of Alexander’s campaign.Footnote ¹⁰¹ This is confirmed by Bosworth, who has shown not only that the number of Macedonians at the death of Alexander has long been overestimated, but also that it remained static between 323 and 301,Footnote ¹⁰² meaning that no additional Macedonian forces were recruited.

However, the noted behaviour of the Thessalians who defected while under Antipater’s command may point towards yet another problem: namely, that Antipater was not the sole Successor recruiting forces from Macedonia. Craterus, although on Antipater’s side, when bringing over the veteran troops from Asia, landed at Amphipolis and enlisted a further 4,000 foot and 1,500 horse, and was meanwhile accompanied by an additional 1,000 Persian light-armed forces.Footnote ¹⁰³ Leonnatus, similarly, recruited extra men in Macedonia before going to Antipater’s aid in Thessaly.Footnote ¹⁰⁴ The collection of forces by several Successors, of course, raises the question of whose call the Macedonians responded to, and whether military service through conscription was still perceived as a duty.

The behaviour of the – formally conscripted – Macedonians in Asia, who had spread out across the former empire, indicates a definite change in the perception of the nature of conscript service. Much like free military labourers, the Macedonians changed their allegiance at will, and while initially their loyalty to the perceived legitimate Successors was at least cited as a motivator, the prospect of better conditions of service and pay appears to have had a part to play.

The Macedonians’ loyalty to the Argead lineage is well documented,Footnote ¹⁰⁵ and was a factor in the attempts by Successors at associating themselves with Alexander or his relatives and descendants.Footnote ¹⁰⁶ Whichever Successor had the best such claim could hope to command the loyalty of the Macedonian troops. The veteran troops known as the Silver Shields, for instance, pledged loyalty to Alexander’s mother, Olympias, and enlisted with Eumenes on her recommendation,Footnote ¹⁰⁷ refusing to desert to Antigonus on two occasions despite his promise of handsome rewards.Footnote ¹⁰⁸ Similarly, the Macedonians in the army of Philip III Arrhidaeus and his wife Adea-Eurydice dropped their weapons in battle against Olympias and Polyperchon, allegedly out of respect for Olympias and in memory of the benefits they had received from Alexander.Footnote ¹⁰⁹ When Polyperchon brought Alexander’s alleged son Herakles to Macedonia, Cassander opted to form an alliance rather than face battle, since he feared the Macedonians would desert to Herakles.Footnote ¹¹⁰

That said, loyalty to the Argead house did not blind the Macedonians to other considerations when choosing whom to support. Those Macedonians who sided with Alexander IV and Philip III Arrhidaeus, and therefore with the regent, Perdikkas, in 321, deserted to Ptolemy.Footnote ¹¹¹ Conveniently ignoring Perdikkas’ claim to their support through Alexander’s relatives, the soldiers allegedly deserted to Ptolemy on account of Perdikkas’ mismanagement of the campaign.Footnote ¹¹² The fact that Ptolemy had recently become master of Alexander’s corpse is sometimes seen as the grounds for the Macedonians’ defection,Footnote ¹¹³ but while it may have aided Ptolemy’s claims to legitimacy and prestige, it is unlikely to have trumped Ptolemy’s generous treatment of his soldiers.Footnote ¹¹⁴ The latter is likely the fundamental cause of the Macedonian enlistment with Ptolemy, with Alexander’s corpse providing a convenient pretext.

This episode constitutes the Macedonians’ first act of desertion. Inspired as it was by financial and social incentives, the pretext of loyalty to the Argead house should always be questioned. With the extinction of the Argead line in 308 upon the death of Alexander’s sister, Cleopatra, these concerns could be done away with altogether, and space for purely incentive-based employment under a king of their own choice opened up for the Macedonians too.

The limitations on the traditional forms of recruitment that the Successors were now faced with meant that the Successors became increasingly reliant on fully voluntary recruits. These troops are referred to as misthophoroi in the literary sources,Footnote ¹¹⁵ but are no longer categorized as distinct from other forces in the contemporary epigraphic record, where they are simply referred to as stratiōtai – ‘soldiers’.Footnote ¹¹⁶ This blurring of the distinction between ‘mercenary’ and common soldiers in itself is indicative of the changing status and normalization of the use of voluntary forces, and the Successors’ reliance on them is crucial to this development.

The prominent role voluntary forces would come to play throughout the Hellenistic period was signalled by Ptolemy’s immediate actions upon his arrival in Egypt, where he promptly set about gathering so-called misthophoroi.Footnote ¹¹⁷ The historiographical sources likewise confirm the availability of men willing to serve in this capacity. The voluntary troops dismissed by Alexander in 330, for instance, had gathered at Cape Taenarum in the Peloponnese; according to Diodorus, 8,000 men were assembled there in the summer of 323.Footnote ¹¹⁸ Similarly, Diodorus attributes the Athenian decision to embark on the Lamian War to the presence in the Athenian assembly of a large number of men who had become accustomed to making their livelihood through war.Footnote ¹¹⁹ Ptolemy likely mustered his first levy of misthophoroi at Taenarum, and others rapidly followed suit. Thibron, a defecting commander of the rebel satrap Harpalus, for instance, collected 7,000 troops at Taenarum in 322,Footnote ¹²⁰ as did Leosthenes, the mercenary commander-turned-general of the Athenians.Footnote ¹²¹

The recruitment of misthophoroi is a running theme throughout the narrative of the Successor Wars. Overall, it happened through a general call for troops, or through the absorption of troops of a competitor’s army after a defeat.Footnote ¹²² At the same time, desertion was actively encouraged by holding out the prospect of better conditions of service.Footnote ¹²³ Some soldiers may have enlisted individually, or as a group under their own commander. Eumenes’ collection of voluntary troops in 318, after his alignment with Olympias and Polyperchon which gave him access to the treasury in Cilicia, is illustrative of this practice. Diodorus describes the process as follows:

As indicated by Diodorus’ account, the collection of forces happened by sending out recruiters in possession of funds, who offered predetermined rates of pay. Other than collecting those already in search of employment and gathered at presumably set locations such as Taenarum, Eumenes was also able to recruit from those who reported directly to him of their own accord. How often this happened is impossible to say, but seemingly even the poleis in Laconia endorsed their citizens’ voluntary service in the Successor armies. For instance, when Antigonus was intent on collecting Peloponnesian soldiers, Diodorus states that Sparta permitted him to do so.Footnote ¹²⁴ This permission should, perhaps, be read as the blessing of the polis upon the soldiers’ career choice and was informed by the hope of their eventual return, which social exclusion on account of their service would have hindered. Although this may indicate a limitation of the Greek soldiers’ freedom of movement, it was a restriction imposed by the polis, rather than by the employer.

Recruitment through the polis hints at the normalization and acceptance of voluntary military labour in exchange for sufficient remuneration, and the passage relating Eumenes’ collection of troops reveals the wide geographical range over which this form of employment had become acceptable. This process of collection is what should be envisaged when the sources mention the collection of misthophoroi, which occurs at several points in Diodorus’ narrative, as indicated by the examples listed in Table 3.7.

As shown by the composition of the Successor armies as reported by Diodorus, these measures appear to have been effective. While Alexander’s army relied on voluntary labour from the outset and saw an increased level of such forces after the reforms of 330, the use of these troops became the norm under the Successors. After his collection of volunteer forces in 318, for instance, Eumenes’ total army numbered 17,500 troopsFootnote ¹²⁵ of whom 12,000, or 68.5 per cent, were voluntary recruits. Looking at the examples in which the composition of armies is given, listed in Table 3.8, misthophoroi made up a considerable part of the troops, in each case at least half. The only exception is Demetrius’ expedition against Cassander, during which he commanded a large division of Greek allies; however, even in this episode, the number of voluntary forces amounts to a sizeable 41 per cent.In addition to this large number of forces whose status is characterized as voluntary, it must be borne in mind that, in practice, the other troops must have behaved in the same, voluntary manner.

Importantly for our argument, the method of initial recruitment and the high mobility of employment ensure that the misthophoroi in the sources should be categorized as free military labourers. Furthermore, when looking at the employment history and behaviour of other categories of troops, it appears that free military labour no longer remained the preserve of the misthophoroi, but rather became the most prevalent form of military service. Distinctions between ‘mercenary’ forces and others, such as the formally conscripted Macedonians, the soldiers levied in Asia, or even those deemed ‘allies’, came to exist in name only in practice, all soldiers could enlist with whichever army they chose.

3.2.2 The Military Contract

While the historiographers provide insight into the armies’ composition and the points of origin of troops, information on the soldiers’ terms of service and the nature of their employment is more fully revealed by the epigraphic record. We have two documents that can be read as proto-contracts between soldiers and employers; they signal soldiers’ inclination to negotiation and detail guarantees of wages, and continued mobility of employment.Footnote ¹²⁶ Both documents attest to the increasingly contractual nature of military service.

The first document constitutes a stele found in 1965 at the Carian polis of Iasos, which lists a number of conditions regarding the terms of service of a group of voluntary soldiers as agreed with their employers.Footnote ¹²⁷ This notable inscription stipulates that a certain Polemaios is to hand over to the Iasians the citadel, and the city with the possessions located therein; this directive is followed by a series of agreements between the polis of Iasos and three commanders. The inscription concludes with an alliance between Ptolemy I and the polis of Iasos. The stele features a second inscription, which records the letter qualifying the details of this alliance.Footnote ¹²⁸ The presence of the name of Ptolemy I allows for close dating of the inscription: because the first record of alliance does not yet refer to Ptolemy as basileus (βασιλεύς) – a title which he took in 305 – and because there is no record of Ptolemaic presence in the area before 309, the decree is presumed to belong to the years c. 309–306.Footnote ¹²⁹

The precise context of the recorded agreements is disputed. Scholarship has focused predominantly on the alliance between Iasos and Ptolemy and its implications for our understanding of Ptolemaic activity and relations in this area,Footnote ¹³⁰ but remains unclear regarding the background of the cited voluntary soldiers present at Iasos. The commander Polemaios is generally taken to be the nephew and general of Antigonus.Footnote ¹³¹ The soldiers and their commanders, Machaon, Hieron, and Sopolis, are thought to have been in the service of this Polemaios – and, by extension, of Antigonus – and to have either defected to Ptolemy or occupied Iasos of their own accord.Footnote ¹³² It appears that Ptolemy came to the aid of Iasos, hence the reference to messengers sent to him (l. 16), and to the resultant alliance. Wherever the loyalty of these men lay, the document provides important information on the nature of service and the perception of voluntary soldiers active in the royal armies, as can be inferred from the following clauses:

This agreement stipulates that the Iasians are to pay any outstanding wages to the commanders and their soldiers; only once these wages are paid would the soldiers surrender the city and other occupied territories back to the Iasians. The agreement further decrees that there should be no additional repercussions, while the soldiers are not only awarded amnesty (l. 19), but those already settled in Iasos are permitted to stay. The decree also specifies that a preceding dispute regarding a set of contracts (l. 25) between Iasos and the soldiers is to be dropped by both parties.Footnote ¹³³

While we are in the dark regarding the context of most of the events recorded, this decree showcases the contractual nature of military service, and the relatively neutral attitude towards the soldiers’ voluntary enlistment. Thus, reference to the dispute regarding contracts indicates a legal basis for the soldiers’ service, while both their remuneration and their terms of service form part of the agreements here recorded. Thus, wages were to be paid out, while the troops’ civic status remains unaffected by their (continued) enlistment, or by their decision to leave Iasos – hence, they are promised continued residence at Iasos, or safe conduct, regardless of where they are going. This last stipulation especially emphasizes the contractual and temporary nature of service: neither Iasos, nor Ptolemy, nor any other named figure of authority makes claim upon the troops’ service – instead, they are free to go and enlist as they wish.

Similar conditions can be surmised from an inscribed decree found in 1887 to the east of Halicarnassus, and dated to c. 309.Footnote ¹³⁴ The site, identified as Theangela, was a military stronghold of some kind, as indicated by the presence of a well-fortified and impregnable akropolis.Footnote ¹³⁵ The document records the agreement between a certain Eupolemos, three local military commanders, and the city of Theangela, specifying various elements of the soldiers’ terms of service, in particular their wages and post-conflict status. The stipulations recorded once more indicate the emergence – or indeed acceptance – of military service as a form of employment, and not one hindered by considerations of loyalty or tied up with the polis.

The decree relates several categories of soldiers: first, those labelled as ‘Ereinaieis’, who have been identified as a contingent from Rhodes;Footnote ¹³⁶ next, the troops under the command of Philippos, Damagathos, and Aristodemos, who seemingly were in the service of the general Eupolemos; then, soldiers who came to Theangela from the territory controlled by Eupolemos; and finally, a separate contingent of catapultists.

The identification of these soldiers, and in whose service they were, hinges on the interpretation of the context of the decree. It has long been read as an agreement made upon Theangela’s capitulation to Eupolemos after a lengthy siege, because the decree refers to a period of seven months.Footnote ¹³⁷ However, the identification of Eupolemos, also known from two additional honorific decrees in Iasos and bronze coins found in the vicinity of Mylasa,Footnote ¹³⁸ poses a further problem. This tentative identification revolved around the question of whether this person should be identified as the Eupolemos appointed as governor of Greece by Cassander, or whether he was a local dynast acting in isolation.Footnote ¹³⁹ Because of the coinage’s distinctive Macedonian design,Footnote ¹⁴⁰ Billows has argued that we are indeed dealing with Cassander’s appointee, who appears to have defected and ruled in Caria as a military dynast between c. 312 303, modelling his rule extensively/303, modelling his rule extensively on that of the Successors.Footnote ¹⁴¹ Descat, on the other hand, while accepting the identification of Eupolemos as Cassander’s general, argues that Eupolemos was in Caria as Cassander’s epimeletes in the war against Antigonus from 315 to 313.Footnote ¹⁴²

Both Rostovtzeff and Robert argue that Damagathos, Philippos, Aristodemos, and their troops were soldiers hired by the city of Theangela in defence of the siege led by Eupolemos. They assume that these commanders gave up the city to the besieger Eupolemos, presumably because of the Theangelians’ inability to pay after the lengthy siege. It is for this reason, they imply, that Eupolemos’ payment of their troops is included in the treaty of capitulation. This interpretation, however, is surely incompatible with the contents of the decree. In fact, both Rostovtzeff and Robert commit an oversight concerning the enlistment of Aristodemos’ soldiers: arguing that Aristodemos and his men deserted Theangela in favour of Eupolemos, they take τοῖς δὲ στρατιώταις τοῖς ἐκ Θεαγ|γέλων (‘to the soldiers from Theangela’) to refer to these soldiers asking for further compensation in the form of settlement. The decree, however, states that the bonus is offered to those of the soldiers who wished to remain (ὅσοι ἄν μένωσιν), which obviously implies that they were already serving Eupolemos. The soldiers of Damagathos, Philippos, and Aristodemos, and ‘the soldiers of the Theangelians’ are therefore different groups. The clause concerned with the amnesty given to soldiers who left Eupolemos for Theangela either in peace or war should thus be taken as a reference to desertion, while the soldiers of Damagathos and Aristodemos were in the service of Eupolemos all along. The decree therefore treats conditions of service of both sides of soldiers involved in the siege of Theangela. Theangela’s soldiers are singled out as a distinct category at the end; all other troops should therefore be seen as in the service of Eupolemos.

What, then, can be surmised about the soldiers’ terms of service? Several conditions are stipulated. Amnesty – is granted to both the Rhodian contingent and the soldiers from Eupolemos’ territory who had joined the Theangelians. The men in the service of the three named commanders are to receive the wages they are due; one of the commanders, Aristodemos, and any of his soldiers who follow him are to receive a bonus if they re-enlist with Eupolemos. The wages for the division of catapultists are also specified. The soldiers who are leaving are absolved from taxation on exports. Those of the Theangelians who wished to serve with Eupolemos, furthermore, would be settled in the unidentified Pentachora. Again, therefore, we see soldiers who are hiring out their labour power: they are in paid service for a predetermined amount of time, while movement between armies was possible.Footnote ¹⁴³

Thus, in this early Hellenistic context, social ties or political loyalties seemingly played no part. Soldiers were free to move between employers without repercussions, although re-enlistment was encouraged through financial incentives; some negotiation on the terms of service was possible. Desertion, meanwhile, appears to have occurred but, crucially, was not punished. Soldiers employed on the opposing side, or even residents of conquered territory, were likewise encouraged to enlist with the added benefit of settlement.

Effectively, in the armies of the Successors, free military labour became the norm. While there was a significant uptick in the recruitment of such forces, former conscripts began to behave in much the same way, enlisting with an employer and king of their own choice. This radical shift in the perception of military service is reflected in known documents detailing the soldiers’ terms of service: enlistment was voluntary and of a temporary nature, ensuring the soldiers’ continued free status and opportunity to choose employers.

3.3.1 The Antigonids

The Macedonian reign of Antigonus Μonophthalmus, and later that of Demetrius Poliorcetes, continued to be characterized by the turbulent nature of the early Successor leadership, but stabilized with the accession of Demetrius’ son, Antigonus II Gonatas (c. 320–239), in 276; he firmly established the dynasty’s control over Macedonia and most of the city states on the Greek mainland.Footnote ¹⁴⁵ Gonatas’ reign ushered in a relatively secure period of over sixty years, during which time the Antigonid kingdom was not under serious threat. The pressing need for rapid assembly of troops, experienced by the early Successors and some of the Antigonids’ contemporary peers, therefore diminished. Furthermore, in comparison to other Successor kingdoms, funds were relatively sparse.Footnote ¹⁴⁶ These two factors prompted a change in the nature and methods of recruitment, and, in the early Antigonid kingdom, a return to recruitment through conscription can be observed.

The absence of the Antigonids from the major theatres of war, however, also means that sources related to the recruitment of troops and composition of the army are limited. While Polybius and Livy, offer the occasional insight into these matters, most information stems from the so-called Drama/Cassandreia Conscription diagramma, dated to the reign of Philip V (r. 221–179), of which fragments have been found in several Macedonian urban centres, describing, for instance, the process of evaluating horses for the cavalry and penalties for those who circumvented them, as well as details of which members of Macedonian society were liable for conscription, and a classification of soldiers in accordance with property classes.Footnote ¹⁴⁷ While this document dates to the reign of the penultimate Antigonid king, it can provide insight into the organization of the earlier Antigonid army. Importantly, it indicates significant organizational continuity with the army of Philip II.

There now exists a general consensus on the broad organizational lines of the Antigonid land army: in line with the Macedonian army as developed under Philip II, we find an infantry and cavalry, each comprising both common and elite divisions.Footnote ¹⁴⁸ In order to understand the muster of these troops, we are first and foremost reliant on an account provided by Livy, from which it is clear that recruitment occurred on a territorial basis, via cities or districts.Footnote ¹⁴⁹ As discussed by Hatzopoulos, officials were sent out to proclaim the muster, after which soldiers assembled for training and eventual departure for battle.Footnote ¹⁵⁰

The Drama/Cassandreia diagramma sheds further light on able-bodied, male Macedonian citizens’ liability for conscription. Age limits were imposed, and service was required of all able-bodied men between the ages of fifteen and fifty. However, unlike in the Greek city states, age was not itself a warrant for service; instead, the Macedonian muster took household composition into account, always ensuring that an eligible male remained within the oikos from which soldiers were levied. In doing so, the Macedonian king could ensure the framework of the individual household remained intact, thus ensuring political and economic stability in the cities of Macedonia, while military operations continued.Footnote ¹⁵¹

The nature of the Antigonid army further highlights a significant break in relation to the recruitment of specialist forces. For while under Philip II, and especially Alexander, appointments to the elite divisions were made on the basis of skill, with financial requirements being met through grants, Philip V’s diagramma clearly specifies that soldiers were assigned to the specialist divisions in accordance with their property class;Footnote ¹⁵² thus, the wealthiest were recruited into the divisions of the agēma and peltastai,Footnote ¹⁵³ with those of lesser wealth to be recruited into the infantry;Footnote ¹⁵⁴ the wealth of the hypaspists is again stated as having to be ‘suitable’.Footnote ¹⁵⁵ Unfortunately, the diagramma has not preserved similar regulations for membership of the Companion cavalry, aside from regulations detailing a review of suitable horses.Footnote ¹⁵⁶ It should be noted that the size of the Macedonian cavalry shrank considerably in this period, perhaps on account of a cavalry force being of little use on the terrain of the Greek mainland, where most Antigonid military activity was concentrated. The renewed deployment of an army of conscript citizens, in which rank was based on wealth rather than skill alone, is reflected in the provenance of high-ranking military men, all of whom seem to have been Macedonians. The organization and recruitment of the Antigonid army therefore points to a return to more traditional customs.Footnote ¹⁵⁷

In strong contrast to the renewed importance of conscript forces, we find the relatively restricted use of hired troops; in the few instances in which the source material cites their presence, they form but a small part of the army, and their employment seems to have been a measure taken only in times of absolute need. One such occasion occurred following the Gallic invasions, which left bands of Gauls roaming mainland Greece, ready to be employed. While Antigonus II Gonatas at first helped ward off the Gallic threat – for instance at Thermopylae in 278, albeit with a meagre contingent of 500 men,Footnote ¹⁵⁸ followed by victory against an 18,000 strong army of Gauls at Lysimacheia –Footnote ¹⁵⁹ he soon enlisted Gauls in his pursuit of the Macedonian throne, drawing on their strength against Antipater.Footnote ¹⁶⁰ Gauls make their reappearance in the sources in descriptions of Gonatas’ efforts against Pyrrhus’ invasion of Macedonia: at the Battle of Aous in 274, Gonatas’ army reportedly consisted of both Macedonians and Gauls.Footnote ¹⁶¹ Similarly, we know of an epitaph for a Gaul named Brikkos, a citizen of Kelainai-Apameia, who fell in battle against Areus.Footnote ¹⁶² While the sources therefore indicate the presence of Gallic volunteer troops under Gonatas, their numbers cannot be ascertained.

Hired troops are likewise documented during the reign of Antigonus III Doson (r. 229–221). Voluntary forces were present during Doson’s campaign in the Peloponnese and at the Battle of Sellasia in 222, when a coalition of Macedonia and the Achaean League confronted Sparta. Polybius records that when Doson arrived at Aegium, on the north coast of the Peloponnese, he dismissed the Macedonian troops to return home for winter, but kept his mercenaries with him.Footnote ¹⁶³ The following summer, Doson’s army, totalling 17,600 troops, is said to have comprised 13,300 Macedonians, supported by 3,300 mercenary forces; the 1,000 Agrianians and 1,000 Gauls should probably be added to the forces serving in a voluntary capacity.Footnote ¹⁶⁴ The Antigonid contingents of the army beleaguering Sparta at the Battle of Sellasia therefore included soldiers who enlisted voluntarily in exchange for pay, but the bulk nonetheless consisted of Macedonian, conscript troops.

Based on the textual record, the campaigns of Philip V show a similar reliance on conscript forces. The conscription diagramma details the efforts of the muster of conscript Macedonian soldiers, while mentions of voluntary soldiers only occur sporadically. For instance, Polybius mentions Thracians who deserted Philip’s army in 219,Footnote ¹⁶⁵ while ‘mercenaries’ are also attested at Cynoscephalae in 197, although again the sources do not reveal the ratio of conscript to volunteer forces.Footnote ¹⁶⁶

Garrisons are another likely place in which hired troops could have served, to the extent that year-round service, far from soldiers’ Macedonian homes, was entailed. While garrisons were an integral method of Antigonid control, especially on the Greek mainland, here, too, Macedonian soldiers are found among the troops; in fact, it has recently been argued that those Macedonians stationed in the garrisons in Attica were settled and expected to become Athenian citizens eventually.Footnote ¹⁶⁷ The presence of Macedonian soldiers on the Greek mainland can thus also be seen as deliberate population movement, an action which would remove these soldiers from Macedonian service.

The restricted use of paid voluntary soldiers is reflected in the numismatic evidence. To begin with, as noted above, Antigonid funds were limited and the kingdom may well have struggled to pay for paid soldiers’ upkeep, aside from perhaps a share in booty.Footnote ¹⁶⁸ Crucially, this is reflected in a general absence of Antigonid coinage after the reign of Demetrius Poliorcetes in hoards found in areas traditionally supplying volunteer soldiers.Footnote ¹⁶⁹ Furthermore, in several instances of the attested use of paid soldiers, the funds may not have been provided by the Antigonid king. For instance, Will has made a strong case that the Gauls in the employment of Antigonus III Doson may have been supplied by Antiochus II Theos, the Seleucid king in Asia.Footnote ¹⁷⁰ Similarly, at the Battle of Sellasia, when Philip V commanded a significant contingent of non-conscript forces, the upkeep of these troops will have been shared by all members of the coalition between Macedonia and the Achaean League.Footnote ¹⁷¹ While paid voluntary soldiers were therefore present in the Antigonid army, they appear to have been included only in times of emergency, and potentially only when a sponsor for their employment could be found.

Thus, by the time of the established Antigonids, intensive recruitment of voluntary forces was over. Instead, soldiers were once again levied from the Macedonian citizenry through conscription when needed. Macedonia, therefore, saw a return to the model of the seasonal farmer-soldier, reflected in the importance of keeping individual households intact and in the kings’ willingness to send troops home for winter. The Antigonids may have only occasionally relied on voluntary forces when ‘professional’ service was required. Overall, the kingdom’s detachment from intense military conflict, its lack of funds, and the minimal attestations of voluntary service all point in the direction that voluntary forces in the Antigonid army were much reduced, perhaps even negligible in number. This set the kingdom on a different course from its rivals – in terms of both its military and its economy.

3.3.2 The Ptolemies

In contrast to the Antigonids in Macedonia, the Ptolemies had a stable claim to the Egyptian territory from the future Ptolemy I’s arrival in 323 onwards; aside from military campaigns aimed at expansion or conducted in support of allies, Ptolemy managed to hold on to the kingdom as a ‘prize of war’Footnote ¹⁷² throughout the Successor struggles. Control of Egypt was likewise stable under his descendants, whose military efforts and interests were concentrated on the wider Mediterranean, rather than solely on Egypt.Footnote ¹⁷³ While this stability of territory offered the Ptolemies good scope for local, conscript recruitment, they chose a different route in manning their vast armies.Footnote ¹⁷⁴ As the richest of the main Hellenistic kingdoms, Egypt was provided with ample scope for the continued enlistment of paid voluntary forces, which were recruited from among subject populations and beyond. Noticeably, however, these voluntary soldiers were encouraged to settle on Egyptian soil in exchange for future liability for military service, which gave rise to a hybrid form of military service, in which we see soldiers who consented to a long-standing liability to be called to arms, alongside troops who were levied as need required. In many ways, the army collected by Ptolemy I upon his arrival – manned by local Egyptian forces, as well as Macedonian veterans and voluntary forces from across the Mediterranean – reflects the basic composition of the army in the first century of Ptolemaic rule.Footnote ¹⁷⁵ The hybrid nature of service, however, renders a clear-cut distinction between conscript and non-conscript forces obsolete; instead, this section will therefore briefly address the origin of troops, distinguishing in particular between Egyptian and non-local troops, before turning to the voluntary nature of service through discussion of the terms of enlistment.Footnote ¹⁷⁶

Although the sources focus on Greek and Macedonian troops, the record indicates that Egyptian troops were present in small numbers and active across all divisions of the Ptolemaic army, serving in both lower and elite ranks.Footnote ¹⁷⁷ These troops are sometimes simply denoted as ‘Egyptian’; the most used denominator was machimoi. The latter term has a long history and was already in use by Herodotus to denote Egyptian warriors.Footnote ¹⁷⁸ While it is unclear whether the term was taken over by the Ptolemaic administration or used continuously by the Egyptian bureaucracy, it denotes culturally Egyptian forces, some of whom may have taken on Greek names. In the early years of Ptolemaic rule, these machimoi appear predominantly in paramilitary positions, as police forces or as aids to local officials on social or economic business, perhaps as an escort.Footnote ¹⁷⁹

However, the civic roles of some machimoi do not preclude proper military activity by others, and Egyptians are attested as serving in battle from the start of Ptolemaic rule. As noted above, Egyptian soldiers appear to have been recruited by Ptolemy I, since they are recorded among the contingents present at the battle of Gaza in 312;Footnote ¹⁸⁰ we similarly encounter Egyptian soldiers manning the Ptolemaic fleet sent out in support of the Athenians during the Chremonidean war in 266.Footnote ¹⁸¹ These instances of Egyptian soldiers in the historiographical sources can be backed up by evidence from the epigraphic record, which attests to Egyptian forces present on Crete;Footnote ¹⁸² on the island of Thera;Footnote ¹⁸³ on garrison duty;Footnote ¹⁸⁴ and as part of Ptolemaic naval operations.Footnote ¹⁸⁵ They appear in significant numbers at the battle of Raphia in 217, with a contingent of 20,000 Egyptian forces attested.Footnote ¹⁸⁶

That Egyptians were included among the elite divisions is confirmed by the Mendas Stele.Footnote ¹⁸⁷ Here it is recorded that Ptolemy II Philadelphus (r. 284–246) chose some of his bodyguards from among the sons of the elite Egyptians.Footnote ¹⁸⁸ This selection process is reminiscent of Alexander’s programme of selecting Persian youths to serve as Epigonoi,Footnote ¹⁸⁹ and confirms the presence of Egyptians in highly prestigious positions in the traditional division of Macedonian military labour.

Despite the availability of Egyptian manpower, these forces were used in small numbers only, and the bulk of the Ptolemaic army consisted of troops levied from outside Egypt, and, indeed, from beyond Ptolemaic spheres of influence. The historiographical record has preserved some reference to the presence and mustering of such troops, which were acquired through general calls for individuals and recruitment of bands of misthophoroi, as well as through symmachia.Footnote ¹⁹⁰

While certain troops’ origins can be determined through the places in which they were mustered, it is the onomastic evidence from Egypt itself that best reflects the sheer scale of non-Egyptian troops in the kingdom. Fischer-Bovet has rightly argued that personal names need to be treated with care, in so far as they are reliable only for the first generation of soldiers.Footnote ¹⁹¹ Additionally, ethnic designators applied to groups of soldiers, such as ‘Macedonian’ or ‘Persian’, came to indicate military divisions rather than the provenance of its members.Footnote ¹⁹² Even so, while the study of onomastics may not provide a full picture, it has nonetheless revealed a continuous presence (and potentially a continuous influx) of non-Egyptians in Egypt, who served in a military capacity, with large-scale immigration occurring until the mid-third century.Footnote ¹⁹³

As we have seen, the early years of Ptolemaic rule saw great concern with recruiting voluntary soldiers, whether these were veterans of Alexander or new recruits.Footnote ¹⁹⁴ The success of these recruitment drives is confirmed by the presence of non-Egyptian forces among the Ptolemaic ranks. For instance, it has been shown that veterans of Alexander readily abandoned Perdikkas to enlist with Ptolemy I in 321.Footnote ¹⁹⁵ Simultaneously, the presence of Greeks in the Ptolemaic army is evident. Examples include Myrmidon, an Athenian commander leading a detachment of 10,000 men in 315;Footnote ¹⁹⁶ or the Milesian Athenagoras, who oversaw Ptolemaic troops stationed at Rhodes.Footnote ¹⁹⁷

The troop numbers offered by Polybius for the battle of Raphia in 217 – which are listed by contingent,Footnote ¹⁹⁸ and are often used as a benchmark for studies on the numbers in the Ptolemaic and Seleucid armies –Footnote ¹⁹⁹ likewise indicate the continued heavy use of voluntary forces by the Ptolemies. Of the 75,000 men assembled,Footnote ²⁰⁰ two-fifths of the cavalry and more than a quarter of the infantry are categorized as voluntary forces. Because some must have been left in garrisons, Griffith estimates a total number of 25,000 voluntary forces in Ptolemaic service in 217.Footnote ²⁰¹

Naturally, the best evidence for the presence of non-Egyptian troops comes from Ptolemaic documentation, which has allowed scholars to assemble information on the scale of, and reasons for, (military) immigrations into Egypt on the basis of onomastics and ethnic designators in legal and administrative texts.Footnote ²⁰² Such studies have indicated a very sizeable non-Egyptian population in the first century of Ptolemaic rule, which dwindled later on.Footnote ²⁰³ A recent estimate holds that c. 40,000 Greek soldiers had arrived before the renewed muster before the battle of Raphia.Footnote ²⁰⁴ While not all immigrants would necessarily have come to Egypt to serve in the army, the number of ethnics occurring in combination with a military title nonetheless confirms that the Ptolemaic army was a significant motivator for relocation.Footnote ²⁰⁵

It is commonly held that other voluntary recruits originated from areas that fell under Ptolemaic hegemony.Footnote ²⁰⁶ Thus, Mueller reports that 170 different ethnics from outside Egypt are attested for the mid-third century, with the majority coming from Greece and the Eastern Mediterranean.Footnote ²⁰⁷ While recruitment from areas under Ptolemaic influence can be expected, the considerable diversity is worth noting: for example, while the majority of recruits were Greek or Macedonian, immigration is also attested from the Black Sea area, with Thracians particularly prominent, and may have made up 15 per cent of the army.Footnote ²⁰⁸ These recruits are a valuable indicator of the attractions of employment in the Ptolemaic army, and testament to the continued preponderance of this type of military service in the Hellenistic world.

The latter is also expressed in Ptolemaic soldiers’ terms of service. Although the Ptolemies had the ability to levy troops through conscription, voluntary enlistment was seemingly preferred; in fact, all soldiers appear to have served in a voluntary capacity, whether on an ad hoc basis, or for longer periods as settled soldiers who were allotted plots of land known as klēroi (κλῆροι).

While we are in the dark with regard to the precise methods of recruitment of Egyptian soldiers, the fact that they served on the same terms as foreign soldiers, and their relatively small numbers, supports the idea that they were not conscripted. This is also confirmed in Johstono’s analysis of the military obligations of citizens of Alexandria,Footnote ²⁰⁹ whose attestation in papyri dated to the first two generations reveals a small number of individuals active in a military capacity, often in high-ranking positions,Footnote ²¹⁰ and always in connection with land in the Fayum. In effect, individuals who fell under direct control of the Ptolemies were levied in the same way as other troops and incentivized by grant of land. Starting with Ptolemy I, soldiers were granted land in exchange for service – a system that came to full fruition under Ptolemy II and III. Settlement was a complex phenomenon, yet a cursory look into the rules governing this process reveal the nature of their service.Footnote ²¹¹ Soldiers received land either at the start or upon completion of service; they either settled on this land themselves or drew rent by subletting.Footnote ²¹²

In summary, the Ptolemaic army comprised soldiers levied from across the Mediterranean. Regardless of origin, the bulk of the troops enlisted voluntarily, with a good number opting for settlement within the Ptolemaic kingdom. Settled troops are thought to have served for only part of the year, thereby mimicking the conditions of service of conscript troops, yet the numbers in which they appear in battle indicate they could be mobilized en masse.Footnote ²¹³ Ordinary voluntary troops, on the other hand, may have simply been paid in coin. However, the soldiers’ ability to sublet their land also allows for the possibility that settled soldiers spent significant time in active service. Effectively, the practice of settling soldiers offered the Ptolemies a stable base of manpower, while non-settled voluntary troops could be levied at will in times of need. The diversity of origin of these latter troops indicates that this was an attractive proposition.

3.3.3 The Seleucids

The future Seleucus I Nikator received the satrapy of Babylonia in 321, and from there vastly expanded his territories, leading to the consolidation of the future Seleucid kingdom in 311; his realm included most of the eastern territories of Alexander’s former empire, extending from Anatolia to Turkmenistan. The state of the written record leaves us in the dark regarding many aspects of Seleucid military recruitment. Yet, although the Seleucids managed to assemble armies of significant size, there was a general drift towards the increasing use of conscript forces. Voluntary forces continue to be present in the army, but we see a return to more traditional methods of recruitment. Given the presence of settled immigrants and the attestation of grants of land that can be connected to military personnel, scholarship has long drawn on the Ptolemaic model in explaining Seleucid levies. However, as we shall see, the assumed connection between Seleucid settlement and military service has been shown to be deceptive, and instead it seems that Seleucid recruitment methods were more akin to those employed by the Antigonids.

The evidence for the extent and composition of the Seleucid army is largely literary, and the historiographers provide overviews of the army at the battle of Raphia in 217,Footnote ²¹⁴ at the Battle of Magnesia in 191,Footnote ²¹⁵ and of a military parade held at Daphne in 166.Footnote ²¹⁶ The accounts, which include reported troop numbers and descriptions of individual contingents, are deemed reliable, in so far as the detail included suggests they are based on official documentation.Footnote ²¹⁷ For guidance in assessing the composition and size of the Seleucid army in the period under consideration, we once more turn to Polybius’ account of the battle of Raphia, in which the breakdown of Antiochus III’s army in Table 3.9 is given.

Polybius’ breakdown reveals that the Seleucid troops were of diverse origin, with both common soldiers and commanders drawn from across the Mediterranean, as well as a small contingent of soldiers denoted explicitly as misthophoroi but of unknown origin. Assessing the troops’ status as voluntary or conscript on the basis of origin is once more a hazardous enterprise, since seemingly ethnic designations may actually refer to military divisions.Footnote ²¹⁸ In the account of the battle of Raphia, this is particularly clear in the description of the troops under the command of Theodotus the Aetolian, which are described as ‘selected from across the kingdom’,Footnote ²¹⁹ and are said to have been armed in the Macedonian manner –Footnote ²²⁰ a description that is repeated in reference to Lydian troops later on.Footnote ²²¹

It is generally agreed that the bulk of Seleucid forces comprised conscript levies. This view is based in part on the numerical stability of troops across sources, and on the attestation of military settlers.Footnote ²²² Such settlers are referred to as katoikoi,Footnote ²²³ and are found predominantly in Lydia and Phrygia.Footnote ²²⁴ While the records of military settlers are sparse, they are present in both the historiographical and epigraphic sources. For instance, from Diodorus we learn of a community of settlers in Syrian Larissa, who originally hailed from Larissa in Thessaly, and who reportedly served as allies to the kings from Seleucus I onwards.Footnote ²²⁵ Similarly, Josephus reveals that Antiochus III moved 2,000 Jewish families from Babylon and Mesopotamia to strongholds and other strategic areas, where they were to be granted plots of land to cultivate.Footnote ²²⁶

Two dossiers of inscriptions reveal the details involved in the process of settlement. The first example stems from Ilion, where a set of inscriptions dated to c. 274 records a substantial gift of royal land to a certain Aristodikes of Assos.Footnote ²²⁷ The dossier comprises the correspondence between Antiochus I and his deputy Meleager, discussing where Aristodikes’ allotment is to be located. While this Aristodikes is otherwise unknown, he is designated as one of the king’s philoi, from which we can surmise that he was active in the military.Footnote ²²⁸ Furthermore, in the discussions on where his allotment was to be, it is revealed that the land on which he had originally set his eyes had already been given to a certain Athenaios, who was commander of the naval base.Footnote ²²⁹ This dossier therefore attests to two instances in which land was given to soldiers. Similarly, the treaty of sympoliteia between Smyrna and Magnesia, dated to soon after 256,Footnote ²³⁰ attests to the presence of military katoikoi in Magnesia, who eventually received citizenship in Smyrna.

The presence of military settlers in Seleucid territory has led scholars to draw parallels with Ptolemaic recruitment policies, and scholarship has often envisaged a situation in which soldiers’ acceptance of grants of land came with military obligations.Footnote ²³¹ In this view, the Seleucid settlements inhabited by katoikoi operated in the same way as the Ptolemaic cleruchs, and thereby provided the Seleucids with a stable pool of settled manpower from which they could recruit through conscription.

However, although we have a handful of instances that attest to the settlement of military personnel, the specific military duties associated with settlement remain a point of debate. Cohen has rightly pointed out that while we see soldiers receiving land, the documents attesting to this do not specify any military obligations.Footnote ²³² Indeed, in the case of the land allotted to Aristodikes, no mention is made of future expectations, while he was a high-ranking member of the military already upon acceptance of the grant. The Smyrnian grant of citizenship to the katoikoi of Magnesia, furthermore, reveals that not all settlers were members of the military; instead, reference is made to both the soldiers and others resident in Magnesia.Footnote ²³³

Both the lack of clear evidence regarding military service in exchange for land and the potentially civilian character of the settlements have cast doubt on the notion that Seleucid landholding operated in the same way as the system known from the Ptolemaic kingdom. One alternative view is that the Seleucids recruited soldiers based on residence in Seleucid territory. Such is argued by Bikerman,Footnote ²³⁴ and Briant has likewise interpreted various references to Seleucid cavalry contingents being disbanded and sent across the empire as indicative of a recruitment process based on residence.Footnote ²³⁵ In this view, the army therefore comprised regional levies, akin to the recruitment policies of the Antigonids, rather than soldiers who served in exchange for land; although gifts of land to immigrants would have amplified the Seleucid numbers, they did not tie recipients to military duties. Cohen likewise disputes the idea that settlement was tied to military service, and instead argues that liability was based on membership of military koina, self-organizing military associations, which were responsible for members’ military training, equipping, and recruitment.Footnote ²³⁶ These latter two approaches have recently been endorsed by Capdetrey, who sees military duties dependent on membership of the koina, rather than tied to the acceptance of land, as the reason why Seleucid settlements retained a civic character.Footnote ²³⁷

Troops serving in an explicitly voluntary capacity are more difficult to discern, and gradually disappear from the Seleucid record. According to Griffith, this was not a deliberate policy, but rather a problem of availability.Footnote ²³⁸ Nonetheless, voluntary recruits were present at Raphia. The contingent of Greek misthophoroi should, of course, be categorized as such, and presumably the Cretans, Neocretans, and potentially the other specialist Greek forces too. Non-Greek voluntary troops also appear in the record, and Galatians especially are consistently attested,Footnote ²³⁹ such as those acting as bodyguards for Seleucus II,Footnote ²⁴⁰ and those forming the majority of voluntary troops under Antiochus Hierax.Footnote ²⁴¹ However, explicit mentions of voluntary forces in the Seleucid army are scarce, meaning that little information is available on these forces’ terms of service or recruitment; we can therefore only speculate on the basis of parallels in other Hellenistic armies.

Evidence for Seleucid military recruitment is therefore weak. Although military personnel can be seen to receive grants of land, the specific conditions and associated duties remain unclear. Nonetheless, seemingly the bulk of Seleucid soldiers were levied through conscription – a liability for which was based on residence or membership of military associations. While voluntary forces are attested, they seem to have been used only rarely and in small numbers – notably, it has been argued that the Seleucid choice to rely on conscripts was critical to their defeat at Raphia.Footnote ²⁴²

3.3.4 The Attalids

The Attalid kingdom followed a different trajectory towards territorial consolidation but was to all intents and purposes a Hellenistic kingdom, and one that could be characterized as a militaristic state, following aggressively expansionist policies.Footnote ²⁴³ The military character of the Attalid dynasty is reflected in the title taken by its founder, Philetairos, who was not known as king, but rather as ‘commander of the garrison’.Footnote ²⁴⁴ Initially serving as general in charge of the treasury for Lysimachus, Philetairos seceded to Seleucus in 282.Footnote ²⁴⁵ Although Pergamon has been described as a vassal state of the Seleucid kingdom, visible in, for instance, the Seleucus types on early Attalid coinage, it appears to have acted relatively autonomously.Footnote ²⁴⁶ Philetairos’ nephew and adoptive son Eumenes I changed course upon his accession: perhaps under the influence of Ptolemy II, Eumenes cut ties with the Seleucids and declared his independence in 263.Footnote ²⁴⁷ His son Attalus was the first to use the title of king from 238 onwards.Footnote ²⁴⁸

Of all the Hellenistic kingdoms, the Attalids seem the most reliant on voluntary troops. The Attalids’ ample funds, first through access to the treasury of Lysimachus, and later through their aggressive policies of acquisition,Footnote ²⁴⁹ allowed for the recruitment of hired forces without problem. The territory over which they ruled, however, was initially modest, and only expanded during the rule of Eumenes I, who established two garrisons, Philetaerea at the foot of Mount Ida, and Attaleia in Lydia, at the extremes of Attalid territory.Footnote ²⁵⁰ Despite Eumenes’ expansion of the kingdom, the army remained small: the largest reported contingent consisted of 6,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry.Footnote ²⁵¹ Ma has postulated that the full army, including garrisons, voluntary forces, and the navy, is unlikely to have exceeded 12,000 men.Footnote ²⁵² The fact that the Attalid army consistently yielded to ‘concentrated threats’ likewise supports the notion of a small force. However, the availability of ample funds in a small territory, with only a small army and the requirement of constant service in garrisons, makes reliance on voluntary forces a natural development.

A dedication set up in Delphi in c. 208 by the people of Lilaea in central Greece in gratitude for the troops sent as garrison forces by Attalus I confirms as much.Footnote ²⁵³ The inscription records the troops present during the mission and shows that the bulk of the forces was voluntary, recruited from across the Greek world.Footnote ²⁵⁴ The Attalid use of voluntary forces is so well attested,Footnote ²⁵⁵ in fact, that the importance of this decree lies in its mention of a conscript contingent of Pergamene citizens and Mysians, which make up just one-sixth of the attested forces.Footnote ²⁵⁶

It was long assumed that the Mysians, a people expelled from Asia Minor by Greek colonists,Footnote ²⁵⁷ formed a conscript contingent.Footnote ²⁵⁸ A recently discovered document related to their settlement supports this.Footnote ²⁵⁹ As argued by Thonemann, the document reveals the explicit military aims of the colony, which came about through Achaemenid-style resettlement of populations and resulted in the availability of reliable pools of manpower.Footnote ²⁶⁰ The soldiers settled in the village of Apollonioucharax were liable to conscription and to punishment for desertion, while extensive land grants for the colony are also attested.Footnote ²⁶¹ The settlement of these soldiers in Apollonioucharax, therefore, indicates that conscript forces of the Attalid army were levied along the same lines as the settled soldiers in the Seleucid and Ptolemaic armies.

It is impossible to give an accurate figure of the balance between conscript and voluntary forces in the Attalid numbers considering the current evidence. However, everything indicates that voluntary forces formed the vast majority. While the importance of the number of voluntary forces in the Lilaea dedication has been downplayed on account of the expedition’s length, which will have made volunteers more suitable,Footnote ²⁶² it should be noted that the garrisons in the Attalid territories needed constant manning as well. It is from these garrisons that the decree detailing the dispute between Eumenes I and his men has emerged.Footnote ²⁶³ Since Eumenes could not quell this uprising, Griffith concludes that more than half of the Attalid troops must have been part of the voluntary forces.Footnote ²⁶⁴

This document, in which the agreements between Eumenes and his soldiers are detailed, offers much information on the terms of service which soldiers expected, and once more reveals the contractual and temporary nature of service. Aside from revised offers of soldiers’ wages and additional benefits, those serving in the garrison were assured of the following terms of service: that the year would last ten months and no intercalary month would be inserted; that those who completed their service and were without work were to receive the wages for the time spent in service; that no taxation was to be imposed for the forty-fourth year;Footnote ²⁶⁵ that those who were apergoi – out of military service – were not to be taxed; and that if someone asked to leave service, he was to be dismissed.Footnote ²⁶⁶ The stipulations regarding the soldiers’ freedom of movement are familiar from the decrees dated to the Successor Wars, while the condition on the length of the year, furthermore, implies that the soldiers signed on for ten months, with the option of renewal.

These conditions are of crucial importance to the conceptualization of military service as wage labour: although we see that the voluntary sale of military labour power was finite, as indicated by the soldiers’ movement between armies, the temporary nature of the transaction in the form of a contract is evident. In the early Hellenistic period, voluntary soldiers in the Attalid army therefore served in accordance with a contract in which their terms and length of service, as well as the conditions for the sale of their labour power, were specified.

As such, Attalid troops represent the culmination of the slow development of military service into wage labour. As we have seen, this transition began with the reforms of Philip II of Macedonia, who, in his zeal to expand his army, normalized voluntary enlistment across all ranks and divisions. Terms of service were dependent on whether a soldier was active in the elite divisions or elsewhere. While scholarship has long restricted the presence of voluntary soldiers to the contingents described as misthophoroi in the ancient sources, an analysis of the troops’ labour relations reveals that this was not the case. A rather sizeable portion of the Macedonian army under Philip was therefore serving voluntarily. These troops went east with Alexander, and the demands of his campaign, which required constant service far from home over several years, paved the way for changing labour relations between the king and conscript forces, which culminated in the reform of 330, when conscript forces transitioned into free military labourers. The growing presence of hired volunteers continued during the Successor Wars, when political conditions pushed these aspiring kings towards almost complete reliance on hired forces. The institutionalization of free military labour at this time is reflected in the epigraphic record, in which contracts detailing terms of service begin to appear. The territorial consolidation of the diverse Hellenistic kingdoms ushered in renewed changes to the nature of military service and accompanying labour relations. The respective kings’ rule and the nature of the territories under their control did, however, give rise to different trajectories of development of their armies. Nonetheless, voluntary troops remain a significant presence in the respective armies and dominate especially among divisions requiring continuous service. Philip II’s military reforms can therefore be said to have broken the traditional mould of military service that long governed Greek warfare. Yet this new form of military service needed to be incentivized and compensated, especially as demands for such soldiers grew. As will be detailed in Chapter 4, its emergence went hand in hand with the development of generous and increasingly sophisticated systems of remuneration.