The year 2015 is now coming to an end and it seems as if every year since 2010 this reviewer has been responsible for the review of a book of the Director of the Fridtjof Nansen Institute in Oslo, Geir Hønneland. And by the end of this year it is the book Russia and the Arctic. Environment, identity and foreign policy, which, as the author states in the Preface, builds on material of two of his previous books, namely Borderland Russians (Hønneland Reference Hønneland2010) and Arctic politics, the law of the sea and Russian identity (Hønneland Reference Hønneland2014) to which this reviewer would still add Making fishery agreements work (Hønneland Reference Hønneland2013). And indeed, one can find several parts from these books in the present volume, however significantly expanded through a much more theory-based underpinning. Moreover, while overlapping in content, Hønneland's goal is not to reproduce the findings, but to locate it within the impressive swing of linking identity, narrative and foreign policy, thus establishing a theoretical framework in which his empirical data is located. And the focus is, as the title implies, Russia, which in this reviewer's opinion is a dramatically underrepresented actor in the foci of English research on Arctic (geo)politics. This fact alone and Hønneland's analysis which ‘maps the narrative fabric within which Russian Arctic politics evolve’ (page 19) make this book incredibly valuable.

It is thus that after the theory-based Introduction, the second chapter delves right into the subject matter and analyses Russian identity between north and west. Feeding on previous literature on the issue, the author locates current Russian political actions within contexts of westernism and Eurasianism, thus making also the current events in Crimea from a political perspective explainable. At the same time Hønneland shows how the ‘north’ became part of Russian identity and how it has thus influenced Russian policy-making. But he goes further and presents different forms of identity-making and -shaping to the reader. Different narratives form the self-understanding of Russians within a diverse country and diverse world.

In The rush for the north pole the Russian understanding of Arctic geopolitics are deciphered. Drawing from extensive newspaper analyses, the author shows, as in his other books, the high degree of suspicion towards the other Arctic states as to their motives in the Arctic. In order to further make this feature understandable, Hønneland does not shy away from citing a critical article in Kommersant in its entirety directly after the infamous 2007 flag planting (see page 52–55). But all in all it is the narrative of NATO which is ‘surreptitiously preparing for the rush for the Arctic, while Russia insists on international cooperation and open dialogue’ (page 55) which steers Russia's discourse and foreign policy in the Arctic.

Delimitation of the Barents Sea, as the title implies, covers the Russian reactions prior and after the signing of the Norwegian-Russian Barents Sea delimitation treaty in 2010. As such, the chapter draws heavily from Arctic politics (Hønneland Reference Hønneland2014) by using the same interview excerpts and following the same structure of the respective chapter in Arctic politics. But while earlier Hønneland's account was more based on description and his own views on the matter, the present chapter has been significantly expanded with more information and data as well as substantiated with IR theory. In a sense, the data provided in Arctic politics could therefore be considered a prelude to or a teaser of what this volume has to offer. Naturally, if one has read both books there will be some overlap in content, but given the different foci of the books and the further expansion of the data, one is not left disappointed.

Similarly, the chapter Management of marine resources is partly taken over verbatim from Making fishery agreements work (Hønneland Reference Hønneland2013) and constitutes a compressed version of the book. And as the previous chapter, the data presented is not necessarily new, but significantly expanded through more details and the theoretical underpinning. The difficult and shaky relationship between Russian and Norwegian negotiators, commentators and diplomats becomes ever more apparent in this chapter. And once again, it seems that suspicion is a driving force behind Russian narratives that constitute a discourse of opposition regarding fisheries management in the Barents Sea.

Region building, identity formation draws from Borderland Russians (Hønneland Reference Hønneland2010). This chapter depicts and analyses self-understanding of Russians in the Barents region vis-à-vis the proximity to Norway. It becomes clear that while active region-building has created the Barents Euro-Arctic Region (BEAR), this does not mean that it is to be equated with the historical identity the region shares, first and foremost in the form of the Pomors. To the contrary, in spite of regional political cooperation, cultural exchange and environmental problem-solving (Sellheim Reference Sellheim2013), Hønneland shows how the fostering of Barents-identity can lead to significant problems with the Russian authorities, once again sparked by a fear of the West aiming to undermine Russian integrity.

In the last chapter of this engaging book, Arctic talk, Russian policy, the author links the findings of the foregoing, recalling that the ‘sense of self, or identity, is part of the fabric that constitutes action, foreign policy included’ (page 145). To this end, actions taken by Russia in the Arctic become explainable and in order to clearly do so, Hønneland has included short tables of key events after the end of the Cold War for the Arctic Ocean, the Barents Sea and the Barents Region after which he lets the ‘story-tellers’, meaning key articles in the Russian press, speak themselves, once again linking the narratives of identity and Russianness with actions within foreign policy.

The author ends the book with the words: ‘The Arctic is the ultimate commonplace for the cultivation of Russianness. [. . .] It is is the venue for the big epic dramas in life, a ballroom floor for the wild Russian dance – through the ages, across the plains’ (page 170). Russia and the Arctic certainly makes exactly this ‘Russian dance’ understandable for those that have been wondering about Russia's actions not only in the Arctic, but also elsewhere in the world. And in combination with Hønneland's unmistakable personal style, which this reviewer is very fond of, Russia and the Arctic should be read and be an inherent part of the book shelves of those interested in Arctic politics, geopolitics and International Relations in general.