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Corruption and NGO Sustainability: A Panel Study of Post-communist States

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2026

Brad Epperly  and
Taedong Lee
Brad Epperly*
Affiliation:
University of South Carolina, Columbia, SC, USA
Taedong Lee*
Affiliation:
City University of Hong Kong, Kowloon, Hong Kong
*
e-mail: epperly@sc.edu
e-mail: taedong.lee@city.edu.hk
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Abstract

The development and viability of the non-governmental organization (NGO) sector varies across the post-communist world. We explore the impact of corruption on NGO sustainability—the overall enabling environment and activities of the NGO sector—in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union from 1998 to 2007. To test hypotheses about the relationship between corruption and NGO sustainability, we employ time-series cross-sectional analyses of 27 post-communist states, controlling for domestic factors such as economic development, government expenditure, and democracy, and international factors such as levels of trade, foreign direct investment, and foreign aid, as well as a country’s status vis-à-vis the European Union. We conclude that corruption is consistently and strongly associated with lower levels of NGO sustainability. In particular, our analyses suggest that corruption is likely to degrade the legal environment and fiscal viability of the NGO sector greater than other aspects related to NGO activities such as advocacy or organizational capacity.

Résumé

Résumé

Dans les pays à l’ère post-communiste, le secteur des organisations non gouvernementales (ONG) connaît une réussite variable en termes de développement et de viabilité. Nous explorons ici les effets de la corruption sur la pérennité des ONG (environnement global favorable et activité du secteur des ONG) en Europe de l’Est et dans l’ex Union Soviétique entre 1998 et 2007. Pour tester les hypothèses concernant les relations entre la corruption et la pérennité des ONG, nous procédons à des analyses transversales de séries temporelles pour 27 états post-communistes, en observant des facteurs (variables ?) nationaux (domestiques ?) tels que le développement économique, les dépenses gouvernementales et la démocratie, ainsi que des facteurs internationaux tels que les quantités d’échanges, les investissements directs provenant de l’étranger, l’aide internationale et le statut (la position ?) du pays vis-à-vis de l’Union européenne. Nous concluons que la corruption est systématiquement et fortement associée à une faible pérennité des ONG. Nos analyses suggèrent plus particulièrement que la corruption est susceptible de dégrader l’environnement juridique et la viabilité fiscale du secteur des ONG davantage que les autres aspects des activités des ONG tels que la promotion d’une cause ou leur capacité organisationnelle.

Zusammenfassung

Zusammenfassung

Nicht-staatliche Organisationen in der post-kommunistischen Welt variieren in ihrer Entwicklung und Überlebensfähigkeit. Wir untersuchen die Auswirkungen von Korruption auf die Nachhaltigkeit nicht-staatlicher Organisationen, d. h. die günstigen Rahmenbedingungen und Aktivitäten des Sektors insgesamt, in Osteuropa und der ehemaligen Sowjetunion über den Zeitraum von 1998 bis 2007. Um die Hypothesen über das Verhältnis zwischen Korruption und der Nachhaltigkeit nicht-staatlicher Organisationen zu testen, wenden wir Zeitreihen-Querschnitt-Analysen (Time-Series-Cross-Section-Analysen) von 27 ehemals kommunistischen Ländern an und überprüfen inländische Faktoren, wie beispielsweise die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung, staatliche Ausgaben und Demokratie, und internationale Faktoren, z. B. Handelsumfang, ausländische Direktinvestitionen und Auslandshilfe, sowie den Status eines jeden Landes mit Hinblick auf die Europäische Union. Wir kommen zu dem Schluss, dass Korruption durchweg eng mit einer niedrigeren Nachhaltigkeit nicht-staatlicher Organisationen in Verbindung steht. Unsere Analysen weisen insbesondere darauf hin, dass Korruption mit aller Wahrscheinlichkeit die rechtlichen Rahmenbedingungen und die finanzielle Überlebensfähigkeit des Sektors mehr schwächt als andere Aspekte im Zusammenhang mit den Aktivitäten nicht-staatlicher Organisationen, wie beispielsweise die Interessenvertretung oder die organisationale Fähigkeit.

Resumen

Resumen

El desarrollo y la viabilidad del sector de las organizaciones no gubernamentales (ONG) varían en el mundo post-comunista. Exploramos el impacto de la corrupción sobre la sostenibilidad de las ONG – el entorno propicio global y las actividades del sector de las ONG - en Europa del Este y en la antigua Unión Soviética desde 1998 a 2007. Para probar la hipótesis sobre la relación entre la corrupción y la sostenibilidad de las ONG, empleamos análisis transversales de series temporales de 27 estados post-comunistas, controlando factores internos tales como el desarrollo económico, el gasto gubernamental y la democracia, y factores internacionales, tales como los niveles de comercio, la inversión directa extranjera y la ayuda externa, así como también el estatus del país frente a la Unión Europea. Concluimos que la corrupción está invariable y fuertemente asociada a menores niveles de sostenibilidad de las ONG. En particular, nuestro análisis sugieren que es probable que la corrupción degrade el entorno legal y la viabilidad fiscal del sector de las ONG en mayor medida que otros aspectos relacionados con las actividades de las ONG, tales como la defensa o la capacidad organizativa.

摘要

摘要

后共产主义各国的非政府组织(NGO)部门的发展和生存力存在差异。我们研究了从1998-2007年期间在东欧和前苏联内腐败对NGO可持续性(NGO部门的总体有利环境和活动)的影响。为了验证关于腐败与NGO可持续性之间关系的假说,我们对27个后共产主义州开展时间序列典型分析,不考虑经济发展、政府支出和民主等国内因素,贸易水平、外国直接投资和外国援助等国际因素,以及国家与欧盟关系状态等因素。我们的研究表明,腐败与NGO可持续性的降低有着连贯和密切的关系。尤其要指出的是,我们的分析显示,腐败很可能对NGO部门的法律环境和财政活力的负面影响,比对倡导或组织能力等NGO活动的其他方面更大。

要約

要約

非政府組織(NGO)のセクターにおける開発と実行力は、ポスト共産主義の国々によって異なる。本論文では、1998年から2007年までの東欧と旧ソ連におけるNGOセクターでの総合的な環境と活動におけるNGOによる不正の影響について調査する。NGOの持続性と不正の関係についての仮説を検証するために、ポスト共産国27ケ国において時系列の断面解析を用いる。ヨーロッパ連合と比較して、経済開発、政府費用、民主主義などの国内の要素、および貿易、海外直接投資、対外援助のレベルなどの国際的な要素を調査する。結論として、不正は一貫して強固にNGOでの持続性のレベルに関連しているといえる。特に分析では、不正によって権利もしくは組織的な容量などのNGO活動に関連する別の側面よりも優れたNGOセクターの法的な環境と財政の実行性が低下されることを示唆する。

ملخص

ملخص

تطوير وقابلية نمو قطاع المنظمات الغير حكومية (NGO) يختلف في جميع أنحاء عالم ما بعد الشيوعية. نحن نستطلع أثر الفساد على إستدامة المنظمات الغير حكومية (NGO)- تمكين البيئة وأنشطة قطاع المنظمات الغير حكومية (NGO) العام - في أوروبا الشرقية والإتحاد السوفيتي السابق 1998-2007. لاختبار الفرضيات حول العلاقة بين الفساد والإستدامة للمنظمات الغير حكومية (NGO)، نحن نستخدم السلاسل الزمنية لتحليلات مقطعية من 27 دولة فيما بعد الشيوعية، السيطرة على العوامل الداخلية مثل التنمية الإقتصادية والإنفاق الحكومي، والديمقراطية، وعوامل دولية مثل مستويات التجارة والإستثمار الأجنبي المباشر، والمساعدات الخارجية، فضلا عن وضع البلد وجها لوجه مع الإتحاد الأوروبي. فإننا نستنتج أن الفساد مستمر ويرتبط بقوة بمستويات أقل من الإستدامة للمنظمات الغير حكومية (NGO). على وجه الخصوص، تحليلاتنا تشير أن الفساد من المرجح أن يؤدي إلى تدهور البيئة القانونية والجدوى المالية لقطاع المنظمات الغير حكومية (NGO) أكبر من الجوانب الأخرى المتعلقة بأنشطة المنظمات الغير حكومية (NGO) مثل التأييد أو القدرة التنظيمية.

Keywords

NGO sustainabilityCorruptionLegal environmentFinancial viabilityEastern Europe and Former Soviet Union

Information

Type
Original Paper
Information
Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations , Volume 26 , Issue 1 , February 2015 , pp. 171 - 197
Copyright
Copyright © International Society for Third-Sector Research and The Johns Hopkins University 2013

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