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Economic knock-on effects of Russia’s geopolitical risk on advanced economies: a Bayesian global VAR approach

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 October 2025

Boris Blagov
Affiliation:
RWI – Leibniz Institute for Economic Research, Macroeconomics and Public Finance, Essen, Germany
Maximilian Wilhelm Dirks*
Affiliation:
RWI – Leibniz Institute for Economic Research, Macroeconomics and Public Finance, Essen, Germany
Michael Funke
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Hamburg University, Hamburg, Germany
*
Corresponding author: Maximilian Wilhelm Dirks; Email: maximilian.dirks@rwi-essen.de
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Abstract

Using a Bayesian Global VAR model as a methodological tool, we analyze how heightened geopolitical risk shocks propagate across advanced economies and quantify the economic effects of these events. The global VAR impulse response functions in response to the skyrocketing Russian geopolitical risk after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine revealed a contraction of GDP and an increase in inflation. Eastern European and Baltic countries are particularly affected by the Russian geopolitical risk shock. We also document a strong component of the Russian geopolitical risk shock that is not driven by fossil fuel prices.

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Articles
Creative Commons
Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BY
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution and reproduction, provided the original article is properly cited.
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2025. Published by Cambridge University Press
Figure 0

Figure 1. Quarterly Russian GPR index from 2000Q1 through 2024Q1.Notes: The quarterly text-mining GPR indices are calculated by the temporal aggregation of the monthly GPR indices. The GPR data were sourced from https://www.matteoiacoviello.com/gpr_country.htm.

Figure 1

Figure 2. The worldwide geopolitical risk landscape (2022Q1–2024Q1).Notes: The map shows the average GPR indices from 2022Q1 to 2024Q1 (Index: 1985Q1–2021Q4 = 1). No GPR scores are available for countries marked in gray. The country-specific GPR indices were sourced from https://www.matteoiacoviello.com/gpr_country.htm.

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Table 1. Individual countries and groups of countries in the BGVAR model

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Table 2. F-tests for weak exogeneity of the exogenous variables in the BGVAR

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Figure 3. Calculated trade shares.

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Table 3. Test for serial autocorrelation of cross-unit residuals

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Table 4. Test for pairwise cross-unit correlation of unit-model residuals

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Figure 4. Output, consumption, and investment responses to the Russian GPR shock, 2000Q1–2024Q1.Notes: Displayed are the GIRFs to the Russian GPR shock on impact and for the subsequent 24 quarters for Germany, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, the United States and Japan. Decimals represent percentage points (i.e., −0.02 equals a contraction of 2%). The shock is scaled to seven standard deviations, mimicking the increase in the GPR index in 2022Q2. The central median impulse response is indicated by the black line. The 68% and 95% confidence intervals (CI) are presented in the light blue and gray shaded areas, respectively.

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Figure 5. Output, consumption, and investment responses to the Russian GPR shock, 2000Q1–2024Q1.Notes: Displayed are the GIRFs to the Russian GPR shock on impact and for the subsequent 24 quarters for Canada, Norway, the Baltic countries, Central Eastern Europe, Nordic countries and the rest of the EEA. Decimals represent percentage points (i.e., −0.02 equals a contraction of 2%). The shock is scaled to seven standard deviations, mimicking the increase in the GPR index in 2022Q2. The central median impulse response is indicated by the black line. The 68% and 95% confidence intervals (CI) are presented in the light blue and gray shaded areas, respectively.

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Figure 6. Expectations, inflation, and interest rate responses to the Russian GPR shock, 2000Q1–2023Q2.Notes: Displayed are the GIRFs to the Russian GPR shock on impact and for the subsequent 24 quarters for Germany, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, the United States and Japan. Decimals represent percentage points (i.e., −0.02 equals a contraction of 2%). The shock is scaled to seven standard deviations, mimicking the increase in the GPR index in 2022Q2. The central median impulse response is indicated by the black line. The 68% and 95% confidence intervals (CI) are presented in the light blue and gray shaded areas, respectively.

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Figure 7. Expectations, inflation, and interest rate responses to the Russian GPR shock, 2000Q1–2024Q1.Notes: Displayed are the GIRFs to the Russian GPR shock on impact and for the subsequent 24 quarters for Canada, Norway, the Baltic countries, Central Eastern Europe, Nordic countries and the rest of the EEA. Decimals represent percentage points (i.e., −0.02 equals a contraction of 2%). The shock is scaled to seven standard deviations, mimicking the increase in the GPR index in 2022Q2. The central median impulse response is indicated by the black line. The 68% and 95% confidence intervals (CI) are presented in the light blue and gray shaded areas, respectively.

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Figure 8. Weighted aggregate output and inflation impacts on the Russian GPR shock, 2000Q1–2024Q1.Notes: The weighted aggregation was executed using purchasing power parity (PPP) USD. Displayed are the generalized impulse response functions to the Russian GPR shock on impact and for the subsequent 24 quarters. Decimals represent percentage points (i.e., −0.02 equals a contraction of 2%). The shock is scaled to seven standard deviations, mimicking the increase in the GPR index in 2022Q2. The central median impulse response is indicated by the black line. The 68% and 95% confidence intervals (CI) are presented in the light blue and gray shaded areas, respectively.

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Figure 9. Generalized forecast error variance decompositions of GDP and inflation.Notes: The figure presents results from the GEVDs, illustrating the forecast error variance proportions attributed to domestic variables (blue), the Russian GPR shock (red) and the remaining foreign variables (gray) on impact and for the subsequent 24 quarters. Displayed are the forecast error variance shares for GDP and inflation.

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Figure 10. GPR shock differences across countries.Notes: The scatterplot shows the cumulative IRF impact of the Russian GPR shock after 24 quarters on GDP (left panel) and inflation (right panel) in % plotted against the bilateral trade volume with Russia in 2019 in % of GDP. Bilateral trade data are sourced from the IMF.

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Figure A1. Generalized Impulse Responses to the Russian GPR Shock, 2000Q1–2019Q4 versus 2000Q1–2024Q1.Notes: Displayed are the GIRFS to the Russian GPR shock on impact and for the subsequent 15 quarters. Decimals represent percentage points, i.e., −0.02 equals a contraction of 2%. The shock is scaled to seven standard deviations, mimicking the increase in the GPR index in 2022Q2. The central median impulse responses are given by the solid red (data until 2019Q4) and dotted black (data until 2024Q1) lines. The 95% confidence intervals are presented by the gray and red shaded areas, respectively. The countries are labeled with three-digit ISO codes. For the compilation of the country clusters, see Table 1.

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Figure B1. Generalized Impulse Responses to the Russian GPR Shock, 2000Q1–2019Q4 versus 2000Q1–2021Q4.Notes: Displayed are the GIRFS to the Russian GPR shock on impact and for the subsequent 15 quarters. Decimals represent percentage points, i.e., −0.02 equals a contraction of 2%. The shock is scaled to seven standard deviations, mimicking the increase in the GPR index in 2023Q2. The central median impulse responses are given by the solid red (data until 2019Q4) and dotted black (data until 2024Q1) lines. The 95% confidence intervals are presented by the gray and red shaded areas, respectively. The countries are labeled with three-digit ISO codes. For the compilation of the country clusters, see Table 1.

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Figure C1. Generalized Impulse Responses to the Russian GPR Shock in the Baseline Model versus the VIX-Augmented Model.Notes: Displayed are the GIRFS to the Russian GPR shock on impact and for the subsequent 15 quarters in the baseline BGVAR Model (dotted black lines) versus the VIX-augmented BGVAR model (solid red lines). The sample period is 2000Q1–2024Q4. Decimals represent percentage points, i.e., −0.02 equals a contraction of 2%. The shock is scaled to seven standard deviations, mimicking the increase in the GPR index in 2023Q2. The 95% confidence intervals are presented by the gray and red shaded areas, respectively. The countries are labeled with three-digit ISO codes. For the compilation of the country clusters, see Table 1.