The authors apologise that upon publication of this article, the paragraphs below (from the section A. Vulnerability Theory as a General Legal Principle, p. 1101) refer twice to the name of Freeman when they should in fact refer to Fineman:

“As proposed by Freeman, vulnerability is a human condition beyond identity, departing from a discrimination approach to formal equality, in a universalism that transcends categories such as race and class.¹² This section argues that the post-identity stance of vulnerability theory is both helpful and limiting in the pandemic and while it can free policies of a set category of vulnerable groups, it can be misunderstood and dilute identity-based claims.

In brief, for Fineman’s vulnerability theory, what distinguishes each person is the resources and effective capacity to endure adversity. Freeman argues for a “responsive State” to allocate resources according to the levels of resilience needed to compensate for the vulnerability strengthened by institutions and society.¹³ This view attempts to steer clear of identity concepts by referring to complexity—how different factors converge to each individual embodied or embedded forms of vulnerability—and particularity—how this complexity materializes individually. Complexity and particularity could be easily taken as identity, but Fineman wants to use vulnerability foremost as a universal principle.”

Corrected text:

“As proposed by Fineman, vulnerability is a human condition beyond identity, departing from a discrimination approach to formal equality, in a universalism that transcends categories such as race and class.¹² This section argues that the post-identity stance of vulnerability theory is both helpful and limiting in the pandemic and while it can free policies of a set category of vulnerable groups, it can be misunderstood and dilute identity-based claims.

In brief, for Fineman’s vulnerability theory, what distinguishes each person is the resources and effective capacity to endure adversity. Fineman argues for a “responsive State” to allocate resources according to the levels of resilience needed to compensate for the vulnerability strengthened by institutions and society.¹³ This view attempts to steer clear of identity concepts by referring to complexity—how different factors converge to each individual embodied or embedded forms of vulnerability—and particularity—how this complexity materializes individually. Complexity and particularity could be easily taken as identity, but Fineman wants to use vulnerability foremost as a universal principle.”