2.1 ASCN knowledge commons resources

A growing body of research examines different ways data-driven technologies are altering lives and cities. Patterns of living, working and movement in modern cities are increasingly shaped by technology-driven firms like Airbnb and Uber (Gurran and Phibbs, Reference Gurran and Phibbs2017; Gottlieb, Reference Gottlieb2013). So far, however, any beneficial effects of these transformations have accrued primarily to the already privileged, while the collateral damage has mostly been inflicted upon the vulnerable, rendering them homeless, unemployed and/or effectively isolated from essential services (Zuboff, Reference Zuboff2019; Rainie and Anderson, Reference Rainie and Anderson2017). More vulnerable, less privileged and minority communities have also borne the brunt of injustices wrought by algorithmically determined social security decisions (Alston, Reference Alston2019), predictive policing and surveillance technologies (Shapiro, Reference Shapiro2017; Rainie and Anderson, Reference Rainie and Anderson2017; Chesterman, Reference S2020).

Despite this growing body of evidence, however, investors and planners everywhere continue to promote the efficiency and other supposed benefits of utilising smart city technologies. This is as true of smart city projects in Southeast Asia as elsewhere. The language used in regional-level ASCN policy documents is of utilising new technologies to achieve goals of sustainability, inclusivity and growth. The idea is that ASEAN smart cities will ‘invest in smart infrastructure to deliver multiple benefits across various stakeholders, … private, public [and] corporate…. [including] (i) smart utilities such as energy, … ; (ii) smart mobility and transportation’ (CLC, 2018, p. 15). Key goals emphasised include efficiency, competitiveness and security. The ASEAN Smart Cities Network policy document (CLC, 2018) contains frequent mentions of efficiency (CLC, 2018: twenty-one times) and the need to be both competitive (CLC, 2018: thirteen times) and effective (CLC, 2018: thirteen times). Thailand's smart city framework and guidance document references the need for efficiency fifty-seven times, while the desire to develop ‘a digital economy and society, in order to enhance … competitiveness’ (DEPA, 2019, p. 5) is referred to on twenty-three occasions. In Malaysia, the government's 2018 smart cities framework policy document mentions efficiency seventy-seven times, effectiveness thirty-seven times and competitiveness thirty-one times (KPKT, 2018). The ASCN Smart City Action Plans document contains twenty-eight references to efficiency, eleven to effectiveness and seven references to competitiveness (CLC and ASEAN, 2018). Security is also defined as a key goal: smart cities ‘can adopt effective technologies to solve urban security problems, strengthening … (ii) cybersecurity of networked infrastructure …, as well as (iii) public safety, city surveillance and crime prevention, among others’ (CLC, 2018, p. 15).

Such vision statements, however, run the risk of ignoring the lessons of history when it comes to ‘blank sheet’ city planning in the name of efficiency. Green (Reference Green2019/2020) highlights ‘the significant challenges faced by early smart city efforts such as Masdar City in the UAE and Songdo, South Korea, both of which remain largely desolate, not to mention the failures of earlier tabular rasa cities such as Brasilia’ (Green, Reference Green2019/2020, p. 154). Cities are not technological problems. Cities are complex ecosystems of human connections, needs and wants, shaped by culture, history and politics. Not surprisingly, therefore, successful smart city innovations have tended to be those that are cautious, tailored to meet specific local needs at a specific point in time – relating to a specific community event or local challenge (see e.g. Willis and Aurigi, Reference Willis and Aurigi2018, pp. 160–161; Green, Reference Green2019/2020, pp. 121–125). When the main goal of smart city planning is to achieve idealised goals of competitiveness and efficiency, unintended social consequences, including perpetuation of pre-existing institutional bias, can result (Zuboff, Reference Zuboff2019; Amis et al., Reference Amis, Mairn and Munir2020; Bassett, Reference Bassett2013).

A key lesson of smart city experience is that any analysis of smart city knowledge resources must begin by recognising the interconnected and interacting nature of urban systems. Transport connections are designed to intersect with demand hubs (often sub-urban and outer-urban housing estates) and typically both overlap and interconnect with information and communications technology (ICT) networks. Housing hubs create demand for essential service infrastructure, including both transport and energy. Energy systems intersect with and help shape communications infrastructure, water and sanitation systems.

The intersected nature of smart city knowledge resources is itself a source of risks, related to both physical and human rights. When systems are interconnected, a failure in one part of one system can have escalating effects, causing system-wide then potentially even city-wide failures (WHO, 2009). When the distribution of these failures, or the allocation of repair priorities in their wake, are unevenly spread, human rights impacts are also unfairly felt. Similarly, the ways in which transport systems interconnect with communications and surveillance infrastructure can also shape individual encounters with the justice system in ways that can have disproportionate impacts on certain community subgroups (Lyon, Reference Lyon2006; Morgan and Coughlan, Reference Morgan and Coughlan2018).

The creation, collection and sharing of data and other knowledge resources in smart city knowledge commons also raise issues of personal security and privacy that have significant human rights implications (Maria de Fuentes et al., Reference Maria de Fuentes2018; Huang et al., Reference Huang2017). Law enforcement arguments in favour of access to data relating to an individual's movements, energy consumption and/or health background must be weighed against the rights to privacy protect by human rights instruments (Klass and Wilson, Reference AB and EJ2016).

ASC knowledge commons will necessarily be constructed within the complex ecosystems of activities, practices and organisations that comprise the modern city. Each ASCN pilot city project will necessarily be located within a unique historical, cultural and political context. It is this context that shapes the relationship between the rights-related concerns of individuals living in ASCN pilot cities and their governance institutions. The next section of this paper thus explores the human rights concerns of ASCN pilot city communities in historical, social and political context.

2.2 ASCN pilot city community attributes

ASCN pilot city communities range from the most developed (Singapore, with USD$65,233 GDP/capita) to amongst the least prosperous (Yangon, less than USD$1,400 GDP/capita) within the ASEAN region (World Bank, 2020). ASCN pilot cities rank amongst the most heavily populated in SE Asia, including the region's largest cities of Ho Chi Minh City (population 13.3 million), Singapore (5.75 million) and Phnom Penh (2.18 million). New Yangon City will draw upon the 6.3 million current population of Yangon (AECOM, 2019). ASCN communities mostly share the attributes of the country within which they are located. Davao, for example, includes Muslim and other minority and tribal groups and languages not having any significant presence outside of the island of Mindanao, such as Maranao, Tagabawa, Matigsalog and Klata-Guiangan language groups. These include ethno-linguistic groups more closely related to those found in Sabah (Malaysia) or Indonesia (Kagan) than are found in central and northern Philippines. The population of the southern island of Mindanao, including Davao city, also includes a higher proportion of Islamic adherents than in the rest of the country, where Christianity remains the predominant religion (Garred, Reference Garred2013). In contrast, the communities of Phnom Penh and Siem Reap reflect those of broader Cambodia, both cities being around 95 per cent Khmer and around 90 per cent Buddhist, and both, like Cambodia, having a young population with a median age of around twenty-five to twenty-six years. The main difference between the two Cambodian pilot cities lies in their relative levels of economic development, with Phnom Penh being amongst Cambodia's most prosperous cities, while Siem Reap remains amongst the poorest (World Bank, 2020).

An important characteristic of city communities relates to the level of social cohesion and social trust (social capital). Social capital is defined here as ‘the features of social organisation, such as networks, norms, and trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit’ (Putnam, Reference RD1993, p. 36). Social capital can have negative as well as positive longer-term consequences. Examples include negative consequences highlighted by the COVID-19 pandemic (Schäfer et al., Reference Schäfer2020), where social networks have been both potential transmitting mechanisms for the virus and a source of strength in social resilience (see also Aldrich, Reference Aldrich, Wanglin and Galloway2017).

Social capital is often damaged or destroyed by warfare and can remain damaged for many years in post-conflict communities (Garred, Reference Garred2013; Naoyuki, Reference Naoyuki2016). Davao, Phnom Penh and Siem Reap can all be considered post-conflict communities. Few community members in Davao remained untouched by the conflict between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and Philippine government forces, not resolved until 2014 with the Bangsamoro Agreement (Garred, Reference Garred2013; Naoyuki, Reference Naoyuki2016; Kovacs et al., Reference Kovacs, Höglund and Jiménez2021). Davao's relatively greater level of ethno-linguistic and religious diversity also makes social capital linkages weaker at a city level. In Cambodia, while ‘there was a strong sense of samaki (solidarity) and community spirit’ following independence, these norms were torn apart when the country was plunged into prolonged civil armed conflict in 1970, made worse by Khmer Rouge genocide (Sen, Reference Sen2012, p. 7). Especially in the urban city of Phnom Penh, the national government's seat of power, social capital remains severely damaged. This is less so in Siem Reap, located in a more rural context, where family bonds remain relatively strong, and which is located at a distance from national authorities. In Myanmar, the 2021 coup is having a devastating impact on the nation's relatively young population, including in Yangon.

Cities with low levels of social capital fared worst during the pandemic (Makridis and Wu, Reference Makridis and Wu2021). The ties existing throughout high social capital communities were instrumental in facilitating the effectiveness of public health measures. Social capital relationships were also instrumental in mobilising available reserves to overcome shortages of essential goods and personnel. ‘Unnecessary’ reserves, whether of personnel or supplies, have typically been considered inefficient ‘redundancies’ in supply chains and human resource management. Efforts have therefore been directed towards eliminating such reserves through ‘just-in-time’ sourcing and ‘lean’ staffing levels. These ‘efficiencies’, however, have resulted in fragile systems that have then broken down in times of crises. During the 2020 pandemic, supply chains collapsed, hospital and other essential public services were left under-staffed, and social trust in government messaging failed.

The resilient operation of smart city systems thus depends upon levels of shared trust amongst community members and between community members and local authorities. Local authorities, in turn, may well be tied into contractual relationships with private-sector owners and operators of public utilities and/or transport infrastructure. Only if system users trust those responsible for the operation of a system are they likely also to trust other users of the system. Conversely, loss of trust in one operator/aspect of the system can have destructive cascading impacts (Navarro-Carrillo et al., Reference Navarro-Carrillo2018; Hasel, Reference Hasel2013; Ali, Reference Ali2016; Aldrich, Reference Aldrich, Wanglin and Galloway2017). Social trust is intimately related to community member feelings of empowerment, involvement and engagement. Citizen involvement and engagement, in turn, are shaped by the institutions, rules and culture of city governance.

2.3 Governance features of ASCN pilot projects

Smart city development is often seen as an opportunity to enable a new relationship between citizens and city governance. Even those most critical of algorithmic governance models on the basis of threats posed to human rights, democratic and rule-of-law principles are likely to use those same models in an effort to enhance compliance with those same principles (Backer and McQuilla, in this issue). Governance goals regularly appear as a theme in discussions of smart city planning, with social inclusion and participatory forms of governance increasingly popular since the mid-2010s (Malek et al., Reference Malek2021; Simonofski et al., Reference Simonofski2019; 2021; Willems et al., Reference Willems, Andeßner, Greiling and Vogel2017; Vácha et al., Reference Vácha2016; Ansell and Gash, Reference Ansell and Gash2008; Romzek et al., Reference Romzek2012; Davis, Reference Davis, Butler and Schultz2019; Renckens, Reference Renckens2020). Recent literature has placed particular emphasis on ‘the importance of citizen's participation’ and the need for ‘active involvement of all stakeholders in the smartification of the city’ (Vácha et al., Reference Vácha2016, p. 1, emphasis in original). The belief is that ‘smart cities often do not optimally reach their objectives if the citizens, the end-users, are not involved in their design’ (Simonofski et al., Reference Simonofski2019).

In line with this trend, ASCN policy documents outline goals that ostensibly include ‘multiple collaborative governance mechanisms that actively engage national, sub-national and local governments, all groups of society, including youth, women and grassroots organizations and particularly the excluded, vulnerable and disadvantaged groups’ (KPKT, 2018, p. 9).

Both the Phnom Penh and the New Yangon City plans describe governance goals that include promotion of social inclusivity (Global Green Growth Institute, 2018; AECOM, 2019). The Phnom Penh Sustainable City Plan 2018–2030 (2019) outlines goals that include the desire to ‘increase social inclusion, reduce poverty levels and improve urban welfare’ (Global Green Growth Institute, 2018, p. 2). Social inclusion is defined (in a footnote) as:

However, evidence demonstrating that smart city systems in fact benefit the most disadvantaged is either absent from ASCN policy documents or ambiguous at best (e.g. Global Green Growth Institute, 2018, p. 10). Despite the positive rhetoric and ambitious aims, there is recognition of the negative impacts that profit-driven city development has had on the vulnerable ‘continuation of privatized development remains a risk for Phnom Penh's urban land-use and the vulnerability of its urban poor’ (Global Green Growth Institute, 2018, p. 2; see also p. 10).

Analysis of key ASCN policy and planning documents also reveals that governance aspects of ASCN pilot projects are driven by ‘top-down’ design approaches. The governance goals of ASCN pilot city projects are mostly couched in terms of ‘economic efficiency, the evaluation of results, rational design of institutions and bureaucratic or discretionary modes of pursuing generalized public interests’ (Morgan, Reference Morgan2007, p. 1). The risk is that governance rules and institutions shaped by such considerations of efficiency and the achievement of generalised city-level goals will result in ‘social practice that restricts rights’ (Morgan, Reference Morgan2007, p. 1).

The words ‘growth’, ‘development’ and ‘efficiency’ appear prominently in city Master Plans for Davao (ALMEC et al., 2018), New Yangon City (AECOM, 2019), Phnom Penh (Global Green Growth Institute, 2018) and Phuket (DEPA, 2019). ‘Participation’ receives only passing mention, mostly in relation to the private sector. There is little, or typically no, mention of concerns more typical of human rights advocates and scholars: questions of citizen voice, mobilisation or social change receive no mention. When these latter concerns are not recognised and not adequately addressed, the danger is that ASCN governance goals will ignore the basic tension that exists between ‘inclusive’ or ‘participatory’ forms of governance and protection of minority rights. As Vácha et al. (Reference Vácha2016) warn, this can result in ‘misuse of participation’, which ‘can lead to more damage than no participation at all’ (p. 1).

The absence of citizen participation initiatives in ASCN pilot projects is in line with findings by Malek et al. (Reference Malek2021) in their comprehensive survey of the literature on social inclusion indicators in smart city projects. The authors found that ‘the acceptance of social inclusion indicators was mainly limited to the realm of democratic developed countries’ (Malek et al., Reference Malek2021, p. 376). This finding is supported by studies of smart city projects in the developed democracies of Sweden and Belgium (Simonofski et al., Reference Simonofski2021), London (Willems et al., Reference Willems, Andeßner, Greiling and Vogel2017), the US (Halegoua, Reference Halegoua2020) and Taiwan (Luque-Ayala and Marvin, Reference Luque-Ayala and Marvin2020, chapter 8). In contrast, social inclusion indicators tend not to be welcomed in emerging and developing countries, including those of Southeast Asia (Malek et al., Reference Malek2021, p. 376). In the ASEAN context, governance, including governance perspectives on citizen engagement, is top-down, shaped by national and regional approaches, and by leaders’ understanding of citizenship (Malek et al., Reference Malek2021; Renshaw, Reference Renshaw2019).

City-level governance institutions interact with provincial and national-level governance rules and structures. These interactions can be close, as in Singapore, where the smart city overlaps with national boundaries, or more remote, such as in Davao City or Kota Kinabalu, where the seat of national government is relatively distant. Yet the very nature of knowledge resources means that even where geographically distant, national governments can remain connected to, and can influence and control, smart city governance institutions. In Southeast Asia, national government policies and priorities are, in turn, shaped by regional (ASEAN) inter-governmental arrangements and agreements.

At the regional level, ASEAN governance dynamics and institutions have not always been consistent with protection of human rights, including protection of minority group interests (Davies, Reference Davies2013; Tan, Reference Tan2011; Renshaw, Reference Renshaw2013; Reference Renshaw2019; Hara, Reference Hara2019). Thus, when the ten state members of ASEAN adopted the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration in November 2012, they affirmed ‘all the civil and political rights in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’, but did so subject to the qualification that ‘the realisation of human must be considered in the regional and national context bearing in mind different political, economic, legal social, cultural, historical and religious backgrounds’ (Art. 7).

Similarly, when affirming ‘all the economic, social and cultural rights in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’, ASEAN leaders agreed that each Member State ‘should take steps, individually and through regional and international assistance and cooperation, …, with a view to achieving progressively the full realisation of economic, social and cultural rights recognised in this Declaration’ (Art. 33, emphasis added), while at the same time reserving the right for individual national governments to ‘determine the extent to which they would guarantee the economic and social rights found in this Declaration to non-nationals, with due regard to … the organisation and resources of their respective national economies’ (Art. 34).

Examples of how these reservations give rise to tensions between national governance institutions and minority rights include laws excluding certain sections of the Rohingya population in Myanmar from enjoying citizenship rights. There has also been an increasing tendency in recent years to resort ‘to repressive new laws that are said to protect national security but in practice imperil human rights’ (Amnesty International, 2016; see also HRW, 2016; Pennington, Reference Pennington2020; Amnesty International, 2014). Even before pandemic emergency declarations were issued in 2020, increasingly oppressive blasphemy laws (Amnesty International, 2014) and a new National Security Council Act 2016 were introduced in Indonesia and Malaysia, respectively. Other ASEAN nations witnessing an increasingly authoritarian use of national security and censorship laws include Vietnam (Onishi, Reference Onishi2020; HRF, 2020), Myanmar (Official Secrets Act; Unlawful Associations Act; Al Jazeera, 2019; Mahla and Noor, Reference Mahla and Noor2020), the Philippines (Anti-Terrorism Act 2020;Footnote ² Amnesty International, 2020; McCarthy, Reference McCarthy2020; Mendoza and Romano, Reference Mendoza and Romano2020) and Cambodia (Louise, Reference Louise2020; Rinith, Reference Rinith2020).

The limited version of human rights protection within broader ASEAN governance institutions (Hara, Reference Hara2019; Renshaw, Reference Renshaw2019) now forms an integral part of the ASCN vision. The umbrella ASCN planning document issued by ASEAN in 2018 states that ‘[t]he ASCN will adopt an inclusive approach to smart city development that is respectful of human rights and fundamental freedoms as inscribed in the ASEAN Charter’ (CLC, 2018, p. 10, emphasis added). In this context, it is particularly important to identify tensions arising between declared ASCN governance objectives and protection of human rights, and to begin considering how those tensions might be resolved.

A focus on technology as a governance tool is one source of tension. While some studies find that technological change is one of the two most important drivers of inequality since 1970 (UNIDO, 2015; Jovanovic, Reference Jovanovic2009), others conclude that the effects of technological change are a more complex mixture of both good and bad (ESCAP, 2018). An EU proposal for regulation of artificial intelligence (AI) recognises these complexities (European Commission, 2018; 2020). It notes that different types of risks are posed by AI in different sectors – transport, energy, health care or law and order (European Commission, 2018; 2020; High Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence, 2019). AI applications that have human rights impacts (direct or indirect) include those affecting privacy, freedom of assembly, movement and expression, and access to essential services (like clean water and electricity).

The central principle put forward in the EU proposals is that the greater the risks posed to basic rights by an AI application, the greater should be the degree of regulation that application faces. Such regulation would cover everything from the data used to train the AI and how records are kept, to how transparent the creators and operators of the system must be, testing for robustness and accuracy, and requirements for independent human oversight. Mechanisms for human oversight should include certification and assurances not only that the AI system is safe, but also that it does not lead to discriminatory outcomes or outcomes that would otherwise constitute a breach of basic human rights. When it comes to managing the disruptive effects of new AI systems, the European Commission has emphasised the centrality of ‘an ecosystem of trust’ (European Commission, 2018; 2020; High Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence, 2019).

The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) has also turned its collective mind to the ethics of autonomous and intelligent systems (A/IS), with a particular emphasis on large and interconnected systems such as those found in smart city ecosystems. Ethically Aligned Design (IEEE, 2019) is a publication of the IEEE Global Initiative on Ethics of A/IS. EAD 2019 outlines eight key principles for AI systems design, including, at the top of the list, human rights and human well-being. ‘Political freedom and democracy’ and ‘government accountability’ are both recognised as key elements of human well-being. Yet this recognition is subject to ‘the cultural precepts of individual societies’ (IEEE, 2019, p. 10). Issues of redistributive justice are not addressed but are left for determination by human actors living in local, relational and essentially political contexts.

Accountability and transparency are central challenges of smart city governance. Many of these issues arise from new and increasing divisions of labour built into algorithmic governance models, including the smart city model. Those who harvest data may not be the same as those who develop analytics (Backer and McQuilla, in this issue), while smart city infrastructures may be underwritten by national and local governments but owned and/or operated by private actors. Accountability gaps are then highlighted when network system failures or breakdown occur. Which level of government bears the cost of infrastructure network failures may then depend upon a federated nation's constitutional division of powers and responsibilities. In Sarawak, liability for the fallout from the illegal use of fake covers for smart electricity meters in Miri was assumed primarily by Sarawak Energy, the state government agency. Sarawak Energy and its utility arm Syarikat Sesco Berhad (Sesco) bore estimated annual losses of RM80 million in 2018 and 2019 arising from the fraud, as well as the costs of conducting meter inspection operations across the state in an attempt to curb the public safety risks arising from the meter tampering (Sarawak Energy, 2018; 2019). The scale of the fraud was such, however, that national government agencies (including the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission, the Ministry of Utilities and the Polis Di Raja Malaysia) also became involved.

Beyond accountability, there are the longer-term governance risks that may arise from declining levels of public trust in government agencies. Simply increasing the amount of lighting and the number of CCTV cameras in public spaces, for example, is unlikely to change levels of reporting of personal crimes affecting women and/or minority groups without a simultaneous change in policing cultures. Moreover, while there may be short-term successes, CCTV's long-term effectiveness in deterring criminal behaviour is still inconclusive and disputed internationally (Surveillance & Society, 2009). CCTV instalment alone does not tackle the underlying causes of violence or crime. Crime prevention technologies may simply result in the displacement and relocation of crime and its consequences (Lim and Wilcox, Reference Lim and Wilcox2017). Likewise, surveillance technologies used to address family violence may make the victim temporarily safer in one context while increasing the extent of her isolation or exposure to danger in other contexts (Overington, Reference Overington2017).

Issues of accountability and transparency also arise in constructing the legal relationship between government agencies and commercial suppliers of infrastructure and services (Yuan, Reference Yuan2020). These relationships can become particularly fraught when the interests of foreign states are implicated (Strangio, Reference Strangio2020; Hiebert, Reference Hiebert2020; Jamrisko, Reference Jamrisko2019). In the ASEAN smart city context, Japan's International Cooperation Agency has partnered with local actors to develop sustainable and smart city plans for Davao (ALMEC et al., 2018), New Yangon City (AECOM, 2019), Phnom Penh (Global Green Growth Institute, 2018) and Siem Reap (Siem Reap Provisional Government et al., 2010). All of these planning documents, not surprisingly, incorporate Japanese models of successful smart city infrastructure (including high-speed rail, sustainable water supply and waste management systems). Funding from the Japanese Overseas Development Agency supports water system development in Siem Reap (Siem Reap Provisional Government et al., 2010). Davao has partnered with the Japanese External Trade Organization (JETRO) and the Japanese Chamber of Commerce in Mindanao (JCCM) and signed a Green Sister City Cooperation agreement with Kitakyushu, the northernmost city on Japan's Kyushu Island (ALMEC et al., 2018, pp. 10–26, 10–32).

In Thailand, on the other hand, it is China's Huawei that has partnered with the national Digital Economy Promotion Agency (DEPA) to develop the 2018 White Paper on smart city development in Phuket. According to Huawei's 2018 Annual Report, the firm has played an active role, ‘contributing ideas to Thailand's Digital Economy and Society Commission regarding new technologies such as 5G, cloud and big data and engaging in government flagship projects’ (p. 63). Huawei's involvement in Southeast Asian infrastructure projects remains controversial (Thu, Reference Thu2019), caught up in broader controversies surrounding China's regional statecraft (Parameswaran, Reference Parameswaran2019).

Competing bids from Japanese-backed investors and Chinese-backed investment for infrastructure projects have generated political controversy and dissension within and between ASEAN member nations (Jamrisko, Reference Jamrisko2019; Hiebert, Reference Hiebert2020; Strangio, Reference Strangio2020). Both China and Japan have placed infrastructure at the heart of their regional strategies in a new era of infrastructure diplomacy. China's flagship Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was launched in 2013, while Japan announced its ‘Partnership for Quality Infrastructure’ in 2015 (Abe, 2015). ASEAN nations, reorienting their growth strategies towards prioritising infrastructure, have proven receptive (Prasad, Reference Prasad2018). Japanese involvement is highest in Vietnam, which has proven most resistant to China's overtures, while Chinese bids have been far more successful in Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines (Jamrisko, Reference Jamrisko2019; Strangio, Reference Strangio2020; Hiebert, Reference Hiebert2020). There remains little consensus within ASEAN on how to deal with Chinese firms, including Huawei, that have been blocked from bidding for major infrastructure projects in the US and other major Western economies (Kaushik, Reference Kaushik2020). Nor is there any indication that ASEAN nations will alter their traditional diplomatic balancing of great power and regional and domestic relationships (Strangio, Reference Strangio2020; Hiebert, Reference Hiebert2020) and it remains unlikely that any united approach will be developed that might diffuse contentious political aspects of particular projects.

The importance of a whole-of-society approach to smart city development is highlighted in a 2018 McKinsey Global Institute discussion paper (McKinsey & Company, 2018). Acknowledging the interconnected nature of all key domains of smart city infrastructure, the rest of this study takes a closer look at the domains of mobility (transport infrastructure) and energy supply.