I. Introduction
The European Union (EU) has transformed “sustainability” into a binding legal objective. Under Article 3(3) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) the EU “shall work for the sustainable development of Europe,” while Article 11 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) obliges every EU policy field to integrate environmental protection. To operationalise those constitutional commitments, the European Climate Law establishes binding targets, requiring at least 55 per cent net-emission reduction by 2030 and climate neutrality by 2050.Footnote 1 The Commission’s twin-transition narrativeFootnote 2 links that climate trajectory to digitalisation, presenting the combined digital-and-green overhaul as a route to long-term European competitiveness.Footnote 3
Within this framework the investment term “ESG” has acquired hard-law status.Footnote 4 The Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CRSD)Footnote 5 obliges undertakings to report against twelve European Sustainability Reporting Standards (ESRS) that disaggregate into individual datapoints.Footnote 6 The Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation (SFDR), the Taxonomy Regulation and the forthcoming Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD) layer sector-specific duties on investors and supply-chain operators.Footnote 7
The data-collection model that feeds these obligations is decentralised and duplicative. For example, each firm mines its own supplier network for Scope 3 emissions, human-rights metrics and biodiversity impacts, generating parallel questionnaires and mounting compliance costs. But perhaps the biggest challenge for ESG investing and integration is the lack of consistent, transparent, and standardised sustainability data, making it difficult for investors to assess companies reliably and opening a “black box” of unclear ratings and reporting.Footnote 8 The Commission’s 2024 survey on SFDR implementation highlighted data gaps, legal uncertainty, and comparability issues – especially due to misalignments with other ESG frameworks – as primary hurdles to effective ESG disclosure.Footnote 9
To address these systemic issues, centralised or semi-centralised ESG data-sharing platforms have been proposed, promising efficiency through standardised data collection, audit-ready inputs, and cost reductions, particularly for SMEs. Such platforms could underpin the envisioned Green Deal Data Space, but depending on the way these are realised,Footnote 10 their implementation may introduce significant competition-law risks, such as facilitating tacit collusion or creating barriers through discriminatory access conditions.Footnote 11
Recent enforcement practice suggests the obstacle is surmountable. The Dutch banking sector’s joint project to standardise ESRS interpretation was informally cleared by the Duch Authority for Consumers & Markets because participation was voluntary, information was aggregated, and access was open.Footnote 12
Building upon these developments, this paper argues that EU competition law, appropriately structured, should not hinder but rather facilitate the establishment of an EU-wide Green Deal data space.Footnote 13 Specifically, it identifies key design principles as critical to ensuring that large-scale ESG data sharing can be both efficient and competition-compliant.
II. ESG disclosure obligations and their operational risks
1. ESG data requirements on EU level
Societal, political and legal focus on environmental and social issues has increased significantly.Footnote 14 Leading to amongst others a Climate law on the EU level, which goals are to: (i) make the EU’s climate, energy, transport and taxation policies fit for reducing net greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55 per cent by 2030, compared to 1990 levels and (ii) ensure the EU is to become the first climate-neutral continent by 2050.Footnote 15
In order to achieve those legally binding goals, it is key that a shift is made towards more sustainable production and consumption. In turn, to be able to make this shift it is a prerequisite that companies have insights in the risks and opportunities arising from social and environmental issues, and on the impact of their activities on people and the environment.Footnote 16 Moreover, in order to enable stakeholders like consumers, civil society organisations and investors to make sustainable choices, greater transparency and disclosure regarding companies’ ethical practices is required.Footnote 17 To this end several rules have been introduced.
What these rules have in common is that they require companies to collect sustainability data from their supply chains. For example, the Taxonomy Regulation requires companies to include in its non-financial statement information on how and to what extent the company’s activities are associated with economic activities that qualify as environmentally sustainable as defined in the regulation.Footnote 18 The SFDR requires reporting about principal adverse impacts on investment decisions on sustainability factors and on due diligence policies with respect to those impacts, although limited to financial market participants.Footnote 19 The CSRD requires a double materiality assessment which means that companies must identify and report about both their impacts on people and environment (material impact) as well as the sustainability matters that financially impact the company (financial impact).Footnote 20 Exactly what companies must report is detailed in the ESRS.Footnote 21 The ESRS contain twelve standards covering everything from climate change to workforce. The CSDD, in turn, requires companies to publish an annual statement on their website in which companies are expected to describe (i) their due diligence policies and processes, (ii) the identified potential and actual adverse impacts, (iii) the measures taken to address these impacts and (iv) a transition plan for combating climate change.Footnote 22 Other than the formalities listed above, the CSDDD provides no clarity on the information and level of detail that should be included in the CSDDD report. The European Commission must issue delegated act(s) clarifying the specific content and criteria for the CSDDD report by March 2027.Footnote 23
2. Implementation of ESG data requirements
In our view, above reporting obligations imply a sort of sustainability “know your customer” requirement to be able to identify, and report about, ESG risks. This means that companies that fall within the scope of these ESG regulations must (continuously) collect data not only of their own activities, but also from customers and other relationships within the chain of the undertaking’s activities. The regulatory duty to “know your customer” morphs into a business risk in two steps: (i) legislators turn ESG criteria into mandatory datapoints; and (ii) firms, unable to obtain or verify them, face enforcement penalties and green-washing litigation. The subsection below traces that causal chain.
To start with the datapoints: the amount of those ESG datapoints is vast. The European Financial Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG) delineated the 12 standards of ESRS into approximately 1,191 individual qualitative and quantitative datapoints.Footnote 24
One of the hurdles companies seem to encounter in complying with the rules is that the collection and management of so much data is complex and requires the right analytical tools or expertise to handle the ESG data which not all companies might have. Moreover, that information must be available. At the moment, it seems that not all the information needed is sufficiently available.Footnote 25 Companies often rely on complex global supply chains, and obtaining ESG data from them, or other partners, might be challenging, especially in emerging markets. Even if the information is available, a third hurdle is that the information might be inconsistent or unreliable. That is partly because there are different measurement and reporting frameworks worldwide,Footnote 26 with limited guidance on EU levelFootnote 27 while there is a lack of legal clarity regarding key ESG conceptsFootnote 28 and about more basic notions, such as whether commuting distance should be included when reporting on distance traveled and whether the outcome of standards should be expressed in euros or kilotons CO2.Footnote 29 Also, it is not always clear what calculation methods and data sources can be used as reliable sources to work out a criterion, like scope 3 emissions.Footnote 30 A survey (2024) under the previously enacted Directive on Non-financial reporting found, for example, that 60 per cent of the respondents labelled information as unreliable.Footnote 31
The above bears the risk of companies using different interpretations, swamping customers and other business relations with requests for ESG data, likely on the basis of different interpretations, probably leading to reports that become incomparable due to those different interpretations and may contain errors and omissions.Footnote 32 As a result, it becomes more difficult for investors, civil society organisations, consumers and other stakeholders to evaluate the sustainability performance of companies. In turn, this might lead to insufficient progress to achieve the sustainability goals the EU has set.Footnote 33 The following quote from the summary report of the consultations on the implementation of the SFDR illustrates this:
However, 77% of respondents also highlighted key limitations of the framework such as lack of legal clarity regarding key concepts, limited relevance of certain disclosure requirements and issues linked to data availability. According to many respondents, these limitations have hindered the effectiveness and usability of the framework.Footnote 34
On top of this all, complying with ESG regulations can entail high administrative costs. Identifying ESG risks in the supply chain, such as human rights violations or environmental impacts, requires extensive due diligence, which can be time-consuming and costly in itself even without the hurdles mentioned. Especially since it is not a one-time exercise but an ongoing process. This is apart from the costs involved in handling data in general (like compliance with privacy rules). In addition, companies risk being accused of greenwashing if their ESG claims are not well substantiated. This can lead to reputational damage and loss of trust among consumers and investors.
III. Two strategic approaches that could transform ESG data management
In the previous section, it was shown that there is a need for efficient methods for collecting and sharing sustainability data. A Dutch SEO report titled “Increased sustainability by digitalisation” (Duurzamer door Digitalisering) (2023), prepared at the request of the Dutch government, highlights the untapped potential of data sharing in optimising material use and advancing sustainability goals. However, this potential remains largely unrealised due to the absence of policies that incentivise data sharing among private entities.Footnote 35 Without a structured approach, opportunities for significant sustainability gains are missed, particularly as companies grapple with the resource-intensive processes of ESG data collection and reporting. This section explores two strategic approaches that can significantly enhance the management and transparency of ESG data, thereby addressing the inefficiencies and risks of inconsistent reporting identified in the current system.
1. Enhanced collaboration among companies within the same sector
A first approach would be enhanced collaboration within industries. When companies within the same sector work together, they can achieve improvements in efficiency, data accuracy and regulatory compliance. This collaborative approach facilitates the harmonisation of reporting practices, particularly in areas like ESG data, enabling consistency and reducing redundancy. It also allows for the sharing of best practices, the development of standardised methodologies, and the pooling of resources.
A practical example of this collaborative approach can be found in the Dutch banking sector, where banks work together for their ESG reports. Supported by the Dutch Association of Banks (Nederlandse Vereniging van Banken or NVB) and informally assessed by the Dutch Authority for Consumers & Markets (Autoriteit Consument en Markt or ACM), this initiative demonstrates how sector-wide collaboration can be compliant with the competition rules and beneficial from a sustainability point of view.Footnote 36 The banks developed a data project to interpret ESG criteria, establish suitable and reliable calculation methods and data sources.Footnote 37 This effort was amongst others aimed at addressing the challenges posed by the CSRD, potentially increasing the comparability of ESG reports across the sector and ensuring that meaningful progress is made toward sustainability goals.Footnote 38
The ACM’s analysis confirmed that this initiative does not pose significant risks to competition, provided that participation remains voluntary, the initiative is open to all competitors, and no sensitive competitive information is exchanged. The focus on objective criteria and transparency were key factors in mitigating potential anti-competitive concerns in addition to the fact that each bank remains responsible for its own ESG report.Footnote 39
This example from the banking sector illustrates that such a collaborative model could be expanded to other industries, where shared methodologies aligned with regulatory expectations could improve the quality of ESG disclosures.
The Dutch government’s Action Plan for Sustainable Digitalisation, particularly Action 2.b.1, aims to build on this concept of collaboration.Footnote 40 The plan proposes to gather insights from existing data-sharing initiatives across both public and private sectors, with the goal of developing a framework that the government can use to stimulate and facilitate data sharing. By doing so, the plan seeks to unlock the sustainable potential of data sharing, helping industries to better align with the CSRD and CSDDD directives.Footnote 41
Other industries have already begun exploring similar collaborative approaches. For instance, in the Netherlands the agriculture and food industry has initiated platforms for sharing data on sustainable farming practices, such as the worldwide Partnership for Biodiversity Accounting Financials (PBAF), which aims to standardise the calculation and reporting of biodiversity impacts.Footnote 42 The energy sector, too, has developed shared platforms for tracking and reporting carbon emissions and renewable energy usage, with initiatives like the international Net-Zero Data Public Utility leading the way. Net-Zero Data Public Utility is a specialised platform that aggregates data on carbon emissions and renewable energy use. These examples further illustrate the growing trend across various sectors to adopt data-sharing platforms, enhancing sustainability efforts while ensuring compliance with evolving regulatory standards.
By following these examples and leveraging the lessons learned from the banking sector’s collaborative approach to ESG reporting, the Dutch government can foster similar initiatives across other industries, thereby maximising the impact of digitalisation on sustainability and ensuring that regulatory compliance is both efficient and effective.
2. Centralised sustainability data sharing platforms
A second approach to enhance the management and transparency of ESG data would be to centralise ESG data with the use of data sharing platforms. The growing market for sustainability information, driven by new obligations under frameworks like the CSRD, underscores the increasing importance of third-party data providers. As these obligations expand, the market for sustainability data is expected to grow, necessitating the availability of data at reasonable costs.Footnote 43 This environment creates a compelling case for moving beyond collaboration within sectors (see previous paragraph) to more centralised data management solutions. Centralised or partially centralised data platforms could standardise ESG data, making it accessible to a broader range of stakeholders, including regulators, investors, and companies, thereby enhancing data comparability and reducing redundancy.
Centralisation can be achieved in various ways. One approach is the creation of private centralised databases. These platforms could be managed by industry consortia or third-party providers and would serve as repositories where companies can submit standardised data, accessible by multiple users. Several existing examples illustrate the potential and limitations of this approach:
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Bloomberg’s Terminal is a comprehensive resource for ESG data, extensively used by large financial institutions.Footnote 44
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The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) Database allows any organisation to submit their sustainability data.Footnote 45 However, because it relies heavily on self-reported data, there may be issues with the consistency and comparability of the information provided.
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In the financial sector, the CDP (formerly the Carbon Disclosure Project) operates a global disclosure system that encourages companies to report their environmental impacts, focusing primarily on metrics such as greenhouse gas emissions, water use, and deforestation.Footnote 46 While CDP is renowned for its rigorous and comprehensive environmental data, its coverage of social and governance factors appears more limited compared to its environmental focus. This emphasis aligns with CDP’s origins as an environmental reporting platform, though they have been gradually integrating broader ESG elements.
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The Open Supply Hub, an open system run by a non-profit organisation, designed to map supply chains and increase transparency. It is currently limited to data relating to the production of goods and also relies on data reported by stakeholders and publicly available datasets.Footnote 47
Private centralised databases for ESG data offer several advantages, such as enabling quick access to standardised and consolidated information from multiple sources, which can enhance the efficiency of decision-making for companies and investors. These platforms also provide valuable financial insights, especially for larger entities that can invest in more comprehensive datasets to improve their compliance and reporting processes. Additionally, industry-specific data available through these platforms helps companies align their sustainability efforts with sector-specific requirements.
However, these (types of) databases also present some limitations. Access appears to come at a significant cost, which may limit their availability to smaller organisations. Moreover, in some cases, the reliance on self-reported data can lead to variations in the consistency and comparability of the information provided. This may impact on the scope and overall reliability of the data, potentially making it more challenging to standardise ESG reporting across different sectors.
Public databases like the European Environment Agency’s (EEA) data repository already provide a wealth of environmental data that is freely accessible.Footnote 48 However, these databases often lack the granularity and sector-specific focus needed for comprehensive ESG reporting. Moreover, they are generally limited to environmental data and do not cover the full spectrum of ESG criteria.Footnote 49 Another relevant example is the OpenCorporates database, which aggregates data on corporate structures and ownership from around the world.Footnote 50 While it provides valuable transparency and is freely accessible, its focus appears primarily on corporate governance and financial data, with less emphasis on environmental and social metrics.Footnote 51
The limitations of these private and public databases highlight the potential benefits of public centralised databases. For example, the EU’s efforts to create a Common European Green Deal Data Space aim to integrate fragmented green data infrastructures across the EU into a cohesive system. This initiative could provide a public platform for ESG data that is accessible to all relevant stakeholders at minimal or no cost, ensuring that data is both comprehensive and comparable across sectors.Footnote 52
By aligning private or public centralised data management with broader European initiatives like the Common European Green Deal Data Space, the EU can ensure that data-driven sustainability efforts contribute effectively to its overarching environmental and economic goals. Centralised data platforms, whether private or public, offer the potential to significantly enhance the quality, comparability, and accessibility of sustainability data, depending on the kind of data included in the database, provided they are implemented with careful consideration of the associated risks and aligned with broader European data strategies.Footnote 53
IV. Competition-law assessment
1. Cartel prohibition and information exchange
One of the key features of a Common European Green Deal Data Space is that European rules and values are fully respected, including the competition rules.Footnote 54 Under these rules, companies may, for example, not enter into anti-competitive agreements or concerted practices that distort competition (cartel prohibition).Footnote 55
When using a shared database, information is inherently exchanged.Footnote 56 Probable competitors contribute data to the database, in addition to other sources, like governments and NGOs.
All agreements and exchanges of information between actual or potential competitors that reduce strategic uncertainty in the market can, however, be seen as anti-competitive. Whether this is the case depends on several factors. Generally, information around prices, costs, turnover, capacity, production, quantities, market shares, customers, marketing plans, but also plans to enter or exit markets, or other important elements of a firm’s strategy is considered commercially sensitive.Footnote 57 In the context of sustainability we think for example of a company’s plans to adopt a specific sustainable strategy or promotional plan or investments in sustainable equipment or technology. This includes digital data sharing, in all possible forms and models of data access, including data pools, where data holders group together to share data.Footnote 58 Moreover, the cartel prohibition also applies to information exchanged via third parties (such as a service provider, platform, online tool) or via a website, to give some examples.Footnote 59
2. Database without commercially sensitive information
To avoid violating the cartel prohibition, one option is to set up a database which does not include competitive sensitive information. As long as the database does not reduce uncertainty regarding recent or future actions of competitors in the market, it will not amount to an exchange of commercially sensitive information.Footnote 60 For example, a database containing general information about suppliers that have (un)sustainable value chains (for instance, suppliers that respect labour rights or pay living wages); use (un)sustainable production processes, or supply (un)sustainable inputs, or information about distributors that market products in a(n) (un)sustainable manner, will in general not restrict competition and fall outside the scope of the cartel prohibition.Footnote 61 The Dutch-bank collaboration cited earlier illustrates how a shared database can avoid competitively sensitive material: the participating banks confine their exchange to interpretations of ESG criteria, calculation methods and data sources, never customer data, and each institution decides independently how to apply those ESG criteria in its own sustainability report.
3. Database as a compliance agreement?
What if the exchange of commercially sensitive information is nevertheless required to set up the desired database? An option is to set up a database solely aimed at ensuring compliance with sustainability due diligence obligations. Sustainability compliance agreements fall outside of the scope of the cartel prohibition. According to the Commission:
[sustainability] agreements that aim solely to ensure compliance with sufficiently precise requirements or prohibitions in legally binding international treaties, agreements or conventions, whether or not they have been implemented in national law (for example, compliance with fundamental social rights or prohibitions on the use of child labour, the logging of certain types of tropical wood or the use of certain pollutants) and which are not fully implemented or enforced by a signatory State, fall outside the scope of Article 101. This exclusion from Article 101 only applies if the agreement provides that the participating undertakings, their suppliers and/or their distributors must comply with such requirements or prohibitions, for example, by preventing, reducing or eliminating the production or importation into the EU of products contrary to such requirements or prohibitions. Footnote 62
This option, of compliance agreements, requires, however, that several criteria set out above are met. Amongst others it must concern sufficiently precise requirements or prohibitions in legally binding treaties, agreements or conventions. Not all ESG datapoints are, however, mandatory for all companies. In addition, some key concepts are based on international open norms. Like the requirement to take “appropriate measures,”Footnote 63 which sometimes depends on “reasonable expectations.”Footnote 64 These requirements might make it more difficult to argue that a database regards a compliance agreement while not yet having discussed the other criteria. In a situation of mere encouragement by law or by public authorities to share information with other companies, or where companies still have discretion in deciding what information to share with other companies, the cartel prohibition continues to apply.Footnote 65
4. Database with commercially sensitive information
Does this mean that a database which requires the exchange of commercially sensitive information is forbidden? No, not per se. Data sharing arrangements to which different competitors contribute data generally do not amount to a restriction of competition by object if it is established that they have genuine pro-competitive effects.Footnote 66 This might for example be different if the database is used as a means to agree on subjective interpretations of ESG criteria to enable the participants to come across more sustainable in their ESG reports than they would have on the basis of objective criteria.Footnote 67 This can be avoided by ensuring the robustness of a calculation method chosen and the reliability (accuracy and precision) of the data. For example, by checking data sourcesFootnote 68 or at least being transparent about it and show that an “best effort” has been made.Footnote 69
Whether a database would have a competition restrictive effect depends on whether it artificially increases transparency between competitors in the markets, which can facilitate coordination of companies’ behaviour and result in restrictions of competition.Footnote 70 Moreover, information exchange can also lead to anti-competitive foreclosure. For example, a database that covers a significant part of the relevant market and to which access is denied or delayed for other competitors may create an information asymmetry, placing those other competitors at a disadvantage compared to the companies that participate in the database.Footnote 71 This is especially true if access is denied to smaller players who may lack the resources, technical skills or infrastructure to collect data.
Whether a shared database can indeed have the effect of restricting competition depends on the economic conditions on the relevant market(s) and on the specific characteristics of the database concerned. These characteristics include the purpose of the database and the conditions of access to and participation in it, as well as the type of information exchanged.Footnote 72 For example, whether it is public or confidential, aggregated or detailed, historical, current or future information, the frequency with which the database is updated and the relevance of the information for setting prices, volumes or conditions of service.
Moreover, measures should be implemented to restrict access to the information exchanged and/or to control how it is used. For example, one could use an independent third party to receive and process information. Furthermore, the database must be set up in a transparent manner.Footnote 73
Even the sharing of aggregated data can, in specific market conditions, facilitate collusion, so every initiative must be assessed case by case.Footnote 74 Where a restriction of competition is identified, the exchange may still be lawful if (i) the efficiency gains outweigh the anticompetitive effects, (ii) those gains are passed on to consumers, (iii) the exchange is indispensable to realise them, and (iv) effective competition is not eliminated.Footnote 75
Interestingly, assuming that the basis for a database is a platform, the Digital Markets Act (DMA)Footnote 76 and the Digital Services Act (DSA)Footnote 77 might in some instances already provide for the relevant safeguards by for example preventing dominant platforms from monopolising access to sustainability data.Footnote 78 For example, the DMA can ensure that gatekeepers do not restrict access to the data, enabling smaller players to also utilise the data for sustainability efforts and thereby creating a competitive environment. It might also enforce interoperability standards, which could facilitate the integration of various sustainability databases across the EU, ensuring that data from smaller platforms or local databases can be easily accessed and used in the centralised system, but also allowing for competing databases and therefore ensuring that innovation is not stifled. The DSA can ensure transparency and accountability by providing for the necessary regulatory oversight to protect against misuse, misinformation and violations of digital rights. This is also critical for preventing greenwashing cartels (and greenwashing claims) and ensuring that sustainability claims are backed by verifiable data, protecting users and smaller players from potential misuse or manipulation of data.
5. Impact of cartel prohibition on the potential of centralised data platforms
Sustainability databases can consolidate expertise, spur innovation and establish common benchmarks, making them powerful instruments for closing the current ESG-data gap. Yet the cartel prohibition still limits their potential on several fronts.
First, the very breadth of the information these platforms collect – that is, carbon-footprint figures, production methods, procurement strategies, cost structures and resource-efficiency metrics – can pose problems. Competition law demands strict “firewalls” around anything that could reveal a firm’s competitive playbook; if the safeguards feel too onerous, companies may withhold the most valuable data and blunt the database’s effectiveness.
Second, innovation-related disclosures create a parallel dilemma. Firms that have sunk significant resources into R&D or proprietary technologies worry that sharing those insights will erode their competitive edge, so the platform ends up with only partial – sometimes obsolete – information.
Third, issues of accessibility arise when the database becomes a de facto passport to market credibility. Well-resourced incumbents can meet the entry requirements with ease, while smaller or late-entering rivals face higher costs or technical barriers, turning a tool meant to level the playing field into one that entrenches existing hierarchies.
Finally, without careful governance the database itself can morph into a coordination device: participating companies might use it to align purchasing of sustainable inputs or to co-invest in renewable-energy infrastructure. Although such collaboration can be welfare-enhancing, it simultaneously reduces independent decision-making and risks excluding non-participants – thereby triggering exactly the competition concerns that the platform was designed to avoid.
To unlock the full potential of these databases, companies must show that their agreements do not restrict competition or meet the exemption criteria under Article 101(3) TFEU. The burden of proof is, however, on the companies involved. This leads to uncertainty, has an impact on resources and potentially discourages participation out of fear of penalties for unintended breaches of the cartel prohibition. Clarity on permissible data-sharing practices and “safe harbours” for sustainability collaborations is critical given the EU’s Green Deal priorities. The European Commission is aware of this and has, for example, adjusted its informal guidance procedure in 2022 to allow companies to seek informal guidance on the application of the EU competition rules to novel or unresolved questions, including explicitly those on sustainability.Footnote 79
V. Conclusion
The growing demand for transparent, trustworthy ESG data – and for greater efficiency in reporting – underscores the value of centralised or semi-central data platforms. Properly designed, these platforms deliver clear benefits, while the sustainability-competition-law tension can be managed by limiting the scope of the data collected and embedding three legal “firewalls”: (i) separation or anonymisation of competitively sensitive information, (ii) neutral, transparent governance with tiered, audit-ready access, and (iii) immutable audit trails. Together, these safeguards minimise competition-law risk. Collusion or the exclusion of smaller market players is a legitimate concern, yet through transparency, voluntary participation and open access such risks can be contained within the existing legal framework.
The Dutch banking sector’s standardised ESG-reporting project shows that competitors can collaborate in ways that comply with competition rules and advance sustainability. Crucially, competition law is not an inherent barrier: if the development of central or semi-central ESG data platforms either avoids competitively sensitive information or adopts mitigation measures, no fundamental overhaul of competition rules is needed – only a strategic application of the rules already in place. Where such mitigation proves impossible, the relevance of “compliance agreements” and, potentially, Article 101(3) TFEU exemptions will rise.
Data-sharing platforms also spur innovation. Better information allows companies to identify risks, act on them and report more effectively. Even with a shared database, each firm remains responsible for – and can still differentiate itself through – its own ESG report. Easier, lower-cost access to quality data likewise helps smaller companies, not yet subject to mandatory reporting, to improve their sustainability performance and stand out. To realise these benefits, however, platforms must be open to all stakeholders on equal terms and host more than the bare minimum needed for compliance; otherwise, they risk triggering a race to the bottom. Equally, platforms must never be used to coordinate on doing “just enough” or for any other anticompetitive purpose. The balance between efficiency and ambition therefore deserves constant, critical scrutiny.
Global supply chains add another layer of complexity. Can a European ESG data platform, such as the proposed Common European Green Deal Data Space, capture the realities of cross-border data flows and divergent regulatory regimes? How will it interact with worldwide data systems, especially where transparency and regulation vary?
Ownership and control of the shared data also raise concerns. As companies disclose ever more detail about their operations and supply chains, who ultimately controls the information? Centralised platforms must avoid becoming gatekeepers able to shape market access or competitive outcomes simply by controlling essential sustainability data.
In short, open access, transparency and equitable participation are essential to prevent market distortions. The challenge lies less in rewriting competition law than in embedding robust safeguards and smart regulation that facilitate collaboration without undermining fair competition – and thereby supporting the EU’s Twin Transition. By applying existing rules strategically and encouraging cooperation that serves the wider public good, the tension between sustainability objectives and competition principles can be managed. Still, unresolved questions around innovation incentives, global alignment and data control mean this field will continue to demand attention from regulators, businesses and policymakers to ensure ESG-data-sharing platforms deliver meaningful, equitable progress.
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