Introduction
Okinawa Prefecture was once the independent Ryukyu Kingdom, established in 1429. Initially a tributary state of China, it came under both Chinese and Japanese influence following the 1609 Satsuma invasion. After the Meiji Restoration, the Ryukyu Kingdom was dissolved, and Okinawa Prefecture was established in 1879. Despite resistance from Ryukyu loyalists, Okinawa’s affiliation with Japan was solidified after Japan’s victory in the Sino-Japanese War (Miyagi Reference Miyagi2023: 114–120; Takara Reference Takara2012: 36; Akamine Reference Akamine2004: Introduction).
Economic hardships marked Okinawa’s history, with labor migration beginning in 1900, when 26 contract laborers arrived in Hawai‘i. Migration intensified during World War I and the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945) (Rabson Reference Rabson2012: 30–31), as Okinawans sought employment opportunities abroad owing to ongoing economic struggles, particularly following the 1920 collapse of sugar prices (Tomiyama Reference Tomiyama1991: 76–78). After the devastating Battle of Okinawa in 1945, which killed between a quarter and a third of its population, the island came under US rule. By 1957, many Okinawans migrated to mainland Japan for employment, and by 1970, over 10,000 Okinawans were employed in mainland Japan, though many faced workplace discrimination and returned home (Sakurazawa Reference Sakurazawa2015: 22–23, 117). Okinawa Prefecture (Reference Prefecture2022b) rejoined Japan in 1972, but hopes for the removal of US military bases went unmet. Today, Okinawa still hosts about 70% of Japan’s US military facilities, a burden highlighted in the “New Proposal for the Realization of a Peaceful and Prosperous Okinawa” (May 2022).
The historical and ongoing structural discrimination has led Okinawans to increasingly use the term “discrimination,” a stronger term than “inequality,” to describe their position, questioning their integration into Japan (Okinawa Times 2022: 29). Given this history, Okinawans often question when Okinawa became part of Japan and when they became Japanese (Takara Reference Takara2012: 282). While many identify as both Japanese and Okinawan (Uchinanchu), a small minority advocates for Ryukyu independence, reflecting unresolved identity issues.
Okinawa has also been a significant source of emigration, both before and after World War II. However, Okinawans and their descendants have preserved strong cultural ties and solidarity in their communities. Today, thriving Okinawan associations across Japan and globally help maintain these connections.
In recent years, the Okinawa Prefectural Government has promoted global networking among Okinawans through initiatives such as the “Worldwide Uchinanchu Convention” to highlight global appreciation for Okinawa and invigorate Okinawan identity (Fujinami Reference Fujinami2022). The 2022 New Okinawa 21st Century Vision Basic Plan focuses on strengthening Okinawan identity and cultural exchanges, ensuring the continuation of its heritage and global connections (Okinawa Prefecture 2022: 150–151).
This study aims to elucidate the Okinawan identity and political consciousness regarding Okinawa-related issues among Okinawan migrants and their descendants residing in mainland Japan, and to examine how these forms of consciousness differ across generations and how they may be situated within the broader framework of the Okinawan diaspora. The analysis draws upon surveys and interviews conducted with members of the Hyogo Prefecture Okinawan Association, carried out on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of Okinawa’s reversion. From the perspective of the interplay between cultural heritage and political awareness, this paper offers a new analytical lens on the intersection of identity and migration—two dimensions that have often been examined separately in previous studies.
Literature review
Large-scale surveys have consistently assessed Okinawans’ attitudes toward daily life and politics; these have been conducted by government agencies, television stations, and newspapers (Ryukyu Shimpo ed. 2002–2006), as well as frequent research surveys (Ando and Suzuki eds. Reference Ando and Suzuki2012). This paper focuses on two surveys particularly relevant to the topic: one conducted by the Japan Broadcasting Corporation (NHK) Broadcasting Culture Research Institute, which has assessed Okinawans’ views since 1973 (NHK 2017), and another, the Okinawa Residents’ Identity Survey, which examines Okinawan identity (Lim Reference Lim2009: 105–142).
Research on Okinawans living in mainland Japan, who possess a dual identity owing to their Okinawan roots, has primarily been conducted in sociology from a historical perspective. This study explores key questions, including migration, experiences of discrimination and assimilation, political and social movements, and the networks and practices of migrants. Below, we highlight four significant studies relevant to these topics (Kinjo Reference Kinjo1997: 193–229; Makino Reference Makino and Kenzo2002).
Tomiyama Ichiro’s research examines the development of social movements among Okinawan descendants in Kansai from the 1920s to around 1948. He explores the emergence of the “Okinawan labor market,” shaped by discriminatory labor practices, and the formation of community groups in Kansai (Tomiyama Reference Tomiyama1991).
Yamaguchi Satoshi focuses on the Hyogo Prefecture headquarters of the Okinawa Prefectural Association, a central focus in this paper. Yamaguchi emphasizes Okinawans’ challenges in mainland Japan, fostering unity under the “Okinawa” identity. Since the 1970s, as living conditions improved, mutual aid activities have decreased, but cultural preservation initiatives remain essential (Yamaguchi Reference Yamaguchi2008: chapter 8).
Masami Shingaki’s study explores the intergenerational experiences of Okinawans in Kansai through interviews in 1997. The study highlights generational differences, with the first generation facing discrimination and the second initially resisting Okinawan culture but later coming to appreciate it. The third generation displayed no negative feelings toward Okinawan identity (Shingaki Reference Shingaki1999: 120–138).
Steve Rabson, however, provides a historical overview of Okinawans in Kansai, drawing on 116 interviews conducted in the early 2000s. His work highlights the complex identity of Okinawans and suggests that the dichotomy of “assimilation versus tradition” is less relevant today, with maintaining ties to Okinawa often depending on personal preference (Rabson Reference Rabson2012).
These studies provide crucial insights, but most rely on historical documents and interviews. While there is extensive research on the Okinawa Prefectural Association, many studies focus on the 1970s, when the association was most active. Recently, Kokaji (Reference Kokaji2021) analyzed university students with Okinawan roots in Aichi Prefecture, focusing on perspectives about the Ryukyu Independence Movement. However, much of the research has remained qualitative (Kokaji Reference Kokaji2021: 21–40).
The only two surveys assessing the attitudes of Okinawa-born residents in mainland Japan were conducted by the Hyogo Prefecture Okinawan Association and by Steve Rabson in the early 2000s (Okinawa Kenjinkai ed. 1982: 227). Below is a summary of these surveys.
The Hyogo Prefecture Okinawan Association conducted four surveys of its members in 1970, 1984, 1992, and 2006, focusing on lifestyle, culture, and awareness of discrimination.
The 1970 survey revealed that none of the respondents rated their standard of living as “high,” with many reporting financial difficulties. While 52% stated they did not face issues due to their Okinawan heritage, 6% admitted to hiding their origin in public, indicating lingering discrimination. Regarding reversion, 43.2% expressed concerns about “economic issues” and “discrimination and prejudice” (Ryukyu Shimpo 1971: 3).
The 2006 survey revealed that 49% of respondents expressed a desire to live in Okinawa, and 68% of first-generation Okinawans could speak Uchinaaguchi (the Okinawan dialect), compared with less than 10% of younger generations. In addition, 40% believed that discrimination against Okinawans no longer existed, while 28% acknowledged its reduced prevalence (Ryukyu Shimpo 2006: 3; Yoju 2006: 3).
The 1984 and 1992 surveys focused on reversion and US military bases. In 1984, 61.2% of respondents expressed a positive view of Okinawa’s reversion, while 26.9% had mixed feelings, and 2.5% believed it would have been better if Okinawa had not reverted. Regarding US military bases, 54.9% felt US military bases should be removed (Ryukyu Shimpo 1984: 17). In 1992, 78.1% affirmed that Okinawa’s reversion was a positive development, though 1.8% still felt Okinawa should not have reverted (Ryukyu Shimpo 1992: 10).
The 2006 survey on US military bases found that 33% felt it was unfair to place the burden solely on Okinawa, while only 20% accepted the presence of the bases (Yoju 2006: 3–4).
While valuable, these surveys have limitations. The 1970 survey included many open-ended questions, resulting in a high percentage of “no response” (Okinawa Kenjinkai ed. 1982: 228). Additionally, the surveys from 1970, 1984, and 1992 were household-based, making it unclear which household members responded, and their survey items were not consistently systematic.
Steve Rabson conducted a survey from July 1999 to June 2000, receiving responses from 300 Okinawans in Osaka, Hyogo, and Shiga prefectures. The survey examined migrants’ reasons for moving to mainland Japan, their ties to Okinawa, and their experiences of discrimination. Rabson found that both migrants and their descendants maintained connections to Okinawa, though fewer descendants participated in association activities (Rabson Reference Rabson2012).
Additionally, the concept of diaspora needs to be addressed. Arakaki (Reference Arakaki and Chinen2007) classified types of diasporas and positioned the Okinawan diaspora within that framework, noting that Okinawans in places such as Hawai’i formed a creolized identity and that they navigated three identity spheres: the host society, the broader Japanese diaspora, and the Okinawan diaspora. While these are valuable insights, Okinawans who migrated to mainland Japan were not included in Arakaki’s analysis. This paper, through surveys and interviews, contributes a new perspective by showing that Okinawans in mainland Japan, despite facing discrimination and pressures to assimilate, maintain a strong sense of connection to their homeland while adapting to the host society. The study thus introduces a new typology within the Okinawan diaspora.Footnote 1
While substantial research has been conducted on the identity and social consciousness of Okinawans living in mainland Japan, many areas remain underexplored. Further quantitative and qualitative surveys are needed to understand generational and age differences and the perspectives of Okinawans currently living on the mainland.
Given these gaps, the authors conducted a public opinion survey targeting the Hyogo Prefecture Okinawan Association. This survey is particularly timely, as it aligns with the 50th anniversary of Okinawa’s reversion to Japan in 2022.
On May 15, 2022, exactly 50 years after the return of Okinawa’s administrative rights to Japan, the anniversary marked not a celebration but a reflection of ongoing issues. The national ceremony was devoid of a festive atmosphere, underscoring the rift between the government and Okinawa regarding US military bases. Governor Denny Tamaki’s speech expressed disappointment that Okinawa’s vision of becoming “an island of peace” had not been realized and emphasized the continued excessive burden of the bases.
The 50th anniversary of Okinawa’s reversion to Japan presents an opportunity to examine Okinawa’s identity and political and social consciousness. While various surveys and studies have explored these issues, surveys of Okinawans living in mainland Japan were notably absent. This gap highlights the need for more research to understand the perspectives of Okinawan descendants living on the mainland.
Methodology
The authors conducted a survey among the Hyogo Prefecture Okinawan Association members between December 2023 and January 2024. As Japan’s largest Okinawan organization, with 2,532 members across 12 subdivisions, the association serves as a vital hub for examining identity and political awareness among Okinawans on the mainland. It began as the Kansai Okinawa Kenjinkai after World War I to address discrimination and improve conditions for Okinawan migrants in industrial areas. The organization, formally renamed in 1978, has long been involved in advocating for Okinawan issues and is politically active.
The survey targeted a random sample of 800 individuals aged 10 years and older, excluding 60 members who had stopped subscribing to the association’s journal, Yoju, for reasons such as relocation to nursing facilities. Surveys were mailed, and responses were collected from December 20, 2023, to January 31, 2024. Out of 800, 169 responses were received, yielding a 21.1% response rate.
Of the respondents, 48.5% were male, and 51.5% were female, and 0% (0 people) identified as other (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transsexual, queer, and more [LGBTQ+]). The generational breakdown was as follows: 30.2% were “Issei” (first generation), while among the remaining, 55.8% were “Nisei” (second generation), 22.5% were “Sansei” (third generation), 5% were “Yonsei” (fourth generation), and 16.7% selected “Other,” which likely includes individuals of the fifth generation or later, those not originally from Okinawa, or those unsure of their generational affiliation.Footnote 2 In terms of age, 4.7% were in their teens, 4.1% in their 20s, 8.3% in their 30s, 11.8% in their 40s, 11.2% in their 50s, 17.2% in their 60s, 27.8% in their 70s, and 14.2% in their 80s, and 0.6% (one person) was in their 90s. The survey’s reliability level was 90%, with a 6.13% margin of error, though a larger sample size would have been needed for the standard 95% reliability and a 5% margin.
Supplementary data were gathered through group interviews with the association’s leadership on December 1, 2023, and follow-up interviews with two younger members in February 2024. These interviews aimed to enrich the quantitative findings, capturing perspectives not fully represented by multiple-choice questions. Interviewees spanned first to third generations, with their ages ranging from their teens to their 80s. Notable participants included Chairman Gushiken and Vice-Chairman Miyagi, whose public roles warranted full identification.
The survey included 31 questions, 12 adapted from NHK’s 2022 Okinawa Attitude Survey 50 Years after Reversion, enabling comparative analysis.Footnote 3 The ethical considerations were in accordance with the principles of the universities with which the authors are affiliated. For analysis, respondents were grouped as young (10–35 years), middle-aged (36–60 years), and older (61 years and older). Owing to limited data, the study concentrated on the first three generations.
This study’s findings are detailed in three sections: Section 1 explores Okinawan culture and identity, Section 2 examines the US military base issue in Okinawa, and Section 3 reflects on the 50th anniversary of Okinawa’s reversion to Japan. To simplify, citations and detailed references are omitted here.
Findings
Okinawan culture and identity
The transmission of memories and culture related to Okinawa
The findings presented in this section start with question 8 of our survey. To assess the degree of affinity toward Okinawa as a basis for further discussion, participants were asked, “Do you feel an affinity toward Okinawa?” The responses are presented in Table 1.
Respondents’ perceived closeness/sense of belonging to Okinawa
Overall responses were “very strong” (54.4%), “strong” (35.5%), “neutral” (8.9%), and “not very strong” (1.2%). This indicates that approximately 90% of members still felt a strong affinity toward Okinawa. By generation and age group, older and first-generation respondents were more likely to answer “very strong,” while second and subsequent generations tended to select “strong.”
To confirm the transmission of memories related to Okinawa, question 11 asked about Irei no Hi (Okinawa Memorial Day, June 23), which commemorates the end of the Battle of Okinawa, while question 12 focused on the transmission of wartime experiences from the Battle of Okinawa. These two questions were the same as those in the 2022 NHK survey. The responses are discussed above in Table 2.
Participants’ knowledge about Irei no Hi (Okinawa memorial day)
Regarding Irei no Hi, the percentage of members of the Hyogo Prefecture Okinawan Association who “did not know” was approximately 20% higher than that of Okinawa residents, while the percentage of those who “knew” was 20% lower than that of Okinawa residents in the NHK survey. However, the percentage of those who knew about Memorial Day was still overwhelmingly higher than that of the entire nation.
When asked whether they had ever heard about wartime experiences directly from survivors of the Battle of Okinawa (question 12), 68.6% of respondents answered “yes,” while 29.6% answered “no,” and 1.8% did not provide an answer. The data are summarized in Table 3.
Respondents’ exposure to Battle of Okinawa memories
Nearly 70% of respondents overall—and about half of the third-generation respondents—had heard memories of the Battle of Okinawa directly from relatives. This is especially significant given that systematic peace education on the Battle of Okinawa has not been conducted in the Kansai region.
One possible reason for this is the ongoing efforts of the association. In 1995, to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the association’s founding, the Hyogo Prefectural Headquarters published A Collection of War Experiences of People Who Left the Island, which aims to preserve and pass on wartime experiences. Additionally, the Friendship Camp, an exchange program held annually as part of the friendship partnership between Okinawa and Hyogo Prefectures, sends several young members to Okinawa each year to learn about the war.
Member N (first generation; in their 70s) recalled growing up in southern Okinawa, where war casualties were left unburied in fields after the battle. Younger generations gain exposure to these stories through family conversations and events. Member T (third generation; in their 20s) reflected: “When I participated in Friendship Camps, we visited places like the Peace Memorial Park. Seeing those sites made me think about what my grandfather’s generation might have experienced.”
To assess the inheritance of Okinawan culture, we asked about the frequency of eating Okinawan cuisine (including Ryukyu cuisine) in question 5 and the observance of ObonFootnote 4 and Shīmī FestivalFootnote 5 in questions 6 and 7. Obon and Shīmī are traditional annual events in Okinawa that continue to be widely observed today.
Compared with a 2006 survey by the association, the trend has changed. In 2006, 47% of respondents said they ate Okinawan food daily, 38% on special occasions such as New Year’s and memorial services, 6% mainly when dining out, 6% rarely, and 4% chose “other” (Yoju 2006: 3–4). The comparison indicates a decline in the frequency of eating Okinawan cuisine among members.
It is difficult to say that Okinawan events have been fully inherited by members of the association. Only 17.8% of respondents reported holding an Obon event every year, and 3% stated they hold it once every 2 or 3 years. For Shīmī (Qingming Festival), the figures were even lower, with 10.7% saying they observe it annually and 4.7% saying they observe it once every 2 or 3 years. Most respondents either did not observe these celebrations or did not know whether they were observed, with approximately 80% of members not observing the two events. This is significantly lower than for the population in Okinawa Prefecture. During interviews with eight members of the association, none of them reported celebrating either Obon or Shimei.
When do members of the association feel that they are from Okinawa or are descendants of Okinawans? When asked to select multiple answers, the most common response was “Okinawan cuisine” (71.6%). This was followed by around half of the respondents mentioning a “family name,” “high school baseball,” a “dialect,” and “Okinawa Prefectural Association events.” In contrast, only 14.2% of members cited “Obon, Shimei, and other events” as times when they felt connected to their Okinawan roots.Footnote 6 See Figure 1.
Events/occasions when association members feel connected to Okinawa or identify as Okinawan.
Okinawan food might not be a daily staple for many members of the association, but it played a vital role in reconnecting younger generations with their heritage. For instance, Member T (third generation; in their 20s) shared: “My grandfather often gives me Okinawan food, like sata andagiFootnote 7 and soki soba.Footnote 8 He regularly prepares Okinawan dishes when I visit him. Those moments make me feel most connected to Okinawa.”
Member H (third generation; in his teens) described similar experiences at Okinawan festivals in Hyogo Prefecture, where traditional dishes were served. Although Member H rarely visited Okinawan restaurants owing to work commitments, exposure to Okinawan culture continued through interactions with older generations, particularly in the context of movies and books about Okinawa.
In addition to food, high school baseball held cultural significance for nearly half of the association’s members, fostering a strong connection to Okinawa. When Okinawan schools compete at Koshien,Footnote 9 supporters enthusiastically follow the games from homes, workplaces, or public spaces.Footnote 10 The Hyogo and Osaka Okinawan Associations have long supported these teams during major national tournaments.Footnote 11
The historical enthusiasm for Okinawan teams is well documented. In 1986, over 2,300 members from Hyogo and Osaka cheered at Koshien for an Okinawan school during the Summer Koshien tournament (Ryukyu Shimpo Reference Shimpo (Okinawa)1986). Controversy erupted in 1994 when the Japan High School Baseball Federation requested Okinawan spectators to refrain from wearing eisa costumes, calling it “strange.” Sculptor Nakama Keiko defended the practice, noting that Koshien had become a symbolic battlefield representing Okinawa’s historical ties and cultural identity in Kansai (Ryukyu Shimpo 1994: 21).
Initially, Okinawan schools struggled at Koshien, often being eliminated early. However, by 1990, they reached the finals, marking a turning point. Former Chairman Uezu reflected on the team’s success, stating that it boosted Okinawans’ confidence after years of being seen as underdogs. In 2018, Oshiro Takehiro, then-chairman of the Hyogo Prefecture Okinawan Association, also highlighted how Okinawa’s first Summer Koshien victory in 1963 symbolized equality for Okinawans after years of discrimination (Okinawa Times 2018: 14).
During the interviews, Member H (second generation; in their 70s) also mentioned high school baseball first when discussing the 50 years since Okinawa’s reversion to Japan. Member H shared memories of neighbors forming cheering squads and attending games personally, recalling the strong sense of community and pride. For members, high school baseball transcends sports, symbolizing history, resilience, and a deep cultural connection.
Self-perception regarding ethnicity
Regarding ethnic self-identification, question 10 asked, “What nationality do you consider yourself to be?” The results were as follows: 49.1% answered “I am both Japanese and Okinawan (Ryukyuan),” 36.1% said “Japanese,” and 11.8% answered “Okinawan (Ryukyuan).” About half of respondents now identified with a mixed identity. However, the proportion identifying solely as “Okinawan (Ryukyuan)” was significantly lower among the second generation, while the number identifying as “Japanese” had notably increased from the second generation onward. See Table 4 above.
Respondents’ nationality self-assessment according to the 2022 survey
A 2022 survey of Okinawans by Kumamoto Hiroyuki and others revealed that 52% identified as “Okinawan and Japanese,” 24% as “Okinawan,” and 16% as “Japanese.” These findings align with the identity patterns of first-generation Hyogo Prefecture Okinawan Association members, who maintained a strong ethnic consciousness owing to their upbringing in Okinawa. In contrast, second-generation and younger individuals increasingly identified as Japanese, with Okinawan identity declining.
Our interviews indicated that the first generation held a strong sense of being “Okinawan.” When asked whether they identified as Okinawan or Japanese, both Members N and W (first generation; in their 70s) strongly identified themselves as Uchinanchu.
Second-generation Okinawans raised in the Kansai region demonstrated more complex or fluid identities. Chairman Gushiken (second generation; in his 70s) initially identified as Japanese but developed a deeper understanding of Okinawa’s uniqueness through personal research. Gushiken reflected on the period before Okinawa’s reversion: “I didn’t really feel like I was Okinawan back then… Even though I identified as Japanese, I was still Okinawan, so I became curious about Okinawa and studied it intensely. Through that process, I began to reflect on how I viewed Okinawans.”
Vice-Chairman Miyagi (second generation; in their 50s) struggled with Okinawan roots but embraced the identity after participating in cultural events. Working for an Okinawan company and participating in Eisa Footnote 12 helped Miyagi embrace their identity. Miyagi developed a strong attachment to Amagasaki City, and noted that, they felt more like an “Amanchu” (a native of Amagasaki) than a Japanese person.
Member Y (second generation; in their 50s) offered a more pragmatic perspective: “I would choose whichever is more convenient. Among people in the prefectural association, I would say I’m Uchinanchu, but if I thought it might cause trouble, I would just pretend not to know.”
Member H (second generation; in their 70s) worked in Kobe around the time of Okinawa’s reversion and did not have a clear sense of identity. Later, as Member H became more aware of their Okinawan roots, they noticed that mentioning their own surname—the most common in Okinawa—often required explanations in the past. Now, people recognize it instantly. While Member H did not explicitly state their own feelings, it appeared they remained only faintly conscious of their own Okinawan identity.
Third-generation Okinawans primarily identified as Japanese or Kansai residents while holding Okinawa as a cultural heritage.
Member T (third generation; in their 20s) shared: “I’ve always considered myself Japanese and Kansai-ish, but I recently visited Okinawa for a friend’s camp. It made me realize how important it is to maintain my connection with Okinawa.” Similarly, Member H (third generation; in his teens) said: “My identity is Japanese. I’ve been involved in Okinawan associations since I was young, and when I see the adults around me putting in so much effort, I can’t help but love Okinawa. I’m Japanese but with a strong interest in Okinawa.”
These evolving identities contrast sharply with the issue of Ryukyu independence, which holds historical and emotional weight but has little contemporary support. This is precisely why “the identity of the Okinawans is seen as having a distinct connotation and meaning, one that goes beyond simple samurai pride or a strong attachment to their hometown” (Lim Reference Lim2009: 129).
Survey results showed that support remained low, with only 9.5% favoring independence and nearly 70% opposing it. However, 42.9% of those who opposed it expressed sympathy for the cause, reflecting frustration over the continued presence of US military bases and historical struggles. See Table 5 above.
Participants’ views on Okinawa’s independence
In conclusion, Okinawan identity remains complex and generationally distinct. First-generation Okinawans held a strong sense of being Uchinanchu, shaped by their upbringing in Okinawa and historical events such as the reversion. Second-generation Okinawans, raised in mainland Japan, exhibited a more fluid identity shaped by life experiences, personal struggles, and cultural exposure. For the third generation, Okinawa represented a cultural heritage to cherish, while their primary identity remained Japanese or Kansai-oriented.
The issue of Ryukyu independence remains marginal but symbolic. While active support was low, the historical memory and struggles associated with Okinawa continued to shape how Okinawans perceived their identity and place within Japan. The sense of being Uchinanchu has persisted, albeit evolving with each generation’s experiences and cultural connections.
Perceptions of the issue of US military bases in Okinawa
This section examines the perceptions of the association members regarding US military bases, comparing their views with the 2022 NHK survey.
As mentioned earlier, approximately 70% of the US military facilities in Japan are in Okinawa Prefecture. The contentious relocation of the Futenma Air Base to Henoko has caused prolonged conflict between the Japanese government and Okinawa. In a 2019 referendum, 71.7% of voters opposed or were neutral toward the reclamation of Henoko, with most voting “no” (Okinawa Times 2019: 3). Despite this, the government has pressed forward with the base’s construction. A 2023 lawsuit filed by Okinawa Prefecture over design changes ended in defeat, intensifying local residents’ sense of resignation (Okinawa Times 2023: 25).
Meanwhile, tourism in Okinawa has flourished, reducing economic dependence on US military bases. Military-related revenue accounted for 15.5% of Okinawa’s total income in 1972 but has remained around 5% since 1989. In contrast, tourism revenue has grown from 6.5% in 1972 to around 10% since 2000 (Sakurazawa Reference Sakurazawa2015: 351). Redevelopment of former military base sites has also positively impacted the local economy. The Okinawa 21st Century Vision Basic Plan, formulated in 2012, identifies US bases as “a major obstacle to promoting Okinawa’s development.” (320, 328–330).
However, younger generations held different views. A 2017 survey indicated that they prioritized economic concerns and passively accepted the bases, believing that “Okinawa’s economy cannot function without US military bases” (Yoneda Reference Yoneda2022).
Questions 21–26 and 28 in the study mirrored the 2022 NHK survey, enabling a comparison between Hyogo Prefecture Okinawan Association members, Okinawans, and the national population regarding US military bases.
Perception of the burden of US military bases in Okinawa
Questions 21 and 22 examined perceptions of the US military bases in Okinawa. Question 21 asked, “What do you think about the US military bases in Okinawa?” Responses were that 14.8% favored complete removal, 58.6% supported reducing them to the mainland level, 17.2% accepted the status quo, 1.2% wanted an increase, and 8.3% did not answer. While support for reduction remained consistent across age groups, generational differences appeared in views on maintaining the status quo. Younger generations were more likely to support keeping the bases as they are. Even among those advocating for complete removal, younger respondents showed a higher tendency to accept the current situation. See Table 6 above.
Participants’ opinions on the US military bases in Okinawa
In the 2022 NHK survey, 16.3% of Okinawans and 7.2% nationwide responded that the US military bases should be completely removed. Meanwhile, 63.2% of Okinawans and 59% nationwide believed they should be reduced to the same level as on the mainland, and 17.9% of Okinawans and 31.8% nationwide thought they should remain as they are. Additionally, 1% of Okinawans and 0.6% nationwide felt the bases should be increased, while 1.7% of Okinawans and 1.3% nationwide provided no answer. Notably, the opinions of Hyogo Prefecture Okinawan Association members and Okinawans were particularly similar in the percentages of those who said the bases should remain as they are and those who supported their complete removal. See Figure 2 above.
Comparison of participants’ views on US military bases in Okinawa with those from the 2022 NHK survey.
Question 22 asked participants for their thoughts on the fact that approximately 70% of the facilities exclusively used by the US military in Japan are located in Okinawa. The responses were as follows: 45.6% responded “I think it’s strange,” 32% answered “I think it’s somewhat strange,” 5.3% responded “I don’t think it’s particularly strange,” 8.3% answered “I don’t think it’s strange at all,” and 8.9% provided no answer. See Table 7 above.
Participants’ views on the unusualness regarding the concentration of US military bases on the island
In the 2022 NHK survey, 56.2% of Okinawans and 23.8% of the national population answered, “I think it’s strange”; 28.3% of Okinawans and 55.1% of the national population answered, “I think it’s somewhat strange”; 8.4% of Okinawans and 13.2% of the national population answered, “I don’t think it’s particularly strange”; 4.8% of Okinawans and 6.5% of the national population answered, “I don’t think it’s strange at all”; and 2.3% of Okinawans and 1.5% of the national population gave no answer. When comparing the groups, there was little difference in the percentage of people who considered the concentration of military bases in Okinawa to be “strange” (including those who answered “somewhat strange”). Comparing association members with the national population, there was a notable similarity in the higher percentage of people who found it “strange” and the lower percentage who considered it “somewhat strange.” See Figure 3 above.
Comparison of participants’ views on the unusualness regarding the concentration of US military bases on the island with those from the 2022 NHK survey.
Question 23 asked whether participants supported or opposed the government’s plan to relocate the US military’s Futenma Air Base to Henoko in Nago City. The results were as follows: 11.8% in favor, 12.4% somewhat in favor, 27.2% somewhat opposed, 32% opposed, and 16.6% no answer. When compared across generations and age groups, first-generation and older individuals were more likely to oppose the relocation to Henoko. See Table 8 above.
Participants’ views on the government’s plan to relocate US military bases within the island
In the 2022 NHK survey, 10.5% of Okinawans and 10.2% of the national population supported the relocation of US military bases, while 23.6% of Okinawans and 43.9% of the national population were somewhat in favor. In contrast, 29.3% of Okinawans and 31.8% of the national population were somewhat opposed, and 34% of Okinawans and 10.9% of the national population were opposed. Additionally, 2.6% of Okinawans and 3.1% of the national population gave no answer. When comparing the groups, the proportions of Okinawans and association members who were “against” or “somewhat opposed” to the relocation were almost identical. However, the proportion of association members who were “somewhat in favor” was about 10% lower, and only 24.2% of association members supported the relocation (including those who were somewhat in favor). See Figure 4 above.
Comparison of participants’ views on the relocation of US military bases in Japan with those from the 2022 NHK survey.
As noted earlier, many members of the Okinawa Prefectural Association sought to reduce the burden of US military bases in Okinawa and opposed the Henoko relocation. They share a deeper understanding of Okinawan perspectives than the national population, partly owing to the association’s management policy. Chairman Gushiken prioritizes the base issue and has strongly advocated for their removal or reduction. In his 2022 New Year’s message in Yoju, he criticized the government’s actions when Okinawa Governor Denny Tamaki rejected design changes for the Henoko relocation (Yoju 2022: 1). The government later invoked the Administrative Appeal Act for a review, prompting Gushiken to question, “Is this really acceptable in a country that claims to be democratic?” His rhetoric aligns with the Okinawa Times and Ryukyu Shimpo, both critical of the Henoko relocation.Footnote 13 The Yoju “Okinawa Trends” column heavily references these newspapers.
Notably, a higher proportion of association members chose “no answer” when asked about US military bases, particularly regarding Henoko. Given the complexity and political sensitivity of the issue, some members might have hesitated to disclose their views, even in an anonymous survey.
In group interviews, four of eight executive members, with family ties to the reversion movement, raised concerns about base-related damages. However, three executives involved in shaping policy, though presumed to hold critical views, did not directly address the issue.
For instance, Member N (first generation; in their 70s) became more aware of the base issue after joining the association, while Member Y (second generation; in their 50s), having lived in Hyogo Prefecture without experiencing Okinawan discrimination, only studied the topic later. Member G (second generation; in their 80s) never mentioned it at all. Member H (second generation; in their 70s) expressed resignation, stating that, given tensions with China, base removal seemed unrealistic.
Perceptions also varied among younger members on the basis of personal experiences. Member T (third generation; in their 20s) remarked, “There may be some benefits to having many bases in Okinawa, but there are also issues such as the discomfort of living there and the noise. I’m sure there are people in Okinawa who find it hard to live under such conditions… Rather than focusing solely on the fact that [US military bases] are concentrated in Okinawa, when you consider how it impacts people’s lives, I feel that having so many bases is a problem.” Member T’s statement highlights an awareness of the issue from the perspective of its impact on residents’ daily lives.
However, Member H (third generation; in his teens) expressed mixed feelings. While he appreciated that Okinawa was returned to Japan, he also noted that many issues related to the US military bases remain unresolved. Recalling a vivid childhood memory of a US military plane crash, Member H said, “It left a very strong impression on me… It’s good that such news has decreased, but it hasn’t disappeared entirely, which is unsettling.” Similarly, Member T shared their concerns, mentioning that, during a visit to Okinawa, they were told about the negative impact of US military bases on coral reef growth. Member T added, “When I hear about the noise, accidents, and incidents like helicopters crashing, I wonder if it’s right for the US military bases to remain for such a long time. I hope they can be reduced gradually, and ultimately, I would like to see them gone completely.”
Perceptions of US military bases in Okinawa and the Okinawan economy
Question 24 asked whether participants believed Okinawa’s economy would not be viable without the US military bases. The responses were as follows: “agree” 10.7%, “somewhat agree” 32.5%, “somewhat disagree” 38.5%, “disagree” 10.7%, and “no answer” 7.7%. While there were no significant differences between generations or age groups, the first generation showed a slightly higher tendency to select “somewhat disagree” or “disagree” than the second and third generations did.
This pattern suggests that the first generation may have a broader awareness of Okinawa’s economic diversification over time, reducing the perceived dependency on the US military bases. See Table 9 above.
Participants’ views on the US bases in Okinawa and their relationship with the economy
In the 2022 NHK survey, 10.5% of Okinawans and 11.7% of the national population responded “agree,” while 31.5% of Okinawans and 46% of the national population chose “somewhat agree.” However, 29.8% of Okinawans and 31.6% of the national population answered “somewhat disagree,” and 25.7% of Okinawans and 9.1% of the national population selected “disagree.” The remaining 2.5% of Okinawans and 1.7% of the national population gave no answer.
Interestingly, the percentage of association members who answered “disagree” aligns more closely with the national population than with Okinawans. However, there is a notable gap of around 10% between association members and the public in the categories “somewhat agree” and “somewhat disagree.” This suggests that, while association members share some perspectives with the national population, their views remain distinct, likely influenced by their ties to Okinawa and its unique sociopolitical context. See Figure 5 above.
Comparison of participants’ views on US military bases and the Okinawan economy with those from the 2022 NHK survey.
Question 25 explored whether participants viewed the presence of US military bases as a positive or negative factor for the future development of the Okinawan economy. The results were as follows: 3.6% answered “positive,” 32.5% selected “somewhat positive,” 29.6% responded “somewhat negative,” and 13.6% selected “negative.” Notably, 20.7% gave no answer.
Similar to the responses to question 24, there were no significant differences across generations or age groups. However, a larger proportion of first-generation respondents viewed the bases as “negative,” whereas a greater percentage of second-generation respondents considered them “somewhat positive.” This contrast highlights subtle generational differences in how the bases are perceived in relation to Okinawa’s economic prospects. See Table 10 above.
Positive versus negative opinions on the presence of US bases on the island
In the 2022 NHK survey, 7.8% of Okinawans and 6.5% of the national population answered “positive,” while 40.9% of Okinawans and 59% of the national population responded “somewhat positive.” Meanwhile, 30.9% of Okinawans and 28.2% of the nation responded “somewhat negative,” and 17.2% of Okinawans and 3.9% of the nation indicated “negative.” Additionally, 3.2% of Okinawans and 2.4% of the nation gave no answer.
A notable difference emerged between the groups: 59% of the public viewed the presence of US bases as at least somewhat positive, a significantly higher percentage than among association members, where only 36.1% shared this sentiment. This suggests that many association members did not perceive the bases as beneficial for Okinawa’s economic development. When comparing association members and Okinawans, however, the percentage of those who viewed the bases negatively was relatively similar. See Figure 6 above.
Comparison of participants’ views on the presence of US bases on the island with those of the 2022 NHK survey.
As seen above, many association members believed that US military bases are necessary for the Okinawan economy, a view more aligned with the national population than with the people of Okinawa Prefecture. However, there was a noticeable trend among these members of not considering the presence of the bases to be a positive factor for the future development of the Okinawan economy. Additionally, similar to the issue of US military bases, the percentage of “no answer” responses was significantly higher than for other questions.
The reasons for this high percentage of “no answer” remains unclear. However, on the basis of the authors’ impressions from interviewing 10 members, it seems that this may reflect a lack of a clear or definitive view on the relationship between the US military bases and Okinawa’s economy. In fact, among the 10 members the authors interviewed about economic issues, only two individuals directly connected the presence of US military bases to the economy.
Vice-Chairman Miyagi (second generation; in their 50s) said, “Regarding the bases in Okinawa, I don’t think they are necessary. The bases don’t really contribute much to the Okinawan economy. The returned bases, including the new city center, are generating money, which means jobs are being created.” From an economic perspective, Miyagi is advocating for the removal of the US military bases.
Member M (second generation; in their 80s) also said, “My friend who lives in Hawai‘i says that the sea in Okinawa is beautiful. But even if we try to make Okinawa a tourism-based prefecture, with so many US military bases nearby, tourists will end up going to Hawai‘i.” Through conversations with friends, Member M came to the realization that the US military bases are an obstacle to the development of tourism, which is Okinawa’s leading industry.
The other eight speakers focused less on the bases themselves and more on their relationship with the Japanese government, as well as issues such as Okinawa’s high poverty rate and low birth rate.
For example, Chairman Gushiken (second generation; in his 70s) highlighted that, before reversion, the Ryukyu government had considered introducing foreign capital, but the Japanese government blocked this plan. Gushiken stated, “Okinawa didn’t just focus on tourism, but tried to develop its economy in various ways. However, the Japanese government thwarted these efforts. It’s quite difficult. What I think now is that if the Japanese government stopped interfering with Okinawa’s work, rather than providing a lot of assistance, Okinawa would develop.” In other words, Gushiken argues that the Japanese government is hindering the development of Okinawa’s economy and that, if Okinawa had more autonomy, it could thrive in areas beyond tourism.
However, Member Y (second generation; in their 70s) shared, “I’ve never really thought about the evaluation of the people on the other island [Okinawa residents] because I was born and raised here. However, when I see and hear about it, it’s our father’s generation, so they didn’t have jobs, and they came here to make money… Even now, young people are coming here [to Kansai] for work. I don’t think that trend has changed in the past 50 years or more. They haven’t been able to create jobs over there [Okinawa Prefecture]. I think it’s hard to say whether that’s the fault of [Okinawa] Prefecture or the [Japanese] government, but I wish they could do a better job in that area.” While they acknowledge the economically poor situation of Okinawa compared with other prefectures, Member Y also refrains from placing blame on either Okinawa Prefecture or the Japanese government.
Both Chairman Gushiken and Member Y recognize that the development of Okinawa’s economy is primarily influenced by the relationship between the Japanese government and Okinawa Prefecture, rather than by the presence of US military bases.
Perceptions of the 50th anniversary of Okinawa’s reversion to Japan
Firstly, in question 13, we asked respondents whether they knew that May 15 marked the date of Okinawa’s reversion to the mainland. The results showed that 69.2% “knew” and 29% “did not know,” and 1.8% did not answer. These findings closely mirrored the responses from Okinawans in the 2022 NHK survey, in which approximately 70% of people were aware of the date. However, awareness of the date tended to decrease with both older and younger generations. Notably, even among Okinawans, younger generations exhibited lower awareness of the reversion date. For instance, in the 2022 Okinawa Prefectural High School Entrance Examination, only 28.4% of students answered the question about the reversion date correctly. Given this, it is perhaps unsurprising that many among the younger generation lack knowledge of this historical event (Yaeyama Mainichi Shimbun 2022: 2). See Table 11 above.
Participants’ level of awareness regarding May 15 (date of Okinawa’s reversion)
Next, to understand how people felt about the 50th anniversary of Okinawa’s reversion, question 17 asked whether Okinawan history and culture had been discussed with family and friends. The responses were as follows: “often discussed” (16%), “sometimes discussed” (26.6%), “not often discussed” (25.4%), “never discussed” (24.3%), and “no answer” (7.7%). These results indicate that 68% of participants had engaged in conversations about Okinawan history and culture during this significant milestone.
However, even with this question, it is evident that the percentage of people who discussed the topic was higher among the first generation and older individuals. Regarding this, Member H, a third-generation, teenage respondent, mentioned that the 50th anniversary of Okinawa’s reversion is a regular topic of conversation in his family. Member H explained, “We talk about things like what Okinawa is like now and the military bases… but not much else. As for the war, I only learn about it through Yoju, so I guess that’s what happened.” When asked whether he had attended any events related to the 50th anniversary of the reversion held in Kansai, Member H replied, “I haven’t been, but my grandmother and mother—especially my mother—have attended.” See Table 12 above.
Proportion of Okinawan history and culture discussed within the family environment
In question 18, we asked, “Looking back on the 51 years since the reversion, what do you think about Okinawa’s Reversion to mainland Japan?” The results showed that 46.2% responded “very positive,” and 30.8% answered “somewhat positive,” meaning 77% provided a positive evaluation. Conversely, only 8.3% gave a negative evaluation. Positive evaluations were prevalent across all generations and age groups, although it is noteworthy that there was a relatively higher percentage of first-generation respondents who chose “somewhat positive.” Similarly, in the 2022 NHK survey, 39% of Okinawans responded, “very positive,” 45% answered “somewhat positive,” and 84% overall gave a positive evaluation. Meanwhile, only 12% of respondents felt it was “not very positive,” and just 2% said it was “not positive at all.” See Table 13 above.
Respondents’ positive versus negative evaluations of Okinawa’s reversion to Japan
When asked about the reasons for their positive views on Okinawa’s reversion, the current survey asked the same questions as the 2022 NHK survey. A majority, 53.8%, responded “because it is desirable for Okinawa to remain part of Japan,” followed by 17.2% who said “because it has developed economically,” 8.3% who chose “because Okinawa’s wishes are now being respected,” 6.9% who cited “because exchanges with other prefectures and foreign countries have become more active,” and 1.4% who answered “because the return of US military bases has progressed.” In the 2022 NHK survey, the responses were 50%, 22%, 8%, 13%, and 3%, respectively. The current survey, conducted in 2023, included a “no answer” option, so a direct comparison is not possible. However, the percentage of Okinawans and association members who selected “because it is desirable for Okinawa to remain in Japan,” the most common response, is similar. Notably, there is a significant difference between the national population and Okinawans regarding the answer “because Okinawa’s wishes are now being respected.” No members mentioned this reason in the interview survey, so this could not be clarified further. See Figure 7 above.
Views on Okinawa’s reversion to Japan.
As demonstrated, many Okinawans and association members hold a positive view of Okinawa’s reversion to mainland Japan, with only a few expressing negative opinions. However, Okinawans have diverse emotions regarding reversion, and capturing their complex feelings through multiple-choice responses is difficult. The same applies to association members. Chairman Gushiken noted that, owing to the ongoing US military base issue, the Hyogo Prefecture Okinawan Association felt it “could not celebrate” the 50th anniversary of reversion. Instead, they chose to hold a lecture to reexamine Okinawa’s reversion.
What were the individual opinions of the association members interviewed? In the group interviews, three participants shared Chairman Gushiken’s view.
Vice-Chairman Miyagi said, “I didn’t think it was something to celebrate. After listening to Professor [Shimabukuro Jun]’s lecture, I came to feel this was the best approach. I think it’s fine for everyone to observe the 50th anniversary of Okinawa’s reversion in their own way. But at a time like this, the Chairman has been interviewed so much on TV and in the newspapers… I hope people across Japan will understand, ‘Oh, it’s been 50 years since Okinawa’s reversion.’ Then, it will probably be forgotten again soon, but that’s okay.”
Member W (second generation; in their 70s) recalled a story on TV about how, after the Battle of Okinawa, US military forces arrived in Okinawa in the middle of the night with bulldozers and requisitioned people’s homes. Member W said, “I just can’t be happy about it… At first, I thought we would feel happier about the 25th or 50th anniversary [of the reversion], but I feel like a lot of difficult issues have gradually emerged. It feels like nothing will change in the future. If war breaks out, Okinawa will be hit again.”
Member M (first generation; in their 80s) shared, “I’m still protesting at Henoko, but some people on social media claim we’re trying to profit from it. I agree with Gushiken that we should either reduce the number of bases or eliminate them altogether.”
However, three others did not directly address the military bases or whether the reversion should be celebrated but expressed the view that economic issues would persist after the reversion.
Member G (second generation; in their 70s) said, “I wish the economy would improve, but it’s all about tourism… I really wish the economy would get better.” Member H (second generation; in their 70s) also commented, “I think it would be good if the economy developed… it’s nice that the birth rate in Okinawa Prefecture is high. I think Okinawa will become a summer resort from now on. I hope everyone will come there to escape the summer heat.” Member H expressed hopes for economic development, citing tourism as a potential example.
Member N (first generation; in their 70s), however, who was not involved in the reversion movement, said, “I worked hard in the fields and didn’t know anything about the mainland… When I think about it, I have no idea whether reversion was a good thing or a bad thing.”
Among the younger generation, Member T (third generation; in their 20s) said, “I love Okinawa, so I’m happy about that… Okinawa is part of Japan, but it feels a bit distant… It’s true that when you visit, it feels like you’re going to a slightly different place, but I’m happy that Okinawa is part of Japan,” expressing a positive view of the reversion. In contrast, Member H (third generation; in his teens) said, “I think it’s good that Okinawa was reverted, but there are still many unresolved issues, like the base issue.”
As mentioned, while the questionnaire survey of association members showed that 77% evaluated Okinawa’s reversion positively and only 8.3% negatively, the opinions of the 10 people interviewed were diverse. Very few expressed unconditional support for reversion, and it is evident that members who prioritized the issue of US military bases tended to have a more negative impression of reversion.
Finally, in question 31, respondents were asked about their thoughts on the outlook for Okinawa’s future. The most common answer was “fairly bright” (42.6%), followed by “not very bright” (33.7%). Overall, 53.3% of members had a positive outlook, while 36.7% were less optimistic. Very few members, regardless of generation or age, selected “not bright at all.” However, a higher proportion of members who were first-generation Okinawans selected “not very bright,” while the middle-aged group leaned more toward “fairly bright.” Comparing Okinawans with the national population, the proportion answering “fairly bright” was about 21.4% lower than the national population and 13.1% lower than Okinawans, with other similar responses. Overall, the proportion with a bright outlook was slightly lower among members. See Table 14 above.
Participants’ views on the future of Okinawa
The interviews also touched on the future of Okinawa. Some of the answers overlapped with the evaluation of the 50th anniversary of reversion asked about in question 19. Chairman Gushiken, Vice-Chairman Miyagi, Member M, and Member H all emphasized the base issue and predicted an increase in the number of military bases. In contrast, Members H, G, Y, and T expressed hope for economic development, while Member N said they “did not know.”
Throughout the interviews, various unresolved issues, such as the base issue and economic concerns, were raised. As a result, no one expressed being “very optimistic,” but similarly, no one said they were “not optimistic at all.” This seems to align with the very low percentage of respondents who answered “very optimistic” or “not optimistic at all” in the questionnaire survey. Additionally, those who prioritized the base issue tended to have a more pessimistic view of the future.
Conclusion
This paper examined Okinawan culture, identity, and political awareness among members of the Hyogo Prefecture Okinawan Association, highlighting three key findings.
First, the preservation of Okinawan culture and historical memory has remained strong, but it is uneven. Around 70% of members passed down memories of Irei no Hi (Okinawa Memorial Day) and the Battle of Okinawa despite the absence of formal peace education in the Kansai region. Community efforts have helped sustain these memories. Traditional festivals were less frequently passed down, but cultural elements such as food, high school baseball, surnames, and association events affirm Okinawan identity, often linked to nationalism.
Second, members were more critical of US military bases in Okinawa than the general Japanese population was. A larger proportion advocated for base removal, with less support for relocation to Henoko. While they were less likely to view Okinawa’s economy as dependent on the bases, they shared concerns that the bases hinder development. Generational differences are evident: younger members were more accepting of the status quo, while older members, especially first-generation participants, opposed Henoko’s relocation and viewed the bases as detrimental.
Third, awareness of Okinawa’s reversion to Japan was widespread, with 70% of members knowing the date, a level similar to Okinawans and the national population. About 68% reported discussing Okinawa’s history on the 50th anniversary of the reversion. Although 77% viewed the reversion positively, this figure was lower than Okinawans’ 84% and the national population’s 93.1%. Regarding Okinawa’s future, 53.3% were optimistic, while 36.7% expressed concerns, mirroring broader opinions but at slightly lower levels.
Generational differences shaped awareness and attitudes toward reversion. Younger members were less likely to know the reversion date or preserve key historical memories, though their positive views on the reversion were consistent across generations. Members who were first-generation often qualified their approval, citing unresolved issues, and tended to be more pessimistic about Okinawa’s future. In contrast, middle-aged members were more optimistic, reflecting a generational shift in outlook.
Interviews revealed a wider range of opinions on the reversion. Members prioritizing the base issue often had a more negative outlook, citing unresolved challenges such as military bases and economic difficulties. While cultural transmission has faced generational weakening, the first generation remained highly active in promoting Okinawan activities and opposing US bases. Some younger members expressed interest in living in Okinawa, suggesting opportunities for renewed engagement through travel and community events to preserve Okinawan culture and political awareness.
This study examined how the identity and consciousness of Okinawan migrants residing in mainland Japan can be positioned within existing Okinawan diaspora theories. The analysis revealed that cultural practices among these migrants have become diluted with successive generations, indicating an ongoing assimilation into mainland Japanese society—a tendency resembling that observed among second and subsequent generations of the Okinawan diaspora overseas. This assimilation trend was also reflected in changes in attitudes and political consciousness toward Okinawa-related issues. Migrants from the second generation onward tended not to preserve an essentialized Okinawan identity; rather, they sustained their connections to Okinawan roots primarily through emotional attachments such as nostalgia and affection. These findings suggest the possibility of theoretically repositioning such individuals as constituting an “internal diaspora,” defined by generational and cultural distance.
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