This is an unusual book, being, as it is, two separate but related stories connected by the presence of one man: Alfred Wegener. The book is in part a biography of Wegener, a remarkable German meteorologist and scientific thinker, with special emphasis on his final Greenland expedition of 1930-31, on which he died during a winter trek on the high, barren icecap. The other part of the book is essentially a history of the development of the theory of plate tectonics and the earlier, less-sophisticated hypothesis of continental drift, particularly as set out by Wegener in the second and third decades of the twentieth century.
Born in 1880, Wegener's undergraduate education emphasised astronomy, but he thereafter shifted disciplines, training in meteorology, like his older brother Kurt, and then extending his work to climatology. In 1906, he joined Ludwig Mylius-Erichsen's Danmark Expedition (1906-08) to Greenland as the meteorologist. Tragically, Mylius-Erichsen and two others died during an extended winter excursion away from their base camp. After beginning his academic career lecturing at the University of Marburg, Wegener made a second trip to Greenland in 1912–13 as a member of Johan Peter Koch's expedition, also taking along one of his students, Johannes Georgi. Throughout this period, Wegener's research interests prompted him to focus on what geological, geodetic, geophysical, and palaeontological data could indicate about past climates. He made extensive studies in these fields, and his continual theorising about the evidence he accumulated led him to write Die Entstehung der Kontinente und Ozeane (Wegener Reference Wegener1915), in which he first outlined his theory of continental drift.
His audacious proposal that continents moved laterally made Wegener a figure well-known in the scientific community, although not always in a positive sense. As has frequently been the case through the centuries when a new and shockingly different hypothesis has been advanced, the majority of the scientific community ranged from sceptical to downright hostile, with criticism being made both professionally and personally. Perhaps the most scathing of the lot were a series of geologists and geophysicists — such as the British geologist Philip Lake and R.T. Chamberlin of the University of Chicago — who clearly resented Wegener's intrusion into fields they regarded as their own. Intriguingly, for those with Antarctic interests, it is notable that one of the most open-minded scientists regarding Wegener's theories was W.A.J.M. van Waterschoot van der Gracht, the one-time government geologist of The Netherlands, whose brother Joseph participated in the second voyage of Aurora during Douglas Mawson's Australasian Antarctic Expedition (1911–14). Despite continuing criticism of his theories, during the next 15 years Wegener's book was re-released in a series of updated editions, and he was named professor in the Department of Geophysics and Meteorology at the University of Graz.
In 1928, at the instigation of Professor Wilhelm Meinardus of the University of Göttingen, Wegener was invited to lead an expedition to Greenland to make measurements of the thickness of the icecap using a new seismic method. Wegener felt that this was his last chance to go back to Greenland and execute his own plan for an extensive investigation of the Greenland icecap, and he expanded the scope of the research to include a variety of glacial, geodetic, and atmospheric measurements as well as to make year-long, daily meteorological observations at three stations, on the west coast, east coast, and centre of the icecap. The Notgemeinschaft der Deutschen Wissenschaft (Emergency Aid Committee for German Science), founded after the First World War to provide funding to struggling scientists, agreed to finance the expedition.
After a preliminary reconnaissance in 1929, the expedition left for Greenland in April 1930. Almost immediately, unforeseen problems developed, as sea ice blocked the location where the supplies for the western and central bases were to be unloaded. By the time the materials had reached solid ground, the expedition was almost six weeks behind its planned timetable. Due to a variety of reasons, including unexpectedly low temperatures, unfavourable travelling conditions, and mechanical problems with the motor sledges — which had been too-heavily relied upon — the establishment of Eismitte, the base on the icecap, fell even further behind schedule. Wegener — with the tragedy of Mylius-Erichsen lurking in the back of his mind — had determined that no sledge trips with dogs would be made after mid-September to Eismitte (Wegener Reference Wegener and Wegener1933), but Georgi and Ernst Sorge, manning that base, indicated that they would not remain through the winter if they did not have more supplies than those that had reached them. Against his better judgement, and own directives, in late September Wegener set out for Eismitte, some 400 km (250 miles) away. The journey was beset with problems, as 12 of the 13 Greenlander drivers refused to complete the journey and turned back early; Wegener's only German companion, Fritz Loewe, suffered from terribly frostbitten feet; they passed the broken-down motor sledges; the terrible weather and snow conditions made a trip that earlier in the season had taken only 12 days last more than five weeks; and with only three men continuing to the base, they fell far short on the supplies they had hoped to deliver. When Wegener arrived at Eismitte on 29 October, it was far too late safely to try a return journey to the coast, but he left Loewe to recover with Georgi and Sorge and began his return with the one remaining Greenlander, Rasmus Villumsen. They both perished in the terrible conditions of the icecap.
Approximately half of Ending in ice is dedicated to this expedition and its aftermath, and the author raises a number of significant issues about the causes of the disaster. Chief among them, he indicates, were an over-reliance upon the motor sledges, which failed; a lack of effort to communicate via radios, although they had been brought out with the expedition supplies; miscommunications between Wegener and various expedition members; and unexpectedly harsh weather and ice conditions. However, disappointingly, the book does not delve into a number of other issues raised in an important article in this journal by Cornelia Lüdecke (Reference Lüdecke2000). In fact, that article and many of the primary documents and other sources referenced in it are never cited or acknowledged in this book. This is highly unfortunate, because the article thoroughly addressed key issues that really should be considered in a full-length work on Wegener and the expedition, and the lack of their inclusion raises questions about the comprehensiveness of the research that went into the book.
Among the most important issues dealt with by Lüdecke but not significantly addressed in the current volume is the role played by the Notgemeinschaft. Wegener had hoped to use aircraft to establish Eismitte, but the idea was quashed by the funding body due to its cost. Later, when a search for Wegener was organised, the Notgemeinschaft vetoed the use of aircraft — including those of Gino Watkins, which were already being used on the Greenland icecap — on the grounds that ‘the reputation and success of the expedition [would] be endangered.’ The Notgemeinschaft determined that if no aircraft were used in the search, the public would assume it was impossible to use them and would not blame the organisation (Lüdecke Reference Lüdecke2000: 146).
It proved to be Georgi who was the scapegoat for the tragedy, and although both this book and Lüdecke's paper concur that he was unfairly sacrificed to save other reputations, the paper also drew attention to several important issues relating to Georgi that the current book lets lie. Ending in ice presents Georgi, as well as the other members of the expedition, as united in their admiration and support of Wegener. Lüdecke, however, showed that Georgi had become essentially a rival of Wegener. Georgi had proposed his own expedition, but his plan had been incorporated into Wegener's, making Georgi his subordinate. Georgi's dissatisfaction showed itself in behaviour, according to Lüdecke, that led to quarrels with Loewe, who insisted on never serving under the former after the training expedition in 1929. Wegener, unfortunately, did not take this situation seriously, although it ‘should have been a warning for Wegener to take notice of Georgi's self-centred and uncooperative manner’ (Lüdecke Reference Lüdecke2000: 150). Nowhere was this more significantly demonstrated than in Georgi's insistence on setting Eismitte at a distance of 400 km (250 miles) from the west base rather than the 300 km (190 miles) preferred by Wegener. That might have made all the difference.
Another significant issue regarding Georgi that was not addressed in the book was his recalculation of provisions. After Wegener departed, Georgi recounted the supplies held at Eismitte, and documented that there was enough food to last five men until the middle of June 1931 (Georgi Reference Georgi1938: 255). Georgi did not ‘publish this information until 1938, in the fifth expanded edition of his book Im Eis vergraben. Had the correct figures been known before his return trip, Wegener might have stayed at Eismitte. Today, it makes one wonder how Georgi could have miscalculated such an essential figure’ (Lüdecke Reference Lüdecke2000: 150).
The final part of the book is the story of the development in the years following the Second World War of the understanding of plate tectonics. Although these advances were not directly attributable to Wegener's theories, they did confirm that some of his basic premises — if not his specific details — showed remarkable foresight and intuition.
Ending in ice is attractively presented, and its photographs, maps, and diagrams are of great value to the reader. However, it is rather disappointing that a publisher with the high standards of Oxford University Press should allow a book to appear with such an apparent lack of editorial oversight. Certain statements of fact are repeated several times throughout the book, in a way that makes one feel that the author thinks readers cannot remember what they have been told. Similarly, the first names of characters in the book are mentioned over and over in a most-annoying fashion. The book also lacks consistency in line editing, as perhaps most clearly shown by the indecision as whether or not to capitalise ‘Earth’ — despite it being a proper name. This reaches its most inconclusive situation on page 22, when it is used twice in one sentence, both capitalised and not!
There is a final point that is perhaps of particular interest to readers of Polar Record. In mentioning a conference held at the Royal Geographical Society in 1923 — at which Wegener was harshly criticised for his theories — the author refers to ‘A Mr Debenham’ who actually expressed some appreciation for Wegener's bold concepts (pages 34–35). This was, of course, Frank Debenham, a member of Robert Falcon Scott's last expedition, the primary influence in the founding of the Scott Polar Research Institute, a key figure in the development of the Department of Geography at Cambridge, and a geologist and geographer of international repute. Such unfamiliarity with Debenham again raised questions about both the author's background knowledge of polar science and the completeness of his research into this work.
Despite any reservations, however, it should be stated that this book is, overall, a very enjoyable read. Moreover, it is certainly true that, as its author wishes, it stands as an excellent tribute to a man who has received all-too-little attention in the English-language world for his polar and scientific achievements and theories.
