Introduction
To date, women remain significantly underrepresented in positions of political power globally. As of 2024 only 31 percent of United Nations member states were led by a female head of government, while women held just 27 percent of legislative seats worldwide (Ferrell Reference Ferrel2024). Furthermore, female leadership has remained consistently low even within international organizations (Barraza Vargas Reference Barraza-Vargas2019). Of these figures, the low percentage of women in parliaments is particularly concerning, since it limits not only their formal participation in politics but also their access to decision-making processes. To remedy this gap, countries around the world have implemented various affirmative actions designed to bolster women’s representation in legislatures, with gender quotas emerging as the most prevalent mechanism in Latin America (Krook Reference Krook and Tobar2008; Piscopo et al. Reference Piscopo, Thomas, Siavelis and Hinojosa2024).
This popularity has generated a vast body of literature on gender quotas, endeavoring on the impact of increasing women’s presence within parliaments. For instance, empirical research demonstrates that female legislators are significantly more likely than men to prioritize, champion, and enact legislation centered on women’s interests (Carroll Reference Carroll2001; Swers and Larson Reference Swers, Larson, Thomas and Wilcox2005; Franceschet and Piscopo Reference Franceschet and Piscopo2008; Reingold Reference Reingold2000; Swers Reference Swers2013; Osborn Reference Osborn2012; Bäck et al. Reference Bäck, Debus and Müller2014; Debus and Hansen Reference Debus and Ejnar Hansen2014). These differences are often attributed to gender mandates, the perceived obligation to represent women’s interests (Franceschet and Piscopo Reference Franceschet and Piscopo2008), which might be both internally and externally imposed on congresswomen (Bergqvist et al. Reference Bergqvist, Bjarnegård and Zetterberg2018). Furthermore, empirical evidence has shown that mandate effects are stronger when gender quotas are implemented (Wang Reference Wang2023), especially if they are adopted through feminist mobilization (Franceschet and Piscopo Reference Franceschet and Piscopo2008); and when faced with active feminist movements (Miguel Reference Miguel, Franceschet, Krook and Piscopo2012).
However, much of this scholarship tends to treat women as a homogeneous group, implying that the benefits of political representation extend equally to all women. When intragroup differences are acknowledged this uniform picture is troubled. While there is some consensus that quotas in themselves neither hinder nor advance marginalized women’s presence within legislative chambers (Holmsten et al. Reference Holmsten, Moser and Slosar2010; Hughes 2011; Reference Hughes2013; Celis and Erzeel Reference Celis and Erzeel2017), the question of their impact on interest representation remains largely unexplored. This article aims to contribute to this literature by centering the analysis on those women at the margins of politics (bell hooks 1984). Adopting a descriptive and exploratory approach, this study examines how gender quotas shape the substantive representation of marginalized women in contexts characterized by strong gender mandates. To this end, I analyzed Chile’s gender quota.
I compared the 2014–18 (pre-quota) and 2018–22 (post-quota) Chilean parliamentary terms. First, I systematized the information on the congresswomen’s social and ascriptive characteristics and party affiliations to determine how many marginalized women gained seats in the Chilean Parliament. Then, I recorded all the laws and bills on gender issues and marginalized groups that were sponsored by congresswomen during each cycle, classifying them based on their alignment with marginalized women’s interests. Finally, I analyzed who best represented the interests of marginalized women through bill sponsorship. The results of this study show a surge in the 2018–22 period of both the total number of legislative initiatives on gender issues and marginalized groups, as well as the average number of gender initiatives sponsored per congresswoman, supporting the mandate effect hypothesis. However, while there was an increase in bills addressing marginalized women’s needs during this second legislative term, they represented only a small fraction of the legislation on gender issues and marginalized groups and remained stalled within Congress, thus having little to no impact on marginalized women’s lives.
Gender Quotas, Mandate Effects, and Women’s Representation
Scholarship on the impact of gender quotas on women’s political representation is extensive. Not only have the conditions that optimize the success of these measures been carefully studied (see for example Krook Reference Krook and Tobar2008), but there is also a substantial body of literature on the relationship between the presence of women within parliaments and the representation of women’s interest. Research has shown that female legislators are more likely than their male peers to introduce bills about (Carroll Reference Carroll2001; Swers and Larson Reference Swers, Larson, Thomas and Wilcox2005; Franceschet and Piscopo Reference Franceschet and Piscopo2008), advocate for (Reingold Reference Reingold2000; Swers Reference Swers2013; Osborn Reference Osborn2012; Bäck et al Reference Bäck, Debus and Müller2014), prioritize (Thomas Reference Thomas1994; Wängnerud Reference Wängnerud2009), and vote for (Debus and Hansen Reference Debus and Ejnar Hansen2014) issues related to gender equality and women’s interest, however diversely defined the latter. These results are persistent in a variety of contexts (Schwindt-Bayer Reference Schwindt-Bayer2006; Clayton et al. Reference Clayton, Josefsson, Mattes and Mozaffar2019), and while more pronounced within leftist parties (González and Preuhs Reference González and Preuhs2012), the pattern also extends to congresswomen from conservative parties (Celis and Childs Reference Celis and Childs2012). This suggests that increasing the descriptive representation of women through gender quotas has a positive effect on the substantive representation of their interests.
There is less consensus on the causes behind this phenomenon. Some argue that congresswomen better understand and are more likely to defend women’s interest due to their shared experiences as women (Carroll Reference Carroll2001; Barnes Reference Barnes2012; Beckwith and Cowel-Meyers, Reference Beckwith and Cowell-Meyers2007), a factor which becomes more relevant when women’s interests are not yet formulated, unclear, or contested (Sapiro Reference Sapiro1981; Phillips Reference Phillips1995; Mansbridge Reference Mansbridge2005). However, these ideas not only seem to suggest that women’s interests cannot be as effectively represented by male politicians as by women themselves, but also run the risk of essentializing women. Others argue that gender quotas can increase congresswomen’s gender consciousness (O’Brien and Ricke Reference O’Brien and Rickne2016), generating a culture that draws further attention to women’s interests (Weeks Reference Weeks2018). Nonetheless, this would not explain why quotas do not alter the behavior of congressmen, nor why congresswomen are more likely to advocate for women even in the absence of quotas.
Finally, some scholars endeavor in the relationship between congresswomen and their constituents. Mansbridge (Reference Mansbridge1998, Reference Mansbridge1999) introduces the notion of surrogate representation, according to which congresspeople may act on behalf of the interests of voters outside of their district; a sense of obligation that is considerably stronger when representatives share experiences with groups disproportionately underrepresented in the legislature. Carroll (Reference Carroll and Rosenthal2002) confirms these ideas with rich qualitative evidence, showing that almost all congresswomen elected in the 103rd and 104th US Congress claimed to feel a duty to represent the interests of women; a sentiment that reportedly affected their legislative work. Drawing on interviews with Argentinian legislators, Franceschet and Piscopo (Reference Franceschet and Piscopo2008) report similar findings, registering how women elected after the adoption of the 1991 gender quota felt a special obligation to push for an agenda that benefit women’s interests; a phenomenon coined as “gender mandate.” Delving deeper into these notions, Bergqvist et al. (Reference Bergqvist, Bjarnegård and Zetterberg2018) distinguish between internal mandates, the self-perceived expectation to support certain issues and groups, and external mandates, the expectations imposed by others; illustrating how female politicians not only face external gender-equality mandates from which their male colleagues are exempt, but also tend to impose on themselves stronger gender mandates than men.
From a rational-choice perspective, the mandate effect perceived by women is theoretically consistent, since is both logical and strategical for congresswomen to respond to the demands of the electorate in their pursue of re-election. This, however, does not imply that all female politicians are always subjected to the same internal or external pressures. On the contrary, gender mandates might vary accordingly to the social and political context, electoral and candidate selection systems, party ideology, and between individuals (Bergqvist et al. Reference Bergqvist, Bjarnegård and Zetterberg2018). Empirical evidence supports the notion of mandate effects (Childs and Krook Reference Childs, Lena Krook, Franceschet, Krook and Piscopo2012), illustrating how these dynamics are more pronounced for quota-elected women (Wang Reference Wang2023). There is also evidence that mandate effects are stronger under two conditions. First, when gender quotas are adopted through feminist mobilization, because congresswomen often attribute their electoral gains to activism rather than party nominations (Franceschet and Piscopo Reference Franceschet and Piscopo2008). Second, when faced with active feminist movements, since female politicians anticipate criticism if they fail to prioritize gender-specific interests (Miguel Reference Miguel, Franceschet, Krook and Piscopo2012).
However, these ideas are troubled when the analysis shifts to the impact of gender quotas on the representation of women as a diverse group. Despite the overwhelming evidence that quotas increase the representation of women, there is no clear consensus on whether said benefits apply to all women equally. At the theoretical level, some scholars argue that increasing the presence of women within Congress improves the likelihood that a more heterogeneous group of women will be elected (Mansbridge Reference Mansbridge1999; Paxton and Hughes Reference Paxton and Hughes2007). Others, on the contrary, believe that gender quotas, as single-axis policies, tend to favor the presence of those already privileged, thus furthering intragroup differences (Young Reference Young, Shapiro and Kymlicka1997). This, in turn, might undermine the representation of marginalized women’s interests within parliaments, since policies designed for rather than with excluded groups often overlook critical concerns (Phillips Reference Phillips1995), by failing to address how race, class, and other social markers deeply impact the life of women far beyond their shared experience of womanhood (bell hooks 1984; Crenshaw Reference Crenshaw1989; Collins Reference Collins2015).
Empirical studies provide little clarity on this matter. Most research on the impact of quotas on marginalized women’s representation has focused on evaluating their efficacy in increasing their presence within legislative bodies. On this line, studies suggest that while quotas are not an impediment to the presence of minority women, they are insufficient on their own to enhance their representation; concluding in most cases that the amalgamation of quotas with other affirmative actions targeted at minorities is the most effective approach (Holmsten et al. Reference Holmsten, Moser and Slosar2010; Hughes Reference Hughes2011, Reference Hughes2013; Celis and Erzeel Reference Celis and Erzeel2017).
Only a few case studies have been attempted on the question of marginalized women’s interest representation, with mixed results. Reingold et al (Reference Reingold, Winder and Harmon2019), for example, concluded that Black and Latina congresswomen are more likely than their peers to sponsor legislation focused on multiple disadvantaged groups, demonstrating that their presence is critical for the substantive representation of these constituents. Brown and Hudson Banks (Reference Brown and Hudson Banks2014), on the other hand, while acknowledging that Black congresswomen support a higher proportion of legislation benefiting both women and minorities simultaneously than their colleagues, claim that a small number of Black congresswomen can shift the legislative agenda towards these issues by leveraging strategic alliances with white women and minority men. Within Chile, Dockendorff et al. (Reference Dockendorff, Gamboa and Aubry2025) reveal that while female legislators advocate for marginalized groups more frequently than their male peers, this advocacy remains uneven across groups. However, because these results derive exclusively from the analysis of non-legislative speeches and committee meetings, the question of how these patterns manifest in formal legislative outputs remains open.
In other words, there is not enough evidence to determine whether a critical mass of marginalized women within Parliament is a prerequisite for the effective representation of their interests. Furthermore, these studies have been conducted primarily in the United States and have focused almost exclusively on race and ethnicity to the exclusion of other relevant ascriptive characteristics, which limits the generalizability of their findings to other institutional settings and social contexts. Finally, this body of research has yet to engage with the literature on gender mandates, leaving unexamined whether quotas or the pressure from feminist movements may compel female representatives to prioritize intersectional policies, furthering the alliances identified by Brown and Hudson Banks (Reference Brown and Hudson Banks2014). Consequently, the question remains as to what extent do gender quotas shape the representation of marginalized women’s interests in contexts characterized by strong gender mandates. This article aims to contribute to this gap in the literature by exploring Chile’s quota results.
Research Design and Methods
Case Selection
Chile is an interesting case to explore the representation of marginalized women due to its institutional, political, and social context. First, it established a medium strength quota obtained with the help of women’s and feminist activists. The Chilean quota law establishes a 40 percent minimum representation for women in candidate lists from 2017 to 2029. To ensure compliance, the quota law incorporates an enforcement framework with measures such as the rejection of non-compliant party lists, a requirement for parties to allocate a portion of state funding to women’s training, and monetary incentives for every woman elected (Le Foulon and Suárez-Cao Reference Le Foulon, Suarez-Cao, Miranda and Suárez-Cao2018). More significantly, the inclusion of the quota law within the 2015–16 electoral reform was the direct result of advocacy by women’s and feminist movements, bolstered by the support of the presidency and female legislators (Piscopo et al. Reference Piscopo, Thomas, Siavelis and Hinojosa2024). Women took to the streets and flooded the halls of Congress during committee meetings and votes to ensure the passage of the quota (Arce Riffo Reference Arce Riffo and Riffo2018). This active mobilization supports the hypothesis that women elected after the implementation of the quota might experience a stronger gender mandate than those elected prior to the quota (Franceschet and Piscopo Reference Franceschet and Piscopo2008). Consequently, the Chilean case is particularly appropriate for studying gender quota’s mandate effects.
Second, the level of participation and the nature of the demands made by feminist movements differ markedly across the two parliamentary terms. Between 2014 and early 2018, feminist groups were comparatively less active than in the following period. The election of President Bachelet in 2013 opened a space for institutional reform in favor of the movement’s demands. Among the proposed measures were the strengthening of laws on gender violence, the decriminalization of abortion, and the increase of women’s presence in both the ministerial cabinet and Congress which, added to the creation of the Ministry of Women and Gender Equity in 2015, left the movement oscillating between instances of government participation and reactivation (Gaudichaud Reference Gaudichaud2015). This is not to imply that feminist groups remained inactive, however. Quite the opposite, within this period a series of demonstrations against gender violence took place, inspired by the Ni Una Menos movement; the student movement initiated its first actions against sexual harassment in universities; and there was a marked pro-choice mobilization around the slogan of a “Free, Safe and Autonomous Abortion” (Follegati Reference Follegati2018; Lamadrid and Benitt Reference Lamadrid and Benitt2019). But this activity remained relatively fragmented compared to the post-2018 period.
Moreover, a large part of the 2014–18 feminist demonstrations, except for those related to the demand for reproductive rights, were not organized around specific comprehensive demands, but rather arose in response to high-profile cases of harassment and femicide that gained traction in the media or social networks (Lamadrid and Benitt Reference Lamadrid and Benitt2019). In this sense, despite the feminist mobilization during this period, and the consequent spread of gender consciousness across civil society, the media and politics, the struggle to build a cohesive political platform continued (Lamadrid and Benitt Reference Lamadrid and Benitt2019). Furthermore, there was no clear connection between the feminist movement and other social movements. Despite attempts by smaller collectives to integrate lesbian and anti-racist perspectives (Lamadrid and Benitt Reference Lamadrid and Benitt2019), the broader movement continued to treat gender in isolation, ultimately centering its advocacy solely on shared experiences as women.
In contrast, the parliamentary period from 2018 to 2022 was marked by an intense feminist demonstration and the resurgence of multiple social movements. At the beginning of 2018, the so-called “Mayo Feminista” took place. This student-led mobilization began as a protest against sexist education, but soon transformed into a transgenerational and heterogeneous movement against gender-based violence (Vergara-Saavedra and Muñoz-Rojas Reference Vergara, Muñoz-Rojas, Navarrete and Tricot2021; López and Hiner Reference López and Hiner2022). This transformation was fueled by strategic coalitions; as street demonstrations intensified, the movement forged deep alliances with migrant, queer, and Indigenous movements (Silva-Tapia and Fernández Reference Silva-Tapia, Fernández, Tate and Gutierrez2022). These synergies culminated in a powerful intersectional agenda that not only demanded the recognition of differences among women, but also launched a systemic critique of patriarchy, capitalism, and colonialism (Vergara-Saavedra and Muñoz-Rojas Reference Vergara, Muñoz-Rojas, Navarrete and Tricot2021).
Following this, in October 2019 the Chilean “Social Outburst” erupted. What began as a protest against a metro fare hike rapidly transformed into a nationwide mobilization driven by long-standing grievances with a socioeconomic and political model that exacerbated inequality (Escudero and Olivares Reference Escudero, Olivares, Navarrete and Tricot2021). This crisis sparked a convergence of diverse social movements united against the precarity of life (Escudero and Olivares Reference Escudero, Olivares, Navarrete and Tricot2021; Perry and Borzutzky Reference Perry and Borzutzky2022), among which the feminist movement remained particularly visible through symbolic interventions that gained resonance globally (Arce Riffo, Reference Arce Riffo and Riffo2018). This momentum carried into 2020, with the historic International Women’s Day march that drew nearly 2 million people in Santiago alone, alongside massive mobilizations in other major cities (Silva-Tapia and Fernández Reference Silva-Tapia, Fernández, Tate and Gutierrez2022). This event showcased, once again, the articulation with other movements, featuring banners demanding justice for Indigenous peoples and LGBTQ+ flags. Finally, between 2021 and 2022, the first Chilean constitutional process took place, an instance in which demands for the representation of women and marginalized groups were institutionalized through the implementation of gender parity and reserved seats for Indigenous peoples due to the pressure of activists (Suarez‑Cao Reference Suarez‑Cao2021; Piscopo and Siavelis Reference Piscopo and Siavelis2021).
Accordingly, feminist mobilization between these two parliamentary cycles differed in both intensity and scope. During the 2014–18 term, the feminist movement, although active, was characterized by fragmented and reactive mobilization, often struggling to connect with other social causes and to make visible the needs of marginalized women. By contrast, the 2018–22 period witnessed a shift towards a more active, massive, and intersectional feminist movement that integrated queer, migrant, and Indigenous perspectives within its agenda. This suggests that the gender mandate effect experienced by congresswomen elected after the quota implementation not only pushed them to act on behalf of women’s interests, but also to represent marginalized women specifically, driven by the pressure from feminist movements (Miguel Reference Miguel, Franceschet, Krook and Piscopo2012). Consequently, the Chilean experience features a robust gender mandate, reinforced not only by the implementation of gender quotas but also by sustained feminist mobilization with intersectional demands, rendering it a unique case for an exploratory analysis of marginalized women’s interest representation.
Third, due to the nature of the Chilean political system, it is unlikely that the women elected after the implementation of the quota will come from marginalized groups. From the return to democracy until 2015, Chilean politics was dominated by the “binomial system.” This electoral formula allocated two seats in each parliamentary district and required a party to double the votes of the second-place finisher to win both (Piscopo et al. Reference Piscopo, Thomas, Siavelis and Hinojosa2024). This had several consequences, among them safeguarding the election of members of the two main party coalitions, which allowed politicians to become unrepresentative and unresponsive to social demands (Piscopo et al. Reference Piscopo, Thomas, Siavelis and Hinojosa2024), and favored the formation of a highly homogeneous political elite (Espinoza Reference Espinoza2010; Delamaza Reference Delamaza2013; Perry and Borzutzky Reference Perry and Borzutzky2022). Although the 2015–16 electoral reform included changes to the electoral formula, the partisan dynamics inherited from the binomial system would hardly be eradicated after a single election. Thus, the structural barriers that favor the existing political elite were likely to persist even after the quota implementation, hindering the entry of women from marginalized groups to Congress. This will allow us to analyze how quotas and their related gender mandate effects shape the representation of marginalized women’s interests when marginalized women themselves are largely excluded from legislative seats.
Data and Methods
To examine how marginalized women’s interests were represented in Parliament after the implementation of Chile’s gender quota, I compared the parliamentary periods from 2014 to 2018 (pre-quota) and 2018 to 2022 (post-quota). My analysis was three-pronged.
First, I studied who entered Congress before and after the quota came into effect, seeking to review how diverse were the congresswomen elected. For this, I systematized information on the social backgrounds, party affiliation, and ascriptive characteristics of the congresswomen, to define how many of them belonged to a marginalized group in terms of race, ethnicity, educational background, sexuality, or ability. Since my interest was to analyze the results of the quota and its mandate, I considered those women who gained seats through direct popular vote at the 2013 and 2017 parliamentary elections, as well as the two female senators elected in 2009 that participated in the 2014–18 parliamentary period;Footnote 1 excluding those women who entered Congress as substitutes appointed by political partiesFootnote 2 who are unlikely to feel obligated by gender mandates. Notably, the four women senators elected in 2013Footnote 3 serve as a compelling comparison point between periods: while elected prior to the implementation of the quota law, the second part of their term was impacted by the 2018–22 feminist mobilization.
The central source of the data collected was the congresswomen’s biographies, available on the Chilean Congress website;Footnote 4 which provided the legislators’ party affiliation, educational background, and a brief introductory presentation. I complemented this with data obtained from interviews and news. I defined Indigenous membership according to each legislator’s self-identification with Indigenous peoples, and classified women who were either Black or Asian as racial minorities. In the case of ability, I only considered physical disabilities for my analysis since other types of disability are harder to identify and may not have been disclosed by the congresswomen. Similarly, I included as members of the LGBTQ+ community those women who openly identified as non-heterosexual and or trans. Finally, although I consider class to be a relevant social marker, I could not include it in my analysis due to lack of data. However, I did consider educational attainment, a variable that is not only easier to compare but also closely linked to class due to the privatization of tertiary education from Pinochet’s dictatorship to 2016 (Espinoza Reference Espinoza2010).
Second, I investigated whose interests the congresswomen represented once elected. For this I reviewed and compared the legislative initiatives introduced by the congresswomen during the 2014–18 and the 2018–22 parliamentary terms, selecting those relative to gender and marginalized group’s issues.Footnote 5 I studied both laws and bills because previous studies have shown that legislators are more successful in gendering the legislative agenda than in enacting gender laws (Franceschet and Piscopo Reference Franceschet and Piscopo2008); furthermore I considered both legislations authored and sponsored by the congresswomen to define the direction and intensity of each legislator’s priorities (Rocca and Gordon Reference Rocca and Gordon2010). I excluded from my analysis what Jones (Reference Jones1997) denominates “non-policy bills,” that is, initiatives that fulfill ceremonial and bureaucratic purposes only; since the focus of this study is the substantive representation of interests through legislative actions that directly affect the lives of people by shaping public policy.
Based on Archenti and Johnson’s work (2006), I defined as gender bills and laws those legislative initiatives of which (at least some) women are the target population, and that aim to improve women’s condition in society, defend women’s rights, or promote gender equality. In this sense, I included legislation on areas such as gender equality, reproductive and sexual rights, gender-based violence, and care work. Importantly, the care work theme encompasses not only motherhood-related initiatives but also those aimed at promoting male involvement in care work, care of dependent adults, and issues of alimony, since it is a subject that seriously impacts Chilean women’s quality of life (Yopo and Fuentes Reference Yopo and Fuentes2024). Similarly, I classified as marginalized bills and laws those legislative initiatives focused exclusively on Indigenous peoples, migrants, racial minorities, the LGBTQ+ community, and disabled persons, or a combination of these; and that aimed to improve their condition in society, protect their fundamental rights, or promote substantive equality for these groups. Following these guidelines, I registered for both periods a total of 296 gender initiatives and 175 marginalized groups’ initiatives sponsored by at least one congresswoman. Importantly, this do not encompass the totality of legislative initiatives concerning women and marginalized groups between 2014 and 2022, as both congressmen and the executive branch also presented bills on these matters.
Following this, I read each document to determine whether they addressed the interests of marginalized women. I classified each gender-related piece of legislation according to three main categories: first, those employing a single-axis approach that did not acknowledge intragroup differences among women or mention any marginalized groups, thus focusing exclusively on the gender variable; second, additive initiatives that either mentioned one or more marginalized groups as entirely separate from women or briefly referred to marginalized women but without acknowledging their specific interests or needs;Footnote 6 and third, intersectional legislation, which considered the joint effect of gender and other systems of domination, thereby making visible the interests and needs of those women at the margins. I applied this same framework for marginalized groups’ laws and bills, classifying them as no-gender related when there was no mention of the women within a marginalized group, thus ignoring intragroup differences by excluding the gender variable. Similarly, I considered as additive those initiatives that mentioned women as a category entirely unconnected to marginalized groups or that referred to marginalized women briefly but without considering their specific interests and lived experiences. Finally, I repeated the same criteria for the intersectional category as for the gender legislation.
Third, I analyzed who best represented the interests of marginalized women. For this, I reviewed and compared the sponsorship of each law and bill during the 2014–18 and 2018–22 period, to check whether belonging to a vulnerable group, party affiliation, or being elected before or after the quota implementation influenced the number of initiatives introduced in favor of marginalized women. Importantly, I defined sponsorship to include both primary authorship and co-sponsorship of a bill to simplify the calculation. Based on this information, I built three original databases that compile data on congresswomen’s ascriptive characteristics and party affiliation;Footnote 7 gender and marginalized groups legislation codes, names, themes, and categories;Footnote 8 and on congresswomen’s sponsorship of each bill and law,Footnote 9 respectively.
Analyzing the Results of Chile’s Gender Quota Mandate
Congresswomen Characteristics
The 2013 Chilean parliamentary election resulted in the election of a total of 23 women, 19 to the Chamber of Deputies and four to the Senate, who joined the two women senators elected in 2009 that remained in office.Footnote 10 This brings the total to 25 congresswomen in the 2014–18 parliamentary term. Of these, 40 percent were affiliated with right-wing parties, with Unión Demócrata Independiente (UDI) being the most successful. The next largest majority was held by left-wing parties with 32 percent of the seats won by women, followed by center-left parties with 12 percent of the elected women. Only two (8 percent) women belong to the centrist party, and the other two (8 percent) women entered the Congress as independent candidates. Importantly, while right-wing parties held more seats individually, aggregating the congresswomen from left-wing, center, and center-left parties reveals that the Nueva Mayoría coalition held most of the seats won by women, outnumbering their right-wing counterparts.
The 2017 parliamentary election was the first time that the Chilean gender quota was applied, resulting in the election of a total of 41 women, 35 in the Chamber of Deputies and six in the Senate. An increase of 7 percent in the total of congresswomen compared to the previous election, which, although humble, was higher than the 1.6 percent average annual growth since 1989 (González, Reference González, Miranda and Suárez-Cao2018). These, added to the four women senators elected in 2013 that remained in office, brings the total to 45 congresswomen for the 2018–22 parliamentary term. Of these, 35.6 percent were affiliated to a left-wing party, with the Communist and Socialist parties being the two most successful. The second majority was held by right-wing parties with 28.9 percent of the elected women, followed by the center-left with 13.2 percent of the seats held by women. Similarly, independent congresswomen made up 13.2 percent of women in Congress, and only four (9 percent) congresswomen belonged to the centrist party (see Figure 1). Although the dissolution of the Nueva Mayoría coalition led to a more fragmented political landscape, the left and center-left parties, now organized into separate blocs, continued to secure most of women seats in Congress, mirroring the previous parliamentary term.
Congresswomen’s Political Ideology by Chamber (Per Term).
Figure 1. Long description
Panel A: A bar graph comparing the number of congresswomen in the Chamber of Deputies and Senate for the term 2014-2018. The horizontal axis represents the chambers (Chamber of Deputies and Senate), and the vertical axis represents the number of congresswomen. The bars are grouped by political ideology: Left, Centre-Left, Centre, Right, and Independent. In the Chamber of Deputies, the Left has 7 congresswomen, Centre-Left has 2, Centre has 1, Right has 1, and Independent has 7. In the Senate, the Left has 1, Centre-Left has 1, Centre has 1, Right has 1, and Independent has 3. Panel B: A bar graph comparing the number of congresswomen in the Chamber of Deputies and Senate for the term 2018-2022. The horizontal axis represents the chambers (Chamber of Deputies and Senate), and the vertical axis represents the number of congresswomen. The bars are grouped by political ideology: Left, Centre-Left, Centre, Right, and Independent. In the Chamber of Deputies, the Left has 15 congresswomen, Centre-Left has 5, Centre has 1, Right has 10, and Independent has 4. In the Senate, the Left has 1, Centre-Left has 1, Centre has 3, Right has 3, and Independent has 2.
Despite their ideological differences, the women elected to Congress in both legislative cycles shared similar ascriptive characteristics. In fact, none of the congresswomen who participated in the 2014–18 and 2018–22 parliamentary terms belonged to a racial minority, identified with the LGBTQ+ community, or reported a physical disability. Greater diversity was evidenced by the presence of women from ethnic minorities, a trend seemingly bolstered after the quota implementation. In the 2014–18 term only one deputy, Yasna Provoste Campillay from Democracia Cristiana party, declared that she had Diaguita ancestry. In contrast, after the 2017 election three congress women openly identified themselves as Indigenous women: Mapuche deputies Aracely Leuquén Uribe affiliated to the right-wing party Renovación Nacional, and Emilia Nuyado Ancapichún from the Socialist Party, and Yasna Provoste Campillay, now as a member of the upper chamber. In this sense, not only did the proportion of Indigenous women within the body of female legislators grow from 4 percent to 6.7 percent between the two terms, but their representation also became more diverse and expanded into both chambers.
Regarding educational attainment, the data show that congresswomen from both parliamentary cycles are largely drawn from the country’s professional population. In the 2014–18 term, 96 percent of the congresswomen were university graduates. Specifically, 48 percent of the women during this period held a college degree as their highest level of education, while six (24 percent) had one postgraduate degree, and another six (24 percent) held more than one graduate degree. Only one representative in the Chamber of Deputies, Andrea Molina Oliva, held a technical qualification as her highest educational level. Similarly, during the 2018–22 term, 97.8 percent of the congresswomen were university graduates. In particular, 66.7 percent of the women within Congress held a college diploma as their highest educational qualification. Of the rest, eight congresswomen (17.8 percent) had a master’s degree, including some obtained abroad, and another six (13.3 percent) had more than one postgraduate degree. Only one representative of the lower chamber, Virginia Troncoso Hellman, held a high school diploma as her highest educational level, which is the minimum requirement to run for office (see Figure 2).
Congresswomen’s Educational Attainment by Chamber (Per Term).
This analysis reveals that the women elected in both legislative periods constitute a remarkably homogeneous cohort, characterized by high levels of educational attainment, professional credentials, and a lack of visible physical disabilities. Furthermore, this group predominantly represents cisgender, heterosexual, and racial majority demographics. Consequently, the only representation from marginalized sectors comes from Indigenous women, whose presence increased following the implementation of gender quotas, although the specific causal mechanisms behind this shift remain unclear. Such a lack of diversity was anticipated, given the partisan practices inherited from Chile’s binomial system. Nonetheless, this homogeneity provides an opportunity to evaluate how quotas and mandate effects translate into the representation of marginalized women’s interests when they lack direct descriptive representation.
Gender Legislation
During the 2014–18 parliamentary term, congresswomen presented and sponsored a total of 82 initiatives related to gender issues, of which 81 were bills, with only one law published within this period. Of these, a total of 61 (74.4 percent) initiatives had a single-axis approach, 12 (14.6 percent) were additive, and 9 (11 percent) could be classified as intersectional. By contrast, the 2018–22 parliamentary term witnessed a surge in gender-related legislation authored by women with a total of 214 initiatives on the subject, an increase of around 161 percent. Of these, 203 initiatives correspond to bills and 11 to laws published within the legislative cycle. A total of 173 (80.8 percent) gender-related initiatives were classified as single-axis, of the remaining 20 (9.3 percent) were categorized as additive, and 21 (9.8 percent) had an intersectional approach (see Figure 3). Importantly, although the number of intersectional gender initiatives more than doubled, rising from nine in the first term to 21 in 2018–22; their relative proportion compared with all gender-related legislation decreased.
Gender Legislation by Chamber and Category (Per Term).
The Chamber of Deputies was the most active branch in both legislative cycles, claiming 58 legislative initiatives between 2014–18 and 161 between 2018–22, a prevalence which is likely due to the higher number of congresswomen in the lower chamber. Similarly in both parliamentary terms the great majority of gender-related legislation were bills, which supports the notion that women are more successful at gendering the legislative agenda than at enacting gender laws (Franceschet and Piscopo Reference Franceschet and Piscopo2008).
Regarding the themes reviewed, of the 82 gender initiatives promoted by women during the 2014–18 parliamentary term, 29 (35.4 percent) focused on caregiving, covering topics such as alimony, and maternal and parental rights. Another 26 (31.7 percent) focused on gender-based violence, specifically sexual harassment, domestic violence, and femicide, while 23 (28 percent) sought to promote equality in areas such as work, marriage, politics, and education. Notably, only four (4.9 percent) initiatives in this period focused on sexual and reproductive rights, with just one bill addressing abortion. This scarcity, despite the intense social mobilization, can be attributed to two factors: first, the alignment of Nueva Mayoría congresswomen with the presidency’s bill to decriminalize abortion in three grounds; second, the introduction of counterproposals by opposition congresswomen that intended to shift the debate toward pregnancy protection, which were classified as care work.
On the other hand, of the 214 gender initiatives from the 2018–22 parliamentary term, 78 (36.4 percent) addressed care work issues such as alimony, maternal, and parental rights, and caregivers’ benefits. Additionally, 62 (29 percent) initiatives focused on promoting gender equality across labor, marriage, politics, education, law, sports, health, and taxation, while 57 (26.6 percent) tackled gender-based violence, specifically sexual and workplace harassment, sexual abuse, rape, domestic violence, and femicide. Finally, the remaining 17 (7.9 percent) sought to improve women’s sexual and reproductive rights, advocating for abortion and contraception access, sexual education, and the eradication of obstetric violence (see Figure 4). Consequently, the quantitative increase in initiatives on gender issues within this second term also contributed to broadening their scope, thus diversifying the legislative agenda.
Gender Legislation by Chamber and Theme (Per Term).
When comparing by category, the 2014–18 parliamentary term included 22 (36.1 percent) single-axis initiatives focused on care work, 20 (32.8 percent) on gender-based violence, 18 (29.5 percent) on gender equality, and 1 (1.6 percent) on sexual and reproductive rights. Similarly, the 2018–22 parliamentary term had 68 (39.3 percent) single-axis initiatives on care work, 51 (29.5 percent) on gender equality, 46 (26.6 percent) on gender-based violence, and 8 (4.6 percent) on sexual and reproductive rights. Importantly, although all single-axis legislation focused exclusively on the impact of gender structures on women, it exhibited significant variation in its framing across both terms. In some cases, the initiatives used gender-neutral language that either did not explicitly state that the issue primarily affected women or directly denied this fact (see, for example, Bills No. 9936-07 2015; 12182-18 2018). In others, the initiatives directly identified women as their primary recipients, thus, for example, signaling them as the main caregivers (Bill No. 12182-18 2018) or the most frequent victims of domestic violence (Bills No. 10905-18 2016 and No. 12968-18 2019).
A notable shift in the 2018–22 cycle, however, was the emergence of initiatives that applied gender analysis to the topics reviewed. These ranged from legislation using key terms such as “gender inequality” (Bill No. 11645-06 2018) or “patriarchy” (Bill, No. 11862-07 2018) to initiatives questioning sex and gender as social constructs and quoting feminist ideas (Bill No. 14082-07 2021). Nevertheless, these laws and bills were the exception rather than the norm. Furthermore, because these initiatives focused exclusively on gender without addressing intersecting systems of power that affect women’s lives, they occasionally resulted in proposals that primarily benefited privileged women. For example, Bill 11668-11 (2018) sought to enhance reproductive rights by facilitating abortion access in private clinics, a measure that disproportionately favors upper-class women while leaving systemic barriers intact for others.
Within the additive category, the 2014–18 term included five (41.7 percent) initiatives on care work, four (33.3 percent) on gender equality, and three (25 percent) on gender-based violence. In the 2018–22 cycle, the focus shifted slightly with 10 (50 percent) initiatives addressing gender equality, six (30 percent) focusing on care work, and four (20 percent) dealing with gender-based violence. Regarding their content, the additive initiatives of the 2014–18 term followed two main patterns: they either included multiple categories of difference in their definitions of discrimination (see for example: Bills No. 10067-13 2015 and No. 11629-13 2018); or mentioned other systems of difference, such as social class, but only to state that a phenomenon affected all women equally despite their differences (Bill No. 11014-18 2016). Similarly, among the 2018–22 legislation some additive initiatives mentioned other marginalized groups only to indicate that an issue impacted all women equally (Bill No. 13847-13 2020); while others named several marginalized groups merely to define discrimination or hate crimes (Bill No. 14776-34 2021), or to exemplify similar laws (Bill No. 11746-07 2018). Additionally, some initiatives treated women and marginalized groups as separate categories, thus providing them with different remedies (Bill No. 13132-07 2019).
Finally, regarding the intersectional category, the 2014–18 cycle offered three (33.3 percent) initiatives on gender-based violence; three (33.3 percent) on sexual and reproductive rights, two (22.2 percent) on care work, and one (11.1 percent) on gender equality. Among these, some initiatives established a statutory aggravating circumstance when a marginalized woman was the victim of a crime, such as Bill No. 10754-07 (2016), which increases penalties for femicide and sexual offenses against disabled women. Others highlighted the special needs and vulnerabilities experienced by multiply disadvantaged women, including poor women (Bills No. 9480-11 2014, No. 10305-11 2015, No. 10911-04 2016, and No. 11409-07 2017), disabled women (Bill No. 10045-18 2015), and queer women (Bill No. 11383-11 2017) within broader laws. Notably, two bills sought to protect several groups of marginalized women from discrimination (Bills No. 10220-11 2015 and No. 11106-07 2017). However, as the latter two bills were introduced as counterproposals to the abortion decriminalization bill, it remains questionable whether this reflected a genuine interest in representing disadvantaged women or served as a strategic maneuver to garner political support.
By contrast, in the 2018–22 parliamentary term 21 gender-related initiatives were classified as intersectional. Of these, nine (43 percent) focused on sexual and reproductive rights, seven (33.2 percent) on gender-based violence, four (19 percent) on care work, and one (4.8 percent) on gender equality (see Figure 5). A portion of these initiatives included a single group of marginalized women, such as disabled women (Bill No. 11741-11 2018), working-class women (Bill No. 12038-34 2018), or queer women (Bill No. 14284-11 2021) within a broader law, acknowledging their different vulnerabilities and specific needs. Other bills focused instead exclusively on a group of marginalized women, addressing issues that affected them specifically, such as Bill No. 14256-07 (2021) which established the legal figure of “co-motherhood” to protect lesbian couples exclusively. Yet, perhaps the most striking bills are those that protected both the interests of both women as a group and of a variety of marginalized women. For example, Bill No. 12148-11 (2018) punished obstetric violence against all women, while also defining special measures to protect incarcerated, working-class, disabled, queer, and migrant women; and Law 21.212 (2020), which had provisions for femicide victims in general, and migrant and disabled women in particular.
Distribution of Gender Legislation Themes by Category (Per Term).
Figure 5. Long description
The bar graph compares the number of laws and bills by category and theme over two time periods, 2014–2018 and 2018–2022. The horizontal axis lists the categories: Care Work, Equality, Gender Based Violence, and Sexual and Reproductive Rights. The vertical axis represents the number of laws and bills, ranging from 0 to 80. The bars are grouped by time period and color-coded by type: Single Axis, Additive, and Intersectional. For 2014–2018, Care Work has 22 Single Axis, 5 Additive, and 2 Intersectional laws and bills. Equality has 18 Single Axis, 4 Additive, and 1 Intersectional. Gender Based Violence has 20 Single Axis, 3 Additive, and 3 Intersectional. Sexual and Reproductive Rights has 1 Single Axis, 3 Additive, and 0 Intersectional. For 2018-2022, Care Work has 68 Single Axis, 6 Additive, and 4 Intersectional laws and bills. Equality has 51 Single Axis, 10 Additive, and 1 Intersectional. Gender Based Violence has 46 Single Axis, 4 Additive, and 7 Intersectional. Sexual and Reproductive Rights has 8 Single Axis, 8 Additive, and 9 Intersectional.
However, it is worth noting that in both parliamentary terms, the majority of intersectional bills acknowledged the interests of marginalized women solely within their preambles, failing to include specific measures for their benefit in the proposed legislation. This is particularly harmful because preambles are lost after the enactment of a law and lack binding legal force, serving primarily as interpretive or symbolic context. Consequently, the interests of marginalized women would still not have been represented, even if the legislation had passed. This could partially explain why only one intersectional law was published in the 2018–22 term and none between 2014 and 2018. The motivations behind these decisions, as well as possible formal and informal obstacles, are explored further in the last section.
Marginalized Groups Legislation
During the 2014–18 parliamentary term, congresswomen sponsored a total of 68 initiatives concerning marginalized groups, of which 64 were bills, while only four were laws published within this legislative cycle. Of these, a total of 41 (60.2 percent) lacked any gender consideration, 23 (33.8 percent) had an additive approach, and 4 (6 percent) were categorized as intersectional. The subsequent 2018–22 term was notably more productive, with a total of 107 pieces of marginalized groups legislation, of which 101 were bills and only six were enacted laws. This represents an increase of 57 percent within the second parliamentary period. Among the legislation sponsored in the 2018–22 term, 73 (68.2 percent) were classified as no-gender, 28 (26.2 percent) were additive, and 6 (5.6 percent) were intersectional (see Figure 6). Notably, despite the decrease in the relative proportion of intersectional initiatives within the total volume of marginalized groups legislation, their absolute count rose from 4 in 2014–18 to 6 in 2018–22. While these figures remain modest, they nonetheless represent a 50 percent increase between parliamentary terms.
As with the gender-related legislation, the Chamber of Deputies was the most productive branch in both legislative cycles, accounting for 46 legislative initiatives during the 2014–18 cycle and 78 during the 2018–22 period. This predominance, once again, is likely attributable to the higher concentration of women in the lower chamber. Additionally, in both parliamentary terms the great majority of marginalized groups legislation was composed of bills. In this regard, it is important to note that none of the laws concerning marginalized groups authored by congresswomen during this period incorporated an intersectional perspective. This implies that all intersectional initiatives either stalled in the legislative process or saw their intersectional components diluted during the legislative debate, ultimately failing to translate into substantive policy outcomes for marginalized women.
Regarding their thematic focus, of the 68 initiatives promoted by women during the 2014–18 term, 39 (57.4 percent) addressed disability, with an emphasis on preventing discrimination and promoting inclusion in education, sports, and the labor market. Another 16 (23.5 percent) concerned Indigenous peoples, seeking formal ethnic recognition and the protection of their political rights. Furthermore, five (7.4 percent) addressed the LGBTQ+ community, seeking to provide family, marriage, and identity rights; four (5.9 percent) engaged with multiple vulnerable groups, addressing hate crimes and discrimination; and three (4.4 percent) dealt with migrants’ integration and protection from human trafficking. Lastly, one (1.5 percent) initiative within this term was linked to racial minorities.
Similarly, in the 2018–22 cycle, 48 (44.9 percent) initiatives were linked to disabled people, providing protection against discrimination and violence while advancing inclusion across education, sports, infrastructure, and public health. Indigenous peoples were the second most addressed group, with 36 (33.6 percent) initiatives targeting the protection of their customs, lands, autonomy, and political rights. Additionally, 10 (9.3 percent) initiatives focused on the LGBTQ+ community, expanding beyond family, marriage, and identity rights to include anti-violence measures, while another 10 (9.3 percent) addressed migrants’ integration and anti-trafficking protections. Finally, three (2.8 percent) initiatives sought to prevent the discrimination of multiple disadvantaged groups (see Figure 7). In this sense, while the targeted groups remained consistent across both terms, the 2018–22 cycle was characterized by a broadening of scope, covering a wider variety of needs.
. Marginalized Groups Legislation by Chamber and Theme (Per Term).
Marginalized Groups Legislation by Chamber and Theme (Per Term).
Figure 7. Long description
Panel A: A bar graph comparing the number of laws and bills by themes in the Chamber of Deputies and Senate from 2014 to 2018. The horizontal axis represents the legislative chambers (Chamber of Deputies and Senate), and the vertical axis represents the number of laws and bills. The themes include Disability, Indigenous Peoples, L G B T Q plus, Migrants, Race, and Vulnerable Groups. The bars are grouped by theme and chamber. The Chamber of Deputies has the highest number of laws and bills for Disability (33) and the lowest for Migrants (1). The Senate has the highest number of laws and bills for Disability (6) and the lowest for L G B T Q plus (2). Panel B: A bar graph comparing the number of laws and bills by theme in the Chamber of Deputies and Senate from 2018 to 2022. The horizontal axis represents the legislative chambers (Chamber of Deputies and Senate), and the vertical axis represents the number of laws and bills. The themes include Disability, Indigenous Peoples, L G B T Q plus, Migrants, Race, and Vulnerable Groups. The bars are grouped by theme and chamber. The Chamber of Deputies has the highest number of laws and bills for Disability (41) and the lowest for Migrants (1). The Senate has the highest number of laws and bills for Indigenous Peoples (13) and the lowest for Migrants (2).
As previously noted, most of the legislation concerning marginalized groups in both terms remained gender-blind, failing to address the specific experiences and needs of marginalized women. Specifically, during the 2014–18 parliamentary term, congresswomen introduced and sponsored within this category 21 (51.2 percent) initiatives regarding disabled people, 13 (31.7 percent) for Indigenous peoples, three (7.3 percent) for migrants, three (7.3 percent) for the LGBTQ+ community, and a single (2.4 percent) initiative addressing multiple disadvantaged groups at once. In the subsequent 2018–22 term, congresswomen contributed 31 (42.5 percent) initiatives for disabled people, 26 (35.6 percent) for Indigenous peoples, nine (12.3 percent) for migrants, six (8.2 percent) for the LGBTQ+ community and one (1.4 percent) concerning multiple vulnerable groups that were classified within the no-gender category. Examples of such initiatives include bills seeking to reserve seats for Indigenous peoples in Congress without measures to ensure the representation of Indigenous women (see, for example, Bills No. 11289 2017 and No. 14098-07 2021); bills promoting the inclusion of disabled people in the labor market without considering the specific barriers disabled women face in accessing employment (see, for example, Bills N° 9394-13 2014 and No. 14789-35 2022); and bills that failed to acknowledge that women and girls constitute the majority of victims of sexual trafficking (see for example: Bills No. 10784-07 2016 and No. 12063-07 2018).
Within the additive category, the 2014–18 term included 14 (63.6 percent) initiatives about disabled people, three (13.6 percent) on Indigenous peoples, three (13.6 percent) dealing with multiple vulnerable groups, one (4.5 percent) for the LGBTQ+ community, and one (4.5 percent) seeking the recognition of the Afro-descendant Tribal People in Chile. Regarding their content, the additive initiatives of the 2014–18 term followed some clear patterns. Some mentioned marginalized women only as a disaggregated statistical point (Bill No. 10625-17 2016); others did so to avoid the use of generic masculine terms when referring to a specific group (see, for example, Bills No. 9424-17 2014 and No. 10279-31 2015); or due to quoting international treaties (Bill No. 10625-17 2016). Finally, others included women within a large list of sources of discrimination, but treated them as a separate category from marginalized groups (see, for example, Bill No. 9372-07 2014).
Among the additive initiatives sponsored by congresswomen during the 2018–22 term, 15 (51.7 percent) addressed disabled people, eight (27.6 percent) Indigenous peoples, three (10.3 percent) the LGBTQ+ community, two (6.9 percent) multiple marginalized groups, and one (3.4 percent) was dedicated to migrants. As with the 2014–18 term, most of these bills mentioned women only briefly in their preambles to provide an example of similar laws (Bill No. 11823-17 2018), as a mere statistical point (see, for example, Bill No. 13715-17 2020; Bill No. 14468-14 2021), or to avoid generic masculine terms (see, for example, Bill No. 14455-35 2021), but without considering their interests and needs. The remaining legislative initiatives within this category include women as a distinct and unconnected group, which is the case of Bill No. 13867-17 (2020) that provides remedies against discrimination based on race, ethnicity, age, sexual orientation, gender, immigration status, income, and disability, but addresses them as separate identities.
Only four initiatives presented by congresswomen who participated in the 2014–18 parliamentary term were classified as intersectional. Of these, three (75 percent) sought to protect people with disabilities, and one (25 percent) addressed the LGBTQ+ community. Notably, three of these initiatives specifically addressed within their preambles the unique vulnerabilities of women with disabilities and the problems they face in their daily lives (Bills No. 9687-31, 2014 and No. 11163-31, 2017), including the disproportionate impact of forced sterilization on this population (Bill No. 11357-11, 2017). The remaining initiative (Bill No. 10626-07 2015) sought to protect all same-sex couples by granting them co-parenting rights, while emphasizing the case of lesbian women.
In the 2018–22 parliamentary term, on the other hand, six marginalized bills introduced by the congresswomen considered the interests of multiply disadvantaged women. Of these, three (50 percent) concerned Indigenous groups, two (33.3 percent) addressed disabled people, and the remaining initiative (16.7 percent) focused on the LGBTQ+ community (see Figure 8). An analysis of their content reveals that four bills analyzed the specific vulnerabilities of marginalized women within broader laws but did not provide any measures within the proposed articles to address these needs (Bills No. 12751-07 2019, No. 12768-15 2019, No. 13549-17 2020, and No. 14334-34 2021). Another intersectional bill represented the interests of women within the framework of a broader law focused on Indigenous peoples’ self-determination, establishing the legal obligation to respect the fundamental rights of Indigenous women and to guarantee gender equality (Bill No. 11873-07 2018). The remaining bill focused solely on Indigenous women, proposing specific articles aimed at redressing historical discrimination (Bill No. 13299-34 2020). However, as previously noted, the intersectional initiatives from both parliamentary terms remain stalled in Congress, failing to produce a tangible impact on the lives of marginalized women.
Distribution of Marginalized Groups Legislation Themes by Category (Per Term).
Sponsorship
Some interesting findings emerged from the analysis of the sponsorship of legislative initiatives. When reviewing by parliamentary period, the data indicate that, on average, congresswomen sponsored 3.28 initiatives each during the 2014–18 legislative cycle, a figure that rose to 4.76 in the following term. Similarly, the number of intersectional gender legislation sponsored also increased during the second legislative period, rising from an average of 0.36 initiatives per congresswoman to 0.47. Legislation concerning marginalized groups followed an opposing trajectory. Although the total number of initiatives grew, the average sponsorship per congresswoman decreased slightly from 2.72 initiatives on this matter during the 2014–18 cycle to 2.38 during the 2018–22 period. This downward trend extended to intersectional initiatives on this topic, decreasing from an average of 0.16 initiatives per congresswoman during the first term to 0.13 in the second. In this sense, the congresswomen elected under the quota period were more productive on gender issues, which coincides with the gender mandate hypothesis.
Regarding ethnicity, Indigenous congresswomen showed no special sensitivity to marginalized women’s interests. During the 2014–18 term, Yasna Provoste Campillay supported a total of eight single-axis gender initiatives and seven marginalized groups bills, of which only one was intersectional. In comparison, her non-indigenous peers sponsored an average of 11.6 gender legislative initiatives, of which 0.7 were intersectional; and 6.7 marginalized group bills, of which 0.3 were intersectional. In the 2018–22 cycle, Indigenous congresswomen sponsored fewer intersectional gender initiatives compared to the average of 2.6 by their non-indigenous counterparts, but demonstrated a higher engagement in intersectional initiatives on marginalized groups, surpassing the average of 0.6 from non-indigenous women. Specifically, Yasna Provoste Campillay sponsored a total of 21 gender initiatives and 11 initiatives on marginalized groups, with only one intersectional project in each category. Emilia Nuyado Ancapichún followed with five gender bills and 15 marginalized groups’ legislation, with only one intersectional project in each category; while Aracely Leuquén Uribe sponsored four gender bills and three marginalized groups bills related to marginalized groups, none of which featured an intersectional approach. However, these cases are insufficient for broader generalization.
Educational attainment appears to bear no clear relationship to the sponsorship of initiatives favoring marginalized women. In the 2014–18 parliamentary term Andrea Molina Oliva sponsored eight gender-neutral bills on marginalized groups and 12 gender bills, of which only one was intersectional. In comparison, congresswomen with college degrees averaged 0.2 intersectional marginalized group bills and 1.3 intersectional gender bills, while those with multiple postgraduate degrees averaged 0.8 and 1.3, respectively. Likewise, in the 2018–22 term, Virginia Troncoso Hellman sponsored a total of 12 single-axis gender initiatives, and ten bills on marginalized groups, among which two had an intersectional framework. By contrast, congresswomen with college degrees averaged 2.8 intersectional gender bills and 0.6 intersectional marginalized groups bills, while those with multiple postgraduate degrees averaged 2.3 and 0.3, respectively. Figures that, when compared, do not indicate a noteworthy difference in their representation of the needs of marginalized women.
The most notable differences were found across the ideological spectrum, with left-wing congresswomen sponsoring intersectional initiatives more frequently than than center and right-wing female legislators. Specifically, during the 2014–18 parliamentary term, when aggregating the individual sponsorship of each gender law and bill, data indicate that most of the intersectional legislation was supported by right-wing congresswomen with 12 sponsorships, followed closely by left-wing congresswomen with 11 sponsorships. However, this dynamic shifted in the 2018–22 parliamentary cycle, as left-wing congresswomen took the lead by sponsoring 74 intersectional initiatives, a figure substantially higher than those of their center and right-wing counterparts (see Figure 9). A similar pattern emerges when analyzing marginalized groups’ legislation, where the majority of support for intersectional laws and bills was concentrated among left-wing congresswomen during both legislative cycles (see Figure 10).
Congresswomen’s Sponsorship of Gender Legislation by Category and Party Ideology (Per Term).
Figure 9. Long description
Panel A: A bar graph compares the sponsorship of gender legislation by congresswomen across different political ideologies for the term 2014–2018. The horizontal axis represents political ideologies: Left, Centre-Left, Centre, Right, and Independent. The vertical axis represents the number of sponsorships. The graph includes three sets of bars for each ideology, representing Single axis, Additive, and Intersectional sponsorships. The Left ideology shows 59 Single axis, 27 Additive, and 11 Intersectional sponsorships. The Centre-Left shows 19 Single axis, 7 Additive, and 4 Intersectional sponsorships. The Centre shows 20 Single axis, 2 Additive, and 1 Intersectional sponsorship. The Right shows 68 Single axis, 7 Additive, and 12 Intersectional sponsorships. The Independent shows 21 Single axis, 3 Additive, and 2 Intersectional sponsorships. Panel B: A bar graph compares the sponsorship of gender legislation by congresswomen across different political ideologies for the term 2018-2022. The horizontal axis represents political ideologies: Left, Centre-Left, Centre, Right, and Independent. The vertical axis represents the number of sponsorships. The graph includes three sets of bars for each ideology, representing Single axis, Additive, and Intersectional sponsorships. The Left ideology shows 237 Single axis, 38 Additive, and 74 Intersectional sponsorships. The Centre-Left shows 85 Single axis, 14 Additive, and 14 Intersectional sponsorships. The Centre shows 58 Single axis, 12 Additive, and 5 Intersectional sponsorships. The Right shows 148 Single axis, 12 Additive, and 6 Intersectional sponsorships. The Independent shows 101 Single axis, 10 Additive, and 13 Intersectional sponsorships.
Congresswomen’s Sponsorship of Marginalized Groups Legislation by Category and Party Ideology (Per Term).
However, these figures are skewed given that, as noted, right-wing congresswomen held most seats in the first parliamentary term studied, while left-wing women predominated in the second. To account for this, I calculated the mean sponsorship per ideological sector by dividing the aggregate legislative output within each category by the number of congresswomen belonging to that sector. As Figure 11 illustrates, left-wing sectors averaged the second highest rate of sponsorship for gender legislation during the 2014–18 term, surpassed only by centrist legislators at the single-axis category. Likewise, when compared to center and right-wing sectors left-wing legislators recorded the highest rate during the 2018–22 period in all categories but the additive one, as well as the highest mean for intersectional initiatives across both legislative cycles. Furthermore, their mean sponsorship of intersectional projects rose sharply, moving from 1.4 bills during the 2014–18 term to 4.6 between 2018–22. Conversely, support for intersectional initiatives declined among right-wing parties, dropping from 1.2 to 0.5. Similarly, Figure 12 shows that left-wing parties maintained a higher average sponsorship rate for marginalized groups’ legislation than the right in all categories and across both periods. Interestingly, however, in the second term, the center and center-left sectors achieved the highest average sponsorship rate of no-gender initiatives. Ultimately, while nearly all sectors slightly increased their average intersectional bill sponsorship in the 2018–22 cycle, these gains remained exceptionally low.
Average Party Sponsorship of Gender Legislation by Category and Ideology (Per Term).
Figure 11. Long description
Panel A: A bar graph comparing party sponsorship of gender legislation by category and ideology for the term 2014-2018. The horizontal axis represents ideological sectors: Left, Centre-Left, Centre, Right, and Independent. The vertical axis represents party sponsorship in percent. The graph includes three sets of bars for each sector, representing Single Axis, Additive, and Intersectional categories. The values for Single Axis are: Left 7.4, Centre-Left 6.3, Centre 10.0, Right 6.8, Independent 4.2. The values for Additive are: Left 3.4, Centre-Left 2.3, Centre 1.0, Right 0.7, Independent 1.2. The values for Intersectional are: Left 1.4, Centre-Left 1.3, Centre 0.5, Right 0.4, Independent 0.6. Panel B: A bar graph comparing party sponsorship of gender legislation by category and ideology for the term 2018-2022. The horizontal axis represents ideological sectors: Left, Centre-Left, Centre, Right, and Independent. The vertical axis represents party sponsorship in percent. The graph includes three sets of bars for each sector, representing Single Axis, Additive, and Intersectional categories. The values for Single Axis are: Left 14.8, Centre-Left 14.2, Centre 14.5, Right 11.4, Independent 16.8. The values for Additive are: Left 2.4, Centre-Left 2.3, Centre 3.0, Right 0.9, Independent 1.7. The values for Intersectional are: Left 4.6, Centre-Left 2.3, Centre 1.3, Right 0.5, Independent 2.2.
Average Party Sponsorship of Marginalized Groups Legislation by Category and Ideology (Per Term).
One final noteworthy case involves the four senators elected in 2013 who maintained their seats from 2014 through 2022, thus experiencing both legislative cycles. Regarding gender legislation, most of these congresswomen increased their sponsorship during the second term. Senator Adriana Muñoz, from a center-left party, moved from 11 initiatives during the 2014–18 term, of which two were intersectional, to a total of 26 in the 2018–22 cycle, of which three were classified as intersectional. Carolina Goic, from a centrist party, went from 15 initiatives to 24, with one intersectional bill in each cycle. Ena von Baer, from a right-wing party, had humbler numbers, increasing from two initiatives, of which one was intersectional, to eight with no intersectional framework. Lastly, Jacqueline van Rysselberghe, also from a right-wing party, was the only one to decrease, going from three initiatives, of which one was intersectional, to only one single-axis bill. A different scenario unfolded regarding marginalized groups legislation, where the senator’s sponsorship declined. Carolina Goic moved from seven initiatives in the 2014–18 cycle to only four during the 2018–22 term, Ena von Baer went from one to zero, and Jacqueline van Rysselberghe sponsored only one initiative in each cycle; none of which was intersectional. The only exception was Adriana Muñoz, who sponsored eight initiatives in the first cycle, including an intersectional one, and ten in the second, although none considered the interests of marginalized women.
Discussion of Findings
The data illustrate that Chile’s gender quota implementation did not lead to a substantial rise in the presence of marginalized women in parliament. Although the total number of Indigenous women in Congress increased after the 2017 election, expanding their presence to both legislative chambers, the remaining congresswomen belonged to the white-mestizo, professional, highly educated, heterosexual, cisgender, and physically abled population. This does not necessarily imply that gender quotas favor the descriptive representation of privileged women only, since the elitist partisan practices established by the binomial system were unlikely to be dismantled immediately after electoral reform. That said, it does support the idea that, while quotas are not an impediment to marginalized women’s representation, they are insufficient on their own (Hughes Reference Hughes2011; Celis et al. Reference Celis and Erzeel2017).
Regarding the representation of interests, the findings offer some compelling insights. On the one hand, the number of legislative initiatives on gender issues and marginalized groups grew during the quota implementation period, going from 82 to 214, and from 68 to 107, respectively. Similarly, the number of gender initiatives and intersectional gender initiatives sponsored by each congresswoman also increased in the 2018–22 parliamentary term. In this regard, the women elected post-quota did not merely increase legislative outputs by virtue of their greater numbers; they were also more productive than their predecessors. This suggests that the strong gender mandate marked by the quota and feminist mobilization might have had an influence on congresswomen’s legislative outputs. These findings are further supported when analyzing the activity of the four senators who remained in their seats from 2014 to 2022, whose records show a general increase in the amount of gender legislation sponsored during the second parliamentary term.
On the other hand, while the absolute count of intersectional initiatives also grew in the second legislative term, going from nine to 21 in the case of gender legislation and from four to six in the case of marginalized groups legislation, their relative share compared to other categories declined during this period. Furthermore, while no intersectional laws were enacted during the 2014–18 term, the subsequent parliamentary cycle saw the publication of only one piece of legislation which, though positive, represents an extremely marginal increase. This likely stems from the fact that most intersectional legislation acknowledged marginalized women exclusively in its preambles, failing to provide specific measures within the proposed laws. Consequently, while the 2018–22 term saw an increase in bills addressing marginalized women’s needs, priorities, and interests, these initiatives not only remained a small fraction of the legislation on gender issues and marginalized groups but were also stalled within Congress or lost their intersectional framework after enactment. In this respect, despite the gender mandate bolstered by the gender quota and feminist intersectional advocacy, there was no substantial shift in the representation of marginalized women’s interests.
Several factors may explain this limited representation of marginalized women’s interests. First, gender mandates, whether derived from quotas or feminist advocacy, force congresswomen into a conflict between representing women’s interests and maintaining party loyalty, the latter of which is often tied to political career concerns. These tensions might be particularly true for women who come from parties that have historically opposed feminist demands, such as those on the political right. Second, although partisan practices favored the selection of incumbents and established political figures within electoral lists, a portion of the women elected after the quota implementation were newcomers, among them those from marginalized groups. This outsider status presents a dual challenge: the need to demonstrate party discipline to secure future candidacies, while simultaneously gaining institutional influence and learning the informal rules of legislative practice. Ultimately, these competing demands might have constrained their agency, leaving them with little room to advance a transformative agenda.
Furthermore, the legislative agenda itself presents a significant hurdle. While relative majorities hold some power to shape congressional debate, the Chilean political system is characterized by strong presidentialism, where the executive can dictate priorities through legislative urgency motions, often sidelining the initiatives of lawmakers (Huertas-Hernández and Palanza Reference Huertas-Hernández and Palanza2019). Consequently, legislators—especially those more experienced—are aware that their motions are likely to remain stalled without coordinated coalition efforts. This suggests two possible strategic behaviors. On the one hand, some bills introduced by congresswomen may serve as mere political statements, designed to demonstrate symbolic support for constituents’ needs rather than to secure actual passage. This could explain why several intersectional bills focused on signaling the specific vulnerabilities and needs of marginalized women in lengthy preambles while failing to propose concrete legal measures. On the other hand, congresswomen who are genuinely committed to representing their most disadvantaged peers may nonetheless intentionally omit intersectional specificities from proposed initiatives, seeking to gain the political consensus needed for law enactment, which intersectional bills might not achieve.
Lastly, when evaluating who best represented marginalized women, the analysis revealed that neither those congresswomen who belong to ethnic minorities nor those with a lower level of educational attainment were particularly sensitive toward the interests of marginalized women. This suggests that descriptive presence does not automatically guarantee the representation of interests, highlighting the importance of avoiding the essentialist assumption that marginalized lawmakers naturally prioritize intersectional agendas. However, the limited number of observations precludes broader generalization. A significant divergence emerged regarding political ideology. The data indicate that congresswomen from left-wing parties were the most frequent sponsors of intersectional legislation in both parliamentary terms, a finding that remains robust even when calculating the average sponsorships by ideological sector. These findings are particularly consistent given that left-wing and center-left congresswomen have strategically aligned themselves with the Chilean feminist movement, most notably through the formation of the “Julieta Kirkwood Feminist Caucus” in early 2018. Consequently, left-wing congresswomen both imposed a stronger internal mandate on themselves and had a compelling external mandate due to the high expectations of a massive and mobilized feminist constituency.
Importantly, given that this study spans only two parliamentary terms, it may be premature to expect a profound transformation in legislative behavior, even under a robust gender mandate. Future research should examine the content of the legislation proposed by congresswomen in other settings to test these findings, specifically in cases where stronger quotas have been in place for longer periods or where affirmative mechanisms ensure a higher presence of marginalized women within Congress. Furthermore, because the design of this study does not allow for the isolation of specific causal mechanisms, these findings remain descriptive in nature. Consequently, longitudinal quantitative studies are needed to evaluate the efficacy of gender quotas in advancing the interests of marginalized women and to identify the specific conditions under which these measures perform best. For only when the margins are acknowledged will the structures start to fall.
Supplementary material
To view supplementary material for this article, please visit https://doi.org/10.1017/lap.2026.10065
Data Availability Statement
The author confirms that the data supporting the findings of this study are available within the article’s supplementary materials.
Acknowledgments
I sincerely thank Professor Sumi Madhok for her exceptional guidance and insightful advice throughout the thesis project that inspired this article. I would also like to express my gratitude to María Belén Lagos and Paula Cáceres for their diligent proofreading. Finally, I thank the peer reviewers for their constructive criticism and valuable feedback.
Funding Declaration
This research was partially supported by the sponsorship the author received to pursue her Master of Science degree in Gender through the London School of Economics and Political Science Master’s Award 2020/21. However, there are no relevant financial or non-financial competing interests to report.
Competing interests
The author declares there are no competing interests to report.
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