Hinge Diplomacy: A Tool of Diplomatic Entrepreneurship

This article shows how Romania’s approach toward refugees was an extension of its foreign policy of hinge diplomacy between different great powers. The article develops the theory of hinge diplomacy, and, based on archival diplomatic documents from Romania, it provides new evidence for what matters to small states in an emerging refugee crisis that is geographically distant. Considerations like economic agreements and avoiding scrutiny of human rights abuses in their own state prompt small states to diverge from policies of great powers with whom they are friendly. Knowing when states are willing to risk deviating from a greater power has consequences for involvement in war and state-building and for interventionism in situations of human rights abuse. Hinge diplomacy as a tool of diplomatic entrepreneurship by small states builds on existing literature about small states in international relations.Footnote ¹ Diplomatic entrepreneurship continues to be a relevant idea in foreign policy theory and practice.Footnote ² For example, Chatham House convened a meeting on the European External Action Service, where one of its recommendations was a strategy that emphasized “diplomatic entrepreneurship,” including “calculated risk-taking” and “creative foreign policy through smaller constellations of states.”Footnote ³ Within diplomatic entrepreneurship, hinge diplomacy is the practice of swinging, as a hinge to a door, between two opposing powers. It is a strategy to avoid taking sides in ways that might be detrimental to particular goals or interests. What distinguishes hinge diplomacy from mere vacillation is the strategic, calculated approach by diplomatic leaders to carefully craft a policy that is calibrated to carve a non-offensive path through balanced actions on two sides of a conflict. Vacillation is erratic, not marked by a clear strategic direction. This might occur when different foreign policy factions within a state pull it in different directions without a clear leader. Vacillation might also occur with a “crisis by crisis” approach, where a state lacks strategic direction, with the result that action is reactive, the diplomatic equivalent of whack-a-mole. By contrast, hinge diplomacy is intentionally strategic and carefully calibrated to balance overtures to two opposing sides in a conflict. This article applies hinge diplomacy to Romania’s approach to the Pakistan conflict of 1971.

Background to the 1971 East Pakistani Refugees

The 1971 East Pakistani conflict and refugee crisis were a momentous event in international relations. Although not a regular contender for main events of the 20^th century, it was the “largest single displacement of refugees in the second half of the century,” with the human suffering, death, and forced movement from it showing the world the violent process of state-building in the postcolonial era as East and West Pakistan broke apart and Bangladesh emerged as a sovereign state.Footnote ⁴ With India and Pakistan on opposite sides of the superpowers, the conflict involved Cold War politics. Beyond diplomatic attention, the situation reached popular culture, as showcased through events like the Concert for Bangladesh by renowned musicians like George Harrison, Ringo Starr, and Bob Dylan.Footnote ⁵ Moreover, it has become a subject for the discussion of tradeoffs when making postwar settlements, in which the goal of peace or security may outweigh concerns of justice.Footnote ⁶

The conflict came on the heels of the expanded global refugee regime. Acknowledgment that refugees were not an isolated, European, World War II effect led to a globally expanded legal document, the 1967 Protocol, that empowered UNHCR to recognize and assist refugees all over the world. Romania responded to East Pakistani refugees in 1971 under the expanded UN regime. The 1967 Protocol expanded the reach and de jure mandate of UNHCR beyond the geographic and temporal limitations of the 1951 Refugee Convention. The East Pakistani refugee crisis and UNHCR’s facilitation of aid are illustrative of UNHCR’s focus on Asia in the 1970s.Footnote ⁷

A rising China and the great power proxy war in Vietnam underscored the importance of the principle of noninterference for non-aligned states like India. India pursued diplomacy in numerous venues to this effect, like disarmament talks. However, it increasingly edged toward the USSR with a bilateral treaty. The international politics of a rapprochement between China and the USA precipitated agreements between the USSR and India, where the “enemy of my enemy is my friend.” As East Pakistan exercised self-determination and emerged as the new country of Bangladesh, how states responded to the Bengali refugees in India was in some ways related to where their strategic relations placed them vis-à-vis India and Cold War politics.

When India and Pakistan became two independent countries, Pakistan split into two noncontiguous parts, West Pakistan and East Pakistan, because “The British, leaving India, had decided to create a single Muslim state in the subcontinent.”Footnote ⁸ While one country in name, Pakistan was splintered by many divisions, not the least of which was the geographic distance between the two non-contiguous parts, about a thousand miles.Footnote ⁹ Looking at a map, it is clear that that sort of distance, with a non-friendly power in between the two land parts of a state, would make running that state difficult even in the best of circumstances. The geographic distance between West Pakistan and East Pakistan was compounded by differences in language, ethnicity, religion, economic development, and politics. In East Pakistan, the majority Bengali people spoke Bengali, which “the government initially refused to recognize … as the second official language after Urdu.”Footnote ¹⁰ In both parts of Pakistan, there were sizable minorities who spoke numerous other languages. While both parts were Muslim-majority, East Pakistan had a larger Hindu minority. Additionally, nationalism, religion, and secularism interacted in complicated ways that defied simple classification as two parts of a Muslim-majority state, as if that was the only demographic metric that determined cohesive statehood.Footnote ¹¹ By several metrics, West Pakistan was more economically developed, such as large-scale manufacturing and movement away from agriculture to industry, whereas East Pakistan only had about 75 percent of relative GDP compared to West Pakistan.Footnote ¹² The economic differences, especially the perception that West Pakistan was more well-off, fed into political tensions between the two parts of the state. In sum, the geographic distance between the two sections of the country exacerbated by demographic differences across language, ethnicity, and economic development led to the political break and bloody conflict, from which the new state of Bangladesh emerged.

Political differences across the two parts of the state contributed to their growing animosity. In the December 1970 National Assembly elections, the Awami League, based in East Pakistan, won a majority of seats, and the Pakistan People’s Party won a majority in West Pakistan. The president would not let the National Assembly meet and outlawed the Awami League. Protests and army violence ensued. The tensions came to a head in March 1971, when East Pakistan declared its independence as Bangladesh. It sought diplomatic recognition from many states, including Romania, in April 1971.Footnote ¹³ The Pakistani army’s repression of those in East Pakistan who were believed to be affiliated with the Awami League forced thousands to flee across the border to India. By May, 100000 people per day crossed into India, with the total reaching 10 million by the end of 1971.Footnote ¹⁴ India described the situation as “chaos and the systematic military repression and the decimation of the Bengali-speaking people in East Pakistan,” and urged the international community’s focus on ending the conditions causing the flight, coming to a political settlement, and repatriating refugees once these conditions were met.Footnote ¹⁵ Others have described the systematic violence against the Bengali people by West Pakistan as a forgotten genocide, and diplomatic correspondence during this time certainly indicated awareness of the oppression and killings that West Pakistan perpetrated against the Bengali people.Footnote ¹⁶ India requested international help through the United Nations in April 1971.Footnote ¹⁷ In June 1971, the Indian External Affairs Minister traveled to the UN and capitals in North America and Europe, including Paris and Moscow, to drum up support for its position and to make the international community aware of its need, asking specifically for assistance “in cash and in kind.”Footnote ¹⁸ In December 1971, several resolutions on the conflict reached United Nations bodies. Poland proposed a ceasefire.Footnote ¹⁹ Several other resolutions were proposed and vetoed. For example, China’s resolution condemning India never received a vote because China withdrew it. Another resolution by Argentina, Belgium, Burundi, Italy, Japan, Nicaragua, Sierra Leone, and Somalia, and received support from the USA, China, and Syria, but it was vetoed by the Soviet Union.Footnote ²⁰ Finally, UN Security Council Resolution 307 (1971) demanded that a ceasefire be observed, and the Security Council adopted it with abstentions only by Poland and the USSR.Footnote ²¹ The East Pakistani refugees eventually were repatriated when their homes became safer, and Bangladesh became its own state.

From an international relations perspective, the 1971 situation in East Pakistan involved the great powers, the USA and USSR, which eventually lined up on opposite sides of the conflict, with the result of the USA backing Pakistan and the USSR backing India. Earlier, the USA had armed both India and Pakistan, with more arms going to Pakistan; however, the USA reversed course and issued an arms embargo on both India and Pakistan in 1965.Footnote ²² Five years later, US President Nixon allowed an exception to the embargo in 1970, resuming sales to Pakistan.Footnote ²³ The Pakistan elections in 1970 resulted in the East Pakistani Awami League gaining political power that West Pakistan saw as threatening, particularly given the autonomy movement within the Awami League.Footnote ²⁴ Concerning for the East Pakistanis was the fact that the election, the first nationwide election, had been postponed, “ostensibly” due to concern “about human miseries caused by the floods,” which had massively devastated East Pakistan that same year.Footnote ²⁵ Already, the East Pakistanis worried that British colonialism had simply been replaced “with West Pakistani colonialism,” leading to a call for Bengali autonomy.Footnote ²⁶ It was not clear at the early stages of the conflict whether this would be more of a confederation or full independence as a new state. As the conflict unfolded, the USA sent mixed signals as it formed its response.Footnote ²⁷ Bass thoroughly documents the buildup of the conflict, the massacres, and the telegrams the American consulate in Dacca sent to Washington. Britain likewise debated how to respond, and it approached the conflict “on an ad hoc basis according to a series of contextual factors,” which ranged from giving and withholding aid to urging Pakistani restraint.Footnote ²⁸ Amidst this complicated international backdrop, Romania formed a foreign policy response to the conflict that was calibrated to give aid to both East and West Pakistan in equal amounts, a careful strategic move that swung between the American and Soviet positions.

Examination of the historical record surfaces a puzzle: Romania, a Warsaw Pact member, diverged from the Soviet Union in the 1971 situation of India and Pakistan. Through diplomatic history, this article explains this puzzle of the Romanian approach to East Pakistani refugees, wherein Romania avoided condemnation of Pakistan. Its concerns about not interfering in the internal affairs of another state and actions to work both sides of the conflict show how a small state pursues its own strategic goals, which may diverge from the policies of the great power it is closest to.

Sources for Romanian Foreign Policy

Primary source research using diplomatic documents in their original languages is important for getting foreign policy analysis right. Relying only on English language sources, such as British or American declassified diplomatic documents, for the analysis of other state action misses the first-hand perspective of other states. For research, this might mean that sources may, even unintentionally, mischaracterize conversations or fail to grasp factors that were important to other diplomatic actors, leading to inaccurate conclusions about reasons for actions. One scholar has pointed out, specifically in relation to the 1971 Pakistan conflict, “Regional politicization of the conflict has, regrettably, seeped into many studies by Western scholars, without mastery of the local languages required to carry out independent research.”Footnote ²⁹ To contribute to knowledge on smaller state perspectives, this article draws on Romanian diplomatic documents. The first source is a collection of Romanian diplomatic documents relating to Warsaw Treaty meetings held by ministers of the exterior. It has been compiled and made available digitally by the Romanian Diplomatic Institute. Secondly, the Romanian National Archive has digitized and made public historical documents, including photos. Some Romanian laws, including historical laws, are available through the Official Gazette. Finally, the article uses archival documents from the Diplomatic Archive in Bucharest, specifically correspondence in the Pakistan and India files in 1971–1972. While these fonds have different types of documents, they tend to be correspondence from the Romanian diplomatic offices abroad to the policymakers in Bucharest and vice versa.

The structure of the filing for the relevant documents at the Diplomatic Archive supports the argument that Romania acted as a hinge between great powers, attempting to project more power by its diverse partners than it would have as a faithful Warsaw Pact member. The Diplomatic Archive contains fonds by year. In 1971, there were three separate fonds, one each on India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan. Most of these files have not been viewed, except for a few by a government minister in 1973.Footnote ³⁰ This makes their contribution to political and diplomatic history novel. It is the first time these small state documents have been read and analyzed, highlighting the Romanian perspective on Cold War international politics, a defining refugee crisis, and the emergence of the state of Bangladesh. The correspondence also sheds light on Romania’s objection to Warsaw Pact agenda items that specifically are about India and Pakistan, which the Romanian diplomatic documents of the Warsaw meetings leave undetermined. While international politics may focus on the great powers in situations like the East Pakistani conflict, smaller states also contribute aid and a diplomatic perspective that shape the international context. These Romanian diplomatic sources provide evidence of hinge diplomacy to address the crisis through actions that are strategic and calibrated. The article argues that in terms of foreign policy, Romania took decisive steps to distinguish itself from the USSR. Its approach to the refugee situation in East Pakistan exemplified this strategy of hinge diplomacy.

Romanian Emigration and Immigration Laws

Because restrictive Romanian laws initially limited its access to certain international economic agreements that it aspired to, this section will contextualize the place of law in Romania’s political development in the 1960s. Its party power and decision making were couched within law, arguably an earlier form of autocratic legalism.Footnote ³¹ The law provided a shroud of legitimacy for flexing political power, both domestically and internationally. In a comparative context, other research has documented the use of law and constitutions to expand and support autocratic governments.Footnote ³² While Romania was not a democracy at the time of Ceaușescu’s rise to power, which this article considers, he did share some strategies with autocratic legalists. These included framing changes as historical, constitutional continuities, making sure new laws were passed through the Grand National Assembly rather than as decrees by the Council of State, and accusing his predecessor, Gherghiu-Dej, of “transgressions of legality.”Footnote ³³ In short, the role of law is important in comparative contexts, including in autocratic contexts. Romanian law and politics toward refugees in 1971 contribute to our knowledge on the consolidation of domestic power through technically legal actions.

Romania’s leadership faced challenges and internal power struggles to see who would rule the party.Footnote ³⁴ In January 1965, the Political Consultative Committee held a conference in Warsaw. It was the last one at which Gheorghiu Dej participated. The members discussed Albania’s exclusion from the Warsaw Treaty, presented as illegal from Romania’s point of view.Footnote ³⁵ In March 1965, Gheorghiu Dej died, paving the path for Ceaușescu to take more control. Romania did not have a delegate at the 1965 Bellagio Colloquium that drafted the 1967 Protocol. Additionally, Romania did not become a party to the 1951 Convention or the 1967 Protocol until 1991.Footnote ³⁶ However, while Romania veered away from the international laws on refugees, it still addressed refugees through its diplomatic correspondence and even medical aid, as its approach to the East Pakistani refugees showed.

Before moving to foreign affairs, a final comment on Romanian laws on foreigners is in order because they affected other diplomatic endeavors. Law No. 25 of 17 December 1969 governed foreigners in Romania.Footnote ³⁷ Article 18 gave the Interior Ministry the power to limit foreigners to certain parts of Romania and even force a change of residence due to matters of state security. The Ministry of the Interior was the institution that handled residence permits, visas, visa extensions, transit permission, and matters relating to foreign citizens presence on Romanian territory. The extent of authority to revoke a foreigner’s permission to remain extended not just to those who broke a law technically, but also to those who infringed a Romanian law through an attitude or comportment that prejudiced the interests of the Romanian state.Footnote ³⁸ This was a vast reach, sure to check the speech, tone, and behavior of any visitor. Foreign citizens were not permitted to work for Romanian governmental bodies, including the army, the Ministry of the Interior, and the judiciary.Footnote ³⁹ The extent to which Romania’s emigration law diverged from other states is suggested by the exceptional circumstances around its economic agreement with the USA. In the mid-1970s, Romania’s emigration restrictions became a hurdle in its growing economic cooperation with the USA. At the time, to obtain Most Favored Nation status with the USA, a state had to permit emigration. Romania did not fit this condition. Nevertheless, the Ford Administration granted MFN status to Romania in 1975 by obtaining a waiver that allowed it to temporarily bypass the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, which otherwise prohibited MFN status to states that did not permit emigration.Footnote ⁴⁰

Romanian Strategic Goals: Hinge Diplomacy and Economic Advancement

Even while part of the Warsaw Pact, Ceaușescu pursued an independent foreign policy.Footnote ⁴¹ Romania held a socialist domestic position, which allowed it some foreign policy deviations from the Soviet Union without negative repercussions. A number of breaks from the policy of the USSR and other Warsaw Pact states illustrate a pattern of opportunistic foreign policy, not idiosyncratic occurrences. Perhaps the one that is most well-known is that he openly criticized the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. After the 1967 war in Palestine, again, unlike other Warsaw Pact members, he maintained diplomatic relations with Israel.Footnote ⁴² He pursued friendships with leaders outside the Warsaw Pact. Digitized archives of Ceaușescu from the time period show him meeting with other communist and non-aligned states. He met with Egypt’s Anwar Sadat on April 6, 1971.Footnote ⁴³ A few months later, he met with China’s Mao Zedong on June 3, 1971,Footnote ⁴⁴ and then with Kim Il-Sung.Footnote ⁴⁵ These meetings came at the height of tensions between the Soviet Union and China, tensions which the US sought to exacerbate. Nixon’s visit to China came on the heels of these visits in 1972. In fact, Romania, along with Pakistan, was the channel through which Nixon and Kissinger wanted to pass messages to China.Footnote ⁴⁶

On the one hand, Romania was part of the Warsaw Pact and obviously within the Soviet orbit. But at the same time, it pushed back in diplomatic ways against some Soviet policies. One argument for why the Soviet Union allowed this independent foreign policy was that Romania had solidified domestically as a communist state. Because it was not a threat to the governing idea and tactics of communism, the USSR allowed it some discretionary independence and deviation from unity in terms of foreign relations. Scholars have attributed this permissiveness to nationalization, personalization, and firm domestic internal control.Footnote ⁴⁷

Romania continued to achieve its foreign policy aims that were not entirely consistent with what the Soviet Union wanted. In 1969, US President Nixon visited Romania.Footnote ⁴⁸ In fact, Ceaușescu “made three state visits to the United States, an honour unprecedented for the leader of a Warsaw Pact member.”Footnote ⁴⁹ Records from the meeting indicate that Nixon wanted to offer aid to Romania, but in a way that did not cause difficulty for Romania with the USSR. They discussed cultural exchanges, scientific knowledge, nuclear energy, and trade. Ceaușescu sought a most-favored-nation (MFN) status so that its exports could help pay for equipment imports. Nixon explained that the MFN status had to come through Congress. Romania was the only Warsaw Pact state to be absent from a meeting in Crimea in August 1971.Footnote ⁵⁰

Ceaușescu’s meeting with Nixon was merely one of several he had with heads of state around the world in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Playing into his strategic independence in foreign affairs, Ceaușescu cultivated relationships and trade agreements with states not in the Soviet bloc. Gaining favorable trade terms facilitated solvency for the weak domestic economy, continuing to prop him up at home.Footnote ⁵¹ At the same time, positioning himself as a diplomatic voice among suspicious states augmented the perceived importance of Romania at this time. Rather than being a loyal and predictable Soviet satellite, Romania could instead make deals and foster relationships between states that were not on friendly terms.

In 1964, Romania signed a most-favored-nation trade agreement with Pakistan and established diplomatic relations with it.Footnote ⁵² Additional trade and cultural agreements between Romania and Pakistan followed in 1966 and 1968.Footnote ⁵³ In 1970, Romania discussed agreements with Pakistan on irrigation,Footnote ⁵⁴ commercial relations,Footnote ⁵⁵ and credit.Footnote ⁵⁶

At the same time, Romania held repeated conversations with India regarding nuclear energy.Footnote ⁵⁷ Indian President Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan visited Romania in October 1965. The two states issued a joint communique on October 10, 1965, agreeing to “principles of the observance of the national independence and sovereignty, of equality of rights, of non-interference in the internal affairs and of mutual advantage,” only noting that India explained its position regarding Pakistan, not that India and Romania agreed to any positions or steps forward on the issue.Footnote ⁵⁸

Romania and India had an agreement, at least in principle, on states’ permissibility to develop and use nuclear energy.Footnote ⁵⁹ The 1968 Indian Foreign Affairs Record does not mention Romania.Footnote ⁶⁰ However, the Indian Foreign Affairs Record jumps to 88 mentions of Romania in 1969, due to new diplomatic developments between the two countries. Most of these 88 references come from the speeches between the leaders of India and Romania and the agreements that emerge from their meetings. These include a Joint Communique Protocol on Economic and Technical Cooperation and a Shipping Agreement.Footnote ⁶¹ Ceaușescu visited New Delhi in October 1969. Speeches by both Ceaușescu and President Shri V. V. Giri highlighted their shared interests in non-interference, anti-imperialism, and industrial development.Footnote ⁶² Ceaușescu explained, “the fact that we have different social systems cannot, and does not, constitute an impediment in the way of our countries working together.”Footnote ⁶³ This visit concluded with the signing of the Indo-Romanian Protocol on Economic and Technical Cooperation, signaling future collaboration in the industries of mining, petrochemicals, machines, and petroleumFootnote ⁶⁴ and the Indo-Romanian Shipping Agreement, arranging for India’s purchase of ten ships from Romania.Footnote ⁶⁵ Foreign Affairs Records from the 1970s have only two references to Romania, both in regard to a new representative at the Disarmament Committee.Footnote ⁶⁶

The diplomatic pace increased again in 1971. Shri L. N. Mishra, Minister of Foreign Trade of India, visited Romania in 1971. A text of the memorandum of discussions elaborates on the discussions.Footnote ⁶⁷ The East Pakistani refugees were not part of this discussion. Rather, the meetings focused on trade and industry. Perhaps this should not be surprising, given that the Indian minister who attended was the one for Foreign Trade, thereby facilitating relations on economic lines.

Soviet-Indian Relations

In April 1971, India and the USSR signed the Indo-Soviet Agreement on Industrial Co-operation, providing for trade with items like cotton and textiles and further industrialization.Footnote ⁶⁸ The statement after the Foreign Affairs Minister’s June visit to Moscow spoke of agreement on the need to stop refugee flows to India.Footnote ⁶⁹ Several months later, India and the Soviet Union came to a higher profile agreement, signing on August 9, 1971, the Indo-USSR Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Co-operation.Footnote ⁷⁰ Minister of External Affairs Singh expressed hope that more treaties like this would come into existence, and that it would bolster India’s position of non-alignment by “being a Treaty of Peace against War” and against aggression. In terms of military commitments, the treaty forbids the use of territory to militarily injure the other party (Article VIII) and the provision of assistance to any state engaging in armed conflict with a party to the agreement (Article IX). In terms of future commitments, Article X prevented the parties from forming any other agreements that would be incompatible with the terms of the Treaty or militarily injure the other party, and this agreement would be initially for a period of twenty years. This is important context for the overtones of the refugee crisis and resolution; India moved closer to the USSR by treaty commitment and walked a fine line between having a superpower by its side as a check against potential foreign aggression, yet also doggedly asserted its non-alignment.

A speech by the Indian Prime Minister in Moscow in September 1971 spoke in the warmest terms of Indo-Soviet friendship, cooperation, and agreement, specifically in efforts to counter colonialism and imperialism. The speech continued to highlight the economic benefits to both states of increased trade in raw materials and machinery.Footnote ⁷¹ A statement at the conclusion of the Foreign Minister’s visit to Moscow “noted the coincidence of points of view of India and the Soviet Union on all major international problems,” showing again the close relationship that India developed with the USSR at this time.Footnote ⁷² The statement further elaborated on their shared agreement about the burden India shouldered by hosting the refugees and that the situation required a political settlement.

In October 1971, India hosted a Soviet delegation for consultation, pursuant to the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation. A summary of the meetings indicated that the conflict in East Pakistan was a subject of discussion and agreement. The joint press statement issued stated, “These consultations were held in connection with the present tense situation in the Indian subcontinent, which threatens the cause of peace in this region. The two sides were in full agreement in their assessment of the situation.”Footnote ⁷³ India responded to insinuations that this treaty tied its foreign policy hands and made it “non-aligned,” by declaring, “article IV in the Indo-Soviet Treaty, which expresses the Soviet Union’s respect for India’s policy of non-alignment as an important factor for Peace,” and that the Foreign Minister of Pakistan need not “shed crocodile tears on the so-called abandonment of India’s policy of non-alignment.”Footnote ⁷⁴

India’s Prime Minister Shrimati Indira Gandhi commented on India’s relations with the USSR on the subject of Kashmir: “I was glad to find that there is no change in the basic position of the Soviet Union on important questions of special interest to us. I was assured that their stand on Kashmir remains to improve relations with Pakistan, they assured us that this would not be at the expense of their friendship with India. They also assured us that they had not supplied any arms or armaments to Pakistan, nor had any agreements been made in this regard with Pakistan.”Footnote ⁷⁵ The negotiations and agreements between the Soviet Union and India in the autumn of 1971 revealed a closer relationship, underscored by the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation.

The East Pakistani Refugees and Romanian Hinge Diplomacy

Romania approached the East Pakistani refugees as part of its larger goals of hinge diplomacy between the great powers through actions that were strategic and calibrated. Romania’s position on the refugee situation diverged from the Soviet Union in that Romania attempted not to take sides with either Pakistan or India, but this divergence was calibrated to avoid fallout with the Soviet Union and still protect its sovereignty. Romania avoided criticizing Pakistan’s internal affairs, criticism that it feared could come back around and be pointed at its own government. As the violence unfolded, in August 1971, Romania communicated to Pakistan that it considered “the situation in East Pakistan as an internal problem of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.”Footnote ⁷⁶ In the same paragraph, Romania elaborated that it hoped for moderation and a peaceful solution to the legal problem between Pakistan and India. The Romanian diplomatic document reports that this position was well-received by Pakistan.Footnote ⁷⁷ Again in September, a telegram from Bucharest to its embassy in New Delhi, the approach should proceed “with calm, consideration … that the problem of East Pakistan constitutes an internal question for the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.” It further expressed hope that the litigious problem between India and Pakistan would be resolved through peaceful understanding between the two parties.Footnote ⁷⁸

A November 19, 1971 record of ministers of the exterior from Warsaw Treaty states exhibited concern over East Pakistan. The record expressed the desire to quickly find a political regulatory solution. It further recognized the legitimate right of the refugees to return in security and dignity. Finally, it called on states to be responsible in their approach and to avoid measures that would aggravate the situation.Footnote ⁷⁹ However, in a November 25, 1971, note, Romania approved the Soviet agenda for a Foreign Ministers Conference, with the one exception of the matter of India and Pakistan.Footnote ⁸⁰ Romania did not want to officially discuss the question of India and Pakistan in the environment of the Foreign Ministers’ Conference. What happened between the November 19^th and November 25^th meetings that led to this divergence? On November 21^st, India authorized troops to cross into East Pakistan, a response to Pakistan’s “shelling [of] Indian border villages and towns.”Footnote ⁸¹ Pakistan asked Romania to appeal to other states for a ceasefire. The Romanian foreign policy officers in Bucharest sent off a telegram to New Delhi to obtain a rapid update on the changes in the situation, with the conflict seeming to go beyond an internal affair to war between India and Pakistan.Footnote ⁸² When Belgium raised the issue of East Pakistan in the UN Security Council, Romania’s foreign affairs office sent a telegram to its delegation in New York emphasizing that it would not be supportive of the proposal because Romania would see it as a mixing or intervention into the internal affairs of a sovereign state.Footnote ⁸³ Avoiding condemnation of another state and continuing to classify the conflict as an internal matter rather than an interstate war was consistent with Romania’s strategy to avoid becoming embroiled with a distant conflict in a way that would isolate it from benefits from either superpower or India or Pakistan. Even the UK, which had been the colonial power ruling the territory that became India and Pakistan, was cautious about weighing in on the conflict and unsure about whether it was a civil war or an interstate war.Footnote ⁸⁴

While its membership in the Warsaw Pact might have led to closer relations with India due to Soviet-Indian diplomatic friendship, Romania instead initially favored Pakistan with the statement that the refugees were an internal issue, implying that Romania would not condemn Pakistan for its military actions against East Pakistan. Invoking sovereignty shielded Romania from irritating Pakistan. This also came in the context of closer Romanian relations and economic agreements with the USA, which was on the Pakistani side of the conflict, and Romania’s own economic and cultural cooperation with Pakistan. At this time, Romania made agreements with diverse international partners. It hoped to shore up its domestic economy. This translated into foreign affairs actions that prioritized opportunistic economic relations and positioning as a hinge between greater powers, planning carefully balanced responses that prioritized Romania’s strategic concerns about sovereignty. Sovereignty arguments also shielded Romania from those who would wanted to look inside its state and find humanitarian or political reasons to intervene.

The Romanian aid to both sides and in similar monetary amounts exemplifies the careful diplomatic strategic approach to international relations as a hinge between the great powers and prioritizing its economic agreements with states that ended up on opposite sides of a major international conflict. Romania was committed to sending humanitarian aid to both sides. The Romanian Red Cross offered medicine valued at 100000 Lei to each of the Indian Red Cross and the Pakistani Red Cross.Footnote ⁸⁵ The offer for humanitarian aid came in the same document that summarized the emergence of Pakistani-Romanian diplomatic relations, trade exchanges, and cultural endeavors. The refugee aid to the same group of refugees, those in East Pakistan, but through two channels on either side of the conflict, indicates the goal of continuing and growing Romanian international economic prospects by working with countries on opposite sides of the superpower alliances, an example of hinge diplomacy.

Through the example of Romania’s divergence from Soviet refugee policy in the case of the 1971 East Pakistani refugees, this article suggests that great powers may face barriers to persuading even those weaker states within their orbits of influence to acquiesce on issues of refugee politics. Responses to refugees touch state concerns about sovereignty and citizenship. As Romania sought to leverage favorable economic agreements across states, including Pakistan and India, its position on the East Pakistani refugees reflected a hinge approach that attempted to balance political and economic relationships on both sides of the conflict.

Small states use diplomatic entrepreneurship to work between larger powers as they pursue their own strategic goals. This is relevant when they desire to keep economic agreements that bolster their domestic situations and when they want to avoid criticizing others for human rights abuses for fear that others might look internally at their governance. Maintaining a principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of other states is important to states that want to avoid scrutiny. As this article has documented, when great power preferences on a conflict get in the way of these concerns of a smaller state, the small state may choose a divergent policy, offering surprising independence and entrepreneurship in diplomacy. These conclusions would not be known without the archival material from a small state. Research on conflicts involving the great powers should look beyond the sources offered by the great powers themselves. Diplomatic documents between smaller states reveal their strategic perspectives in their own words and own languages that help international relations scholars understand the conditions under which small states are willing to risk diverging from a superpower’s preferred policy. This understanding has consequences for when and how small states will involve themselves in wars, naming and shaming, state building, refugee aid, and diplomatic recognition of new states.