3.a Selfhood and individuality

‘Self’ is a term that I use to denote a particular person, an individual (say, Jane). By ‘individual’ I mean someone who is identical to herself (Jane is the same Jane over time), and distinct from others (Jane is not identical, either numerically or qualitatively, to Charlotte, Emily, or Anne). My thesis, to be defended below, is that it is one’s individual essence that makes one an individual, and I term this quality (of individual essence) ‘selfhood.’Footnote ¹⁶ Selfhood is the quality that makes one a self, while a self is an individual in the sense just explained. Jane’s selfhood, then, determines her identity as Jane (over time), and distinguishes her from others (Charlotte, Emily, or Anne).Footnote ¹⁷

Further, when I speak of Jane’s identity, I refer to something slightly different from Lockean personal identity. To speak of Jane’s identity in the Lockean sense, is to refer to her psychological continuity: Jane at a certain time T2, is identical to Jane at a former time T1, if Jane at T2 has access to the thoughts and experiences of Jane at T1 (Locke Reference Locke1979, 335).Footnote ¹⁸ However, consider the following thought experiment.

Suppose that a wicked fairy changed Jane from an earnest, clever, courageous woman, who loves Edward and is passionate about painting, to a devious, foolish, cowardly one, who is indifferent to both Edward and painting. It is clear that something significant has been lost, and, under these circumstances, we would be likely to say that Jane was no longer herself. We would say so even if we assumed that her ability to access her thoughts and experiences prior to the change is unaffected—that is, if we assumed that she remains the same person in the Lockean sense. Let us say, then, that what has changed is her selfhood: she is the same person, but not the same self.

The change in question, please note, is not only of character. The transformed self, who loses her identity (in the relevant, not Lockean, sense) as Jane, will also have a different set of preferences, passions, desires, and inclinations. She will not, however, have a different set of memories. Hence, to emphasize again, she keeps her identity in the Lockean sense, while nevertheless becoming ‘someone else.’ The notion of ‘self’ as I use it, then, is meant to convey a kind of identity that the Lockean conception of personal identity does not capture. Accordingly, it should be emphasized that the discussed thought experiment is only meant to demonstrate the specific use of the notion of identity at work here and should not be taken to imply that such a radical change of self is at all possible.

Now, while according to Locke, one’s personal identity is determined by one’s self-consciousness, I suggest that the identity of one’s self is determined by one’s individual essence or selfhood, which is to say that the essence of an individual is not personhood but rather a particular shape of personhood (I explain below what it means), which is uniqueFootnote ¹⁹ to her: selfhood.Footnote ²⁰

I use the term ‘selfhood’ not only because the idea of possessing an individual essence works well with a common usage of the term ‘self’ (as in “I am truly myself only with you”), but also because my notion of selfhood as an individual essence is ingrained in Kierkegaard’s analysis of the self. More specifically, I rely on three of his ideas: (1) every person possesses a ‘divine name,’ (2) a human being is ‘both temporal and eternal,’ and (3) every person has the potential to become a ‘self.’ Let me begin with the third idea.

3.b The possession of selfhood in a potential state

In Kierkegaard’s view, there is a gap between being created by God as an ‘intended’ or ‘destined’ X, and actually becoming that X. Footnote ²¹ This gap indicates that one has the potential to be the X, the self, that one is intended to be, with the task being to fulfil this potential and become that X. Hence, the quality that makes one the self that one is intended to be—selfhood—is given to humans, upon their creation, in a potential state.

Putting aside (in the context of the present discussion) the theistic assumption that we are intended to become X, I use this Kierkegaardian idea to suggest that one’s selfhood, one’s individual essence, is possessed in a potential state. Thus, just as a talent for singing, for example, is possessed in a potential state that one needs to actualize in order to become an accomplished singer, the same is true of the quality of selfhood; the quality of being a specific self. The claim is, then, that one has the potential to become (say) Jane.

Here a clarification regarding my use of the term ‘potential’ is necessary. Potential, as denoting the mode or state of a power before its actualization, usually allows for the possibility of nonactualization. This is not the case with regards to potential selfhood however, since there must always be some degree of actualization. Hence, while it might be natural to suppose that when speaking of potential selfhood, the theory is saying that one who has not actualized the relevant potential is only potentially a self—this is not the case. One’s potential selfhood is always actualized, at least minimally, simply by virtue of one’s existence. What we find, then, are not potential selves but rather different versions of self, corresponding to the different degrees of actualizing one’s potential. I return to this point below.

Now, while it is clear enough what it means to possess, in a state of potential, qualities such as a talent for singing, sense of humour, or rationality—the quality of selfhood is obviously different. To clarify the nature of this quality, let us turn to the second of Kierkegaard’s relevant ideas, namely, his characterization of humans as both temporal and eternal.Footnote ²²

It seems reasonable to assume that by characterizing humans in this way, Kierkegaard is referring to the supposed relation of a human being to God, i.e., the ‘eternal.’ This relation is of a double nature: first, humans are created by God, and second, they are created in the image of God. Again putting aside the theological context, in my understanding the characterization of humans as both temporal and eternal gives rise to two ideas that are not explicitly presented by Kierkegaard. The pair temporal-eternal, I suggest, can be understood as expressing the duality of, first, particularity and universality, and, second, of contingency and essence.

3.c Particularity and universality

To be Jane is a function of many factors: of her past and her life circumstances, of her inner world, self-consciousness, and memories. But, I submit, first and foremost it is a function of her individual essence. To possess individual essence is to possess selfhood, which amounts to personhood in a particular shape. What does this mean?

Personhood is the quality that renders one a person, and it is typically conceived as amounting to one’s rationality (recall Velleman’s discussion). For Kierkegaard, who views humans as created in the image of God, personhood reflects that image amounting, thereby, to a combination of the qualities that characterize God—e.g., rationality, creativity/imagination, free will, caring. Whether personhood amounts, as Velleman suggests, to Kantian rationality or, as the Kierkegaardian framework would have it, to God’s image, however, is not crucial for the present discussion. Let us assume, then, an understanding of personhood that extends Velleman’s Kantian conception into something like Kierkegaard’s theistic one—so that personhood is understood to be rationality in the elaborate sense of including also creativity or imagination, freedom of will, and the capacity for caring.Footnote ²³ These universal qualities are essential to Jane (for example) by virtue of her being a person.

My claim, however, which will become clearer as the discussion progresses, is that just as there are universal qualities that are essential to Jane being a person, there are particular qualities that are essential to her being Jane: e.g., earnestness. What determines which of her particular qualities are essential? My suggestion is that one’s essential particular qualities are those that best manifest one’s personhood. After all, qualities such as rationality and creativity are not abstractly possessed.Footnote ²⁴ Rather, these and the other relevant universal qualities abide in a person (as it were) by virtue of particular qualities. Accordingly, some character traits (e.g., wit, responsibility, resourcefulness) can be seen as an expression of rationality; particular talents (e.g., for painting, math, music) can be seen as expressions of creativity and imagination; other traits or passions (e.g., courage, determination, ambitiousness) can be seen as expressions of will; and moral qualities (e.g., empathy, kindness, sensibility) can be seen as expressions of the capacity for caring.

Now, the criterion for the essentiality of a particular quality is its efficacy in expressing an essential universal quality. In other words, its ability to effectively bring person X closer to personhood at its best (or to be ‘in God’s image’ as much as possible). Hence, of all X’s particular qualities, only those that manifest personhood are relevant to begin with, so having yellow hair, for example, clearly cannot be an essential particular quality. Furthermore, of these, only the particular qualities that manifest personhood in the best possible way relatively to X are essential to X. For example, while Jane is sensitive and sensible, and has a genuine, even enthusiastic, interest in people, John is stiff and reserved. He is more enthusiastic about ideals than about interacting with people. We can therefore say that in the case of Jane her caring is best expressed by means of her sensibility and enthusiasm, while in the case of John it is rather his rigid kindness that serves as the vessel for his caring. According to the suggested criterion, then, sensibility is essential to Jane, while tough kindness is essential to John.

Every person possesses a ‘pool’ of such essential particular qualities that are the ‘ingredients’ of which one’s selfhood (in its potential state) is constituted. However, simply listing these qualities does not seem to be an accurate way of entirely capturing one’s essence: it risks a retreat back to describing the beloved rather than naming her (to use Frankfurt’s distinction). I will shortly return to this point (see section 3.e), but first let me articulate further the important implications of possessing one’s selfhood primarily as a potential. This brings us to the second meaning of Kierkegaard’s characterization of humans as temporal and eternal.

3.d Contingency and essence

When I talk about X’s essence, I use it in two different senses, which, importantly, my theory allows to be compatible. First, essence is the quality that determines the identity of X and, as such, it is invariable. Second, essence—in maybe a more intuitive or everyday use of the term—denotes the unique nature of X: its distinctive presence as X, the ‘very essence’ of its being. Essence in the latter sense is not necessarily invariable. When experiencing a tree in bloom, for example, the blooming is a part of its essence in the second sense, although blooming is not a part of its essence in the first sense: it will be the same tree when naked in winter.

My thesis is that when X’s individual essence is in a potential state it determines X’s identity, i.e., essence in the first sense. When in an actualized state, it amounts to the unique (and changing) nature of X, i.e., essence in the second sense. Let me explain what I mean.

As the possession of one’s selfhood is primarily in a state of potential (again, see section 3.b), it admits manifold actualizations. In the same way that the capacity for rationality, while arguably essential to humans, can be actualized in a person in different ways and to different degrees—so does the quality of selfhood. Although it is essential to who we are—it determines our identity (as specific selves or individuals)Footnote ²⁵—possessing it in a state of potential allows different actualizations. These actualizations, however, are contingent: there can be several versions of the same self. In other words, although in its potential state one’s selfhood/essence is the same and unchangeable, it can be actualized in different and changing forms. The following example will help to clarify this point.

In Kieślowski’s film The Double Life of Véronique we first meet the Polish Weronika—a lively, passionate, caring young woman with a great talent for singing, who suffers from a debilitating heart condition. Despite the danger to her health, she opts to pursue the opportunity to become a professional singer and dies on the stage soon after beginning her promising career. We then meet the French Véronique—a woman as lively, passionate, and caring as her Polish version. She also has a great talent for singing and a heart condition. Véronique, however, decides not to pursue a singing career (to the dismay of her teacher) and chooses to lead the much quieter life of a school music teacher.

Two different lives, but, as the title indicates, the same Véronique. What makes the two characters identical? They are obviously not the same person in the Lockean sense—after all, they possess a different set of memories—but there is nevertheless an important sense in which they are the same. For the sake of the present discussion, let us consider the film not as demonstrating the metaphysical possibility of two persons possessing the same selfhood,Footnote ²⁶ but rather as dramatizing the implications of life choices. We can therefore say that the two Véroniques are two different versions of the same self. They are essentially the same because they share the same potential essence (i.e., the same selfhood in its potential state), but the two actualizations of this potential are different.

If this still sounds too confusing, just consider how easily we can imagine ourselves in a completely different life. Not only can we envision ourselves working in a different job, living in a different country, having a different marital status, and so on, we can also envision ourselves in vastly different circumstances. Just like Virginia Woolf’s Orlando, we can imagine ourselves living in a different time, having a different family, inhabiting a different body. I suggest that this ‘self’ of ours that remains the same is our selfhood/individual essence in its potential state. And if selfhood is a quality in a state of potential, it follows that it can be fulfilled in many forms and to many degrees. Such a conception not only coheres with the thought experiment I presented, but also substantiates the common conviction that we can be a better or a lesser version of ourselves.

Understanding selfhood as a quality that, while determining our identity, exists primarily in a potential state and hence allows for a dynamic actualization accommodates the two senses of essence (presented at the beginning of the section). It thus results in a conception of essence as both invariable and changeable. In its potential state, one’s essence is fixed and invariable; in its actualized state, it is contingent and changeable.

3.e The nature of selfhood as a complex unified quality

The thesis, recall, is that to possess an individual essence is to possess the quality of selfhood, which is given to us in a potential state. This quality is constituted (in this state of potential) by a ‘pool’ of particular essential qualities. However, despite being accounted for in terms of many other qualities, selfhood is not reducible to a mere list of these. This is because selfhood is a unified body; rather than an aggregation of separate, individuated, qualities, it is more like an amalgamation of qualities. Being such a complex quality, it is comprised not just of the individual qualities of which it is composed but also of the ways in which these qualities are combined.

To clarify this point, the following analogy may be helpful. In the same way as a combination of distinct colours merges to create a new one, so the combination of different qualities creates a new, unified whole—selfhood. Consider, for example, how colours in a mixture affect each other: when mixed, say, with yellow, green behaves differently than when mixed with red. So, I suggest, do qualities. Each quality receives its special character in accordance with the other qualities it is ‘mixed’ with. Accordingly, although both Jane and Edward are witty, clever, and passionate, the wit, cleverness, and passion of Jane are different from those of Edward.

Selfhood, as thus construed, is therefore a quality that escapes simple articulation. There is, nevertheless, a way to capture its import: the concept of a name. This, finally, brings us to the first of the three of Kierkegaard’s ideas that serve me in my conception of individual essence. The idea of significantly possessing a name is hinted at by Kierkegaard who, when speaking of a person who fails to become the self that he can be, characterizes this person as someone who “forgets his name divinely understood” (Kierkegaard Reference Kierkegaard, Hong and Hong1980, 33–34). The significance of this, in my understanding, is that according to Kierkegaard Jane is not created a person and becomes, contingently, Jane—but is rather created as Jane.Footnote ²⁷ That is, not just a person but a particular one: a person with an individual essence.Footnote ²⁸ Coming full circle, we can say that Frankfurt’s appeal to nameability finds a home in Kierkegaard’s understanding of individuality. To be nameable is not to be reduced to a list of qualities; rather, it is to be singled out by virtue of possessing the complex, yet unified, quality that makes one who one essentially is: a particular individual, a self.

4.a The twofoldness of selfhood

We said that the possession of selfhood in a potential state allows many contingent actualizations. This contingency has two levels.

First, of the pool of the essential particular qualities that composes one’s selfhood, some qualities are interchangeable. For example, suppose that Charlotte possesses both a great talent for painting and a great talent for writing. Both these qualities are essential because both serve as a vessel for, say, her creativity. My theory allows that Charlotte’s individual essence as ‘Charlotte’ will be maintained whether she becomes a painter or a writer. She would be herself in both cases. The point, then, is that while Charlotte’s selfhood is composed of a specific pool of particular essential qualities unique to her, from this pool several different combinations may emerge. As long as the combination includes qualities from this specific pool, Charlotte will be herself.Footnote ²⁹ The first level of contingency, then, is rooted in the possibility of having one’s selfhood fulfilled through different essential particular qualities.

More straightforwardly, the second level of contingency is rooted in contingent particular qualities, which are part of the relevant actualization. Physical traits, such as the colour of one’s hair, are an obvious example, but other examples for contingent particular qualities—in the case of the two Véroniques, for instance—would be love for teaching or for performing on stage, being cautious or reckless, being slightly melancholic or cheerfully optimistic.

Crucially, understanding one’s selfhood in these terms—i.e., as both a potential and an actualization—gives the contingencies of our life their due. While our essence is a fixed given, having this essence primarily in a state of potential genuinely allows for various changing and changeable actualizations. Such an actualization is dependent on our will, which means that we have real freedom to determine how we will be. Namely, even if in an important sense we are predetermined—being created as Jane, we cannot become Charlotte (in the same way that, being humans, we cannot become a cat)—in a no less important sense, we are free to determine what version of Jane we will be. Further, the actualization also depends significantly on circumstances: when and where we live, the specific body that we are born with, events that occur and things that happen to us, the people we meet, and the interactions that result. All of these have a dramatic effect on the fulfilment of our potential of becoming the individual that each of us is.

Following Velleman’s notion of ‘empirical persona,’ I want to suggest the related, and yet different, notion of an ‘individual persona.’ ‘Empirical persona,’ recall, denotes the person as we experience her: her looks, manners, behaviour, and so on. That is, in a way it is akin to what I have just described as the actualized state of one’s essence. However, while the notion of an empirical persona denotes a combination of contingent qualities only, the actualized state of one’s essence—i.e., one’s individual persona—includes, as we have just seen, both contingent and essential qualities.

My suggestion is that when we encounter a person as ‘Véronique,’ as an individual, we respond to the actualized state of her essential qualities, with her contingent qualities crucially contributing to the shape this actualization takes (or rather, to use the analogy from above, to its ‘colour’). Some contingent qualities support essential qualities: for example, Veronique’s friendliness is a contingent quality that supports her essential quality of trustfulness. Others are indifferent to essential qualities, but may help to bring to light, as it were, the person’s essence: for example, Veronique’s quiet beauty emphasizes her gentleness. Still others may even be disruptive of a person’s essential qualities: for example, Veronique’s restlessness or impulsiveness.

What we face and experience when we encounter Véronique, then, is her individual persona: it is Véronique in one of her possible actualizations.Footnote ³⁰ We might not be meeting the best version of her, but nevertheless it conveys her potential by virtue of being an actualization of it and so, in principle, we can detect it. No matter what version of her we encounter, then, we are always in a position to perceive ‘who she is.’ This is because her essence, both in its actualized state and in its potentiality, is accessible to us by virtue of her experienced qualities.

As a way of concluding my view of individual essence with its different aspects, let me present yet another example. The Danish television series Borgen (The Government) tells the story of Birgitte, who somewhat incidentally becomes the prime minister of Denmark. Birgitte is an idealist—a strong, sincere, and wise woman, whose ambitions and self-confidence do not clash with her openness and warmth, and do not get in the way of her loyalty to family and friends. Let us call this version of her B1. The series demonstrates how the pressing demands of her new position change her. She (slowly and unconsciously) becomes a lesser version of herself: less confident in herself and yet more ruthless, suspicious, and cynical; less idealistic and, most painfully, less devoted to her friends. She deals with this unwelcome change in herself by becoming tougher and increasingly emotionally detached. Let us call this version of her B2. Birgitte, however, evidently does not like who she has become, and is strong enough to understand this and act accordingly. She hence ‘returns to herself,’ as it were, becoming a sober, and more mature and realistic version of her former self. She quits politics and goes into business. Let us call this version B3.

It is clear that B2 is a less successful actualization of Birgitte’s potential selfhood than B1. She is the same Birgitte (because the potential is the same), but essential particular qualities such as her friendliness or loyalty, which are essential to Birgitte because in her case they are the vessel for her universal essential quality of caring, appear to a lesser degree in B2.Footnote ³¹ Hence, there is a strict correlation between failing to properly realize one’s potential selfhood and failing to best express essential universal qualities; after all, the former is rooted in the failure to realize properly those essential particular qualities that serve as the vessel for the latter. A result of this failure is that one becomes a lesser version of oneself. In version B2, Birgitte’s individual persona is only a partial, incomplete, and even distorted actualization of her potential. In version B3, however, especially after deciding to return to politics (a space that gives better expression to her idealism than the business world did), her individual persona is no lesser an actualization than B1. B1 and B3, then, are two different ways to realize her potential properly.

At the same time, it should be emphasized that in all these versions—better and lesser alike—Birgitte is always ‘Birgitte,’ because the potential remains the same. In each instance, however, she is a different version of herself, a different individual persona, and this is crucial because the actualization of the potential is as important to ‘being who she is’ as the potential. Being Birgitte (or Véronique or Jane), then, consists of both her potential and its specific actualization.

My claim is that when we love Birgitte (or Véronique or Jane), the focus of our love is her being who she is: namely, her selfhood in its twofoldness.

4.b The beloved’s selfhood

Let us think about Dante’s famous love for Beatrice.Footnote ³² All would agree that the focus of his love is Beatrice herself, and, according to my theory, this means that his love responds to her individual essence—her selfhood—possessed primarily in a state of potential and constantly in a process of actualization. In its potential state, Beatrice’s selfhood amounts to an amalgamation of particular qualities that are essential to her, among them, for example, purity of heart. In its actualized state, her selfhood also includes qualities that are contingent to her, for example, an excellence in moral philosophy.

Any possible actualization, her ‘individual persona,’ will include amalgamation of her essential particular qualities. Thus, in any version of Beatrice she will possess purity of heart. However, different versions of her will include different contingent qualities. As we said, some of these qualities support or express her essential qualities: her excellence in moral philosophy, for example, expresses her purity of heart. Others are indifferent to her essential qualities (say, her brown hair) but of these some may accentuate, or more easily disclose, her essential qualities (her gracious posture, for example), and some may even go against them: impatience, nervousness, or whatever poor qualities that she might possess.Footnote ³³

Hence, although that which is fixed and determines her identity (over time, etc.) is her individual essence in its potential state, the actualization should equally be considered as her essence. Firstly, it is her essence by virtue of amounting to her unique nature as constituted by the specific actualization (essence in the second sense)Footnote ³⁴; secondly, it is her essence by virtue of including her essential qualities. Beatrice is ‘herself,’ then, due to the actualization no less than the potential.

Returning to the Kierkegaardian roots of my theory, recall that for Kierkegaard human beings are what he calls a “synthesis” of the eternal and the temporal. That is, we belong equally in these two categories: we are neither more nor less eternal rather than temporal. The significance of this for the present context is that the temporal (that is, contingent) actualized selfhood is in no way inferior in terms of importance and value to one’s ‘eternal’ (that is, independent of time and circumstances) potential selfhood. Accordingly, taking the beloved’s selfhood to be the focus of our love is to understand our love as responding to both the beloved’s invariable potential and its contingent actualization.

4.c The focus of love

To emphasize: when I claim that the focus of our love is the essence of the beloved, I do not, by any means, claim that the genuine object of our love is ultimately her potential, nor do I claim that the actualization is only a vehicle to the beloved’s ‘true self.’ First, as I demonstrated, the beloved’s essence is not reducible to the potential. The potential determines what Jane can (and cannot) be, but what Jane in fact is, depends on the actualization of the potential. Hence, in as much as Jane’s essence takes its form through the actualization of the potential, the actualization is no less the focus of our love.

Second, to have the beloved’s essence as the focus of our love is indeed to respond to who the beloved truly is. However, the beloved is who she truly is regardless of the extent of the actualization. The potential does not stand for a ‘true self’ that we have to ‘find’ beneath the incomplete actualization. Rather, the relation between the potential and the actualization is like that between an idea or sketch for a painting (in the painter’s mind or on paper) and the painting itself. In a sense, then, the actualization is even ‘truer’ than the potential: we respond to the painting, not to the sketch (although the sketch is discernible in the painting).

It would be helpful to compare this with Velleman’s view. Recall that he distinguishes between the beloved’s universal essence and her particular empirical persona. While the former is the focus of our love, the latter serves only as that which enables access to the former, hence it is not in itself the focus of love. In Velleman’s view, then, the focus of Dante’s love for Beatrice is her personhood not her particularity as Beatrice. However, as argued above (section 2), failing to account for Beatrice in her particularity as the focus of Dante’s love does not accord with the experience of love.

There are two major differences between my theory and Velleman’s; spelling them out will allow us to understand how my alternative preserves Velleman’s basic and, in my view, correct, intuition that the focus of love is the beloved’s essence, but succeeds where his theory fails.

The two theories agree both that the beloved’s essence is the focus of love and that this essence is experienced through the particular qualities of the beloved. Velleman terms the latter ‘empirical persona’ and I term it ‘individual persona.’ However, while in Velleman’s theory the beloved’s essence is constituted by her personhood, which is a universal quality, in my theory her essence is constituted by her selfhood. In proposing the idea of an individual essence, then, my theory departs from Velleman’s by designating as the focus of love an essence that is particular to the beloved.

Further, while in Velleman’s theory there is nothing that guides the connection between the beloved’s personhood (her essence) and the beloved’s empirical persona (the communicator of her essence), this is not the case in my theory. Understanding the beloved’s essence as existing in two states—potentiality and actualization—the relation between the beloved’s essence and her individual persona is of a different nature. Far from being an accidental vehicle of the former, the latter—being the actualized state of the former—does not serve as a communicator of her essence but is, in itself, her essence.

Thus, while in Velleman’s theory the particularity of the beloved is inferior to her universal essence—it only mediates that which is the real focus of love—in my theory essence and particularity are inseparable. From the point of view of the lover, who in his love responds to Beatrice—to who she is—the conception of Beatrice’s individual essence as the focus of his love fits more adequately with his experience.