Zsuzsa Anna Ferenczy’s book, Partners in Peace: Why Europe and Taiwan Matter to Each Other analyses the importance of the Europe–Taiwan relationship. Although the EU’s member states do not grant Taiwan diplomatic recognition, adhering to Beijing’s ‘One China’ policy, Taiwan has been added as a partner in the EU’s official discourse. Trade anchors this partnership: Taiwan manufactures most of the world’s advanced semiconductors, and both share democratic values, reinforced by joint efforts to counter disinformation from the China–Russia authoritarian axis, which promotes anti-Western and Global South alignments. Ferenczy’s book consists of four chapters: Chapter 1 covers political will, geopolitical tests, the Global South, Taiwan as partner, and the value of democracy; Chapter 2 addresses shared interests in the Indo-Pacific, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) matters, and rethinking dependencies; the next chapter explores economic coercion, China in Europe, derisking, semiconductors, critical raw materials, like-minded collaboration, and the way forward with Taiwan; and Chapter 4 discusses democracy at a crossroads, the hybrid threat landscape, the power of narrative, Taiwan as inspiration, and Europe’s turn.

In Chapter 1, Ferenczy notes that the EU has been unable to persuade Beijing and Moscow to honour commitments, as the ‘power of ideas’ yields to interests and hard power. Beijing promotes a multipolar order framed as democratisation, while it does not act against disinformation, misinformation, and cyber insecurity that rank among the most severe global risks. Western influence is waning, the Global South’s weight is rising, and China exploits that ambiguous sense of unity. Some states, including BRICS member India – which is not anti-Western – are moving closer to China, raising doubts on whether and how Taiwan can strengthen its security. EU fragmentation enables Beijing’s influence and limits Taiwan engagement. She urges EU cooperation with partners to protect Taiwan’s democracy, counter China–Russia disinformation, and clarify the ‘One China policy’ versus ‘One China principle’, which does not require statehood. Taiwan’s role has been reinforced by EU investment, pandemic cooperation, USD 110 million in aid, sanctions on Russia after Ukraine’s invasion, and shared democratic values. The Taiwan Strait’s strategic role – 40% of EU trade and 90% of major shipping – makes political will to engage with Taiwan essential for Indo-Pacific stability. Pelosi’s 2022 visit underscored Western, especially the USA’s, support.

Chapter 2 depicts the EU as avoiding overt alignment in the China–US rivalry while preserving strategic engagement with Taiwan and ASEAN. Ferenczy argues that, since 2021, Brussels has pursued a distinct European approach, strengthening Indo-Pacific partnerships, including Taiwan, to adapt to shifting power dynamics. The European Parliament’s ‘Taiwan Narrative’ positions Taiwan as a reliable partner, illustrated by mask diplomacy during Covid-19 and humanitarian aid to Ukraine. Xi Jinping’s ‘major-country diplomacy’ invokes a ‘shared future’ but functions as a vehicle for diplomatic, military, and economic dominance – a paradox eroding ASEAN trust while enabling Beijing to externalise blame onto the USA.

The next chapter explores how the EU–Taiwan relationship is anchored in a shared goal of strengthening economic resilience through EU derisking and Taiwan’s diversification. Against the backdrop of China’s race for technological supremacy, joint initiatives maximise complementarities in the semiconductor sector, a critical link in the global supply chain. Lithuania’s 2021 decision to host a ‘Taiwan’ trade office triggered Chinese economic coercion, disrupting Lithuanian exports and threatening the EU single market, echoing vulnerabilities seen in Russia’s energy weaponisation. Ferenczy maintains that, in any case, Taiwan’s position as a semiconductor hub offers the EU opportunities to derisk with like-minded Indo-Pacific partners. Yet, Europe remains dependent on Chinese raw materials and hampered by policy fragmentation. Taking Taiwan seriously requires political will, insight into its trade with China, and a focus on supply chain resilience, diversification, stricter investment controls, and state intervention. Japan’s reduction of rare earth dependence on China shows that resilience is possible. The ‘It’s All about Semiconductors – And Critical Raw Materials’ section stresses that no country can own the full semiconductor supply chain – yet ‘silicon nationalism’ drives major powers to try. With China supplying 98% of EU critical raw material imports, diversification with trusted partners such as Taiwan is essential, exemplified by TSMC’s €3.5 billion investment in Germany.

Chapter 4 underscores the EU and Taiwan’s shared commitment to countering foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), as Beijing and Moscow coordinate to undermine democratic systems. Taiwan’s advanced counter-disinformation expertise strengthens its value to Europe, with China’s hybrid warfare targeting public opinion through disinformation, artificial intelligence (AI) deepfakes, and socioeconomic exploitation. The EU’s 2020 identification of China as a disinformation source, alongside Russia, has marked a decisive shift, framing Beijing as a ‘systematic rival’. Russia’s tactics in the Baltic states mirror China’s against Taiwan, and their ‘no limits’ partnership has accelerated hybrid threats, blending disinformation, sabotage, and social destabilisation. While divergent threat perceptions within the EU remain, Taiwan’s experience offers a blueprint for resilience. Ferenczy points out that both now face a shared imperative: reject imposed narratives, counter authoritarian influence, and reinforce democratic stories through coordinated strategic communication.

In sum, Partners in Peace positions Taiwan as a strategic EU partner, linking its semiconductor role and counter-disinformation expertise to Europe’s security, resilience, and democratic values amid fading Western dominance. More detail on how individual countries have built bilateral trade ties with Taiwan – beyond brief mentions of the Netherlands and Czechia – would strengthen the analysis, offering practical examples of how national-level political will can advance cooperation despite broader EU hesitation.