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There Is No Such Thing as Expected Moral Choice-Worthiness

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 September 2023

Nicolas Côté Open the ORCID record for Nicolas Côté [Opens in a new window]
Nicolas Côté*
Affiliation:
Philosophy department, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, Scotland
*
Email: Nicolas.Cote@glasgow.ca.uk
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Abstract

This paper presents some impossibility results for certain views about what you should do when you are uncertain about which moral theory is true. I show that under reasonable and extremely minimal ways of defining what a moral theory is, it follows that the concept of expected moral choiceworthiness is undefined, and more generally that any theory of decision-making under moral uncertainty must generate pathological results.

Keywords

moral uncertaintynormative ethicsprobability theorydecision theory

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Type
Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 53 , Issue 1 , January 2023 , pp. 1 - 20
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Canadian Journal of Philosophy

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Footnotes

Article last updated 25 October 2023.

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