Having dealt in Chapter 3 with the concept of δαίμων introduced in B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most), its divine status and its relation to Empedocles’ belief in rebirth, in this chapter I will look into further concepts, most of them introduced in the proemial fragments, which translate the Empedoclean notion of godhood. This investigation is important for at least two reasons. On the one hand, it is a very controversial question of Empedocles studies as to who (or what) can be considered as true gods in his physical system and which entities can be assumed to be truly divine: are the six principles (the four elements and the two forces of Love and Strife), in virtue of their being fundamental entities of reality, the only truly physical gods? Or can the Sphairos, the ‘most perfect’ form of the universe under Love’s unification, be considered not only as divine as well, but also as the major deity in Empedocles’ system? What about the Muse and the other gods he invokes in fragment B 3 (= EMP D 44 Laks-Most)? And if the principles, the Sphairos and the Muse can rightly be considered gods, what makes then different entities equally divine?

On the other hand, since Empedocles’ doctrine of rebirth includes the final promise of a divine reward, as has been established in Chapter 2, it is crucial to understand what is meant by ‘divine’. In other words, a definition of the divine in Empedocles’ thought is essential to fully understand his notion of rebirth. The exploration of the key terms in relation to the notion of the divine therefore forms a fundamental basis for the coming chapters, the aim of which is to further define the details of Empedocles’ doctrine of rebirth in order to reconcile them with the principles of his natural philosophy.

In what follows, I will analyze those entities Empedocles refers to explicitly as gods, that is, attributing to them terms such as θεός (theos) or δαίμωνFootnote ¹ (daimon) or calling them by the names of traditional deities. These include different divine beings ranging from the four elements and Love and Strife, to the ideal form of the universe formed by Love at the height of her dominion, namely the Sphairos and, closely related to it, the Holy Mind (not presented in the proem). However, as we have already seen in Chapter 2, Empedocles envisaged the existence of other divine beings, not only the Muse (B 3 [= EMP D 44 Laks-Most]) but also for instance the underworld goddess who dresses the souls with a new body (B 126 [= EMP D 19 Laks-Most]) or the so-called ‘long-lived gods’ (B 21.8 [= EMP D 77a.8 Laks-Most] and B 23.8 [= EMP D 60.8 Laks-Most]). Moreover, as we have seen, a novel aspect of his philosophy is that he ascribes to himself divine nature and wisdom, while divine knowledge and powers are also promised to those who rigorously follow his teachings, purify themselves and are released from rebirths. Below, I will identify what makes these diverse beings all equally divine, aiming at defining more precisely the Empedoclean idea of ‘godhood’.

To this end, this chapter embarks on an in-depth analysis of all those concepts to which divine qualities are ascribed and is therefore structured according to these concepts, so that I will consider the elements in Section 4.1,Footnote ² Love and Strife in Section 4.2,Footnote ³ the Sphairos in Section 4.3,Footnote ⁴ the Holy Mind in Section 4.4Footnote ⁵ and, finally, the so-called long-lived gods in Section 4.5.Footnote ⁶ Within this last group, I would argue we include (traditional) gods, either referred to as a groupFootnote ⁷ or those individually mentioned by the names Zeus, Kronos and Poseidon;Footnote ⁸ the Muse and more specifically Calliope;Footnote ⁹ deities who guide souls in the underworld, among whom we may number Pythagoras;Footnote ¹⁰ a goddess in the underworld who dresses souls with new bodies;Footnote ¹¹ guilty and exiled godsFootnote ¹² and thus Empedocles’ himself;Footnote ¹³ and, finally, those who escape rebirths.Footnote ¹⁴

We will see that although, in a general sense, all members of the five groups are divine, each of them is divine for different reasons; yet members across several groups also share common qualities. Thus, my methodological strategy here is to pinpoint those particular aspects that make the divine nature of each group different from the other, while indicating in parallel the common aspects they share as gods, in order to more precisely delineate an Empedoclean notion of the divine. In this respect, the main result of this investigation is that, with regard to living beings, we can confidently say that for them to be (or become) gods means to have a divine status that is modelled upon the divine characteristics of the Sphairos, the perfect form of the universe. These characteristics are associated with Love in contrast to Strife and comprehend purity, stability (continuity), symmetry and beauty, blissfulness and perfect knowledge.

In this sense, the divine nature of the Sphairos represents the ideal form of godhood in Empedocles’ cosmos to which all integrated beings aspire. As we will see in Chapter 7, the achievement of this kind of godhood by the individual has remarkable repercussions on the cosmic level. Thus, in conclusion, the result worked out here will not only provide us with a definition of the divine in Empedocles that helps us better understand his doctrine of rebirth; it will also represent necessary groundwork to the central argument of this book.

4.1 The Four Elements

The first type of entity I will consider is the four elements, because it is here that we can most easily see the way in which Empedocles refers to aspects of his physical system with divine terms. As we have seen in Chapter 2.7, in fragment B 6 (= EMP D 57 Laks-Most) Empedocles introduces the elements as four divine roots corresponding to two pairs of gods and goddesses: Zeus, Hera, Aidoneus and Nestis.Footnote ¹⁵ While the plant metaphor in this fragment already suggests some essential qualities of the four elements – the elements like the roots of a plant are what sustains and nourishes life – in order to understand why fire, air, water and earth are equated to important gods of the Greek pantheon (and, thereby, to explore what makes their godhood) we need to focus on their working in the cycle.

This working is presented for the first time not in the proem, but rather within the cosmological exposition beginning with fragment B 17 (= EMP D 73.233–66 Laks-Most). Precisely at lines 16–18 (= EMP D 73.247–49 Laks-Most) and 27–35 (= EMP D 73.258–66) we read:

The lines of B 17.16–18 (= EMP D 73.247–49 Laks-Most)Footnote ¹⁶ tell us that the elements of ‘fire and water and earth and the immense height of air’ work in a cosmic cycle in which they are alternately and regularly united into one thing alone and are separated into many things again. Moreover, lines 30–33 (= EMP D 73.261–64 Laks-Most) point out that they comprise the total quantity of matter in the world. In fact, nothing can be added to the whole that is made out of them, nor can any one of the elements be lacking in any way. Indeed, Empedocles rejects the possibility that any of the elements could utterly dissolve or that anything else outside the totality could increase it on the basis of three arguments, lucidly reconstructed by Inwood:Footnote ¹⁷

These three basic arguments represent Empedocles’ version of the principle of the conservation of matter, namely the fact that the elements are quantitatively invariable. By virtue of this invariability and the fact that they are the ingredients of cyclic changes from one to many and from many to one (B 17.16–17 [= EMP D 73.247–48 Laks-Most]), they are also the foundations of the physical world.

Furthermore, (1) establishes that they are indestructible, which entails that they will forever be. However, this does not entail that they will forever have the same shape. In fact, by running through each other, the four elements become different at different times (δι’ ἀλλήλων δὲ θέοντα / γίγνεται ἄλλοτε ἄλλα: B 17.35 [= EMP D 73.266 Laks-Most]). Thus, by mixing with each other, they become the immense variety of animate and inanimate things we can see in the world. However, although mixture and exchange among mixed things (B 8.2 [= EMP D 53.2 Laks-Most]) produce an infinite number of new things, each of them is ultimately to be traced back to the four elements as its basic ingredients. This explains quite well the plant metaphor we saw above: the elements can be compared to ‘roots’ because, being the basic components of all living beings we can see in the world, they enable and sustain life.

Moreover, in B 17.27 (= EMP D 73.258 Laks-Most) we find the claim that the elements are all identical in birth. This idea is expressed in a context in which Empedocles aims to dispel any doubts about the fact that all four elements are equally fundamental. In this respect, he first describes the elements as all equal (ταῦτα γὰρ ἶσά τε πάντα), thereby suggesting that none is greater in size than the others. Second, they are said to be all identical in birth, which indicates that none of them is temporally or ontologically prior to the others.Footnote ¹⁸ Third, the elements are said to dominate in turn in the cosmic cycle. While I shall return to the analysis of this third claim soon, it is worth observing that the characteristic of being fundamental entities may well accord with the idea of their dominion at some point in the cycle. This idea can be taken as comparable (indeed, it could derive from) the notion we find in traditional theogonies, in which regal power and dominion are usually accorded to gods who are temporally and/or ontologically prior to their fellow divine beings. It follows that both the characteristic of being fundamental entities and that of their dominion at some point in the cycle can be taken as aspects of their divine nature.

The elements’ characteristic of being fundamental entities of the physical system and, consequently, their divine nature has generally been taken as Empedocles’ reply to Parmenides’ monism.Footnote ¹⁹ According to this standard reading, the four elements are divine entities – indeed, they are often taken as being the most divine (sometimes even the only truly divine) entities in Empedocles’ universe – because they are thought individually to replicate the attributes of Parmenides’ what-is. More precisely, they are thought to be ingenerated, indestructible and qualitatively unalterable.

In light of this standard reading, the aforementioned notion of identical elements in birth (ἥλικα γένναν) – more generally the idea of fundamental principles coming into being – is surprising, to say the least. However, Rowett, in an influential 1987 article, highlighted that Aristotle, by discussing Empedocles’ elements at the end of his On Generation and Corruption 1.1, states that they lose their properties when they are united in the Sphairos and are genuinely reborn from it when cosmology begins again. More recently, Palmer has shown that, in contrast to the standard interpretation, ‘the Empedoclean roots have their own life cycles and undergo their own transformations like virtually everything else in his system’.Footnote ²⁰ In this respect, as we will see below, Empedocles relates the fact that the elements mix with each other and transform themselves into integrated beings to their unsteadfast lifetimeFootnote ²¹ and even to their death in the cycle, which at first reading may be an astonishing notion given that the elements are already declared to be indestructible, as we have seen above.

On second reading, however, it agrees with the Empedoclean conception that processes of birth and death, hence life cycles, do not entail any creation (from nothing) or disruption (into nothing) strictly speaking, but really are mixture, interchange of mixed things and separation of elements.Footnote ²² Moreover, the idea that the elements have their own life cycles does not contradict the notion that they are eternal. In fact, it can be said that being eternal requires the quantitative invariance of the elements – namely, the fact that they comprise the fixed and total quantity of matter in the universe – but is also compatible with their qualitative mutability.Footnote ²³ In other words, because the elements persist in the same amount in the cosmic cycle, they are eternal, although, in contrast to Parmenides’ what-is, they do not endure endlessly as one and the same form or, simply put, they are not eternally unchangeable. This means that the divine character of the elements accords first with their (quantitative) persistence in the cycle and second with their having a life cycle.

The quantitative persistence of the elements in the cosmos, however, does not exhaust the issue of what it means for them to be eternal. In particular, the fact that elements have a life cycle raises further questions about their being immortal – a problematic notion, as already recognized by A. Long. Exploring the Empedoclean representations of immortal entities, Long concluded that Empedocles worked out a novel notion of immortality, which does not entail endless duration, but the ability of a given entity to continue, as one and the same organism, over a long but finite period.Footnote ²⁴

The equivocal character of Empedocles’ notion of immortality is highlighted by the lines of B 35 (= EMP D 75 Laks-Most), in which Empedocles argues that the elements can be seen as both mortal and immortal entities. Specifically, B 35 (= EMP D 75 Laks-Most) describes the moment in the cosmic cycle when Love begins expanding her influence among the elements after Strife’s disruption of the Sphairos. ‘When Strife has reached the deepest depth of the vortex, and Love has come to be in the centre of the whirl’ under her influence, the elements start coming together. Love’s intervention among the elements causes these to come together willingly. ‘And while they were mixing, myriad tribes of mortals spread out.’ Empedocles adds:

Under the influence of Love, the elements, which until then have been (indeed, have learned to be) immortal und unblended, grew mortal and mixed. As Empedocles tells us in the last two lines of the fragment, elemental mixtures give rise to ‘myriad tribes of mortals’. The inference is that the elements are said to be born as mortals when they are mixed as all kinds of mortal beings through the renewed power of Love,Footnote ²⁶ which in turn implies that they are immortal when they stay unblended under Strife’s influence.Footnote ²⁷

Some lines of fragment B 26 (= EMP D 77b Laks-Most) add further information to this picture.

Through these lines, Empedocles depicts the working of the elements in the cosmic cycle as an alternation between their dominance and growth on the one hand and their subjection and death on the other.Footnote ²⁸ As we learn, the elements become all kinds of living beings by running through each other, while they are subdued when they come together as one, being thoroughly compounded in the Sphairos by Love’s power. Elsewhere we are told that in the Sphairos ‘neither the swift limbs of the sun can be distinguished’ (B 27.1 [= EMP D 89 Laks-Most]). By understanding the ‘limbs of the sun’ as representing the element of fire (see B 21.3 [= EMP D 77a Laks-Most]) and by assuming that what pertains to fire pertains to the other elements, it follows that the subordination of the elements in the Sphairos (B 26.7 [= EMP D 77b.7]) coincides with the loss of their distinct characteristics when they are united into the One. In other words, the elements are said to be subdued and die when they lose their specific properties. In parallel, they can be said to be born and dominate when they are distinguished as four separate elements, each with its characteristics. B 26 (= EMP D 77b Laks-Most) tells us that this occurs due to Strife’s disruption of the Sphairos. By adding the information we gained from B 35 (= EMP D 75 Laks-Most), quoted above, we can fairly conclude that, because of Strife’s influence, the elements remaining unmixed have their part of dominion in the cycle and, as inasmuch as they do not undergo mixtures and changes, they also stay immortal.

To wrap up my investigation to this point, Empedocles is explicit both about the fact that the elements are quantitatively stable and that they are not eternally unchangeable, but are born, perish and undergo myriad qualitative changes. As we have seen, Empedocles leaves little doubt that the four roots have their own life cycles, as they periodically die and lose their identity and properties when they grow together as one in the Sphairos, while they are (re)born as elements when they are separated from the One due to Strife. Moreover, as they also lose their specific properties when they are mixed as myriad different things, each with qualities of its own, the elements can be taken as dying when they are born as compounded living beings (in fact, they are called ‘mortal’ when they mix to form living beings in B 35.14 [= EMP D 75.14 Laks-Most]).Footnote ²⁹

Although we can conclude with Palmer that ‘the clear and cumulative impression of these various statements is that the roots are … subject to generation and destruction’, Empedocles does not withhold immortality from them. In fact, when they stay unmixed and persist as fire, air, water and earth under Strife’s influence, they are called ‘immortal’ and are even said to dominate in the cosmic cycle. Moreover, although they are transformed by mixture into myriad compounds, at B 17.13 (= EMP D 73.244 Laks-Most) and again in B 26.12 (= EMP D 77b.12 Laks-Most) they are nonetheless defined as ‘always unchanged in their cycle’, αἰὲν ἔασιν ἀκίνητοι κατὰ κύκλον.

Scholars generally interpret ἀκίνητοι (akinetoi) with reference to the regularity of the elements’ changes. Accordingly, the elements are always immutable in the cycle because they alternately and regularly come together and are separated in an endless alternation. In Empedocles studies, the elements’ characterization as ἀκίνητοι is usually taken as further evidence that they exist in the strong Parmenidean sense.Footnote ³⁰ The claim to be αἰὲν ἔασιν ἀκίνητοι κατὰ κύκλον in B 17.13 (= EMP D 73.244 Laks-Most) is slightly modified in the conclusion of the fragment (B 17.35 [= EMP D 73.266 Laks-Most]), in which the elements, despite all various changes they undergo by running through each other (that is, by mixture) and becoming all living beings, are said to be ‘always continually the same’, ἠνεκὲς αἰὲν ὁμοῖα. Wright comments upon the phrase, noting that ‘the Eleatic argument for self-consistency … is applied to the individual roots, completing the point made in line 28 – each root has its own τιμῆς and ἦθος, which are preserved inviolate through the various arrangements and rearrangements of parts in the formation of θνητά’.Footnote ³¹ As we have seen above, however, the interpretation of Empedocles’ elements replicating Parmenides’ what-is is untenable in light of his own verses, which rather foreground the elements’ qualitative mutability, as they do not endure endlessly as one and the same form.

In light of this finding, I would question Wright’s notion of elements preserving their τιμῆς and ἦθος inviolate through their various arrangements and rearrangements as living compounds. As we have seen above, Empedocles is clear enough about elements dying – that is, losing their specific and identifying qualities – when they are mixed as mortal forms. Rather, I would argue that by the idea of elements being unchanged kata kyklon and being therefore always continually the same, Empedocles aims to emphasize the particular nature of their life cycles, upon which their special status as fundamental entities and their divine nature rest. According to this reading, kata kyklon in B 17.13 (= EMP D 73.244 Laks-Most) and B 26.12 (= EMP D 77b.12 Laks-Most) does not refer to the cosmic cycle in general, but rather to the elements’ particular life cycle: they are ‘unchanged in their cycle’. Moreover, the variation of the otherwise analogous B 17.35 (= EMP D 73.266), ταύτῃ δ’ αἰὲν ἔασιν ἠνεκὲς αἰὲν ὁμοῖα, suggests that, despite their continuous transformations into all kinds of living compounds, these being forms of mortals or of the One/Sphairos, the elements are always ultimately and regularly reborn as the same four kinds of fundamental principles. In this way, they regain the τιμῆς and ἦθος that characterize each of them and, by means of these, they are every time reborn as ‘themselves’.

Thus, I would contend that in B 17.13 (= EMP D 73.244 Laks-Most), B 26.12 (= EMP D 77b.12 Laks-Most) and B 17.35 (= EMP D 73.266 Laks-Most), Empedocles typifies the elemental life cycles in contrast to the life cycles and transformations ordinary mortals undergo. Whereas the latter take on a new form of body each time they are reborn, the former are always reborn as themselves again. As Palmer points out:

In other words, although the elements have a life cycle just like the compounds formed out of them, in contrast to those compounds, the elements will every time be reborn as themselves again, no matter how often they interchange, lose their identities and die by mixtures. It is in this respect that they can be said to persist unchanged. In doing so, they can be considered immortal, according to Long’s definition, and are more ontologically basic within Empedocles’ physical system than the compounds formed from them. This finally assures that they are divine.

To sum up, the divine nature of the four elements essentially consists in their being ontologically fundamental entities of Empedocles’ physical system. Moreover, Empedocles assures that the total amount of each of them never decreases or increases in the cosmic cycle, but persists unaffected. Indeed, the elements comprise the fixed and total quantity of matter in the universe. Furthermore, they are the basic components of every existing thing. Thus, everything in the cosmos, as it comes to be from and always dissolves into the four elements, can be traced back to them. It follows that they are prior to, and more ontologically basic, than the compounds formed from them.

However, despite their quantitative invariance, the four elements are qualitatively mutable: by running through and mixing with each other, they lose their characteristics and transform themselves into integrated beings with new qualities of their own. More precisely, each of the elements has its own life cycle. This determines that they die when, by being united in compounds, they lose their identities and are genuinely born again as ‘themselves’ from the Sphairos, when the cosmological process begins anew. As we have seen, their qualitative variability is such that despite their life cycles and the myriad transformations in all kinds of compounds they undergo, they still persist unchanged in their cycle. Which means that they are reborn every time as fire, air, water and earth, with those same qualities they had before undergoing changes. For this reason, they can be said to be immortal, as each is able to persist as one and the same entity over a long period.

In conclusion, Empedocles’ conception of godhood with reference to the four elements foregrounds the idea of their persistence, which characterizes them as fundamental entities of his physical system. Their persistence is quantitative, in that they comprise the fixed and total amount of matter in the universe. But it is also qualitative, in that their cycle ensures that, despite their innumerable transformations into all kinds of mortal forms, they are always reborn each time as each of the same four elements. Incidentally, it is worth noting that their being divine agrees with the notion of elements having a life cycle like virtually everything else in the cosmos. It follows that godhood is not denied, in principle, to those beings, such as men and women, who have their own life cycle, provided, however, that their cycle entails the possibility that they remain unchanged for a certain (rather long) period. By virtue of this conclusion, my goal in this chapter is thus precisely to understand what divinity entails in reference to human beings striving to become gods.

4.2 Love and Strife

Having established the correlation between the status of the elements as fundamental principles of the physical world and their divine nature, and having identified this in the way they persist in the cosmic cycle, I will now turn to the second kind of entity that Empedocles explicitly refers to as gods or calls by the names of traditional deities: Love and Strife. Here I will look at those verses that delve into their action upon the four elements and their function in the cosmic cycle. This will allow me to define their godhood in contrast to that of fire, air, water and earth and to show that their divine nature is more in line with the traditional notion of gods as immortal (and eternally unchanged) beings.

As we have seen in Chapter 2.7, Empedocles introduces the principles of Love and Strife for the first time through the lines of B 16 (= EMP D 63 Laks-Most) as two entities that persist through the history of time. While I will return to this fundamental characteristic later in this section, where we will see that it reflects a quality that is ascribed to traditional gods, it is first necessary to draw attention to the dichotomy that guides the Empedoclean description of these two principles in his physical exposition. In fact, Love and Strife are made antithetical principles that act on the elements and influence their functioning in opposite ways. Empedocles links Love with a positive principle working on the elements and striving to bring all things to one form alone, the Sphairos. In contrast, Strife is made the negative principle that destroys the Sphairos, tearing the elements apart and producing the Many.Footnote ³³ Because of their impact on the elements and the cycle, Love and Strife have also been considered cosmic forces or powers.

Related to this, continuing along the lines of the antithetical description of the two principles, Love is usually associated with a unifying power in contrast to the separating force of Strife, as for instance in B 17.7–8 (= EMP D 73.239–40 Laks-Most): … Φιλότητι συνερχόμεν’ εἰς ἓν ἅπαντα, / … δίχ’ ἕκαστα φορεύμενα Νείκεος ἔχθει.Footnote ³⁴ Additionally, Love’s unifying action is emphasized through verbs with the prefix συν-, such as συν-έρχομαι (B 17.7 [= EMP D 73.239 Laks-Most], B 20.2 [= EMP D 73.303 Laks-Most], B 26.5 [= EMP D 77b.5 Laks-Most], B 35.5 [= EMP D 75.5 Laks-Most]), συν-βαίνω (B 21.8 [= EMP D 77a.8 Laks-Most]), συν-φύομαι (B 26.7 [= EMP D 77b.7 Laks-Most]) and συν-ίστημι (B 35.6 [= EMP D 75.6 Laks-Most]). Moreover, Love is usually associated with the notion of ‘one’ (thing, cosmos, etc.),Footnote ³⁵ whereas Strife is typically connected with the concept of ‘many’ or plurality.Footnote ³⁶ The prefix δια- seems to be particularly linked to the notion of plurality and change: see δι-έφυ (B 17.2 = B 17.10 [= EMP D 73.234 = 73.241 Laks-Most]), δια-φύντος (B 26.9 [= EMP D 77b.9 Laks-Most]), δι-αλλάσσοντα; δι-αλλάξαντα (B 17.12 [= EMP D 73.243 Laks-Most], B 35.16 [= EMP D 75.16 Laks-Most]), δια-τμηθέντα (B 20.4 [= EMP D 73.305 Laks-Most]), διά-μορφα (B 21.7 [= EMP D 77a.7 Laks-Most]) and δι-έχουσι (B 22.6 [= EMP D 101.6 Laks-Most]).

Nevertheless, Aristotle noted that the ability to unify things also pertains to Strife, while Love too can separate. Specifically, Aristotle observes that Strife separates the One, but unifies each element with its homologous portions, thereby forming four homogeneous elemental masses. In parallel, Love unifies the four heterogeneous elements into the One, but separates each element from its homologous portions (that is, she separates and dissolves the elemental masses).Footnote ³⁷ As a clarification to Aristotle’s report, however, it can be said that Strife’s unions and Love’s separations result incidentally from their main action in the cycle. In fact, Strife always works in the cosmic cycle by separating Love’s compounds and, in doing so, brings about a gradual increase of parts. Therefore, although its action may incidentally cause heterogeneous elements to come together,Footnote ³⁸ Strife can nonetheless be said to be the cause of separation. Analogously, Love, by unifying separate parts, forms wholes and gradually reduces the number of things until her re-composition of only one whole thing, the Sphairos. This makes Love the cause of union, although her activity incidentally causes the elements to separate from their homologous portions and to combine in heterogeneous mixtures. As a result, Love can be defined as the principle of unity (and One) whereas Strife tries to impede Love’s mixtures and, by separating her compounds, is the principle not only of division, but also of the Many.

With reference to the divine nature of the two powers, scholars generally argue that we only have straightforward evidence for the divine nature of Love,Footnote ³⁹ who is frequently called by the names of traditional goddesses such as Aphrodite, Cypris and Harmonia.Footnote ⁴⁰ Strife, on the other hand, is not explicitly mentioned as a deity in our extant fragments. Moreover, the gender of Strife’s name in Greek (Νεῖκος) is neuter, which, as V. Hladký points out, ‘already on the level of grammar, makes it distinct from the other, more personal, masculine or feminine gods that appear in Empedocles’.Footnote ⁴¹ Nonetheless, we do have some Empedoclean verses in which Strife is referred to by the names Kotos and Eris (B 21.7 [= EMP D 77a.7 Laks-Most] and B 20.4 [= EMP D 73.305 Laks-Most]). Additionally, traditional gods such as Ares and Kydoimos (see B 128.1 [= EMP D 25.1 Laks-Most] with n.8 above) may also be taken as two names to indicate Strife, just like Cypris and Aphrodite are names for Love or, assuming they are rather ‘manifestations of the cosmic super-god Strife’,Footnote ⁴² they can still be interpreted as signs of Strife’s divine nature. Be that as it may, Love’s and Strife’s divinity is emphasized in B 59.1 (= EMP D 149.1 Laks-Most) where, as we have seen in Chapter 3.6, they are both referred to as δαίμονες.Footnote ⁴³

Moreover, since, as we have seen above, Empedocles connects mortality to mixture,Footnote ⁴⁴ Love’s and Strife’s divine status is also determined by the fact that at least a part of them stays unmixed during all phases of a cosmic cycle. In fact, in contrast to the four elements, Love and Strife are introduced in the proem (see B 16 [= EMP D 63 Laks-Most]) in a way that emphasizes their persistence over time:

Looking at this fragment, we can see that the first line is reminiscent of Il. 1.70, ὃς ᾔδη τά τ’ ἐόντα τά τ’ ἐσσόμενα πρό τ’ ἐόντα, a line referring to Calchas’ perfect knowledge of all present, past and future events, through an epic formula indicating the eternity of time and history. Similarly, Hesiod (Theog. 39) employs the same formula with an analogous meaning to depict the Muses’ ability to master a song comprising past, present and future. By echoing the epic formula, therefore, Empedocles indicates that the two forces persist in the cosmic cycle eternally unchanged: Love and Strife are now as they were before and will be in the future.

The contrast between the persistence of the two forces and the four elements undergoing generations and destructions is plain and well received by Hippolytus, who commented upon the lines quoted above in the following way:

Later on, Hippolytus connects Love’s and Strife’s stable natures with their immortality. Indeed, he calls the four elements ‘mortal gods’, whereas Love and Strife are ‘immortal, unborn and hostile to each other always’.Footnote ⁴⁶

To sum up, the analysis of the godlike nature of Love and Strife highlights that the they are divine because they are, like the elements, fundamental principles of Empedocles’ physical system – indeed, they are forces acting upon the four elements and influencing their workings in the cosmic cycle. Moreover, Love’s and Strife’s divine nature also resides in their immortality; indeed in their eternal persistence as one and the same form – a characteristic that more than any other is traditionally connected to godhood. In fact, the Homeric gods are nothing if not ἄμβροτοι.

Thus, Love’s and Strife’s immortality requires not only that they are endless – indeed, they are eternal – but also that at least a part of them stays unmixed and, consequently, unchanged during all phases of the cosmic cycle. This characteristic makes their immortal and divine nature slightly different from that of the elements. Indeed, as we have seen above, the four elements are born and die when they transform themselves into living compounds and have a life cycle like everything else in Empedocles’ system. Because they undergo qualitative changes, the elements can only be said to be unchanged in their cycle, while they are immortal just in that part of the cosmic cycle when they are kept unmixed by the influence of Strife. In contrast, Love’s and Strife’s immortality and divinity entails that they stay unborn and imperishable; that is, perfectly unchanged through the eternity of time.

4.3 The Sphairos

Turning to the next of those concepts to which Empedocles explicitly ascribes divine nature in his fragments, we see that the Sphairos (or the One) – that is, the form of the universe resulting from the perfect unification of all things into one whole entity – is called θεός in B 31 (= EMP D 95 Laks-Most). Moreover, Hippolytus in his Refutatio omnium heresium tells us that the Sphairos is ‘the most beautiful form’ of the universe because it emerges from Love’s dominion over Strife.Footnote ⁴⁷ This characterization agrees with the fact that, as we are going to see, Empedocles conceptualizes the Sphairos as his ideal of perfection. In this regard, let us examine B 27 (= EMP D 89 Laks-Most):

As we have seen in Section 4.1 above, B 27.1 (= EMP D 89.1 Laks-Most) indicates that the Sphairos is a blend in which the four elements no longer stand out as four distinct entities. Taking this concept to the extreme, we conclude that, as already argued, the four elements no longer exist when united to form the One, or, as Empedocles puts it, they are subdued in the Sphairos.Footnote ⁵⁰ The impossibility of distinguishing between its ingredients may well point to a representation of the Sphairos as a thorough blend, with an emphasis to its overall balance and symmetry.

This conclusion accords with what we can read in fragment B 28 (= EMP D 90 Laks-Most):

The Sphairos’ shape is here again presented in a way that stresses its overall balance, as the Sphairos is said to be everywhere equal to itself. This relates well to the representation in B 27 (= EMP D 89 Laks-Most) of the One as a blend in which its ingredients cannot be distinguished. Additionally, the specification that the Sphairos is everywhere always identical to itself indicates that the thorough blend of B 27 corresponds to a perfectly symmetrical and balanced shape.

The One’s quality of multidimensional symmetry, highlighted by the notion of the Sphairos being everywhere equal to itself, is repeated almost verbatim in another fragment, B 29 (= EMP D 92 Laks-Most):

As we can see, the concluding claim according to which the Sphairos is from all sides equal to itself is presented here as the result of its being a non-anthropomorphic god: it has neither arms nor feet, nor knees, nor genital organs.

Looking at the reception of this description, scholars agree that lines 1 and 2 are Empedocles’ criticism of the anthropomorphic representation of the divine, which can be traced back to Xenophanes. By emphasizing that different societies represent their deities with physical characteristics that are typical of those societies, Xenophanes pointed out the subjective character of the anthropomorphic approach. For instance, the Aethiops represent their gods as snub nosed and dark skinned, whereas Thracian gods have blue eyes and blond hair.Footnote ⁵² From this observation, Xenophanes arrives at a rather radical deduction, namely that just as people from different societies create different and self-resembling representations of the divine, so too would horses and oxen, if only they had the ability to represent their deities, make them similar to themselves.Footnote ⁵³ While recalling Xenophanes, Empedocles’ rejection of anthropomorphism and especially the Sphairos’ lack of genitals contrasts the specific paradigm of epic theogony with personified gods that reproduce themselves sexually, and points out instead that the Sphairos has no need of reproduction and does not procreate. Thus, instead of an anthropomorphic shape, what is proposed is a symmetrical and spherical form: ἀλλὰ σφαῖρος ἔην.

The spherical form of the Sphairos is made explicit through both the adjective κυκλοτερής (B 27.3 [= EMP D 89.3 Laks-Most] and B 28.2 [= EMP D 90.2 Laks-Most]) and the name Σφαῖρος itself, the masculine form derived from the Greek σφαῖρα (‘sphere’). This is reminiscent of Parmenides’ what-is being like a well-rounded sphere,Footnote ⁵⁴ while later philosophical tradition will concur that roundness is a perfect shape.Footnote ⁵⁵ In fact, any point on the surface of a sphere is equidistant from its centre and this is considered a sign of ideal symmetry. Thus, the Sphairos’ roundness contributes to constructing the ideal of balance of the ‘most beautiful form’ of the universe, which is ultimately functional to portraying Empedocles’ ideal of perfection.

Returning to the description of the Sphairos in B 27 (= EMP D 89 Laks-Most) and 28 (= EMP D 90 Laks-Most), we will now see further qualities ascribed to the One that contribute to depicting Empedocles’ ideal of perfection. First, the perfect nature of the Sphairos is also constructed through the verb ἐστήρικται (‘to stand still’) at B 27.2 (= EMP D 89.2 Laks-Most). As movement is conceptually related to the idea of a process that is not yet completed, perfection requires in contrast completion of motion and therefore rest. We already find this idea in Parmenides (DK 28 B 8.30–38 [= PARM D 8.35–43 Laks-Most]), who connects the lack of motion of his what-is to the fact that it is not allowed to be incomplete (οὐκ ἀτελεύτητον τὸ ἐὸν θέμις εἶναι). Thus, any entity is perfect iff it is complete, and it is complete iff it does not move.

Moreover, the Sphairos’ state of rest is a consequence of Love’s perfect dominion over Strife. In fact, whereas Empedocles makes it quite clear that Strife is the principle of struggle and movement (Νεῖκος starts motion by separating the Sphairos), Love results in peace and rest. Indeed, although Love can also initiate and influence movement (for instance, of heterogeneous things that come together in mixture), D. O’Brien has cogently demonstrated that ‘the movement which Love initiates is movement towards rest, and when Love is successful there is no longer any movement’.Footnote ⁵⁶ Thus, when she forms the Sphairos, Love achieves a universe of absolute rest.

Second, since, as we can appreciate, the Sphairos’ qualities that make up its perfect shape are the result of the work of Love, it is to be assumed that the property of being one (or oneness) is also a sign of perfection in contrast to Strife’s multiplicity. The quality of solitude, stressed in B 27.3 (= EMP D 89.3 Laks-Most) and B 28.2 (= EMP D 90.2 Laks-Most) by the word μονίηι, might emphasize the notion of onenessFootnote ⁵⁷ and indirectly relate to the idea that Love has made the elements into a one, unique, whole being. However, the meaning of μονίη is debated.Footnote ⁵⁸ The word can derive from μένειν, indicating that the Sphairos is at rest, or it can stem from μόνος and so defines the Sphairos as alone.Footnote ⁵⁹ Wright is surely correct when emphasizing that ‘the unusual word was probably deliberately chosen for its ambiguity’, which nonetheless displays that Love is in charge, as the concepts of both one and rest can be associated with her.Footnote ⁶⁰ However, since the absence of movement in the Sphairos is pointed out, as we have already seen, through the verb ἐστήρικται at B 27.2 (= EMP D 89.2 Laks-Most), the option for μονίη stemming from μόνος seems to be preferable: alongside the notion of rest, Empedocles might have wanted to stress the fact that Love has now reduced multiplicity to one single thing.

Third, the close of both B 27 (= EMP D 89 Laks-Most) and B 28 (= EMP D 90 Laks-Most) emphasizes a further characteristic of the Sphairos, namely, its being blissful. This agrees with the conception of the Sphairos as Love’s product, and in virtue of this it is to be assumed that blissfulness is conceived as a further sign of perfection. In this regard, it is worth noting that in B 17.24 (= EMP D 73.255 Laks-Most), Empedocles claims not only that Love is the principle whereby people think friendly thoughts and accomplish deeds of concordance, but for this reason, she is also called Joy: Γηθοσύνη.Footnote ⁶¹ Since this appellation is etymologically related to the word περιγηθέι, which in 28.2 (= EMP D 89.2 Laks-Most) expresses the Sphairos’ emotional state, it follows that not only are certain emotions connected to Love’s influence, but Love is the true source of joy.

To sum up, the fragments on the Sphairos construct an ideal of perfection, which is more specifically characterized as utter symmetry, therefore as a quintessential balance, physically represented by the spherical form. Moreover, the Sphairos’ perfection also consists in rest, oneness and blissfulness. As we have seen, all these qualities are connected to the principle of Love and in fact, in B 27.2 (= EMP D 89.2 Laks-Most), Empedocles makes it clear that the Sphairos is riveted ‘in the dense hiding place of Harmony’.Footnote ⁶² By displaying that the Sphairos arises by Love’s influence, and indeed upon Strife’s defeat, this line reveals that Love is the source of ideal perfection.

Strife’s complete absence from the Sphairos not only causes this to be perfectly blended and so perfectly balanced throughout, but also endows it with perfect knowledge. As we will see more thoroughly in Chapter 6.3, according to Empedocles, the ability to know is strictly related to the blend of elements in the body. More precisely, the ability to know depends on the blood surrounding the heart and, in particular, its extremely symmetrical krasis of elements.Footnote ⁶³ Indeed, the mixture of the four elements in blood is according to the ratio 1:1:1:1 and this makes it able to think and know best, as Theophrastus tells us.Footnote ⁶⁴ As we can see, the blood’s elemental ratio reproduces, on a microcosmic level, the elemental ratio of the Sphairos, made out of the four elements in the same proportions.Footnote ⁶⁵ By this standard, it is possible to think that, by virtue of this elemental ratio, the Sphairos is a cosmic mind and can produce thoughts and gain knowledge – like blood does on a minor scale.

Indeed, the notion of the Sphairos as a cosmic mind invites the reading that the One has outstanding knowing potential. However, an ancient reader of Empedocles, such as Aristotle, would have disagreed with this conclusion, believing rather that the Sphairos is, because of the lack of Strife in its elemental composition, a god that cannot genuinely know. In a passage of his Metaphysics, Aristotle attributes to Empedocles the view that knowing occurs by likeFootnote ⁶⁶ and supports his claim by quoting B 109 (= EMP D 207 Laks-Most), a fragment in which, as we will see in more detail in Chapter 6.3.1, Empedocles states that each element (presumably in the object of knowledge) is known by its homologous principle (presumably in the knowing subject): fire is known by fire, air by air, water by water, earth by earth, Love by Love and Strife by Strife.Footnote ⁶⁷ In a passage of De Anima, moreover, Aristotle reiterates his criticism of Empedocles’ theory of knowledge and, again citing B 109 (= EMP D 207 Laks-Most), deduces that the Sphairos must be the least intelligent of all beings.Footnote ⁶⁸ In fact, by focusing on Strife as a principle by which we know (portions of) the world (namely those that are made of Strife, in the same way that we know portions of the world made of fire by fire), Aristotle must conclude that the absence of Strife from the Sphairos’ mixture makes the One incapable of attaining perfect knowledge.

As I will extensively discuss in Chapter 6.3, nevertheless, one of our most important sources for Empedocles’ theories of perceiving, thinking and knowing, Theophrastus, makes it clear that the acquisition of knowledge according to Empedocles does not rest upon each single principle in the knowing agent that knows its homologous principle in the object of knowledge, so much as upon the fact that perception and understanding rest above all upon the krasis of elements in the organs of perception and knowledge being symmetrical to epistemic inputs from the outside (from the objects of knowledge).Footnote ⁶⁹ The more harmonious the elemental kraseis in body organs are, the more symmetrical they are with respect to external effluvia emanated by things in the world, the more the external epistemic inputs adapt to our organ of knowledge, giving us the possibility of knowing more and better. Thus, it is the symmetry between organs and objects of knowledge (more precisely, between the elemental blend within the body and the effluvia emanated by external things) that enables perception, thought and knowledge. This is the reason why, as we have seen above, the knowing organ in humans is blood around the heart. Its harmonious krasis makes pericardial blood apt to produce thoughts and gain knowledge to the highest degree.

Since not only are harmony and symmetry qualities associated with Love, but it is Love that forms harmonious and symmetrical mixtures, it follows that the ability to perceive, think and know is always related to Love’s power. This invites the reading that Strife is an impediment to rather than a principle for knowing. Indeed, since Strife always works to impede the integral and well-ordered compounds of Love, an elemental mixture affected by Strife would lack the balance and symmetry that ensures rational thought and knowledge. Consequently, the Sphairos, whose composition lacks Strife and is for this specific reason utterly symmetrical (and therefore harmonious to the highest degree), must be, by virtue of this, also the most rational and wisest of all beings.

In conclusion, the divine nature of the Sphairos is conveyed through making it Empedocles’ ideal of perfection, which is constructed around outstanding physical characteristics, such as utter balance and symmetry, and therefore sphericity, rest and oneness, as well as a blissful nature and exceptional epistemic ability. Because it embodies Empedocles’ ideal of perfection, the Sphairos can be taken as the major god in his system. However, in contrast to the four principles and the two forces of Love and Strife, the Sphairos is a compound of elements – indeed, the perfect blend of the four elements. Its characteristic of being compounded means that its divine nature rests on the fact that it is a thorough blend. This makes the Sphairos not only the most beautiful form of the universe, as Hippolytus tells us, but also the form of ‘compound’ divinity at its perfect degree, to which, as I will argue below, all other forms of integrated beings – that is, above all, human beings – should approach.

4.4 Holy Mind

The non-anthropomorphic shape of the Sphairos and his having an outstanding knowing ability are closely associated with another divine entity in Empedocles’ system: the Holy Mind. This is presented in fragment B 134 (= EMP D 93 Laks-Most), within a context that, according to our sources,Footnote ⁷⁰ deals with the divine, τὸ θεῖον (to theion):

As we can see, the first three lines of the fragment are nearly identical to the first lines of B 29 (= EMP D 92 Laks-Most), although B 134.5–6 (= EMP D 93.5–6 Laks-Most) presents the divine as a holy and vast mind, whose swift thoughts move across the whole cosmos. Analogously, as mentioned above, the Sphairos displays, to a macrocosmic scale, the same elemental ratio of the human mind and can therefore be said to be, by virtue of this, a vast, cosmic mind.

On the basis of these similarities, can we conclude that the Holy Mind and the Sphairos are one and the same form of the divine and of the universe in Empedocles’ physical system? Scholars are divided on this issue. For instance, Guthrie pointed out that the indication of the Holy Mind darting its thoughts across the cosmos constitutes an objection to this identification. According to Guthrie, ‘the Sphere exists only at a certain stage of the cycle’ and ‘during its perfection there is no cosmos in the ordinary sense’.Footnote ⁷² Guthrie seems to refer the word κόσμον in B 134.5 (= EMP D 93.5 Laks-Most) to our world, which in Empedocles’ cosmic cycle is opposed to the Sphairos (being Many instead of One). However, his interpretation encounters some obstacles when compared to other occurrences of the term κόσμος in the Empedoclean fragments. In fact, these rather indicate that κόσμος means a well-integrated, harmonious form that is one and united with respect to its parts,Footnote ⁷³ whereas in PStrasb. a(i) 6 (= EMP D 73.267 Laks-Most) κόσμος seems to coincide with the Sphairos.Footnote ⁷⁴

Nevertheless, other scholars have noted that the thinking activity of the Holy Mind, described by Empedocles as swift thoughts moving across the cosmos, contrasts with the fact that the Sphairos is at rest. In contrast, it can be argued that the verb καταΐσσουσα is here used figuratively to conceptualize the quick and pervasive production of thoughts by the Holy Mind. This could be an indication that the verb does not denote a real motion, least of all the spatial movement Empedocles denies the Sphairos. Rather, it could be argued that Empedocles, as elsewhere, used vivid and concrete images to illustrate an abstract and more elusive mental faculty. In this sense, ‘darting forth across the whole cosmos by swift thoughts’ could express the concept of a deity whose thoughts can extremely rapidly concern every aspect of what exists and, in this sense, they can be said to ‘dart and reach’ every existing things in the cosmos. Moreover, by assuming that the Holy Mind coincides with the Sphairos and therefore with the whole universe, thoughts reaching what exists in all its parts could denote an entity that is entirely and ubiquitously perceptive and knowing, just like the ‘one god’ of Xenophanes, who ‘sees as a whole, thinks as a whole and hears as a whole’.Footnote ⁷⁵

Returning to a characteristic of the Holy Mind I have mentioned at the outset of this section, our sources for B 134 (= EMP D 93 Laks-Most) refer it to Empedocles’ representation of the divine in general. Specifically, AmmoniusFootnote ⁷⁶ told us that Empedocles, when speaking of the Holy Mind, was referring ‘primarily to Apollo who was the immediately relevant topic of his discourse’ but, in the same way, he was also referring ‘to the totality of the divine in general’. Similarly, Tzetzes reported that Empedocles was showing through this fragment ‘what the substance of a god is’.Footnote ⁷⁷ This specification may suggest the notion that being divine is straightforwardly connected to being a Holy Mind, resulting in the assumption that any god, indeed any divine entity, in Empedocles’ system is a Holy Mind.Footnote ⁷⁸

In contrast, I understand our sources’ indication that the description of the Holy Mind shows the substance of a god as a further reference to the assimilation between the Holy Mind and the Sphairos. Specifically, as we have seen in the previous section, the Sphairos is both the ideal form of a compounded being and, as such, the god par excellence in Empedocles’ system. From this it can be inferred that it also is the prototype and the ideal of a perfection to which all compounded divine entities aspire. By assuming that the Sphairos and the Holy Mind coincide, the indication that the Holy Mind represents the very substance of godhood for Empedocles might refer to the fact that it represents the ideal and model upon which he conceptualized the divine nature of integrated beings. Thus, while the Sphairos/Holy Mind’s godhood principally coincides with perfect shape (perfect wholeness, perfect balance and perfect beauty), perfect knowledge and perfect blissfulness – hence, complete association with Love against Strife – so too does the divine nature for all integrated beings who populate the cosmos. Their godhood must therefore entail that they are well-ordered and harmonious, wise and utterly happy because of their association with Love, as we will now see.

4.5 Long-Lived Gods

Turning to the next and last of those entities that Empedocles explicitly refers to as gods in his fragments, long-lived gods, ‘the greatest in honour’, are listed by Empedocles, together with plants, animals and human beings, among the myriad mortal forms that arise from the combination of the four elements. Let us consider B 21.7–12 (= EMP D 77a.7–12 Laks-Most):Footnote ⁷⁹

Through these lines, Empedocles tells us that his physical system envisages the existence of some gods who are made out of the four elements, as is every other living being. The quality ‘long-lived’ attributed to these gods appears as a novel notion in contrast to the traditional representation of gods being ambrotoi, immortal. It can be explained, however, with reference to Empedocles’ ontology, according to which, what is made out of compounded elements must abide by the cosmic cycle; hence, long-lived gods, since they are integrated beings, were born at some point in the history of the world and will also ultimately die, just like any other compounds, when things come together to be just one whole being, the Sphairos.

In the introduction to this chapter, I listed diverse divine entities under the definition of long-lived gods. These include (traditional) gods recalled as a group or individually mentioned by the names of Ares, Kydoimos, Zeus, Kronos and Poseidon; the Muse and more specifically Calliope; deities who guide the souls in the underworld, among whom we may number Pythagoras; a goddess in the underworld who dresses souls with new bodies; guilty and exiled gods and thus Empedocles’ himself; and, finally, those who escape rebirths. The heterogeneous character of this group of gods implies that, on my interpretation, any god that is not a principle (that is, either one of the four elements or Love and Strife) can be taken as a long-lived god.Footnote ⁸⁰

Because they are mortal deities, made of the four elements just like any other living being, long-lived gods belong on the scale of rational beings that also includes plants, animals and humans. In this respect, it should be safe to argue that gods, probably because they are the most rational beings, represent the top of the scale, whose bottom is occupied by plants, with animals and human beings in between. Furthermore, although gods share with animals and plants an analogous elemental structure and, ultimately, even mortal nature, their being long-lived refers to the fact that they are among the most stable elemental structures of the cosmos, while human beings are swift to die (B 2.4 [= EMP D 42.4 Laks-Most]), have just a small portion of life (B 2.3 [= EMP D 42.3 Laks-Most]) and are many-times-dying (B 113.2 [= EMP D 5.2 Laks-Most]). Thus, while the mortal nature of humans consists in them being frail and having a fragmented existence, it is assumed that gods have a firm and unbroken nature and are, therefore, able to live much longer than any other living beings.

It is worth observing that the adjective δολιχαίωνες, which characterizes the gods ‘greatest in honour’, recalls the definition of δαίμονες as οἵτε μακραίωνος λελάχασι βίοιο, ‘gods who have won long-lasting life’ in B 115.5 (= EMP D 10.5 Laks-Most). I agree with Sedley that θεοὶ δολιχαίωνες include the δαίμονες with a share in long life.Footnote ⁸¹ Consequently, all those who escape rebirths and become gods become long-lasting or long-lived gods. As B 146–47 (= EMP D 39 and 40 Laks-Most) tells us, their godhood primarily consists in them ‘having no parts in human sorrows’ and being ‘indestructible’; additionally they partake in divine feasts and banquets. We have already come upon the characteristic of having a blissful existence with respect to the nature of the Sphairos, which ‘rejoices’ in its solitude. Moreover, this quality of the Sphairos has been linked to the power of Love and the defeat of Strife. In a more general sense, we can say that divine nature and blissfulness are associated with Love. In parallel, mortality and misery are connected to Strife.

Furthermore, long-lived gods do not have a fragmented existence that is subjected to many deaths; rather, they have just one death (which may coincide with the end of the world and which in any case makes their lives extremely long), unless they abide by Strife and commit a crime. In that case, they are condemned to become ordinary mortals and so to die and be born again many times. This particular aspect once more relates the divine nature of this group of gods to Love in opposition to Strife. Analogously, as we have seen, the dialectic of divine nature in Empedocles’ system that can be reconstructed through the demonological fragments is based upon the antithesis between a blissful state (and abode) that the guilty δαίμονες lose and the miserable place and life they are compelled to embrace in our world because of their trust in Strife. This conclusion links the godhood of this group to an aspect of ethical import: their being pure and behaving justly. We already know that gods can lose their divine nature because of certain crimes they commit at some point in their life. Moreover, in Chapter 6.4 we will see that Pausanias, in order to escape rebirths and become a god, must learn to ‘fast from evil’, hence to behave justly, purifying himself from Strife and its works. This is a further sign that, with relation to integrated beings, like human beings, divinity is linked to purity and therefore to Love, as much as mortality is connected with ‘pollution’, crime and Strife.

4.6 Conclusions

The investigation put forward in this chapter has shown that, in Empedocles’ system, the divine nature of the elements is different from the divine nature of Love and Strife, just as this is different from the divine nature of the Sphairos and the Holy Mind, or from that of long-lived gods, greatest in honours. However, at least with regard to compounds and integrated beings, like living beings, we can confidently say that their divine nature presents some common traits that closely recall, indeed are modelled upon, the characteristics of the Sphairos, the prototype of all integrated entities and the ideal of godhood. Thus, as the Sphairos shows, being divine for integrated individuals, such as men and women, is associated with Love in contrast to Strife, indeed it is essentially connected with the absence of Strife. Therefore, integrated individuals’ godhood is linked with blissfulness in contrast to misery, purity in contrast to pollution, stability (continuity) in contrast to fragmentation, symmetry in contrast to unbalance and perfect knowledge in contrast to the ignorance of ordinary mortals who have a short lifespan and know just what they happen to experience. In other words, what is promised to those who escape rebirths and become gods is a long and stable life consisting of quintessential happiness and perfect knowledge.

In conclusion, this chapter completes, along with Chapter 3, the definition of key terms and concepts in Empedocles’ thought that are significant for a more fully comprehensive account of his doctrine of rebirth. While the previous chapter concentrated on the notion of δαίμων, the focus here is on further terms translating the Empedoclean notion of divinity. Such an analysis has proven important not only because it has clarified a controversial issue of Empedocles studies – namely, what can be considered as divine in his physical system and why – but also because it lays the necessary groundwork for the major argument of this book, by enabling us to define in more detail Empedocles’ belief in rebirth. This groundwork will finally allow me to work out, beginning with the next chapter, the ways in which this belief can be reconciled with the principles and theories of his natural philosophy.