Introduction
Over one billion people currently live in a fragile state (OECD 2022). The definition of this condition remains contested at the academic level (Ficek Reference Ficek2022). Nevertheless, several international organizations – among them the OECD, the World Bank and the Fund for Peace – offer their own interpretations of this concept (ILO 2016). Though slightly different from one another, a minimum common denominator among these definitions is the characterization of the fragile state as one that is poorly capable of providing for its citizens, of asserting its authority, of exercising a real impact on its territory and of ensuring the political-institutional cohesion of society. These symptoms are common to all fragile states.
It is worth noting that all states exhibit some degree of fragility: the Fragile States Index, for example, illustrates this clearly by assessing all the countries of the world (FFP 2025). However, we speak of a ‘fragile state’ when such fragility becomes a defining feature of its political-legal-institutional system. These states, located primarily (though not exclusively) in the Global South, follow historical, geographical and cultural trajectories that are at times radically different, and whose fragility results from an almost inextricable plurality of causes (Acemoglu and Robinson Reference Acemoglu and Robinson2012). The outcome, however, tends to be similar in all cases: these are countries with a state apparatus that is weak in effectively exercising its power over its own territory.
It often happens that, due to its fragility, a state ends up sharing the exercise of its power with other states or non-state actors, either voluntarily or involuntarily. As for the former case, the recent book by J. Ciorciari, Sovereignty Sharing in Fragile States, has shed light on the phenomenon of states substituting another in the performance of essential functions on its own territory, such as security or public order (Ciorciari Reference Ciorciari2021). The phenomenon of charter cities, theorized by Nobel Prize-winning economist Paul Romer, and consisting of entire cities placed under the control of a nation different from the one in which the territory is located, represents an extreme example of this kind of voluntary power sharing (McCartney Reference McCartney2022).
Instead, when rebel groups install a ‘state within the state’ with separatist or subversive aims (Gutiérrez Reference Gutiérrez2022), we are witnessing an involuntary sharing with non-state actors, as also occurs with Mexican cartels operating in regions such as Sinaloa, Guerrero and Michoacán (Teiner Reference Teiner2020). In both cases, these non-state actors take the place of the state in some of its typical functions (provision of services, administration of justice, or collection of taxes) in areas where the state fails to assert its authority.
A particular case of sharing state functions in fragile contexts concerns multinational corporations, especially those operating in the extractive sector. These entities sometimes end up assuming de facto state-like functions vis-à-vis a given community in fragile countries, providing education, infrastructure, security, justice and more (Bainton and Skrzypek Reference Bainton and Skrzypek2021; Bezzola et al. Reference Bezzola, Brugger, Günther and Sebhatu2021).
There are at least three relevant elements of complexity. First, in this scenario, we witness a typically private actor performing functions that are typically public. Unlike other non-state entities that mimic the state and/or aspire to replace it, as indicated in the examples of rebels and criminal cartels, this is not the case with corporations, which find themselves performing such public functions only as an accessory to their business activity (Gatti Reference Gatti2023 ).
The second problematic aspect, connected to this, is that the nature of this sharing is often ambiguous. It can be interpreted as involuntary insofar as the state is frequently so incapacitated in carrying out its fundamental functions that this generates institutional voids, especially with respect to isolated communities such as those often surrounding mining sites, and the corporation steps in to fill them. At the same time, it has been noted that the fragile state may ‘take advantage’ of this imbalance in position with corporations by stepping back from its tasks – often costly ones – and indirectly delegating them to the company, in a form of presence-through-absence. The recent phenomenon of state-mandated CSR, in turn, is an expression of direct delegation (Lin Reference Lin2021).
The third problematic aspect concerns the difficult normative framing of this phenomenon. On the one hand, it may appear intuitively desirable that, in a context where the state abdicates its fundamental functions – whether voluntarily or involuntarily – another actor takes its place. On the other hand, however, it is legitimate to question how well-suited a corporation is to replace the state, and to what extent the relationship between the state and its citizens – often already precarious in fragile contexts – may be further undermined by the state’s ceasing to perform its fundamental functions.
The objective of this paper is to identify this normative criterion. We must therefore assess whether the benefits derived from corporate substitution in the performance of state functions can be justified in light of the state’s condition of fragility, and to what extent these benefits are nonetheless counterbalanced by the impact that such substitutive practices have on the respective roles of the state and the corporation within society. We believe that the best way to do it is to reach a better understanding of the role of state’s political power within society – a role that can be clarified through a rigorous use of constitutional theory. We stress the word ‘rigorous’ because the term constitutionalism is often used loosely, as a label under which any number of normative stances are gathered without conceptual clarity (Kapiszewski, Groen and Newman Reference Kapiszewski, Groen and Newman2024). This tendency has compromised its usefulness, and is also one of the reasons why it is rarely employed in the study of fragile states (Harding Reference Harding2019). However, if handled with care, we believe it will prove to be an indispensable tool for developing a normative reflection on the interaction between power exercised by the state and power exercised by private actors in fragile contexts.
Our turn to constitutional theory stems from the view that the two bodies of literature that have most directly sought to deal with the problem described – political corporate social responsibility and the privatization of public services – both lack certain elements needed to arrive at a clear normative criterion. Each captures only some aspects of the broader problem while leaving others, equally relevant, unaddressed. They are limited by the unbalanced focus of both theories – either predominantly on corporations or predominantly on the state – which prevents a proper assessment of the role of the other actor within society. In addition, they display an absent or weak normative stance, insufficient to support a general normative criterion of the kind we seek to develop. Finally, they fail to explain the link between the state’s role within society and the performance of certain fundamental functions – an element that we consider essential for addressing the question of whether, and to what extent, corporations may legitimately substitute the state in carrying out those functions.
For these reasons, we believe it is necessary to bring the debate onto the level of public law theory, since the problem under consideration is essentially one of the exercises of public powers by two institutions – the state and corporations – whose powers are closely tied to a specific and irreplaceable purpose within society. We argue that an adequate understanding of this leads to the conclusion that, even in fragile contexts, certain state functions such as law-making, the delivery of public services, or territorial administration are connected to the very raison d’être of states, and therefore cannot be sacrificed for short-term advantages. This normative criterion is accompanied by a new conceptualization of the contribution that corporations can make in these contexts: using their political power to strengthen state capacity in carrying out these three fundamental functions, rather than replacing it.
This conceptual article should therefore be understood as a contribution to the theory of public law, and is intended to conduct a purely conceptual investigation. The paradigmatic cases that enrich the work should not be interpreted as empirical case studies, but as illustrative examples useful to situate the phenomenon within its theoretical context. The article’s contributions are twofold: a better understanding of the differing roles of state political power and private corporations in fragile contexts, and a demonstration of constitutionalism as the proper analytical tool, if used correctly, to answer questions of this nature.
To achieve its aim, the paper is structured as follows. Section title “Corporations performing state-like functions in fragile states” illustrates the issue of private corporations performing state-like functions in fragile states. It explains the historical roots of this phenomenon, its current scope and its controversial nature, which is difficult to evaluate normatively as either desirable or undesirable in the absence of a clear reference criterion. To clarify the issue, we present a number of paradigmatic cases of corporations that have performed such functions, primarily from the extractive sector.
Section title “Understanding state power in fragile contexts through positive constitutionalism” introduces the theory of constitutionalism, explaining how a proper conceptual and normative understanding of it allows us to shed light on the role of the state within fragile societies, and on how the performance of certain functions by the state cannot be outsourced to other social actors without compromising the stability of the social contract. It also illustrates in detail the advantages that derive from seeking this criterion within the literature on constitutionalism rather than looking at the two fields that have come closest to addressing this issue, namely Political CSR and the recent debate on the privatization of state functions.
Section title “A normative criterion for corporations ‘performance of state-like functions in fragile states,” in light of these reflections, shows how the analysis of power fragmentation in fragile states – when approached through a correct conceptualization of constitutionalism – can yield a normative criterion for assessing the desirability of private corporations performing state-like functions in fragile contexts. These functions, we argue, cannot replace the essentially public role of the state within society, but must instead be subsidiary in nature, aimed at reinforcing state effectiveness in the interest of social cohesion.
Corporations performing state-like functions in fragile states
According to the classic definition by Max Weber, a sovereign state exercises supreme authority over its own territory (Weber Reference Weber, Gerth and Mills1948). The term supreme does not, in itself, imply that it is the only authority over that territory: historically, the state has always shared the political space with other entities such as families, churches and merchant guilds. It is only with the post-Westphalian order in the 1600s that the state gradually imposed its authority, progressively occupying more of the public sphere. These entities, which we can refer to as non-state actors, experienced a significant reduction in their political power – but not its complete extinction (Stern Reference Stern2011).
Multinational corporations are a particular type of non-state actor and, unlike many others, their trajectory has been largely upward. They have not been substantially hindered by the expansion of state functions in the modern era (Mclean Reference McLean2004). Consider that in the 1600s, the Dutch East India Company reached the height of its influence, followed by the British East India Company. Both held a degree of political power that remains unparalleled, to the point that Edmund Burke described the latter as ‘a state in the disguise of a merchant’ (Burke Reference Burke and Payne1999). However, this political power should not be viewed in opposition to that of the state, but rather as complementary. These companies operated in areas that were physically inaccessible to the state’s authority, which was often quite willing to delegate functions to them. In the terminology adopted in the introduction, this represents an early case of voluntary sovereignty sharing, a dynamic that still characterizes the division of political power between states and multinational corporations in fragile states – and beyond (Whelan Reference Whelan, Rasche, Morsing and Moon2017).
Power-sharing occurs, as we have noted, wherever there are areas of intervention that the state cannot effectively reach. This phenomenon can be seen in the political power wielded by corporations operating in vastly different sectors: from technology firms to extractive industries. In terms of assuming state-like functions, technology companies have taken a central place in the literature. They have been entrusted with a broad range of actions, exercising de facto sovereignty over digital spaces in which they regulate access, behavior, security and more (Lindman, Mäkinen and Kasanen Reference Lindman, Mäkinen and Kasanen2023). This is a phenomenon affecting states globally, as all struggle – albeit to varying degrees – to assert authority over the digital realm (Schaake Reference Schaake2024).
At the opposite end of this technologically advanced sector lies one of the oldest and most enduring industries in human history: extraction. The extractive sector also has a deep-rooted tradition of political power-sharing, dating back to colonial dynamics but also present in developed countries through so-called ‘mining towns’, which range from Sweden to the United States and across the Global South. Extractive corporations possess certain characteristics that make them particularly suited to performing state-like functions: they remain in a given location for extended periods, make large, immobile investments and thus become deeply tied to a specific territory and to the population living there (HKS 2007). Globalization has been considered a force that has tilted the balance of power between the state and corporations in favor of the latter, partly due to its ability to escape unfavorable regulatory environments by relocating production (Schrempf-Stirling Reference Schrempf-Stirling2018; Kourula et al. Reference Kourula, Moon, Crane, Pisani, Frynas and Sandberg2019). This is not the case for extractive corporations, which are still required to build deep and stable relationships both with the state that grants them extraction rights and with the local population that interacts with them. In the political and managerial literature on extractive corporations, considerable emphasis is placed on how these companies must obtain and maintain both a legal license to operate – understood as requiring cooperation from the host state – and a social license to operate, which is secured through the consent of the local population affected by their operations (Breakey, Wood and Sampford Reference Breakey, Wood and Sampford2025).
Therefore, the fact that a state shares political power with a corporation due to its limited ability to enforce authority over a given space is not uncommon. However, in fragile states, the issue becomes especially acute. As outlined in the introduction, these are states with severely constrained capacity, and the number and gravity of the areas they fail to reach are significantly greater. In the case of mining corporations, this dynamic becomes particularly visible. In the context of fragile states, it is common for corporations to fill voids left by the state – both spatial and functional – to the point of substituting the state in providing welfare services, crafting legal norms, or administering territory (Scherer, Palazzo and Matten Reference Scherer, Palazzo and Matten2016). Certain paradigmatic cases illustrate the relevance of this phenomenon and its complex implications for the life of these states. While the cases mentioned here are not intended as fully developed case studies, they serve to ground the theoretical discussion in concrete examples, facilitating understanding (Flyvbjerg Reference Flyvbjerg2006). These examples are not limited to a specific area or region; rather, their transversal nature across diverse settings highlights how widespread these dynamics are in contexts where state performance is in decline.
A first paradigmatic case is the involvement of Firestone in the response to the COVID crisis in Liberia, which shows how the substitution in performing essential functions occurs where a company steps in to provide services that the state either does not want or is unable to organize and deliver with the same speed and efficiency (Butler Reference Butler2019). While the African country significantly struggled to organize an effective response, the areas under the company’s control were equipped with highly efficient and responsive hospitals. What is more significant, however, is not so much the difference in responsive capacity, but the attitude observed in the population involved. This population showed greater trust and willingness to cooperate with the private company than with the Liberian government, towards which there remained a suspicion that reporting possible cases would lead to difficult hospitalizations.
The Firestone case highlights both positive and negative aspects of this phenomenon. The corporation has a controversial reputation in the country, where it exercises considerable influence and de facto controls a significant part of the territory (Mitman Reference Mitman2021). The relationship between the corporation and the Liberian state is considered to be at the limits of so-called ‘state capture’, which occurs when state authority becomes de facto subordinate to that of a corporation (Saunders and Malone Reference Saunders and Malone2025). The demonstrated capacity, in the case of the COVID-19 pandemic, to surpass government institutions and to secure greater responsiveness and cooperation from citizens than the state itself must be regarded as highly problematic when viewed in this light, showing how the Weberian paradigm of the state’s supremacy within society is manifestly called into question. On the other hand, this is counterbalanced by the fact that, faced with the manifest incapacity of state authorities, the corporation did in fact succeed in replacing them by providing Liberian citizens with a fundamental service they would otherwise not have received.
If the delivery of public services has an ambiguous nature and cannot be immediately classified as either a fundamental or an ancillary function of the state, other paradigmatic cases show how corporations also substitute for functions that are far more characteristic of state authority, such as what we call the ‘legal chain.’ We use this expression to group under a single category all those activities connected to the creation and delivery of law in a society, from law-making to adjudication.
With respect to the issue of law-making, Butler (Reference Butler2019) highlights a paradigmatic case by analyzing the contribution of Total E&P in promoting the adoption of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative Standards (EITI Standards) in Myanmar (n.d.). The corporation leveraged its influence over the country to push it to comply with this international standard, which provided the corporation itself with several advantages in terms of avoiding certain sanctions and facilitating its own market access, as well as offering greater investment security (Öge Reference Öge2016). On the one hand, this episode highlights problematic aspects of substitute law-making: usurpation of competence, shaping the legal system to one’s own interests and pushing for the integration of norms that are unsustainable in the legal context into which they are imported. Myanmar had to exit the EITI Standard just a few years later due to its inability to meet the requirements (EITI, nd). On the other hand, however, it shows how corporations can act as actual champions of international law and shared governance practices, using their influence to pass laws that would otherwise not be easily adopted. The risks and opportunities associated with corporations engaging in this activity as socio-political reformers are receiving increasing attention in the literature (Gatti Reference Gatti2023).
As noted earlier, the problem of substituting the state also concerns the adjudicative function. In this respect, the most well-known paradigmatic case is the Porgera Mining Framework by Barrick Gold (Laplante Reference Laplante2023). Following allegations by women who had been victims of sexual violence by security personnel at the Porgera mine in Papua New Guinea, Barrick Gold Corporation and the Porgera Joint Venture established an operational grievance mechanism (OGM) to address the issue. The OGM is generally considered a tool available to corporations to provide victims of corporate conduct with further access to remedies. However, in this case, it has been widely criticized for its inconsistency with international obligations and best practices in the field, drawing attention even from the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. The fundamental problem is that it was seen as a way of bypassing ordinary jurisdiction, seeking to obtain more favorable conditions for the corporation (Laplante Reference Laplante2023). In fragile countries, judicial systems are often critical, and the pursuit of alternative avenues for accessing justice is generally welcomed. Yet the Barrick case also illustrates the inherent risk in practices where corporations supplant a typically public role, such as the provision of justice (Laplante Reference Laplante2023).
A third set of examples involves actual twists in local sovereignty, with areas of influence shifting from the state to the control of private companies. This is a phenomenon particularly relevant in the so-called mining enclaves – systems that are primarily, though not exclusively, closed off from the rest of the territory, where citizens do enjoy a certain level of well-being, but where a dynamic of dependency inevitably exists (Rubbers Reference Rubbers2019).
A recent and extensive case study on Papua New Guinea has highlighted the relevance of this phenomenon (Bainton and Macintyre Reference Bainton, Macintyre, Bainton and Skrzypek2021). The Lihir Islands, rich in natural resources but isolated and largely neglected by state authorities, have fallen under the de facto control of the mining corporation operating there, which, in addition to providing health services, water and infrastructure, also created and maintained the local police station, establishing with it a relationship of semi-subordination (Bainton and Macintyre Reference Bainton, Macintyre, Bainton and Skrzypek2021). While this has allowed the Lihir Islands to enjoy at least some form of authority present on the territory, it has inevitably compromised the role of the already fragile Papua New Guinean state. As the authors observe, ‘It could certainly be argued that [the state’s] presence has been dwarfed by the expansion of the mining company, and further diminished by the company’s assumption of governmental functions’ (Bainton and Macintyre Reference Bainton, Macintyre, Bainton and Skrzypek2021, 135). Similar shifts in sovereignty over mining enclaves have also been observed in other fragile states, such as Mozambique (Diphoorn and Wiegink Reference Diphoorn and Wiegink2022).
Through this overview of episodes, we are able to understand two key points. First, where state power is fragile and private power is strong, the latter gains ground in the performance of typically state functions. Second, this substitutive behavior is of a controversial nature. It brings intuitively positive elements, such as the possibility of benefiting from better services in emergency situations, as in the case of Firestone in Liberia, or the adoption of international legal standards by countries otherwise unwilling to adopt them. At the same time, however, it creates dependency relationships between companies and communities – as in the case of mining enclaves – facilitates state capture, or fragments the relationship between the state and its citizens, who lack trust or willingness to engage with its relevant services.
Power-sharing between the state and corporations in fragile countries is a complex and delicate issue. What is notably absent in this domain is a clear normative framework to assess whether fundamentally public functions – such as the provision of essential services and fundamental rights, the creation and administration of justice, or the governance of portions of national territory – can legitimately be outsourced to another actor due to the state’s inability to fulfill them.
To derive such a normative criterion, one must begin with a precise understanding of the role of political power within a society. What, in essence, are citizens entitled to expect from state authority? What functions are inherently non-delegable, and how can the state be empowered or restructured to effectively perform these functions even under fragile conditions?
Developing this kind of contextualized understanding of state power is a necessary precondition for evaluating how it compares to political authority exercised by non-state actors – in this case, extractive corporations. Such a comparison cannot proceed meaningfully without first clarifying the scope, justification and ethical grounding of state authority itself. We argue that to address these questions adequately, one must turn to constitutional theory. When properly understood, constitutionalism sheds light on both the nature and the normative foundation of state power within society. It offers conceptual and ethical tools to determine not only what the state ought to do, but also under what conditions it may legitimately share or devolve its powers – and what the consequences are when it does so.
Understanding state power in fragile contexts through positive constitutionalism
If we want to understand the problem of corporations using their political power to carry out functions typically associated with the state in fragile countries, we must begin with a proper understanding of what political power of the state is, and what functions it is expected to fulfill within society. The answer to these questions must be sought in the theory of constitutionalism.
Defining constitutionalism is not an easy task – so much so that it borders on what has been called an ‘essentially contested concept’ (Sultany Reference Sultany2012). Often, however, the issue lies not so much in the excessive number of definitions, but in the fact that many of those who write about constitutionalism do not take the time to clarify what they are talking about, or why they have chosen that particular approach (N. Barber Reference Barber2015). A recent and extensive literature review has shed considerable light on the persistent issues afflicting the scholarly debate on constitutionalism (Kapiszewski et al. Reference Kapiszewski, Groen and Newman2024). By examining the body of literature produced from 1945 to the present, it has become clear that the growing interest of legal scholars in the concept has not been matched by a proportionate increase in conceptual clarity. This is largely due to a widespread tendency among authors to avoid offering clear definitions, to neglect engagement with previous theoretical frameworks, and to extend the scope of the concept by continually incorporating new subtopics – thus subjecting constitutionalism to a kind of conceptual stretching which risks undermining its analytic utility.
Another major issue in the use of the term lies in the frequent conflation of constitutionalism with adjacent disciplines, such as constitutional law or comparative constitutional law. This generates confusion over the appropriate methodological approach. Further ambiguity arises from the overlapping of conceptual and normative dimensions of constitutionalism: although most theories claim to be conceptual in nature, this frequently serves to obscure normative agendas – particularly when we encounter what is often called ‘adjectival constitutionalism’ (Kapiszewski et al. Reference Kapiszewski, Groen and Newman2024).
Since we, too, are about to venture into the field of constitutionalism, the literature review mentioned above must be taken as a serious warning. For this reason, we take the time to define constitutionalism in the clearest, most minimal, and most conceptually grounded terms available in existing scholarship – before we move on to explain how this definition allows us to extract a normative criterion for evaluating the exercise of classically state functions by corporations in fragile countries. For the constitutionalism expert, this analysis may seem overly simplified or hastily formulated; nonetheless, we believe that including it is preferable to leaving the reader in confusion and thereby contributing further to the ambiguity surrounding this term.
The conceptual dimension of constitutionalism
At the conceptual level, we define constitutionalism as a set of principles that organize the political power of the state in order to prevent its arbitrary use (Krygier Reference Krygier, Adams, Meuwese and Ballin2017). A few clarifications are necessary with respect to this definition.
When we speak of a ‘set of principles’, the danger of vagueness inevitably re-emerges. Some scholars explicitly refer to ‘principles’ (N. Barber Reference Barber2018). Others take a broader view and include norms, institutions and practices under this umbrella. In general, regardless of how they are labeled, these tend to be recurring elements: rule of law, democracy, sovereignty, separation of powers, protection of private property and so on (Waluchow and Kyritsis Reference Waluchow, Kyritsis, Zalta and Nodelman2023). What is often missing is a clear criterion for determining which principles should be included in – or excluded from – this set, without falling into a normative position that, at this stage of the analysis, we want to avoid.
For this reason, the most coherent approach is to adopt the selection criterion implicit in our own definition: we will consider as constitutional principles all those that are necessary to prevent the arbitrary exercise of state power. To do this, we must first examine what arbitrariness consists of. Once we understand it, we will then be in a better position to evaluate which principles are required to avert it.
The notion of arbitrariness in power is debated in the literature (Krygier Reference Krygier, Adams, Meuwese and Ballin2017). However, two influential approaches to defining arbitrariness can be identified: the procedural and the substantive. The former – found in the work of Frank Lovett – considers power arbitrary when no formal or institutional obstacles can be imposed on it. The latter – found in Philip Pettit – defines power as arbitrary when it can be exercised without taking into account the interests or well-being of those upon whom it is exercised (Arnold and Harris Reference Arnold and Harris2017).
Constitutionalism is designed to organize power in such a way that both of these arbitrary tendencies can be avoided. On one hand, it creates mechanisms of checks and balances aimed at preventing abuses of power, along with a set of self-reinforcing protections for constitutionalism itself to avoid its dismantling. This is generally referred to in the literature as the negative component of constitutionalism, traditionally associated with the liberal conception of the state. On the other hand, constitutionalism also binds the exercise of political power to its purpose: it ensures that this power must serve not the interests of the ruling elite – or no interest at all – but the interests of the citizens. This purpose is what legitimizes the acceptance of state sovereignty by those governed. This second function is generally described as the positive component of constitutionalism, and is traditionally linked to social contract theory (Śledzińska-Simon Reference Śledzińska-Simon2023).
In its conceptual dimension, therefore, the principles of constitutionalism fulfill both a negative and a positive function. Consider a classical principle of constitutionalism: the rule of law. It functions both to limit the possibility that the state may abuse the law, and to imbue the law itself with the characteristics it needs in order to fulfill its legitimate purpose. Framed historically, we can observe that these negative and positive components have evolved in parallel with the development of constitutionalism itself: according to the influential interpretation of Charles McIlwain, the positive component was characteristic of the constitutionalism of the ancients, while the negative one came to define the modern state (McIlwain Reference McIlwain1947).
On the conceptual level, constitutionalism outlines what is legitimate to expect from state power: namely, that it not be absolute, and that it be exercised in the interest of citizens. Various principles – or institutions, or whatever other label one may prefer – contribute simultaneously to the achievement of these two objectives: rule of law, separation of powers, sovereignty, democracy, subsidiarity and so on. In this conceptual sense, constitutionalism is a characteristic more or less common to all states. A state where absolute arbitrariness of political power prevails, or where the interests of citizens are not pursued in any meaningful way, can hardly be defined as a ‘state’. Such an arrangement would more closely resemble a criminal gang holding its hostages at gunpoint to satisfy every whim – a scenario that is not impossible, nor unique, but which undermines the kind of structured social organization that allows us to speak of ‘the state’ in the first place (N. Barber Reference Barber2018).
This same reasoning applies to the fragile countries examined in this paper. While there are indeed countries in which political power is more or less detached from constitutional limits, or in which elites systematically pursue their own interests rather than those of the broader population, in none of these cases is this situation absolute. Conceptually, constitutionalism is a matter of degree: virtually every country possesses some greater or lesser level of positive and negative constitutionalism, but some form of it is always present to some extent (Stone and Weiss Reference Stone and Weis2021). Where there is a unitary state, we are either in the presence of a medieval-style absolute sovereign, capable of doing whatever they wish based purely on their own will, or a failed state in which no real authority exists. Except for these limited cases – which do indeed exist – most countries, including those we examine, exhibit at least a minimal degree of both negative and positive constitutionalism.
The normative dimension of constitutionalism
Having clarified the conceptual level of what constitutionalism is, we can now turn to the normative level – that is, to the question of what constitutionalism ought to be. While the negative and positive components coexist on the same level conceptually, on the normative plane it is possible to assign greater weight to one over the other. This means that the principles of constitutionalism can be oriented predominantly toward the goal of limiting state power to prevent abuse, or toward enabling the state to actively pursue the well-being of its citizens. One may speak, following an analytical framework used in Stone and Weis (Reference Stone and Weis2021), of ‘strong’ negative constitutionalism and ‘strong’ positive constitutionalism, to indicate this shift in emphasis.
In the context of fragile states, which of these orientations should constitutionalism adopt? In legal academia, a strong negative approach is largely dominant (N. Barber Reference Barber2018). In such analyses, the principal objective of constitutionalism is to impose constraints and controls on state power in order to prevent authoritarian drift and abuse. This is the conclusion reached, for example, by McIlwain, as well as by various encyclopedic definitions of the term, which also show how the strong negative interpretation is so pervasive that it tends to blur the distinction between normative and conceptual understandings of constitutionalism. Strong negative constitutionalism reflects a typically liberal-democratic vision of the state, in which political power is perceived as a latent threat – one that must be contained by a ‘dam’ built of constitutional principles such as separation of powers, the rule of law and so forth (Waldron Reference Waldron2012).
Using a strong negative concept of constitutionalism in fragile states, however, presents several limitations.
The first limitation is that this form of constitutionalism reflects a specific and historically contingent model of the state – the liberal minimal state – primarily rooted in 19th-century thought and later revived by libertarian theories in the 20th century (Waldron Reference Waldron2012). The partiality of this vision, combined with the determined effort to impose it in fragile contexts – an effort that shaped much of the international community’s approach throughout the 20th century – has nearly led to the collapse of the entire field of law and development, and has seriously undermined the functional usefulness of constitutionalism in these settings (Tamanaha Reference Tamanaha2009). Fragile states are not necessarily ready to embrace a liberal-democratic, minimal-state model – and that model is not necessarily the only, or even the most effective, framework for restoring stability (Lee Reference Lee2019).
The second major limitation of the strong negative approach is that it can be used to restrict or delegitimize state intervention in society, effectively cutting off at the root any serious effort to build a welfare state. This critique, extensively developed by Jeremy Waldron (Reference Waldron2012), resonates especially in fragile contexts, where the state’s capacity to provide basic services and meet even minimal standards of welfare and social protection is already extremely weak (S. Barber Reference Barber2006).
The third – and most fundamental – limitation of this approach, which subsumes the previous two, is that it fails to provide an adequate understanding of the role of state power in society (N. Barber Reference Barber2015). Without any reference to what the state ought to do with its power, or what functions it should be capable of performing, there is no normative standard by which to assess power-sharing with non-state actors. Nor is there any solid framework to formulate a meaningful account of the role and scope of political power within the broader social order.
A strong negative approach to constitutionalism in fragile states, in short, renders the concept poorly suited to understanding the state’s role in society, the purpose of its authority, and, as a consequence, to evaluating the fragmentation of that authority in favor of non-state actors. We argue instead that a strong positive approach to constitutionalism is more suitable for addressing the specific needs of fragile states.
According to this perspective, the purpose of constitutionalism is not merely to limit state power but to enable it to serve its foundational function – namely, to promote the well-being of citizens. This view aligns with a conception of constitutionalism as politeia, and finds its roots in Aristotle’s theory of the state (Johnson Reference Johnson1989). Although still in the minority, a solid body of scholarship has embraced and further developed this line of thought, albeit in different directions. N. Barber, S. Barber and A. Vermeule can be considered among the leading and most recent exponents of a strong positive constitutionalism, although with rather different trajectories and outcomes.
The notion of ‘citizen well-being’ is a common thread running through theories of positive constitutionalism, though with different nuances. One of the most well-known accounts is offered by Adrian Vermeule and proponents of his ‘common good constitutionalism’, a form of strong positive constitutionalism in which the common good is understood as ‘the happiness or flourishing of the community, the well-ordered life in the polis’ (Vermeule Reference Vermeule2022). While the concept of human flourishing is itself the subject of a vast body of literature (Finnis Reference Finnis1980; Solum Reference Solum2023) Vermeule organizes it into three main components: the creation of preconditions for development (such as peace, health and prosperity); the cultivation of human virtues; and the provision of opportunities for rational and social activities in the form of meaningful work and leisure. Of these three dimensions, the first is the most easily operationalized and is also supported by other authors who adopt a strong constitutionalist perspective – for example, Sotirios Barber – who align strong positive constitutionalism with a vision of the welfare state, as opposed to the minimal and limited state promoted by the strong negative model (S.Barber Reference Barber2003).
Understood in these terms, constitutionalism becomes, in our view, a useful tool for investigating political power in fragile states.
First, it reflects a post-liberal vision of the state that is more easily adaptable to social and political contexts not rooted in the liberal-democratic tradition (Law Reference Law2022). This avoids the difficulties inherent in attempting to replicate a model that may be poorly suited to the historical, institutional and cultural conditions of many fragile states. Second, it allows for a more realistic understanding of political power and of what it means when that power is absent. Fragile states are often characterized precisely by their inability to fulfill the foundational function of the state – which is to serve as a meaningful actor within society. A strong positive conception of constitutionalism offers a framework for assessing what direction political power ought to take in such contexts – namely, it should aim to establish the conditions for human development: peace, health and economic prosperity. At the same time, it expresses a normative hope that state power can in fact be made effective – that is, concretely capable of achieving those goals. In this way, it re-centers the idea of the state within constitutionalism, responding to a particularly urgent need in contexts where statehood is weakening or eroding (Grimm Reference Grimm2016).
Deriving a normative criterion from positive constitutionalism
This brief overview of constitutionalism has allowed us to highlight how, in its positive dimension, it offers a particularly valuable framework for addressing questions concerning political power in fragile contexts. We must now determine whether it can be used effectively to tackle the specific issue examined in this paper – namely, whether it can support a normative criterion for assessing the desirability of private companies performing state-like functions in the kinds of situations illustrated by the paradigmatic cases in Section title “Corporations performing state-like functions in fragile states”.
To do so, we turn to two additional bodies of literature that, despite addressing the performance of state-like functions by private corporations, have, in our view, been unable to sustain a normative criterion. Our aim is to examine their limitations and then consider whether positive constitutionalism may compensate for them. As noted in the introduction, these two bodies of work are political corporate social responsibility and the recent debate on the privatization of public services.
Political corporate social responsibility (PCSR) can be understood as the field that is ‘concerned to normatively prescribe, and positively describe and explain, the political duties and activities of corporations, and MNCs in particular’ (Whelan Reference Whelan2012). In this perspective, the corporation steps in to fill the institutional voids left by the fragile state (Amaeshi, Adegbite and Rajwani Reference Amaeshi, Adegbite and Rajwani2016). It is grounded in the fundamental assumption that the changing relationship between state and business – with the decline of the former and the surge of the latter – imposes on corporations a broader spectrum of social obligations as an expression of their corporate citizenship (Scherer and Palazzo Reference Scherer and Palazzo2007; Matten and Crane Reference Matten and Crane2005).
While it provides valuable conceptual and normative insights for this analysis, the PCSR literature has certain limitations that make it difficult to arrive at a satisfactory normative criterion. First, it focuses primarily on the corporation – its features and its interests – relegating the state to a secondary role (Schrempf-Stirling Reference Schrempf-Stirling2018). As a result, it lacks a reflection on the state’s fundamental functions and on the consequences of delegating those functions to a private company. The problem is further exacerbated by the fact that PCSR analyses often fail to take into account the specific features of the fragile state (Amaeshi et al. Reference Amaeshi, Adegbite and Rajwani2016). Finally, critical scholarship has pointed out that the substitution of the fragile state by extractive companies through PCSR initiatives has produced controversial outcomes: it has delivered short-term and unsustainable benefits (Hilson, Hilson and Dauda Reference Hilson, Hilson and Dauda2019), generated distortions in the social contract (Bezzola et al. Reference Bezzola, Brugger, Günther and Sebhatu2021), and compromised relations among the company, the state and the communities involved (Maher, Huenteao and Quintremán Reference Maher, Huenteao and Quintremán2022). The literature has also highlighted the inherent – not merely episodic – problematic nature of political corporate social responsibility (PCSR) as a tool for corporate intervention in the political sphere, thereby underscoring the need for clearer normative guidance (Hussain and Moriarty Reference Hussain and Moriarty2018).
Positive constitutionalism, compared to PCSR approaches, has the clear advantage of placing the state and its role within society at the center of the analysis and, in doing so, of sharply distinguishing it from the role of private companies, even when fragile settings blur these boundaries. The state is presented as an institution entrusted with pursuing the well-being of its citizens: this inherently public purpose allows us to differentiate it from non-state actors, which may legitimately pursue private aims. Centering the state in the analysis, especially in fragile contexts such as those we have described, prevents its role from being viewed as contingently replaceable through similar mechanisms, such as PCSR practices.
In this respect, there is an affinity between positive constitutionalism and the second body of literature that has addressed this issue – namely, the recent political–philosophical debate on the legitimacy of privatizing state functions (Cordelli Reference Cordelli2020; Heath Reference Heath2023; Claassen Reference Claassen2024; Cordelli Reference Cordelli2024). This literature has highlighted how the pragmatism that often justifies the privatization of essential state functions, even when well-founded, is nevertheless insufficient to offset the resulting erosion of political legitimacy (Cordelli Reference Cordelli2020; Dorfman and Harel Reference Dorfman and Harel2013). This assumption, which we share, is certainly a valuable element in approaching a normative criterion. However, as the subsequent debate has shown, this literature struggles to identify which functions of the state are truly fundamental and therefore not subject to privatization, and above all to explain clearly what makes these functions fundamental for the state (Claassen Reference Claassen2022). Moreover, when we look at the specific context of fragile states, the counter-argument that there is a range of privatizations it would be irrational to oppose becomes much stronger, often presenting a choice between the absence of a public function and its privatization (Heath Reference Heath2023). Consider, for example, the case of Firestone in Liberia described in Section title “Corporations performing state-like functions in fragile states”. If the delivery of health services is considered an ancillary function of the Liberian state, then this case could be understood as one in which privatization was the only reasonable way to ensure the provision of the service. If, on the other hand, it is regarded as a core function of the state, then the earlier observations about not allowing short-term interests to overturn the political-institutional framework would once again apply. Furthermore, the literature – mirroring developments in the PCSR field – offers little insight from the perspective of corporations regarding their capacity to perform these public functions and possible alternative normative directions for their political power that do not entail replacing the state.
Positive constitutionalism, in our view, fills the gaps that prevent this second body of literature from serving as a foundation for a robust normative criterion. It provides a criterion for distinguishing fundamental state functions from contingent ones. The former are those without which the state becomes unable to pursue the well-being of its citizens. They relate to the very raison d’être of the state: a state cannot delegate these functions because, in doing so, it would cease to perform the role that brought it into existence. The identification of these functions is linked to the principles of constitutionalism, which mirror them, and ultimately to the conception of well-being one adopts. Major theories of positive constitutionalism tend to align with what Sarah Conly, in her recent article, calls ‘objective-list theories of well-being’ (Conly Reference Conly, Bellamy and King2025). We adopt this approach as well, considering the delivery of public services, the creation and application of laws and control over the territory as objective expressions of the reasons why states come into existence.
If we consider these two strengths of strong-positive constitutionalism – its ability to provide a sense of the state’s raison d’être, and to connect this raison d’être to the performance of certain fundamental functions – then we see how it can offer a more solid starting point for formulating a normative criterion to evaluate whether private companies should replace the state in performing these fundamental functions. This new criterion tells us that a company cannot use its private power to substitute itself for the state in performing fundamental functions – those connected to the state’s existence and to its pursuit of the citizens’ well-being. Where a company encroaches upon these fundamental functions, contingent interests – even though, as we have seen, highly relevant in fragile contexts – cannot be regarded as primary.
A normative criterion for corporations ‘performance of state-like functions in fragile states’
To be consistent with the state’s objective of pursuing the well-being of its citizens through the performance of certain fundamental functions, the latter cannot be delegated to a private company, despite the short-term advantages that may result. This normative criterion, grounded in the theory of positive constitutionalism, recalls the position expressed in Cordelli (Reference Cordelli2020) and Dorfman and Harel (Reference Dorfman and Harel2013) on the privatization of public functions in general, but enriches it thanks to a solid foundation concerning the role of the state within society and the connection between this role and the performance of fundamental functions.
In our analysis, we consider the delivery of public goods, the management of the ‘legal chain’, that is, the creation and application of laws, and territorial management to fall within this category. These not only reflect the most recurrent themes identified by the objective-list theories of well-being used as references in the positive constitutionalism literature, but also reflect some of the most characteristic expressions of state activity as compared to that of non-state actors. The delivery of public goods is a valid example. It reflects the state’s mission as the institution entrusted with addressing matters of public interest. It establishes a clear boundary between state action, directed toward collective concerns and private actors, who are entitled (and better positioned) to deal with private matters. It is one of the most concrete manifestations of the social contract between citizens and the state, and when another entity replaces the latter, the social contract itself becomes actively compromised.
Of course, a reasonable degree of disagreement is possible regarding what constitutes a fundamental function of the state as opposed to an ancillary one, and indeed there is some heterogeneity in the positive constitutionalism literature in this regard. However, what is important is the underlying criterion by which this fundamental or ancillary nature is assessed, namely its instrumental role in enabling the state to achieve the minimum level of well-being for its citizens that justifies its existence.
If the use of positive constitutionalism therefore allows us to anchor ourselves in the state’s raison d’être and its functions in order to normatively assess the phenomenon of substitution by private companies in the performance of typically public functions, it can nevertheless also go further: it can help us not only to understand how companies should not use their political power, but also to gain a more constructive insight into a more constitutionally coherent use of that power. The problems relating to the weakness of the state compared to the strength of the company in the fragile contexts described, indeed, cannot be ignored. The company has the capacity and the possibility of having an impact through the exercise of its political power, as observed in the political CSR literature. It is nevertheless necessary that this impact, in light of what has emerged from our analysis, does not undermine the balance of the social contract and the role of the state within society.
Under this profile as well, we believe that positive constitutionalism enriches the insights emerging in the debate on the privatization of state functions, which, as we observed in the previous section, fails to explore a possible role for the company in this context. Strong positive constitutionalism instructs us that the state’s fundamental public functions must support the capacity of the state to fulfil its raison d’etre. Its normative horizon is the achievement of state effectiveness, pursued through improved management of the legal chain, stronger territorial control and the ability to provide essential services (Jackson and Dawood Reference Jackson and Dawood2022). This aspiration offers a normative orientation that is currently lacking in the literature on institutional development: a guiding direction for legal and institutional reform, and for the design of law and development interventions. In this framework, corporate political power becomes normatively desirable when it strengthens the state’s capacity to perform its fundamental functions, rather than substituting itself for the state in carrying them out. Corporations must therefore employ their political power to directly intervene in the state’s weak governance of a particular phenomenon, providing support for systemic restructuring (Nelson Reference Nelson2008).
Let us return to our approach to paradigmatic cases to help clarify our normative take on the role that corporations should have in these contexts.
In the case of Firestone’s involvement in combating the COVID outbreak in Liberia, the issue is not, in itself, the provision of a typically public service, which in fact facilitated the enjoyment of a fundamental right. The problem lies in the rupture this generates in the social contract between the state and citizens, who cease to view state authority as a reliable institution due to its inability to provide for them. The critical literature on political corporate social responsibility, as we pointed out in the introduction, has highlighted the reality of this risk, with PCSR activities proving to be counterproductive for the stability of citizen-state relations (Gamu and Dauvergne Reference Gamu and Dauvergne2018; Bezzola et al. Reference Bezzola, Brugger, Günther and Sebhatu2021).
The perspective on constitutionalism we have adopted supports the idea that such actions may, albeit unintentionally, harm the relationship between the state and its citizens, who perceive the state as abdicating its responsibility to provide a public service essential to the enjoyment of their fundamental right to health. The participation of corporations in the delivery of such public services should instead, to be consistent with the functions of the respective political powers, aim to strengthen the host state’s effectiveness in providing this service, acting as a force that empowers state authority. This subsidiary – rather than substitutive – posture toward state authority constitutes, in our view, a criterion for the use of corporations’ political power in the provision of public services.
A similar comparison can be made regarding the strengthening of state’s capacity along the ‘legal chain’, as we called it in Section title “Corporations performing state-like functions in fragile states.” A company that simply transplants legal norms into systems not prepared to receive them – as in the case of the EITI standard in Myanmar – may appear to be contributing to the effectiveness of international law, which it indeed is, but it does not produce a transformative impact on that legal system (Butler Reference Butler2020). The participation of private corporations in the law-making process is a highly controversial issue, where the balance between the opportunity to draw upon expertise in highly technical sectors and the risk of facilitating undue interference in the regulatory process is often difficult to maintain.
From a constitutionalist perspective, however, it is not problematic – in fact, it is desirable – for a company to use its political power to support the legislative system of its host state, for example, by contributing to the creation of legal infrastructures, the digitalization of legal services and the support of universities and legal clinics (Beqiraj and McNamara Reference Beqiraj and McNamara2014). Recent literature has shown, for example, that building courts fosters access to justice and contract enforcement (Chemin et al. Reference Chemin, Chen, Kimalu and Ramos-Maqueda2025). This type of activity would align with the idea of strengthening state capacity rather than substituting for it.
This type of initiative can be considered a form of ‘rule of law from below’, also consistent with the need for greater corporate involvement in achieving UN Sustainable Development Goal 16 (Buyse et al. Reference Buyse, Fortin, McGonigle Leyh and Fraser2021). A paradigmatic case that illustrates this type of contribution is the South African National Business Initiative with over 150 companies involved in strengthening the country’s criminal justice system through the sharing of resources, expertise, technology and funding, through the Business Against Crime Organization (Nelson Reference Nelson2008).
Finally, in the case of mining enclaves and corporate territorial management in institutional voids, the distinction becomes especially clear between adopting substitutional approaches to state authority and approaches that reinforce it. Multinational corporations participate in societal governance, especially in fragile contexts where they remain one of the main institutional actors (Azizi, Börzel and Hansen Reference Azizi, Börzel and Hansen2021). However, this should not result in a situation where local state institutions disappear or are marginalized, as they serve as the primary point of coordination between the interests of the state, the local population and the corporation (Oh, Shin and Ho Reference Oh, Shin and Ho2023). In this regard, literature has emphasized the importance of mining companies contributing to the strengthening of local institutions and the development of expertise for tax collection and fund allocation, in order to ease tensions with communities in remote areas (Konte and Vincent Reference Konte and Vincent2021). This is a clear example that illustrates the difference between a substitutive and a supportive mode of action – where it is in the collaboration between state and enterprise that we witness something genuinely transformative.
These paradigmatic cases, which mirror those analyzed earlier, help us understand how, by adopting a perspective of strong positive constitutionalism – where the state exists by virtue of its capacity to perform fundamental functions effectively – the role of corporate political power becomes one of supporting state institutions in achieving this goal.
Constitutionalism – properly understood – offers a criterion for evaluating the exercise of political power by corporations performing state-like functions in fragile contexts. These actors cannot replace the state, even when short-term gains might appeal to local elites, international organizations, or local populations. All such effects must be weighed against the inevitable destabilization of the social contract that occurs when the state loses its centrality. The criterion for desirable corporate engagement is thus whether it contributes to reinforcing the fundamental state functions and thereby supports state effectiveness. What emerges is a supportive – not substitutive – role for corporate actors.
Conclusion
Positive constitutionalism proves, in our view, to be a valuable tool for investigating the relations between the political power of the state and that of corporations in fragile contexts. In its conceptual dimension, it is universal, common to all properly constituted states – understood as political orders where power cannot take on absolute characteristics, neither in form nor in purpose. In its normative dimension, it offers a framework within which to assign meaningful value to fundamental state functions, such as the delivery of public goods, the management of the legal chain and the control of territory.
The valuable literature review by Kapiszewski et al. (Reference Kapiszewski, Groen and Newman2024) serves as an important warning: this theory risks becoming ineffective not due to neglect, but because of the superficiality with which it is often employed. The tendency to conceptualize constitutionalism solely in its negative dimension makes it ill-suited to non-liberal state logics, stripping it of crucial contextual relevance. It ceases to serve as the infrastructure for a political project and instead becomes a tool of anti-politics – a mechanism for removing powers from the state. As a result, it becomes decontextualized, stripped of explanatory power and of diminishing interest to scholarship.
In this paper, we have tried to show that a change of direction is possible. By emphasizing the positive dimension of constitutionalism and embracing a strong normative positioning – one that aligns with the contextual needs of states that differ from the classical liberal model (such as fragile states) – we can use constitutional theory to engage with problems that have largely escaped the attention of public law scholars, even though these are precisely the domains where such scholars could and should be active. In our case, these problems concern the political power of corporations and the relationship between the state and business in fragile countries.
As for the first theme, to the best of our knowledge, this is one of the first works to frame the substitution of the state by corporations in fragile contexts as an issue of public law theory. The other strands of literature that have addressed the issue – particularly political corporate social responsibility and the debate on the privatization of public functions – provide valuable insights, but they do not allow us to arrive at a normative criterion with the same degree of precision as constitutionalism theory.
Second, while the problem of non-state actors wielding political power and engaging in sovereignty-sharing in fragile states is not new, the increasing relevance of this phenomenon, the general crisis of sovereign states and the growing institutional voids that corporations are stepping into, make these reflections more urgent than ever. Our paper shows how a deeper understanding of state power – something only attainable through a positive reading of constitutionalism – also gives us a more accurate understanding of para-state or sub-state powers. This provides a basis for addressing fundamental questions about the role of the state and of corporations in society, particularly in areas where economic and political interests tend to blur. The idea that the provision of public services, the administration of justice, the governance of territory and, more generally, the effectiveness of political power are all intrinsically tied to the raison d’être of the state – and therefore cannot be outsourced to other actors with whom the state may happen to share social space – is a powerful normative model. It re-centers statehood within the discourse of constitutionalism and lays a foundation for Law & Development strategies aimed at institutional strengthening in fragile contexts, thereby responding to various recent appeals in the literature (Harding Reference Harding2019).
Some limitations in this type of analysis – such as the reliance on illustrative examples rather than systematic case studies, the lack of a fully developed criterion to distinguish fundamental from non-fundamental state functions, or the need for a more refined conceptualization of the citizen well-being that positive constitutionalism seeks to pursue – should be viewed as productive entry points for future research. With respect to the suggestion advanced in Chapter 3 regarding appropriate ways for corporations to contribute to the strengthening of state authority, the incentive these corporations may have to favor a stronger state remains to be investigated. While it is widely noted that operating in a strong and stable state is generally advantageous for business, the track record of predatory practices by numerous firms in the extractive sector in fragile contexts raises legitimate doubts that warrant further inquiry. At the same time, further normative assessments are needed to address the potential problem that the increased capacity of state power relative to private power – which, in this analysis, is assigned a subsidiary role – may deprive the latter of a check-and-balance function against public authority’s overreach. The recent discussion on the application of rule-of-law principles to private power may offer promising starting points for integrating this perspective (Gowder Reference Gowder2024; Tamanaha Reference Tamanaha2024).
The paper therefore does not aim to provide a definitive answer to an extremely complex situation, but to show that once these kinds of challenges are brought under the umbrella of constitutional theory, and once we adopt clearer criteria for how to use the concept rigorously, it becomes possible to draw from the vast existing literature a wide array of tools to deepen this line of inquiry – especially when integrated with insights from adjacent fields such as political corporate social responsibility, political theory and law and development studies.
Acknowledgements
The paper has benefited from a research stay at the Edinburgh Law School, made possible through the support of the Anna Maria Lundins Scholarship, for which I am deeply grateful.
Funding statement
The author declares none.
Competing interests
The author declares none.
AI disclosure
AI tools used for revision only.
Open access
