Introduction
For Global South countries who faced vaccine inequity during the COVID-19 pandemic, the development of an equitable Pathogen Access and Benefit Sharing (PABS) system is considered to be “at the heart of the political bargain”Footnote 1 of a pandemic agreement, and is critically important to prevent a repetition of vaccine inequity in future pandemics. These countries want to ensure that they have equitable access to pandemic products developed using genetic sequence data (GSD) or digital sequence information (DSI) from their geographies. A repeat of pandemic history, where GSD was uploaded from the Global South (such as from China, and from Botswana in the case of the Omicron variant), with Global South countries receiving a lower proportion of vaccine supply, would be abhorrent.
There are fundamental disagreements between Global North and Global South countries in the negotiations for PABS in the Pandemic Agreement, resulting in modalities of PABS not being finalized in the Pandemic Agreement adopted in May 2024,Footnote 2 but rather being left to be agreed upon through an intergovernmental working group on a PABS annex to be concluded by September 2026.Footnote 3 This contribution seeks to address and rebut Global North arguments on three key points of divergence: that pathogen GSD is “too complex” to be traced; that additional requirements reduce innovation; and that these create a “closed system,” discouraging participation. Traceability in the context of an access and benefit sharing (ABS) system means that it would be possible to follow a genetic sample that has been uploaded to the ABS system from the original lab through databases, patents, and products. This way, an ABS system can see who used what genetic samples, when they used it, and what for. As a result of traceability provisions, agreed benefits (such as technology transfer, or sharing of products manufactured from the genetic samples) can be triggered and given back to the original contributors.
Conversely, the Group of Equity, Africa Group, and other negotiating delegations have repeatedly called for identifiers to be integrated into ABS systems. For example, Malaysia, in their August 2025 textual proposals prior to PABS Annex Intergovernmental Working Group proposed an Article 12(5)(d), which states that the role of WHO should be to “manage digital registries and traceability systems, including Digital Object Identifiers (DOIs) for GSD/DSI, to track material and sequence use and enforce benefit-sharing obligations.”Footnote 4 Corresponding text by Africa Group proposes “unique labels that trace sequences to their country of origin.”Footnote 5 Notably, there are areas where Global North and Global South delegations agree. For example, in August 2025, negotiating delegations submitted their proposals for the PABS annex. The joint submission of Australia, the United Kingdom, Norway, Canada, and New Zealand recognized the principle of states having “sovereign right … over their biological resources and of the importance of collective action to mitigate public health risks.”Footnote 6 This is also reflected in the Africa Group’s submission.Footnote 7
In each of the below sections, I lead with the Global North argument, why I think that is wrong, and provide arguments as to why, in the hope that these can help guide negotiators to consensus.
Pathogen Genetic Sequence Data Is “Too Complex” to Be Traced
Concerns that pathogen GSD are too complex to be traced are overstated. Furthermore, not every use of GSD/DSI requires tracing. Traceability mechanisms should be used to trace DSI to specific pandemic products that have undergone clinical trials and received regulatory approval. Global North arguments are often anchored in the notion that pathogen GSD is too complex to trace. These arguments imply current practices for data sharing are unregulated and that current traceability mechanisms would be infeasible because pathogen data is simply more complex than any other type of DSI. Digital identifiers, registration of users, and geographical data all arguably reduce complexity and have been included in other ABS systems; arguments of complexity should not be used to exclude these proposals.
Dr. Amber Hartman Scholz’s work has been especially influential for the Global North.Footnote 8 Scholz argues that there are 10–15 million total users of the International Nucleotide Sequence Database Collaboration (INSDC) that live in every country in the world, that it is not possible to know what data the users are using, whether they are commercial or non-commercial,Footnote 9 and that user data are based on anonymous IP addresses.Footnote 10 Other researchers have found that GSD is difficult to trace “due to its digital and replicable nature,”Footnote 11 and that it is “technically infeasible” to regulate billions of sequences on thousands of databases with millions of users worldwide “without disrupting the underlying scientific infrastructure”Footnote 12 and that Decision 16/2 of the Convention on Biological DiversityFootnote 13 acknowledges this challenge.
The Convention on Biological Diversity’s decision acknowledges the traceability challenge but takes a different approach. Decision 16/2 adopts modalities for operationalizing a multilateral mechanism for the fair and equitable sharing of benefits within the Convention, noting that exploration of new tools, such as databases, will be undertaken to make DSI publicly accessible.Footnote 14 It does not discuss the feasibility of regulating DSI/GSD nor the disruption of scientific infrastructure.Footnote 15
Additionally, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations encourages the use of DOIs for all Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture.Footnote 16 The High Seas TreatyFootnote 17 requires that users of the database notify a clearinghouse of relevant information relating to the collection of the marine genetic resources, including the database where information will be deposited, the geographical area from which resources were collected, and the treaty’s standardized batch identifier.Footnote 18
Claims of complexity are overstated. For one, geographical data can be recorded for uploaded DSI. Moreover, researchers found improved traceability to the country of origin, and while there was a 5 percent mismatch in the GPS coordinates for some users of the INSDC, country tags were always correct.Footnote 19 Others have proposed downstream monitoring points such as through publications, patenting, and regulatory approvals as a feasible way to link use to benefits.Footnote 20
Additional Requirements Will Reduce Innovation of New Pandemic Products
An effective PABS system will require specific provisions in the PABS Annex that improve the ability to conclusively identify that xyz final products were developed from specific DSI (whether vaccines, monoclonal antibodies, topical creams, or other relevant pandemic products). In addition to traceability requirements such as identifiers, this could include user registration requirements, geographic location of the user, and other relevant requirements. Global North countries and experts have argued that these will reduce innovation of new pandemic products. However, these arguments are incorrect because identifiers have not been proven to be a barrier to innovation. Pointedly, the EU’s own guidelines recommend identifiers.
In a session convened by the Intergovernmental Negotiating Body in September 2024, the Leibniz Institute of Virology claimed that traceability requirements would “disrupt scientist research in the Global South.”Footnote 21 The Permanent Representative of Norway in Geneva stated in September 2025 that the agreement must be concluded without restricting research and warned against making research and development too difficult.Footnote 22 However, an examination of existing databases and EU guidelines on data provenance and traceability indicate otherwise. The EU’s own practices around identifiers for data originating from within their borders show that European scientists are not deterred from uploading DSI to databases that integrate traceability. The European Commission’s Open Data, Software and Code Guidelines recommends that data have “a persistent identifier” and that “publishing your data will allow you to track its provenance and ensure that those responsible for its generation are adequately credited for their work.”Footnote 23
Additionally, genetic sequence databases such as GenBank, the Global Initiative on Sharing All Influenza Data (GISAID), and the INSDC all hosted SARS-CoV-2 sequences during the pandemic. As of June 19, 2023, the total INSDC collection included approximately 7.12 million SARS-CoV-2 nucleotide sequences.Footnote 24 According to Corbett et al., Moderna’s original mRNA-1273 vaccine was designed using the Wuhan-Hu-1 spike sequence from GenBank with a specific identifier/accession number.Footnote 25 This is an example where a sequence uploaded from the Global South was used to develop the vaccine, and where identifiers were not a barrier toward its development.
Nor are identifiers a barrier to upload. The European Bioinformatics Institute Biosample Database is illustrative. It uses electronic standard identifiers and records the country of origin, the organism, and the depositing organization. 8.83 million SARS-CoV-2 samples were uploaded by 2023, with an exact number traceable to specific organizations.Footnote 26
Further, the notion that traceability would disrupt the work of Global South researchers is unsubstantiated because it is hard to disentangle whether they are discouraged from uploading data due to identifiers versus discouragement due to the lack of research and development funding, a supportive research environment, and other key factors.
Registration and Identifiers Create a “Closed System,” Discouraging Participation
Several parties from both the Global North and South have cautioned against the creation of a “closed system,” usually envisioned as a rigid WHO-hosted new database for GSD,Footnote 27 and frequently cite principles of “open science” against bureaucratic registration and traceability requirements.Footnote 28 There is a “concerning trend” toward interpreting open science and open access to mean the removal of mechanisms that allow determination of how data is being used.Footnote 29 This trend is reflected in European Union comments to a PABS subgroup that the current GSD-sharing systems cannot be altered “because scientists should be guaranteed non-discriminatory and fair access” to pathogen data.Footnote 30
These arguments fundamentally misunderstand what constitutes “open science,” i.e., a set of practices to make science more accessible to “scientists and society as a whole.”Footnote 31 Improved requirements for user registration and identifiers arguably encourages open science because they improve the ability for us to know the provenance of the data used to create pandemic products, and can facilitate quicker pre-purchase agreements, ensuring the right to science and that science is accessible for both scientists, and society.
Further, this should be read in line with the right of everyone to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications.Footnote 32 As defined by The Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, the right to science refers to both the process of “doing science” and results of science, and that “benefits” refers to the material results of the applications of scientific research, such as vaccinations.Footnote 33 Open science is therefore not just about accessing the GSD/DSI, but also vaccines.
Additionally, a PABS annex would not necessarily create a new WHO-hosted database but rather will improve regulation of current databases, and incentivize scientists and manufacturers to participate by building in easy access tendering for pre-purchase agreements.Footnote 34 Western diplomats assert that even WHO is clear that they should not run the PABS database.Footnote 35 Certainly, scientists are already familiar with existing databases, and it may make more sense to facilitate better traceability practices within those systems based on domestic regulations and laws that are compliant with the Pandemic Agreement, rather than establishing a new system requiring additional confidence-building.Footnote 36
The reasons for Global South arguments for a WHO database are grounded in the loss of trust in existing systems for benefit sharing due to previous inequities in access to vaccines.Footnote 37 Trust can potentially be rebuilt by factoring in easy access tendering/pre-purchase agreements and eliminating/reducing import and/or export restrictions for a new WHO PABS system.Footnote 38 The latter has already happened, with standard batch identifiers in other treaty regimes resulting in improvement and changes in the INSDC.Footnote 39
Conclusion: A Traceable, Pro-science PABS System
Building a PABS system that works for all in the Pandemic Agreement requires an understanding of several facts: that existing ABS systems have forms of traceability and have not restricted innovation, that “open science” arguments are based on a narrow definition, and that PABS traceability is not about tracing all pathogen GSD. Rather, what the Global South is arguing for is a system that ensures fair sharing of benefits with predictable governance. It is my hope that this contribution brings clarity and helps move countries toward consensus on a PABS annex in May 2026.
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