Introduction
Extensive and repeated damage to civilian infrastructure has become a dominant and recurring feature of contemporary armed conflicts, inflicting severe and enduring harm to civilians. Over the past year alone, in contexts such as Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Israel, Lebanon, Mali, Mozambique, Myanmar, Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, Ukraine, Yemen and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, widespread damage to or destruction of civilian infrastructure, such as health and educational facilities, energy systems, water sources and religious sites, has significantly disrupted life-saving services, undermined livelihoods, heightened the risk of disease outbreaks, deepened humanitarian needs and eroded community resilience.Footnote 1
Whether civilian infrastructure is deliberately targeted or incidentally damaged during attacks directed against military objectives,Footnote 2 the resulting impacts on civilians are typically severe and multifaceted. This is especially pronounced when hostilities take place in urban areas, where military objectives are often intermingled with civilian infrastructure.Footnote 3 In such settings, the use of explosive weapons with wide area effects, as frequently seen in recent conflicts, further exacerbates the risk of indiscriminate and disproportionate harm.Footnote 4 In particular, the indirect or reverberating effects resulting from damage to or destruction of civilian infrastructure can deprive individuals and communities of access to services essential to their survival and well-being, such as health care, education, water and sanitation, and electricity, causing widespread and long-lasting harm.Footnote 5
Given the complex interdependence of civilian infrastructure and essential services systems and networks, especially in urban areas, these effects are often cumulative and overlapping, manifesting across a wide range of interconnected sectors.Footnote 6 For instance, disruptions to water and sanitation services caused by damage to water infrastructure can expose populations to health hazards and lead to the outbreak of infectious diseases, adding pressure to already overwhelmed medical facilities in conflict-affected areas. Similarly, damage to power plants not only cuts off electricity to households and businesses but can also disrupt the provision of health-care services and affect transportation and communication systems and networks. As such, strikes damaging civilian infrastructure are likely to affect a much larger portion of the civilian population than those present in the immediate impact area and, over time, may result in far more deaths and suffering than the initial attack itself, with impacts often persisting long after hostilities end.Footnote 7
These impacts have been extensively documented across a range of conflicts over the past decade.Footnote 8 A growing and robust body of evidence has shed further light on the distinct patterns and types of harm resulting from attacks affecting civilian infrastructure, including the differentiated impacts on vulnerable groups such as children, women, persons with disabilities, the elderly and displaced populations.Footnote 9 This evidence base has broadened the understanding of civilian harm beyond the immediate loss of life, physical injury and destruction to encompass the reverberating harm reflected in disrupted or impeded access to essential services and the ensuing repercussions for the survival, dignity and well-being of civilians.Footnote 10 In addition, some harms inflicted on individuals and the social fabric of communities by the destruction of civilian infrastructure cannot be as easily measured and are likely to span generations.Footnote 11
Beyond these profound and far-reaching humanitarian consequences, the destruction of civilian infrastructure can also entail significant strategic and operational costs. During active hostilities, particularly in the context of asymmetric urban conflicts, the destruction of civilian infrastructure can compromise the effectiveness of operations for conventional forces, complicating logistics and the mobility of military personnel. It may also enable opponents to exploit damaged environments for tactical advantage, including by using destroyed buildings and rubble for ambushes or the concealment of fighters, weapons and other military equipment.Footnote 12 Even where such attacks may offer short-term gains during a campaign, in the longer term they often reinforce cycles of instability by making rebuilding more complex, costly and time-consuming – and prolonging the deprivation of access to essential services. This can significantly undermine recovery efforts, delay the return of displaced populations and further entrench the conditions conducive to conflict relapse, hindering progress towards peace.Footnote 13
Taken together, these humanitarian and strategic considerations underscore the importance of understanding the multifaceted nature of civilian harm, as well as the implications this has for both normative frameworks and operational responses. In addition to more accurately reflecting the lived experiences of civilians in contemporary conflicts, adopting a broader view of civilian harm carries significant legal and practical implications. It can influence how international humanitarian law (IHL) principles and rules on the conduct of hostilities are both interpreted and applied, and consequently, how civilians are protected from the increasingly foreseeable effects of attacks affecting civilian infrastructure. Yet, despite the extensive documentation of these effects and the increasing availability of tools for anticipating and assessing them, there is limited understanding as to how most militaries integrate relevant considerations into their operational planning and decision-making, particularly when applying the rules of proportionality and precautions in attack. Beyond the deliberate and systematic targeting of civilian infrastructure observed in recent conflicts, existing patterns of harm suggest a growing reliance on expansive or overly permissive interpretations of these rules, as well as lowered standards of care in their application, that risk undermining their protective purpose and exposing civilians and civilian infrastructure to heightened risks of harm.Footnote 14
In light of these trends, this article argues that the protection of civilian infrastructure must be regarded as a central component of efforts to prevent and mitigate civilian harm in armed conflicts. Crucially, this understanding should guide not only the interpretation of relevant IHL rules on the conduct of hostilities, but also the adoption of practical measures to ensure that these rules can be effectively implemented across all stages of military operations in order to meaningfully protect civilians from foreseeable harm.
Following a brief overview of the evolving legal and policy frameworks governing the protection of civilian infrastructure in armed conflicts, and drawing on the existing evidence and knowledge base, this article presents concrete measures to help better operationalize relevant legal obligations and policy commitments, with the aim of preventing and mitigating both direct and reverberating harm to civilians in contemporary hostilities.
Enhancing the implementation of relevant legal and policy frameworks
Safeguarding civilian infrastructure in today’s armed conflicts – which have become increasingly complex, protracted and urbanized – can present a host of challenges to belligerents. Beyond the fundamental obligation under IHL to distinguish at all times between civilian objects and military objectives and to only direct attacks against the latter, the conduct of robust proportionality assessments and the rigorous application of precautionary measures is critical to avoiding or minimizing damage to or destruction of civilian infrastructure and the resulting patterns of reverberating harm to civilians.
The following section provides a brief overview of the IHL rules governing the conduct of hostilities – specifically on proportionality and precautions in attack – as they pertain to the protection of civilian infrastructure. It focuses on how the interpretation and implementation of these rules can be strengthened to afford effective and meaningful protection to civilians from the direct and reverberating effects that often arise when infrastructure on which they rely for their survival and well-being is damaged or destroyed.
IHL principles and rules governing the conduct of hostilities are complemented by several normative and policy frameworks that reinforce the protection of civilian infrastructure in armed conflicts. Among these, the Political Declaration on Strengthening the Protection of Civilians from the Humanitarian Consequences Arising from the Use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas (Political Declaration on EWIPA) represents an important tool for promoting standards and norms that advance the protection of civilian infrastructure in contemporary armed conflicts,Footnote 15 including by strengthening compliance with and improving the implementation of relevant IHL principles and rules on the conduct of hostilities.Footnote 16
Strengthening and refining proportionality assessments
While compliance with the principle of distinction is fundamental to strengthening the protection of civilian infrastructure in armed conflicts, this article focuses primarily on measures to avoid and minimize incidental harm resulting from attacks against military objectives. In this context, the principle of proportionality prohibits belligerents from launching attacks that “may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated”.Footnote 17 In other words, the expected incidental harm resulting from an attack must not outweigh the anticipated military gain.
In practice, proportionality assessments can vary significantly depending on the nature and scope of the incidental harm considered.Footnote 18 For instance, an assessment will likely produce different outcomes depending on whether it accounts only for immediate civilian deaths and injuries or also includes damage to or destruction of civilian objects,Footnote 19 and crucially on how the expected consequences of such damage or destruction – the reverberating effects – are understood and factored into the proportionality calculus. Although interpretations may differ and State practice is not entirely transparent or consistent, there is a growing consensus that not only the direct but also the reasonably foreseeable reverberating effects must be considered during proportionality assessments,Footnote 20 even if their precise scale and scope cannot be fully anticipated or quantified.Footnote 21
Accordingly, when evaluating – or “assigning weight” to – the incidental harm expected to result from attacks likely to affect civilian infrastructure, special consideration must be given to those objects whose damage or destruction will have the most severe effects on civilians.Footnote 22 Crucially, this determination hinges not only on an assessment of the expected direct impacts – which may rely primarily on quantitative factors such as the number objects affected or the extent of physical damage incurred – but also on a qualitative understanding of the attack’s broader consequences for the civilian population.
In particular, when civilian infrastructure and systems enabling the provision of essential services (such as electricity, health care, and water and sanitation) are impacted, the reverberating effects often outweigh the immediate harm in both time and space.Footnote 23 Given the nature of such infrastructure, meaningful assessments of the incidental harm expected to result from an attack may therefore require accounting for the interdependencies between related services and systems – which can influence the extent, severity and duration of the reverberating effects on the civilian population – as well as for the baseline conditions of the targeted infrastructure, especially in the context of protracted urban hostilities.Footnote 24
Although the notion of “foreseeability” can be highly contextual, it evolves with advances in technology and capabilities, as well as with past operational experiences and lessons learned.Footnote 25 In particular, the extensive documentation of the reverberating effects of attacks affecting civilian infrastructure across multiple conflicts over the past decade has significantly improved the understanding of their nature and scale, and should inform both the planning and conduct of military operations.Footnote 26
This obligation is further reinforced by other legal and policy instruments, including the Political Declaration on EWIPA, which commits endorsing States to ensure that, in the planning of military operations and the execution of attacks involving the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, their armed forces take into account not only the direct effects but also the reasonably foreseeable indirect effects on civilians and civilian objects.Footnote 27 As described in the Declaration’s preamble, these effects often stem from damage to or destruction of critical civilian infrastructure and manifest in various forms, including deprivation of, or impeded access to, essential services such as health care, education, and water and electricity supply, as well as environmental damage, large-scale displacement, and psychological and psychosocial harm.Footnote 28 While this description of harms may be broader than what some States traditionally consider in their own proportionality assessments, it reflects well-documented patterns of harm to civilians in contemporary conflicts, as described above.Footnote 29
Enhancing the implementation of precautionary measuresFootnote 30
Under the principle of precautions in attack, belligerents are under an obligation to take constant care to spare civilians and civilian objects from the effects of military operations.Footnote 31 This obligation is central to the protection of civilian infrastructure in armed conflicts, particularly when those conflicts take place in urban areas, where such infrastructure is often exposed to heightened risks of harm.Footnote 32
In practice, the application of this rule means that the greater the risks to the civilian population posed by an attack, the higher the standard of care required from those planning and executing it. Applying stringent precautionary measures is particularly important when conducting operations that are likely to incidentally damage or destroy civilian infrastructure enabling the provision of essential services. In this context, the rigorous implementation of such measures should involve not only avoiding direct damage to such infrastructure but also actively seeking to minimize incidental harm – including reasonably foreseeable reverberating effects. In addition to doing everything feasible to verify that intended targets are lawful military objectives in accordance with the principle of distinction,Footnote 33 the principle of precaution requires belligerents to select appropriate means and methods of attack in order to avoid or minimize incidental harm.Footnote 34
Moreover, belligerents must take all feasible precautions to ensure that an attack does not violate the principle of proportionality.Footnote 35 Doing so entails an obligation to obtain sufficient information for a robust assessment of the expected incidental damage to civilian objects, including the ensuing repercussions of such damage for the civilian population, which are often manifested through reverberating effects.Footnote 36 While these determinations are inherently contextual (as are proportionality assessments themselves), they should be informed not only by the specific circumstances of an attack but also by past operational experiences and lessons learned, along with the expanding body of evidence documenting the reverberating effects of attacks affecting civilian infrastructure.Footnote 37 In a similar vein, the concept of “feasibility” in taking such precautions is not static; rather, it evolves with the development and increasing accessibility of tools and capabilities that can be deployed to increase understanding of the risks posed by military operations to civilians and civilian infrastructure. It also evolves with the growing awareness and dissemination of knowledge on effective measures and practices for avoiding or minimizing the resulting harm.Footnote 38
In line with these obligations, belligerents must cancel or suspend an attack if it becomes apparent that the target is not a military objective or is entitled to special protection, or if the attack is expected to have disproportionate effects.Footnote 39
Practical measures to facilitate and enhance the implementation of relevant IHL rules and strengthen the protection of civilian infrastructure
Good-faith interpretation and implementation of IHL principles and rules on the conduct of hostilities, particularly the rules on proportionality and precautions in attack, are essential to strengthening the protection of civilian infrastructure in contemporary armed conflicts. Having presented a purposive interpretation of these rules, this article will now outline practical measures that States and their armed forces can adopt at the political-strategic, operational and tactical levels to help operationalize them throughout the targeting process and better safeguard civilian infrastructure during hostilities. These measures include elevating the protection of civilian infrastructure to a clear policy and strategic priority, enhancing intelligence-gathering and analysis systems to account for civilian infrastructure, adopting robust target development and engagement processes, and establishing mechanisms and procedures to enable the tracking and analysis of damage to civilian infrastructure and the resulting patterns of harm to civilians, including through operational reviews and institutional lessons learned processes.
Making the protection of civilian infrastructure from the effects of hostilities a clear policy and strategic priority
Safeguarding civilian infrastructure and preserving essential services from the direct and reverberating effects of hostilities should be clearly articulated in policy guidance and explicitly reflected in military doctrine, particularly in relation to air and land warfare and urban operations.Footnote 40
Such guidance should recognize the potential strategic and operational implications of damage to and destruction of civilian infrastructure, as well as its multifaceted impacts on civilians, including likely cumulative and long-term consequences such as disruption to essential services, increased reconstruction costs, and impediments to post-conflict recovery and peacebuilding, as outlined above.Footnote 41
Overall guidance and strategic direction to avoid or minimize damage to civilian infrastructure should be reflected in the commander’s intent – which typically provides the vision for the desired end-state and post-conflict conditions – and reinforced through mission-specific rules of engagement (ROE), tactical directives and standard operating procedures, to ensure that it is regarded as a critical component of operational planning and decision-making across all stages of military operations.Footnote 42 This would enable the allocation of relevant resources, including for the development of tools and capabilities, the provision of adequate training to military personnel, and the establishment of coordination mechanisms with external actors, such as humanitarian organizations.Footnote 43
Enhancing intelligence-gathering and analysis systems to account for the civilian environment, including civilian infrastructure
States and their armed forces should develop or enhance intelligence-gathering and analysis processes to ensure that those planning and deciding upon attacks have all necessary information to be able to anticipate, assess and mitigate the potential effects of military operations on civilian objects, including the foreseeable reverberating effects resulting from damage to or destruction of civilian infrastructure.Footnote 44
While the intelligence collection and analysis systems and tools used by most militaries have traditionally focused on enemy capabilities and positions, it is equally critical that they support a robust understanding of the civilian environment,Footnote 45 especially in urban settings, where military objectives are often intermingled with civilian infrastructure. In particular, the greater the likelihood of incidental damage to civilian infrastructure that may be expected from an attack, the greater the requirements should be in terms of the capabilities, expertise and resources allocated to the intelligence-gathering and analysis process.Footnote 46 Although these requirements may vary depending on the specific operational context (including between dynamic and deliberate targeting scenarios), the following measures could be adopted to help develop or strengthen existing systems with a view to better protecting civilian infrastructure:
• “All-source” intelligence collection: Information should be gathered from a diverse range of sources – such as signals, imagery and human intelligence – and should be recent and corroborated.Footnote 47 Moreover, integrating non-traditional sources, including open-source information, can enhance understanding of the civilian environment and help mitigate the risks of misidentification or mischaracterization of civilian objects. This should include the gathering of specific information on the nature, location, condition and interconnectedness of critical civilian infrastructure and essential services,Footnote 48 as well as on the value and significance of such infrastructure and associated services and systems for the civilian population.Footnote 49
• Multidisciplinary expertise: In addition to legal advisers and weapons experts, robust intelligence assessments may require input from engineers, cultural advisers, public health specialists and other technical experts, particularly when hostilities take place in urban areas. Participation of relevant technical experts in the targeting process can help in mapping critical interdependencies between infrastructure and systems, as well as in evaluating structural and systemic vulnerabilities which may influence the likelihood and magnitude of reverberating effects resulting from damage to or destruction of civilian infrastructure.Footnote 50 Civil–military coordination officers and liaison systems with international and non-governmental organizations should also be established to facilitate input from other actors with relevant expertise.Footnote 51
• Tools and capability development: Investments in advanced intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, as well as in analytical and predictive tools that can improve the understanding of the civilian environment, should be made. These may include systems that support the identification and characterization of civilian objects and infrastructure, as well as modelling and simulation tools that help anticipate and map the potential impacts of an attack on both individual infrastructure nodes and the wider systems and networks they support.Footnote 52
Comprehensive and robust intelligence collection and analysis that integrates information on the civilian environment is crucial across all stages of military operations.Footnote 53 Over time, an improved understanding of the civilian environment should also enable more accurate assessments of potential reverberating effects both prior to and after military operations.Footnote 54
Moreover, integrating such intelligence into operational planning and decision-making processes can help refine proportionality assessments and the implementation of precautionary measures, particularly by strengthening target verification and validation processes and informing the selection of appropriate means and methods of attack and other measures to mitigate the risks of incidental damage to civilian infrastructure during target engagement, as discussed in more detail below.
Adopting robust target development and engagement procedures
Implementing robust practices throughout the target development and engagement processes – particularly procedures for the identification, validation and approval of targets – is essential to avoiding or minimizing unforeseen and incidental damage to civilian infrastructure and reducing the likelihood and/or magnitude of reverberating effects on the civilian population. In doing so, belligerents can adopt a range of practical measures to reinforce the protection of civilian infrastructure, including specially protected objects.
Target development and validation
Developing and maintaining no-strike and restricted target lists
The adoption of clear policies and procedures for the identification and designation of objects and facilities that should be subject to heightened or special protection, such as no-strike and restricted target entities,Footnote 55 is an important step to strengthen the protection of civilian infrastructure during military operations. These designations serve as essential safeguards to prevent the inadvertent targeting of civilian objects and can help mitigate the risk of incidental harm.Footnote 56
To support this, armed forces should develop and maintain no-strike lists (NSLs) and restricted target lists (RTLs), informed by comprehensive intelligence that accurately reflects the civilian environment. In addition to considering the civilian nature and protected status of objects, assessments of the likelihood and magnitude of potential reverberating effects should be key factors in determining whether to place specific objects or facilities on these lists.Footnote 57
These lists must be continuously updated on the basis of current intelligence, and may be complemented with input provided by humanitarian organizations operating on the ground through structured civil–military coordination channels.Footnote 58 The criteria and procedures for amending such lists, particularly the removal of entities, should be clearly articulated in operational guidance documents/ROE, such as tactical directives and standard operating procedures.Footnote 59 In addition, stricter requirements could be established for dual-use facilities.Footnote 60 These processes should be reinforced by strict data management systems to maintain the currency and verification of objects placed on such lists, as well as to ensure traceability and accountability.Footnote 61
Establishing stringent positive identification requirements and criteria
Clearly specifying and implementing criteria for the positive identification (PID) of targets – i.e., the establishment with reasonable certainty that an object of attack is a lawful military objective based on its function and location and in accordance with IHL and applicable ROE – is a critical component of efforts to enhance the protection of civilian infrastructure during military operations.Footnote 62 PID is usually obtained through observation and analysis of target characteristics, including visual recognition and functional characterization, and should be supported by multi-source and up-to-date intelligence.Footnote 63
Establishing stringent PID requirements for dual-use entities or targets situated near critical infrastructure can help reduce risks of misidentification or incorrect classification of objects, which may lead to erroneous estimates of incidental harm during proportionality assessments and heighten risks to civilian infrastructure during hostilities.Footnote 64 Efforts to improve PID requirements could include measures such as:
• Defining differentiated “levels of confidence” for engaging targets based on the degree of incidental harm expected from the object’s damage or destruction, taking into account factors such as the object’s nature, function and location. For instance, a higher threshold of certainty could be required prior to engaging objects whose destruction is likely to have particularly adverse effects on civilians, such as dual-use objects or other critical infrastructure on which civilians depend for their survival and well-being, including objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population. This could include requirements relating to the number and type of intelligence sources needed to substantiate the target identification, as well as to the corresponding accuracy and reliability of these sources.Footnote 65
• Instituting processes for the periodic review of previously approved targets. These reviews would help to ensure that a potential target continues to effectively contribute to military action and that its destruction or neutralization would yield a definite military advantage “in the circumstances ruling at the time”, minimizing risks of unforeseen harm prior to engagement.Footnote 66 This is especially important when the accuracy and reliability of the intelligence supporting the engagement is not assessed as high.
Implementing rigorous target validation and approval processes
As part of target validation and approval processes, and in line with their obligations flowing from the rules on proportionality and precautions in attack, belligerents must adopt rigorous processes to support estimations of the expected incidental effects of attacks that are particularly likely to harm civilian infrastructure enabling the provision of essential services. Such processes can also contribute to the identification of measures to mitigate the risk of unforeseen or incidental damage to such objects and the resulting reverberating effects on civilians.
Several armed forces already employ sophisticated tools – such as collateral damage estimation methodologies (CDEMs) – to ensure that relevant information is available for both assessing and mitigating the incidental harm expected to result from attacks. The use of these methodologies can help in assigning appropriate weight to expected harm during proportionality assessments, including by supporting determinations of whether such harm would be “excessive” in relation to the anticipated military advantage.Footnote 67 The accuracy and reliability of these assessments depend on the robust target verification practices outlined previously. For instance, if civilian objects located near intended targets are not properly identified or characterized, or are misidentified as military objectives, they will not be adequately factored into the proportionality analysis, which may lead to erroneous or inaccurate assessments.Footnote 68
Although CDEMs are typically classified, they are generally understood to focus primarily on the direct incidental effects of attacks, and there is limited understanding as to how and to what extent indirect or reverberating incidental effects are incorporated into existing methodologies.Footnote 69 Yet, in order to effectively avoid or minimize incidental harm likely to result from attacks, especially those likely to affect civilian infrastructure, CDEMs should be designed to account for the reasonably foreseeable reverberating incidental effects.Footnote 70 To address existing limitations, it has been suggested that more technically advanced States and their militaries could lead the development of tools for anticipating and assessing indirect incidental harm, as well as for supporting the integration of relevant considerations into subsequent determinations of the lawfulness of an attack.Footnote 71
Following – or in addition to – CDE processes, further measures can be adopted to strengthen target validation and approval processes and contribute to both preventing and mitigating the risk of incidental damage to civilian infrastructure:
• Implementing graduated levels of target engagement authority (TEA) – the authority responsible for approving engagements against lawful targets – based on the outcomes of CDE assessments. For example, if a strike is expected to exceed a certain threshold of harm, the approval for target engagement would need to be sought from higher command or even political levels.Footnote 72
• Instituting mechanisms and safeguards to mitigate the risk of target misidentification or mischaracterization, including by helping to identify and reduce potential cognitive biases or other negligent practices throughout the targeting process.Footnote 73
• Designating national “red card holders” in coalition or partnered military operations to ensure that engagements involving a State’s national capabilities comply with relevant national policies, including limitations on acceptable levels of incidental harm.Footnote 74
In light of ongoing technological developments, a growing number of tools, such as computational and predictive models, are becoming available to support efforts to both estimate and mitigate incidental harm during operations, including potential reverberating effects.Footnote 75 Simulation and modelling techniques can enhance militaries’ ability to anticipate these effects by integrating data from a range of internal and external sources, including information from past operations and the expanding evidence base, as well as by enabling comparisons of different courses of action and their potential consequences for civilians. If properly deployed to assist human decision-makers, such tools can improve the accuracy of incidental harm assessments and help inform the identification of relevant mitigation measures.Footnote 76
Target engagement
During the execution phase of military operations, belligerents must implement a range of measures in order to avoid or in any event minimize the likelihood and/or magnitude of incidental harm to civilian infrastructure and comply with their obligations stemming from the principles of distinction, proportionality and precautions in attack. This is particularly important when engaging targets located near such infrastructure, or when striking objects that serve both military and civilian functions.
Selecting appropriate means and methods of warfare to avoid or minimize incidental harmFootnote 77
The selection of appropriate means and methods of warfare, as required by the principle of precautions in attack, is central to preventing and mitigating both the direct and reverberating effects of attacks that may harm civilian infrastructure.Footnote 78
When preparing to engage targets, especially those that serve both military and civilian purposes, due consideration must be given not only to the choice of munitions and delivery systems but also to the specific component or part of the infrastructure or system to be targeted, with a view to preserving the target’s civilian function and minimizing the potential impacts of an attack on civilians. In particular, the position of a component or node within a supply system (i.e., upstream or downstream) often determines the extent and duration of the related service disruption – for instance, damage to upstream components of an infrastructure system can have a far greater impact on service functioning and delivery than damage to downstream components.Footnote 79 Therefore, in line with their precautionary obligation, belligerents must carefully assess which part or component to strike and adjust weaponeering practices accordingly in order to mitigate the risk of harm to civilians, including the reasonably foreseeable reverberating effects. For example, by adjusting the fuse type or warhead size to limit or delay the weapon’s effects, or by modifying the angle or timing of an attack, belligerents can reduce the likelihood or magnitude of the potential impacts of the attack on civilians.Footnote 80
While specific weaponeering procedures may not be feasible in all contexts, their implementation is especially important when operating in populated areas or considering strikes against dual-use objects or other critical civilian infrastructure.Footnote 81 In such cases, it is essential to take into account the likely duration and severity of the damage or functional impairment and its corresponding impacts on civilians, including challenges related to the reconstruction of damaged infrastructure and the rehabilitation of essential services, particularly in the context of protracted or high-intensity hostilities.Footnote 82 Recognizing that belligerents’ capabilities and resources vary and may influence what may be considered as “feasible” in the circumstances, should the absence of specific capabilities or resources mean that the attack would result in indiscriminate or disproportionate harm, then the duty to take precautions in attack would require the attack to be suspended or cancelled.Footnote 83
Adopting “minimum safe distances” to designate no-fire zones
Belligerents could also adopt a concept analogous to “minimum safety distances” or risk estimates – commonly employed to protect one’s own or friendly forces – when conducting military operations in proximity to civilian infrastructure, particularly in the context of hostilities in urban areas. Based on an assessment of a weapon’s accuracy and blast and fragmentation radius, such a measure would establish the minimum distance required to safeguard civilian infrastructure from foreseeable harm. These distances should be adapted to the specific weapon system and munition used, as well as to the characteristics of the surrounding environment, including factors such as population density and infrastructure vulnerability. This concept can also help to inform the designation of “no-fire areas” and other protected zones.Footnote 84
Assessing civilian harm from damage to civilian infrastructure and strengthening lessons learned processes
Conducting assessments of the impact of military operations on civilian objects is essential for understanding the nature and extent of the resulting civilian harm, as well as for identifying lessons learned that can inform future operational planning and decision-making with a view to preventing, mitigating and responding to such harm. While various mechanisms and processes exist to support these assessments, they must be consistently implemented and adapted in order to effectively track damage to civilian infrastructure and enable analysis of the potential reverberating effects on civilians.
For instance, States that have endorsed the Political Declaration on EWIPA commit to collecting, sharing and making publicly available data on direct and indirect effects on civilians and civilian objects of military operations involving the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, as well as to facilitating data collection by international organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and civil society organizations.Footnote 85 Implementing these commitments requires States to develop or adapt tools and processes to enable the collection and sharing of such data,Footnote 86 and can be further supported by exchanges of good polices and operational practices within and between States and their armed forces, as foreseen under the Declaration.Footnote 87
Establishing and adapting mechanisms to enable assessments of damage to civilian infrastructure and the resulting reverberating effects on civilians
Civilian harm tracking denotes a “specific military function referring to armed actors’ ability to systematically gather data, assess, and analyse a range of negative effects on civilians caused directly or indirectly by [their] operations”.Footnote 88 This function can encompass a wide range of tools and processes that allow armed forces to better monitor and assess the impacts of their own operations on civilians and civilian objects, including those resulting from damage to or destruction of civilian infrastructure.Footnote 89 Although not a legal obligation per se, the establishment of dedicated capabilities within armed forces to track, analyze, respond to and learn from civilian harm has increasingly been recognized as an effective practice that can facilitate compliance with, and strengthen the implementation of, IHL rules on the conduct of hostilities.Footnote 90
While most mechanisms established to date have focused primarily on tracking immediate civilian casualties and injuries,Footnote 91 there is growing recognition of the need to systematically monitor and assess damage to and destruction of civilian infrastructure in order to develop a more accurate understanding of the full range of impacts that military operations may have on civilians, including by enabling assessments of the reverberating effects arising from such damage or destruction.Footnote 92 This includes both incidental damage and damage caused by direct attacks (such as in the case of dual-use objects).
In addition to leveraging military operational records and intelligence, such mechanisms should integrate information from credible external sources to allow for more comprehensive and accurate assessments of both the direct and potential reverberating effects of infrastructure damage or destruction.Footnote 93 To enable this, it is important to establish clear protocols for the verification and integration of external information, as well as to create reporting channels that allow both civilians and third-party actors to submit relevant data in a structured and reliable manner.Footnote 94 Relevant informational elements may include:
• type of infrastructure affected (hospitals, water and sanitation systems, transportation networks, electricity grids, food distribution lines etc.);
• location (e.g., above-ground, ground-level or underground) and infrastructural set-up;
• associated systems and networks, including interdependencies between related infrastructural elements (including people and consumables).
Further analysis of the damage incurred, including preliminary assessments of its nature and extent, can be classified according to several criteria, such as physical, functional or systemic impacts, or degree of severity (e.g., partial or complete destruction).Footnote 95 A range of tools and methodologies can support both the detection and assessment of such damage and the ensuing consequences for civilians. In addition to advanced ISR capabilities and sophisticated data processing and management systems, satellite imagery and other remote-sensing data can enable granular assessments of damage to various types of civilian infrastructure, including the impacts on specific sectors or activities (environment, cultural heritage, agriculture, economic activities etc.).Footnote 96 When combined with pre- and post-strike intelligence on the civilian environment, including data gathered from external reporting,Footnote 97 this information can help estimate the number of people likely to be affected in both the short and long term and contribute to identifying specific trends and patterns of harm.
Ideally, these assessments should be conducted in real time in order to enable timely feedback loops and inform operational planning and adjustments to targeting practices during the course of a campaign. Procedures should be put in place to ensure that targeting staff receive information on the outcomes of such assessments. Robust assessments can provide valuable insights to support the classification and categorization of objects in future operations, including determinations regarding their civilian nature and function or protected status.Footnote 98 If preliminary assessments reveal possible IHL violations, there should be systems in place to enable subsequent investigations, including through referral to appropriate accountability mechanisms.Footnote 99
Moreover, such assessments can contribute to effective responses to civilian harm, such as by supporting the rehabilitation of infrastructure or the restoration of essential services. These measures are increasingly recognized as important components of comprehensive civilian harm response frameworks, especially in the context of large-scale hostilities – even if, unlike reparations, they may not constitute a legal obligation for the attacker.Footnote 100 In addition, robust assessments can also facilitate communication and coordination on the specific needs and priorities of affected individuals and communities, with relevant organizations providing assistance during and in the aftermath of hostilities.Footnote 101
Enhancing post-strike assessments and broader lessons learned processes to integrate considerations on civilian infrastructure damage and destruction
Information gathered through post-strike assessments and broader lessons learned exercises can play a critical role in helping armed forces to understand the nature and extent of the damage caused to civilian infrastructure by their own operations, and to adjust future practices with a view to avoiding or minimizing such damage and its reverberating effects on the civilian population. When undertaking battle damage assessments, after-action reviews or other relevant operational review processes, especially in the absence of a dedicated civilian harm tracking mechanism, belligerents should ensure that these processes consider not only the effects of attacks on the intended target but also their potential direct and reverberating effects on civilians, including those resulting from damage to or destruction of civilian infrastructure.Footnote 102
In addition to informing tactical adjustments in the course of an operation, the outcomes from such assessments – whether conducted after a specific attack or as part of broader operational reviews – should feed into lessons learned processes in order to help identify systemic issues that may increase risks to civilians and civilian objects during the planning and conduct of operations.Footnote 103 If complemented by further analysis, these processes can help uncover underlying causes of misidentification or misclassification of civilian objects, as well as of inaccurate estimations of incidental harm, contributing to the further refinement of targeting procedures. Ideally, this process should also support institutional reforms aimed at addressing systemic issues that have caused or contributed to erroneous or inaccurate decisions.Footnote 104 States should review and update relevant policies to ensure that these assessments are conducted systematically and that adequate resources are allocated to them, including by ensuring adequate technical, analytical and contextual expertise as well as access to relevant data from both internal and credible external sources.
As part of broader lessons learned processes, States could consider the following measures to identify steps to strengthen the protection of civilian infrastructure in armed conflicts:
• Systematically reviewing the relationship between expected and actual damage: Post-strike assessments should include comparisons between pre-strike proportionality analyses and the actual incidental damage incurred. This can help in identifying potential gaps in targeting procedures and opportunities to refine proportionality assessments or introduce additional precautionary measures to mitigate even further risks of unforeseen or excessive harm to civilian infrastructure.Footnote 105 Where significant discrepancies are identified, further analysis or investigations should be undertaken to determine whether mistakes have been made, including in the identification or classification of targeted objects or in the assessment of their civilian nature.Footnote 106
• Conducting comprehensive incident reporting and operational reviews: Operational reviews and broader lessons learned exercises should include detailed examinations of specific incidents that resulted in damage to or destruction of civilian infrastructure. Such reviews can help in identifying measures to avoid or mitigate harm in future operations and can contribute to institutional learning. They may also improve the understanding of the full scope of civilian harm caused by military operations, informing the adjustment of targeting practices accordingly.Footnote 107 While these reviews should be undertaken as part of internal military processes and made publicly available whenever possible,Footnote 108 they can be complemented by commissioned or independent studies, including those conducted by international and non-governmental organizations.Footnote 109 Importantly, reviews should extend beyond immediate physical damage to encompass the reverberating effects of strikes impacting civilian infrastructure, feeding into the broader knowledge base and informing future operational planning and decision-making to prevent and mitigate these effects.
Conclusion
Strengthening the protection of civilian infrastructure is essential to prevent and mitigate civilian harm both during and after armed conflicts, especially as today’s hostilities become increasingly complex, protracted and urbanized. This article has argued that meaningfully protecting civilians from the full range of harms resulting from attacks affecting civilian infrastructure requires good-faith interpretation and implementation of relevant IHL principles and rules on the conduct of hostilities; in particular, the conducting of robust proportionality assessments and the adoption and rigorous application of precautionary measures are essential to avoiding or minimizing incidental civilian harm, including the increasingly foreseeable reverberating effects.
Crucially, effective responses to the multiple challenges of safeguarding civilian infrastructure in contemporary conflicts require States and their armed forces to adopt practical measures to facilitate compliance with, and strengthen the implementation of, IHL rules across all stages of military operations. Such measures can include making the protection of civilian infrastructure and the preservation of essential services an explicit policy and strategic priority, enhancing intelligence-gathering and analysis systems in order to better understand and account for risks to civilian infrastructure, adopting robust target development and engagement procedures, and establishing mechanisms to track, assess and analyze damage to civilian infrastructure and the resulting patterns of harm to civilians, including through post-strike operational reviews and other lessons learned processes.
Beyond legal and humanitarian considerations, enhancing the protection of civilian infrastructure during hostilities – including efforts to prevent and mitigate the reverberating effects that often result from its damage or destruction – is essential for long-term stability and the resumption of civilian life once hostilities cease, helping to create conditions that are more conducive to sustainable transitions to peace.
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