Introduction
The conflict in Syria has been ongoing for almost twelve years. The largely peaceful uprising of 2011, which demanded democratic and economic reforms after a decade of intense political and economic restructuring programs, soon spun into a deadly conflict and the initial binary struggle between the government of President Assad and a collection of loosely connected opponents expanded into a multifront and multi-actor war, producing a lethal mix of civil and proxy wars.Footnote 1 The conflict has resulted in one of the worst humanitarian crises in the twenty-first century, effectively fracturing the country, with the various belligerents carving out their own fiefdoms with the support of foreign armies and non-state actors.
International intervention has been rampant in the Syrian conflict, with external actors employing a mixed set of policies and tools to respond to the conflict in an attempt to influence the actions of actors, and to affect changes that are favorable to their own interests and in line with their own agendas. Along with propaganda and diplomatic and military tools, economic coercive policies were heavily deployed against the Syrian government and in support of both the armed and unarmed opposition groups. Unilateral measures were imposed on several targets as early as May 2011, adding to or complementing pre-conflict (mostly US) sanctions. Prior to the outbreak of the conflict in 2011, Syria was under two types of US sanctions: general and Syria-specific. The variety of legislative provisions and executive directives prohibit US aid to Syria and restrict bilateral trade. In addition to being a designated “State Sponsor of Terrorism,” Syria is subject to legislation: the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Act 2003 and the USA Patriot Act 2006,Footnote 2 as well as the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019 (Caesar Act).
These sanctions are ostensibly “smart” and “targeted” and were arguably imposed,Footnote 3 at least initially, to address human rights violations. However, as the conflict progressed, and the scale and severity of sanctions increased, several voices, including the Carter Center, Chatham House, and the UN Special Rapporteur on Unilateral Coercive Measures, have asserted that these sanctions have contributed to the overall suffering of civilians, and have created barriers for legitimate actors and businesses. These actors and others are now calling for the reform or abolition of the sanctions on Syria.Footnote 4 Importantly, while humanitarian needs continue to grow exponentially, the sanctions have created an arduous operational environment for humanitarian actors, hindering their work and negatively impacting the entire humanitarian response to the crisis.
This chapter draws upon various data to present a cohesive picture of how sanctions impact the operations of humanitarian actors within the Syrian context, and how they impede humanitarian operations directly and indirectly. In addition to a review of available literature on the sanctions on Syria and official UN and INGO reports, the chapter is based on twelve interviews with current and former UN and INGO aid workers who operate, or have done so in the recent past, in Syria and the neighboring countries. Two of the interviewees have held different positions with two different organizations operating within the country. Interviewees included national and international staff with field and HQ experience, who held different levels of seniority, including at the head of programs. With the exception of one interviewee, all other participants asked for their affiliation to remain anonymous for fear of retribution from donors and sanctioners, or because they are not authorized to disclose operational information by their employers. The work of interviewees encompasses activities ranging from emergency support to early recovery and provision of basic services, as well as safety and security monitoring and reporting.
The chapter focuses on the period that extends between the start of the conflict and January 2023. It is worth noting that the period following the earthquake that hit Syria and Türkiye on February 6, 2023 did witness the issuance and adoption of a series of humanitarian carveouts, exceptions, guidance notes, and modifications to some of the international sanctions imposed on the country.Footnote 5 However, as indicated by interviewees from the field as well as other research, the impact on humanitarian operations remained limited, and will be discussed in the conclusion. The chapter proceeds as follows. First, it provides a brief overview of the humanitarian situation and current humanitarian response modalities. It then introduces the various sanctions regimes imposed on the country. Subsequently, the chapter discusses the direct and indirect impacts of sanctions.
The Syrian Conflict: Taking Stock of the Humanitarian Toll and Understanding the Humanitarian Response
The consequences of the conflict have been calamitous, and a decade of hostilities have had a profound impact on the humanitarian situation in the country. Half of Syria’s pre-conflict population has been internally and externally displaced, with hundreds of thousands of deaths,Footnote 6 and millions of people suffering from injuries and traumas.Footnote 7 The poverty-stricken country, where approximately 90 percent of the population is living under poverty line,Footnote 8 is at risk of famine according to the UN,Footnote 9 and statistics show that 2.5 million people are severely food insecure, while 12.1 million people are food insecure.Footnote 10 Children, women, and the displaced are among the most vulnerable, and the fact that 800,000 children are chronically malnourished is a testament to this.Footnote 11 In 2023, approximately 75 percent of Syrians inside the country, equivalent to 15.3 million people, are in need of humanitarian assistance, according to the UN.Footnote 12
The conflict, which reversed many developmental and other achievements that Syria had made in the preceding decades, has been manifested in several consecutive and interconnected humanitarian crises, with the current crisis being unprecedented in scale and severity. Despite the relative recent calm on the frontlines, humanitarian suffering is increasing compared with earlier years of the conflict, as noted by the UN Special Envoy to Syria.Footnote 13 Of course, the crisis is foremost the result of the conflict. However, global and externally induced crises, such as Covid-19, the financial crisis in Lebanon, and the imposition of aggressive sanctions, have gravely exacerbated the situation at a time when resources are falling short and needs are growing. The mounting challenges underline the importance of establishing a more effective and sustainable humanitarian response that adheres to humanitarian principles.
The protracted humanitarian crisis, one of the largest humanitarian operations in the twenty-first century, has necessitated the involvement of various UN agencies, INGOs, as well as civic and faith-based local organizations. Throughout the conflict, different aid-delivery modalities have been deployed with different hubs operating in Syria and across the region. The latter efforts, mostly led by UN aid agencies, catered to Syrian refugees in neighboring countries. They also provided cross-border aid delivery, when that became possible in 2014, with the adoption of UNSC Resolutions 2165 and 2191, authorizing UN aid operations to enter Syria without requiring the consent of the Syrian government. However, as of 2020, aid delivery has been restricted to one entry point, from Türkiye, after other points, namely Iraq and Jordan, were dropped as the UNSC failed to reach agreement for their renewals.Footnote 14
Sanctions: Structure, Enforcement, and General Impact
In the discussion about sanctions in Syria, there exists an active debate about the underlying motives of sanctioners, their policy choices, and whether their models were used to coerce the government into submitting to sanctioners’ demands, or for other objectives, such as symbolism or constraint. In fact, the four models identified by Crawford and Klotz all seem to be at play.Footnote 15 Arslanian neatly sums up the motives of sanctioners in his analysis, arguing that the objectives of sanctions varied between “initially aiming at coercing the government to undertake reforms and then forcing it to concede power, which then shifted towards symbolism and constraining.”Footnote 16
While the debate about motives and models of influence continues, the discussion about the nature of sanctions against Syria seem to have been settled. In the case of the US, the sanctions imposed on Syria are akin to a total embargo on all trade,Footnote 17 while the sanctions imposed by the EU were unprecedented.Footnote 18 Furthermore, many would argue that, collectively, sanctions against Syria are one of the “strictest and most complex collective regimes in recent history,”Footnote 19 or “most complicated and far reaching sanctions regimes ever imposed.”Footnote 20 Along with the US’s primary and secondary unilateral measures,Footnote 21 the EU,Footnote 22 and other nations and entities, including Australia, Canada, Japan, Norway, Switzerland, Türkiye, the UK, and the Arab League, impose sanctions on Syria.Footnote 23 Furthermore, several Jihadist groups operating in the country are subject to UNSC resolutions,Footnote 24 resulting in a very complex compliance environment for anyone involved in the country, including humanitarian actors. Although the US measures on Syria are unilateral, and hence arguably nonbinding internationally, they function effectively as though they are global due to the US’s extraterritorial application of sanctions and the global reach of the US dollar. Further, sanctions on Syria are quite punitive, even in comparison to many other heavily sanctioned contexts. For instance, with regard to medical devices, unilateral measures targeting Syria are much harsher than those targeting Sudan.Footnote 25 Furthermore, Syria does not have anything similar to the “Green List” of Iraq or the “Basic Human Needs” list that can be used to export goods without a license from the U.S government to otherwise embargoed countries, such as Cuba.
The unilateral measures in place are similar and overlapping, though not uniform, and imposes a broad range of restrictions on individuals and government entities. Sanctions outlaw dealing in sectors such as banking and oil and power production, and importantly, particularly the US’s Caesar Act, prohibit engagement in “significant” reconstruction. Simultaneously, all sanctions allow for the work of humanitarian actors and contain provisions for humanitarian exemptions, or the possibility thereof through derogations or general or specific licenses. Nonetheless, the reality is more complex, especially due to the multiplicity of sanctioners and the need to work with and across several national agencies, cross-border, and international authorities.
The enforcement of sanctions varies across the different control zones and hence the challenges vary and are unique to their own contexts. The US- and Turkish-controlled areas were largely shielded from enforcement or enjoyed lax enforcement,Footnote 26 and in May 2022, the US issued a General License No. 22, allowing activities in these areas that would otherwise be prohibited under the Syria sanctions regime.Footnote 27 Meanwhile, sanctions are aggressively enforced against government-held areas. Thus, the impact of sanctions in the government-held areas is naturally more severe, but other areas are not fully insulated from the impact, since internal trading with government-held areas and the use of Syrian currency continue. Meanwhile, in nongovernment-controlled areas, the focus is on anti-terrorism regulations due to the presence of Jihadist groups, namely Hayat Tahrir al-Sham.
Manifestly, sanctions are not solely responsible for the humanitarian crises in Syria; however, as premised in the literature, unintended consequences have proliferated, impacting various aspects of life. Previous research shows, among other things, that sanctions have been found detrimental for the operations of legitimate businesses and actors, and have offered new opportunities for de facto authorities and warlords to indirectly benefit and consolidate their power, allowing the conflict to continue.Footnote 28 Further, scholars argue that sanctions have debilitated the state and its capacity to provide basic services to the population, and materially contributed to the partial failure of the state, making the conflict intractable.Footnote 29
As far as humanitarian needs are concerned, it is admittedly difficult to disaggregate the effect of sanctions from other factors. However, in line with earlier findings,Footnote 30 anecdotal evidence shows that there is a good case to link sanctions with increased humanitarian needs and with currency depreciation. Sanctions contributed to major capital flight,Footnote 31 and their imposition on the Syrian banking sector channeled most hard currency dealings away from official banks to unofficial dealers, and thus impinged on the Central Bank’s ability to control and influence the exchange rate.Footnote 32 In 2015/2016, with the imposition of new US and EU sanctions,Footnote 33 the Syrian economy, infrastructure, and availability of basic goods faltered even more, and the number of people in need surged to 13.5 million.Footnote 34 The numbers then stabilized at 11 million until 2019,Footnote 35 when the US imposed the Caesar Act, further restricting the flow of goods and funds, at which point the number of people in need of humanitarian assistance surged again to 13.4 million people, while the number of food insecure people rose from 6.5 million in 2019 to 12.4 in 2020 and 2021.Footnote 36 In 2022, and with food prices increasing by 532 percent over the course of two years,Footnote 37 14.6 million people were in need of humanitarian assistance, an increase of 1.2 million from 2021.Footnote 38
Sanctions as Barriers: Impact of Sanctions on the Work of Humanitarian Organizations
Humanitarian operations in Syria are beset with a set of problems and challenges, including, but not limited to, politicization of aid, diversion of aid, restriction of access,Footnote 39 funding shortfalls,Footnote 40 and, naturally the subject of this chapter, an unfavorable environment due the proliferation of unilateral measures and counter-terrorism financing regulations. Challenges caused by sanctions fall into three categories: (1) financial challenges related to money transfer due to overcompliance and de-risking; (2) legal challenges linked to due diligence, compliance requirements, and interpretation of sanctions; and (3) operational challenges related to “dual-use” regulations, “State Sponsor of Terrorism” designation, and direct sectoral sanctions. After engaging these challenges, this section will briefly elaborate on the indirect impact of sanctions with regards to oil supplies and currency depreciation and fluctuations.
A Continuous Struggle: Getting Money to Syria
Throughout the conflict, humanitarian actors have reported facing difficulties accessing and moving funds to Syria, which has hindered their ability to operate. It has added to the complexity of conducting a principled humanitarian response, providing aid impartially and on the basis of need, without regard to political affiliations or other factors. Initially, the root cause of this problem were the sanctions against the Syrian public banking system, which limited access to reliable banking services in the country, and increased reliance on private banks, which had limited capacity in comparison to their public counterparts and did not operate in opposition- and Islamist-held areas.Footnote 41
Early on, the Syrian public banking system was subject to crippling sanctions, which among other things included banning the establishment of new correspondent banking channels – the intermediary banks needed for transnational transactions – and placing restrictions on financial activities with government-controlled or linked entities.Footnote 42 For INGOs, this has made financial dealing with banks in Syria the subject of intense scrutiny, while the chilling effect of these sanctions prompted financial institutions to terminate existing channels, or to refuse to process payments related to Syria altogether, especially with the US pursuing legal actions against several entities for Syria-related violations over the course of the conflict.Footnote 43
As the conflict progressed and its risks increased, especially with the spread of local and international terrorist organizations, humanitarian actors were increasingly faced with de-risking practices, with international banks significantly reducing their correspondent bank services and further aggravating the problems of channeling funds to the country.Footnote 44 Currently, as a result of sanctions and de-risking, fewer than five Lebanon- and Tunisia-based intermediary banks continue to provide banking services to humanitarian organizations in Syria.Footnote 45 Increases in transaction costs have also been reported, with some fees increasing from 0.25 or 0.5 to 10 percent of the total amount, translating to a loss of some 10 percent of aid money in some cases.Footnote 46 Furthermore, de-risking, as previous research shows, has not only reduced the appetite of banks to process services for organizations working in Syria but can also result in the total termination of services and closure of humanitarian organizations accounts.Footnote 47
Humanitarian organizations operating in government-held areas and making use of the available banking channels were, and continue to be, faced with extended delays, rejections, and continuous requests for information. Despite the fact that the problem has been identified, and that solutions were proposed as early as 2016,Footnote 48 practitioners interviewed for the purpose of this chapter indicate that no progress has been made, and that funds still require six months on average to reach their accounts,Footnote 49 while a 2021 survey among Damascus-based NGOs showed that delays can be as long as ten months.Footnote 50
Several interviewees further indicated that the majority of transactions require extensive paperwork and responses to repeated requests for additional information, and that delays and rejections are not accompanied by any explanation from by their corresponding bank. These comments correspond to the findings of the aforementioned survey of Damascus-based NGOs. Interviewees indicated that they were requested to provide extensive information on identical transfers, even for the same project, and with the exception of one NGO based in Western Europe, banks provided no opportunity for the representatives of NGOs to inquire as to the source of the problem, in case of rejections.
Delays and refusals to transfer funds have caused project cancellations or delays, planning problems, and interruption of salary payments and contract obligations. For instance, one interviewee, speaking on behalf of a Dutch INGO operating a medical center in northern Syria, indicated that in 2020, salaries for staff were delayed for three months on several occasions.Footnote 51 Another interviewee explained that the delayed arrival of funds affected the organization’s budgetary planning for the following year, as the donor refused to grant new funds for new programs until the available amount was exhausted.Footnote 52
Delays and subsequent currency fluctuations have also led to problems with local contractors, as reported by two representatives of European INGOs.Footnote 53 For example, a senior representative of a West European INGO reported that a local contractor refused to honor a contract for infrastructure rehabilitation in the countryside of Damascus, as payment had been delayed due to banking problems, and the price of materials and labor costs had increased significantly between the agreement and date of execution.Footnote 54 In another example that was reported in a previous study, the delay of payment halted the rehabilitation of nearly 200 apartments in 2019, forcing the INGO that was carrying out the project to cover $400,000 in project extension costs.Footnote 55
UN organizations, which in principle enjoy exemptions from sanctions, have reported similar problems. For instance, after the imposition of the US’s Caesar Act, which further constricted banking transactions, the WHO reported delays and problems with financial transfers affecting the agency’s activities and ability to provide aid.Footnote 56 Similarly, UNICEF reported delays in its interventions and those of its implementing partners because of delays and blockages related to financial transactions.Footnote 57
To counter these challenges, humanitarian actors have adopted several problematic solutions. First, as shown in earlier reports, NGOs utilized nonbanking channels, which in the case of nongovernment areas became total dependence on IVTS such as hawala (Arabic for “transfer”) to transfer money or conduct business in the country.Footnote 58 The hawala system operates outside of, or in parallel to, formal financial channels and is totally dependent on the credibility of often unregistered local money brokers. It is characterized by a lack of written contracts or guarantees and is rather based on trust. This brings a set of legal and security problems. One interviewee speaking on behalf of a Turkish NGO, for example, explained that €25,000 were usurped by a hawala office under false claims, leading to problems with the donor and eventual cancelation of the project.Footnote 59
Second, INGOs became increasingly dependent on partnerships with UN agencies as to guarantee availability and flow of cash, since the latter face fewer problems transferring money in comparison to non-UN agencies. Similarly, a representative of a West European INGO contended that their organization was operating as a “bank” for other consortium members originating from the same country due to transfer delays.Footnote 60 Three interviewees speaking on behalf of West European INGOs reported resorting to “tailor-made solutions” and “solutions beyond normal routes,” including “fund swaps,” using earmarked funds that were received from UN agencies to finance other projects pending financial transfers, which may never materialize, exposing those INGOs to reputational and legal risks.Footnote 61
Third, previous research shows that some INGOs reorganized their projects to avoid stringent bank requirements,Footnote 62 which was discussed by two interviewees for this project. “No-problem criteria,” a term coined by one of the interviewees, entailed that problematic areas and projects were excluded or de-prioritized at the level of overall planning and operation design.Footnote 63 For example, a request to provide the names of beneficiaries for the purpose of screening and vetting made one INGO change its program for the support of small farming, from cash assistance to in-kind assistance, according to one senior European NGO staff member. In the same vein, a program officer working for a West European INGO further reported that her INGO de-prioritized projects in Raqqa, a governate that had seen massive devastation, because of the convoluted due diligence requests of her employer’s bank. This is particularly problematic because it means that the most vulnerable may be excluded from assistance, or that programs are designed not based on needs, but rather on banking-related requirements.
NGOs operating in nongovernment held areas have faced similar problems. However, due to the presence of terrorist organizations, due diligence requirements, such as documenting, monitoring, and reporting, are reported to be actually stricter than in government-controlled areas. Since the official banking system is nonexistent, organizations must use nonbanking channels, including hawala and cash transfers. Funds were received in neighboring countries, and potentially in Damascus if organizations had the ability to send the money across the internal de facto division lines, and subsequently moved through a network of locally organized transfer mechanisms. Gradually, the process was made more difficult, as neighboring countries enforced new regulations. This was the case in Türkiye, where the official Turkish Post, also known as PTT, has been made the only legal venue for transferring money. While the ability to use PTT was welcomed by the interviewees that used the system, it was explained that the registration process in Türkiye was cumbersome, time-consuming, and challenging, in particular because INGOs were required to meet a specific quota of Turkish nationals as employees.Footnote 64
The Legal Struggle: Licensing, Due Diligence, and Interpretation of Sanctions
Humanitarian actors operating in Syria find navigating the different sanctions in place, including exceptions and licensing, a formidable task and describe it as a “constant struggle.” This has also been the experience of humanitarian actors with the due diligence process. According to several interviewees, this has resulted in lost opportunities to carry out legitimate programs, such as technical rehabilitation of water management plants,Footnote 65 and delays due to usually extensive and time-consuming consultations with sanctioners. This is particularly cumbersome because of the need to verify information across various countries and in accordance with different regulations, and there is increased risk aversion behavior and self-imposed overcompliance by humanitarian actors.
According to several interviewees, the frameworks for implementing sanctions exceptions and licenses are technical and require legal expertise that is not always available to humanitarian actors. This is in line with the previous research, which has found the process of obtaining licenses and exemptions to be rigid and opaque.Footnote 66 In addition, the process is very lengthy and time consuming, with the average time for obtaining a license, as per four interviewees, estimated to be six to nine months, including for projects identical to those for which licenses were granted earlier. While experiences with EU exemptions vary based on the issuing country, the process is especially slow for US-related sanctions, as most of the time there is a need to obtain separate licenses from OFAC and the Bureau of Industry and Security, in cases involving US products or foreign-made items containing greater than 10 percent of US-origin controlled content. For instance, one interviewee explained the experience of requesting an exemption for the purchase of five laptops for a project that necessitated collaboration with technical staff of the government:
I had to answer questions twice about the identity and occupational affiliations of our counterparts as well as their place(s) of work. We were also requested to provide a guarantee that the use of laptops would be limited for the purpose of the specific project, which is practically impossible. Two months before the end of the project, a new request for information came in. Meanwhile, we had found a solution that entailed using our own laptops.Footnote 67
Further, several interviewees questioned the utility of some licenses, given the general situation in the country or their limited application. For example, a representative of a European INGO explained that despite obtaining a license to use the sanctioned national airline, prohibitions on spare parts supplies to Syria meant that aircrafts were occasionally not in shape to fly, rendering the license useless. Another example involves licenses for the purchase of a laptop, which excluded the possibility for maintenance in Syria and required that laptops be sent abroad for repair. In this particular case, when two laptops needed repair, they had to be dispatched to Dubai in the UAE, according to a former Damascus-based UN staff member.
As far as due diligence compliance is concerned, all interviewees reported struggling to ensure that their projects met the requirements of sanctioners, OFAC in particular, requirements which are ambiguous – some argue deliberately so – and differ according to the areas of control. This is consistent with previous research that showed how sanctions lack clarity on the precise requirements of due diligence, leaving them open to interpretation and potentially inadvertent violations. The research shows that the level of due diligence required by OFAC and the EU varies, depending on the scope of the project; the partners involved; the likely exposure to a blacklisted actor, either directly or indirectly; geographical areas of location; and who is involved in the payment chain.Footnote 68 Consequently, humanitarian actors continue to lack knowledge of what precise steps are needed to ensure compliance, reduce processing time, and obtain licenses in a timely manner.
A 2021 survey of Damascus-based NGOs shows that more than half of these organizations maintain an in-country full-time dedicated staff member working on compliance-related issues, with frequent support from colleagues in headquarters or regional offices.Footnote 69 Compliance with due diligence is also “very demanding” in nongovernment-controlled areas, according to representatives working in northeast and northwest Syria. One interviewee described the compliance requirements and donors’ strict scrutiny as an “endless headache,” with the continuous need to screen local partners and verify beneficiaries to avoid benefiting members or associates of designated groups.Footnote 70
Beyond compliance and licensing, ambiguities within US and EU regulations further burden INGOs and their projects, providing little guidance as to how to interpret terms such as the “Syrian government” and “reconstruction.” While sanctions allow for “humanitarian aid and assistance,” they prohibit engaging in any activity that is related to certain sectors such as energy, any activity considered to be “significant” reconstruction, and any activity that will benefit the government of Syria rather than the civilian population. However, the US government does not clearly define these terms, leaving aid organizations in uncertainty about what is or is not permitted, while being fearful that a misinterpretation on their part could result in severe penalties. Such a concern is not unreasonable, since it seems that the US strategy is to simply minimize economic activity in Syria as much as possible, in order to pressure the Syrian government. The US envoy to Syria said as much, stating that his country had stifled the Syrian economy and prevented reconstruction, even by UN entities, and that these measures were part of a strategy to force the regime to agree to a “political transition.”Footnote 71 Thus, humanitarian actors continuously struggle with uncertainty about what is permissible, engaging in extensive and costly consultations and project-based approvals. A case in point is programs related to rebuilding and rehabilitation schools as only “light rehabilitation” is allowed, without providing clear criteria for what is considered “light.” For civilians, this resulted on many occasions in children receiving their education in makeshift locations, which were funded as emergency programs to avoid questions related to the interpretation of sanctions.Footnote 72
The ambiguities found in the sanctions regulations create further complications, as there may be diverging views between donors and sanctioners about what constitutes work beyond the provision of humanitarian aid, and therefore might be considered sanctionable. For instance, an interviewee cited a problem that they faced in one of their projects, where a donor deemed the project, which supports locals working in the agricultural sector in areas recently recaptured by the Syrian government, as humanitarian in nature, while the sanctioning authorities in a major European country rejected it, due to the need to collaborate with state employees. Subsequently, the project, which aimed to rehabilitate irrigation canals and water pumps to assist small-scale farmers, was dropped. Only after the scope of the project and number of beneficiaries were reduced by almost 60 percent was it deemed acceptable, and the project was then implemented.
Dual Use and Direct Sectoral Sanctions
Challenges faced by humanitarian organizations in this category stem from the broad definition of “dual-use” goods, as well as having to deal with and utilize services from sectors under sanctions, such as telecommunication.
Dual-Use Goods
The sanctions in place prevent the import of dual-use items, a category covering items that can be used for peaceful as well as military purposes. This include products such as nitrous oxide, which is necessary for anesthetics and hence surgical operations, and helium, a chemical element used for cooling MRI scanners.Footnote 73 “Dual use” further includes spare parts for maintenance, as well as software for upgrades for products of US and EU origin, such as dialysis machines,Footnote 74 or equipment for infertility treatment. The list also has, but is not limited to, pipes (including water pipes), water pumps, and many kinds of essential construction or technical equipment that is used to treat solid waste or clean oil spills. Fertilizers, pesticides, and herbicides, which are of paramount importance for the revival of the agricultural sector, are also prohibited.
With many of these items being vital for the revival of essential sectors, including agriculture, health, and water management, INGOs and UN agencies have taken it upon themselves to import these items. While exemptions are theoretically available from OFAC and EU, interviewees have described the process of obtaining a license for the import of “dual-use” items as particularly lengthy, complex, and frequently unclear since the process involves different authorities and requires both technical and legal knowledge and expertise. Dual-use licenses are further made complex as they are governed by “randomness,” according to the interviewees, with identical requests receiving different decisions or none at all in some cases. In one reported case, and despite securing all necessary licenses, the shipping company refused to move such goods for fear of a technical violation of the sanctions.Footnote 75
IT and Electronics
Syria’s designation as a “State Sponsor of Terrorism” prohibits the export to the country of any product that contains 10 percent American-origin content. This functions as a blanket embargo on a wide range of items, such as computers and mobile phones, but could also involve routers, printers, copy machines and, importantly, software operating systems, such as Windows, and Google services, among others, as these are either American or contain US made components.
This hampers the work of humanitarian organizations directly and indirectly. For instance, two interviewees reported that their globally operated program management information technology (IT) system does not work in Syria because it is built by a US-based company. As a result, data related to operations in Syria is transported to a neighboring country for data entry, which causes delays, especially in the case of reporting, and opens the door for mistakes and fraud. It was further reported that IT consultants were increasingly refraining from engaging in any work that “has the word Syria in the description” because of payment delays and fear of inadvertent violations of sanctions.Footnote 76
Another interviewee reported that their organization’s staff had been requested not to “overuse” or “overburden” office equipment, as obtaining licenses for new devices or spare parts was difficult and demanding. For the latter reason, on frequent occasions, staff were asked to rely on their personal devices because of delays or rejections of licenses.Footnote 77 Another interviewee reported resorting to leasing routers instead of buying new devices, and then obfuscating expenses to cover the cost in order to avoid requesting licenses.Footnote 78
Besides operational problems, the “10% rule” also affects the security and safety of humanitarian actors. This is reflected in the prohibition on the import of radio telecommunications and car GPS devices, which are used across many UN agencies. For example, there is a UN agency that is central to the safety and security of the whole UN system; it is in charge of the UN Security Management System and is also in charge of interagency security coordination. The agency reported problems with regard to obtaining new devices or spare parts for its telecommunication devices. These devices are critical to the safety of UN staff, allowing their home offices to know where they are located, and enabling staff members in the field to call in case their safety is jeopardized. On several occasions, the lack of sufficient radios and GPS devices has led to cancellation or reduction in the number of missions, inhibited the ability of security coordinators and/or security focal points to track their staff during missions, and hindered effective reporting on security incidents by staff during or after field missions.
Telecommunication
Syria has two companies that provide mobile phone networks, Syriatel and MTN. While the latter is not under sanctions, it has limited coverage and is less reliable, as opposed to the former which is sanctioned but offers by far better service and is the only provider in certain parts of the country. While operational needs require and arguably justify the use of Syriatel, especially for safety related aspects, such as the ability to promptly report incidents in case of emergencies, several INGOs reported problems obtaining exemptions, at least initially. To avoid issuing licenses for the use of Syriatel, a representative of an INGO explained that his organization was encouraged by its European donor to use roaming services from a Lebanese network in areas where MTN does not work. This in turn hiked up costs and diverted funds from the organization’s intended objectives, prompting complaints from donors. In other cases, staff were requested to use their own phones and cover the expenses themselves.
The Indirect Impact of Sanctions: Currency Fluctuation and the Humanitarian Response
Currency Depreciation and Price Inflation
The continuous currency depreciation and price inflation has negatively affected humanitarian operations. As indicated earlier, and despite the presence of other contributing factors, there is a good case to link sanctions with severe inflation. Studies show that sanctions may, and, in some cases, do in fact trigger inflation, which in turn impacts the purchasing power of civilian populations and the economic stability of the sanctioned country.Footnote 79 This was the case in Syria, where every new wave of increasingly stringent sanctions triggered a new wave of currency depreciation. In the wake of the Caesar Act, which was concomitant to a financial crisis in neighboring Lebanon, the market exchange rate of the Syrian pound against the US dollar weakened by 224 percent in 2020. In reality, this meant that the Syrian pound tumbled from 435 to the US dollar to approximately 4,000 to the US dollar, and the pound lost around 750 percent of its value.Footnote 80 Given the reliance of Syria on imports, this quick and significant fall fed into higher domestic prices and caused high inflation. The World Bank estimates that inflation hit 114 percent in 2020 and 90 percent in 2021.Footnote 81
In response, the government intervened with several policies, however, to no or little avail. Indeed, some of these policies worsen the situation for aid organizations. For example, in areas under its control, the Syrian government maintains different exchange rates, including a lower and unfavorable one for humanitarian organizations. The gap between the two prices, let alone the price of the pound on the black market, is quite considerable and has resulted in huge financial losses.Footnote 82 Due to the prevailing uncertainty, INGOs report a constant struggle to decide on whether to get their money into Syria in large one-off payments, which in case of sudden changes in the value of the pound could lead to considerable losses; or smaller payments that are at risk, because of the uncertainty of being able to transfer money to Syria due to banking issues.
Furthermore, currency depreciation and price inflation have led to delays in the contracting process and have disrupted supply chains for various programs, as contractors were unable or unwilling to deliver goods and supplies according to previous agreements. As local contracts are signed in Syrian pounds, due to national regulations and because of fears of further devaluation, local contractors and suppliers are further reluctant to enter longer-term contracts.Footnote 83 This in turn has impacted relations with donors, where programs are delayed or not fully implemented because of budget shortages as a result of financial losses. In two cases, donors responded by imposing extra due diligence requirements for fear of manipulation or fraud.Footnote 84
Fuel
The purchase of fuel has been identified as one of the most complicated issues for humanitarian actors operating in Syria.Footnote 85 The challenge stems from the need for licenses from sanctioners, both in the US and EU, at least for some organizations, and the risk of dealing with potentially sanctioned entities or individuals, since only a select group of government-connected private contractors are allowed to import fuel. These contractors have a monopoly over the market, while distribution is predominantly carried out through the Syrian Company for the Storage and Distribution of Petroleum Products, a state-owned company. This situation, according to interviewees, leaves aid organizations in constant fear of reputational damage or inadvertent violations of sanctions and has rendered INGOs dependent on a handful of “vetted” fuel providers.
Another challenge includes the availability of fuel. Shortages impact the mobility of humanitarian actors as well as their ability to provide basic services to entities such as medical centers and schools. One interviewee reported that fuel shortages have led to a reduction in the number of field visits, which directly impacts the process of monitoring, reporting, and needs assessment. The lack of fuel has further hindered the ability to provide in-country support in the fields of food security and health, prompting the humanitarian community to seek the Syrian government’s permission to start its own seaborne import operation, and run a fuel depot for UN agencies and NGOs.Footnote 86
Conclusion
Despite sanctions on Syria being depicted as “smart” and “targeted,” this chapter joins previous studies showing that the direct and indirect impact of sanctions on humanitarian operations in Syria impede an effective humanitarian response. The chapter exposes the fundamental conflict between the sanctioners’ goal of using sanctions to respond to the human rights violations of the Syrian government, on the one hand, and the human rights violations that are then caused by the sanctions, on the other. It shows that while utilizing sanctions as a tool to protect and promote human rights is an attractive idea, sanctions can be counterproductive and have the potential to make circumstances considerably worse for legitimate actors, such as humanitarian organizations, and subsequently for their beneficiaries, innocent civilians.
In regard to the humanitarian exemptions that are incorporated into the sanctions regime, the chapter shows that they fall short of their intended task, and should not be realistically considered as able to mitigate the negative impact of sanctions. This chapter further shows that these exemptions are of very limited use, without greater clarity from sanctioners on what the exemptions entail or how they could be implemented. Further, the chapter demonstrates that exemptions are often rendered ineffective, where the process to obtain them is not streamlined and the requests are not processed within a reasonable time.
The post-earthquake humanitarian exceptions and carveouts are a case in point. In addition to their delayed introduction, well beyond the crucial three days necessary for successful rescue operations,Footnote 87 research and available reports show that the majority of humanitarian organizations continued to report similar problems to those that existed prior to the introduction of these exemptions and carveouts. While sending personal remittances was reported to have become easier and faster, problems faced by NGOs such as financial de-risking and overcompliance continued unabated, while export controls remained an obstacle for the import of lifesaving goods and other important items. Although some improvement has been reported in the time needed for money transfers, especially in the case of money destined to Türkiye, transfers to Syria still need months, in some cases more than six months. The short duration of these carveouts and exemptions, as well as the lack of clarity regarding their renewal, is yet another factor limiting their utility as this does not provide NGOs and humanitarian actors with guarantees to engage in long-term relief efforts.Footnote 88
The chapter also highlights the urgent need for action on the part of sanctioning states. Throughout the conflict, sanctioning states have denied that sanctions hinder the work of humanitarian actors, and sanctioners continue to point to the generous aid contributions to humanitarian organizations. While lamenting the damage of sanctions, sanctioners refuse to acknowledge responsibility for the obstruction of humanitarian operation and instead blame the Syrian government.Footnote 89 Nonetheless, the sanctions review by the US and several guidance notes released by the EU during and after the outbreak of the Corona virus represent an oblique acknowledgment of the direct harm of sanctions to humanitarian operations and legitimate businesses.Footnote 90 In the case of the US, the introduction of a general license for humanitarian goods pursuant to the UNSC Resolution 2664 has only had a very limited impact, with banks still hesitant to engage with organizations operating in Syria.Footnote 91 Furthermore, and in contrast to what humanitarian practitioners had hoped for following the introduction of the general license, the number of banks providing intermediary services dropped down to only one by early 2024.Footnote 92 Other steps by the US were also not sufficient,Footnote 93 and a more proactive approach is needed to protect and insulate the work of humanitarian organizations and other legitimate actors within the war-torn country.
Lastly, and given the extensive and unregulated use of sanctions against Syria and their harm to humanitarian operations, among others, this chapter should motivate questions about accountability for the negative impact of sanctions. It is admittedly a complex matter, due to the extent of the harm and damage caused by sanctions, the multiplicity of actors that could be held responsible, and other contributing factors in the conflict. But the question should nonetheless be seriously entertained. And while legal accountability may be unattainable for the time being, it should not mean that inquiry into this should be shelved or that other forms of political accountability, such as reparations and reforms to the current sanctions regimes, should not be pursued.
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