The 1954 Hague Convention and its Second Protocol

States party to the 1954 Hague Convention and its 1999 Second Protocol are required to submit national implementation reports every four years.Footnote ³⁷ As with other international law treaties, the provisions on reporting included in these instruments are brief and do not specify the type of information that parties must include in their reports.Footnote ³⁸ For instance, Article 37 of the Second Protocol merely states that “the Parties shall submit …, every four years, a report on the implementation of this Protocol”.Footnote ³⁹

Nonetheless, a complementary role has been played by the intergovernmental body established by the Second Protocol, namely the Committee for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (Second Protocol Committee), which consists of twelve parties elected by the Meeting of the Parties to the Second Protocol.Footnote ⁴⁰ This body has been mandated, among other functions, with considering national reports and supervising the implementation of the Protocol.Footnote ⁴¹ Within this framework, it developed in 2009 the Guidelines for the Implementation of the 1999 Second Protocol, providing, inter alia, guidance to States Parties vis-à-vis the content of their reports,Footnote ⁴² and has regularly updated them since then.Footnote ⁴³ In accordance with the Guidelines, States party to the Second Protocol must report on the implementation of provisions regarding the protection and enhanced protection of cultural property, criminal responsibility, dissemination, and technical assistance.Footnote ⁴⁴ The type of information required under each of these thematic areas is further specified therein.Footnote ⁴⁵ In addition, the Guidelines invite States party to the Second Protocol to follow the reporting period of the 1954 Hague Convention in order to align the reporting cycles under these instruments.Footnote ⁴⁶

The UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Secretariat of the 1954 Hague Convention and its two (1954 and 1999) Protocols has also taken several steps to standardize the reporting procedure and guide parties throughout this process – for instance, by creating a list of issues that parties to the 1954 Hague Convention should consider in their reports.Footnote ⁴⁷ Moreover, at the request of the Second Protocol Committee, the Secretariat has prepared an electronic question form for the submission of reports under the 1954 Hague Convention and its two Protocols.Footnote ⁴⁸ A revised version of the aforementioned questionnaire, along with a model report on the implementation of the above instruments, was prepared by the Secretariat and presented at the 14th Meeting of the Second Protocol Committee in 2019.Footnote ⁴⁹ The revision of the reporting format was also among the recommendations provided in the evaluation report of UNESCO’s cultural conventions by the organization’s Internal Oversight Service (IOS), which encouraged the Secretariat to revise the reporting form “in order to improve the quality, utility and rapidity [of periodic reports], as well as to address the low reporting rate for national reports”.Footnote ⁵⁰

The revised questionnaire adopted during the 14th Meeting in 2019 was used during the reporting cycle of 2017–20, where forty-six out of eighty-four parties to the Second Protocol and sixty out of 133 High Contracting Parties to the 1954 Hague Convention submitted reports.Footnote ⁵¹ As the report by the UNESCO Secretariat regarding the 2017–20 reporting cycle notes, these numbers are significantly higher than those for the 2013–16 reporting cycle.Footnote ⁵² Indeed, the reporting rate for States party to the 1954 Hague Convention has increased from 27% in the 2013–16 reporting cycle to 45% for the 2017–20 cycle, a fact that can be attributed to the revised electronic questionnaire and the preparation of a model report on the implementation of the 1954 Hague Convention and its two Protocols by the Secretariat, as well as increased international attention to these instruments.Footnote ⁵³ Before the 2013–16 reporting cycle, the numbers of reports submitted under the 1954 Hague Convention, albeit significantly lower, were also on the rise. Specifically, the reporting rate of 16% for the 2008–10 cycle rose to 21% in the 2011–13 cycle.Footnote ⁵⁴

The Secretariat’s report for the 2017–20 reporting cycle also includes a statistical overview of the implementation of the 1954 Hague Conventions and its Protocols which highlights, among other issues, the reporting rates per geographical group of States Parties.Footnote ⁵⁵ In terms of the information included in reports, it is worth mentioning that the vast majority of States have reported the adoption of preparatory measures such as “the elaboration of inventories, the dissemination of information to the public, the adoption of basic training related to [IHL] to the military, and the adoption of national legislation”.Footnote ⁵⁶ A statistical overview focusing on the number of States Parties (per geographical group) that have adopted relevant implementation measures was also included in the report prepared by the Secretariat for the 2013–16 reporting cycle, wherein the Secretariat noted that the dissemination of the 1954 Hague Convention and its Second Protocol and the adoption of preparatory measures by States party to the Protocol had been particularly successful.Footnote ⁵⁷ It should be noted, however, that the Secretariat’s reports rely on the information communicated by States Parties in their implementation reports and do not make any type of assessment regarding the value or veracity of the information included therein.Footnote ⁵⁸

At the time of writing, a process aimed at aligning national reporting across all of UNESCO’s cultural conventions, which focuses on a single global submission date, revised reporting forms, a new common reporting platform, and joint reporting-related capacity-building activities, is ongoing.Footnote ⁵⁹ In addition, further reform of the reporting process under the 1954 Hague Conventions and its two Protocols, including the online questionnaire, is under consideration by the Secretariat, in close consultation with States Parties.Footnote ⁶⁰ Reflections have so far focused on the revision of the questionnaire’s format to “enable the Secretariat to collect more relevant and accurate statistical and quantitative data, and to develop more pertinent needs assessments in order to offer tailored assistance to States Parties”, as the reliance of the questionnaire on “yes or no” check boxes has been considered to limit the scope of the information provided.Footnote ⁶¹ Other relevant considerations include the use of a thematic approach in the questionnaire, which is currently organized by instrument, to avoid the duplication of information submitted by States Parties.Footnote ⁶²

In terms of the supervision of the reporting process, the Second Protocol Committee is vested, among other tasks, with the mandate “to consider and comment on reports of the Parties [to the Second Protocol], to seek clarifications as required, and prepare its own report on the implementation of this Protocol for the Meeting of the Parties”.Footnote ⁶³ Recent practice by the Second Protocol Committee demonstrates that it takes into account reports submitted under both the Second Protocol and the 1954 Hague Convention when exercising its mandate to consider national reports.Footnote ⁶⁴ This practice was encouraged by the UNESCO Secretariat given the close link between the implementation of the Second Protocol and the 1954 Hague Convention.Footnote ⁶⁵ This is a positive development considering that the 1954 Hague Convention did not establish a body similar to the Second Protocol Committee,Footnote ⁶⁶ and that the engagement with national reporting by the Meetings of High Contracting Parties to the 1954 Hague Convention has been limited.Footnote ⁶⁷

However, an examination of the Committee’s practice highlights that this body merely consults the reports prepared by the Secretariat on the basis of the national reports received, without giving actual consideration to the information included therein, passing comment or seeking clarifications in line with its mandate under the Second Protocol.Footnote ⁶⁸ For instance, during the Fifth Meeting of the Second Protocol Committee in 2010, the consideration of the thematic summary of national reports (prepared by the Secretariat) was limited to a comment by the chairperson of the Committee on the number of reports submitted by States,Footnote ⁶⁹ while the final report of the Eighth Meeting of the Committee in 2013 merely stated that the intergovernmental body discussed the document prepared by the Secretariat (on national reports), without specifying what the discussion had covered.Footnote ⁷⁰ Following the adoption and use of an electronic questionnaire for the submission of national reports, the Secretariat has been able to collect statistical data for each question and incorporate them in its reports prepared for the Committee’s consideration.Footnote ⁷¹ In spite of the new format in which the information submitted by States Parties is organized and presented by the Secretariat, the final report and decision of the Committee during its 16th Meeting in 2021 showed that the intergovernmental body had not engaged in depth with the information included in the Secretariat’s report.Footnote ⁷²

The only case where a State party to the Second Protocol and member of the Committee has commented on the report of another State Party and referenced the Committee’s mandate to consider national reports as the basis for this action was during the 12th Meeting of the Committee in 2017. During that meeting, Azerbaijan commented, as a member of the Committee, on Armenia’s implementation report and sought clarifications on the information submitted in relation to the situation of Nagorno-Karabakh.Footnote ⁷³ The request for clarifications regarding Armenia’s periodic report by Azerbaijan prompted exchanges between these two countries,Footnote ⁷⁴ but, as the decisions adopted during that session confirm, it did not result in any action by the Committee.Footnote ⁷⁵ The exchanges between Armenia and Azerbaijan appear to be a unique incident as no similar practice has been observed in previous or subsequent meetings of the Committee. Nonetheless, this incident was sufficient to highlight that the intergovernmental nature of the Committee could pose challenges to the implementation of its mandate to consider national reports, specifically the manner in which it would publicly engage with this function, and expose its meetings to politicization risks, particularly when the discussion singles out specific States and when comments or clarifications are provided or requested by an individual member of the Committee instead of the Committee as a collective body.

Moreover, the decision adopted by the Second Protocol Committee during its 12th Meeting (concerning the consideration of national reports) requested the Secretariat to present to the 14th Meeting two reports: an analytical report presenting best practices by States Parties, and a report “analyzing the challenges met by the High Contracting Parties and formulating actions to address them, referring as appropriate to the High Contracting Parties’ best practices”.Footnote ⁷⁶ The Secretariat’s report on the latter topic highlighted shortcomings in the adoption of preparatory measures for the protection of cultural property from the foreseeable consequences of armed conflict, the training of military personnel, the adoption of national criminal legislation, and the planning of awareness-raising initiatives related to the need to protect cultural property.Footnote ⁷⁷ In terms of best practices by States Parties, the preparation of inventories, the adoption of measures to transport cultural property to safe locations, systematic mapping using the Blue Shield, the development of rules of engagement specific to the protection of cultural property, the establishment of a working group comprising civilian and military actors, and the adoption of digital maps to facilitate the identification of cultural property during the conduct of hostilities are some examples of best practices identified by the Secretariat in line with its methodology.Footnote ⁷⁸ While the Secretariat submitted the two above-mentioned reports to the 14th Meeting of the Committee held in 2019, the latter did not take any action in relation to the challenges identified by the Secretariat or the measures proposed to address them.Footnote ⁷⁹ The Committee merely took note of the challenges identified by the Secretariat and encouraged “the Members of the Committee as well as all other Parties to the Second Protocol to disseminate and promote their good practices”.Footnote ⁸⁰

The preparation by the Secretariat of an analytical report regarding good practices by States Parties was also included in the decision adopted by the 16th Meeting of the Committee in 2021 (in relation to national reports).Footnote ⁸¹ The analytical report prepared by the Secretariat, which relied on the national reports submitted for the 2017–20 reporting cycle, provides “suggestions, guidance, and examples to help States Parties to reinforce their national policies”, and refers to the guiding documents that the Secretariat prepared to assist parties with specific implementation issues such as establishing a National Advisory Committee, military services to safeguard respect for cultural property, civilian and military trainings, and capacity-building measures.Footnote ⁸² In addition, the report provides recommendations in relation to the 2021–24 reporting cycle and states the Secretariat’s readiness to engage in consultations with States with a view to reforming the reporting process.Footnote ⁸³ On the basis of the analytical report submitted by the Secretariat, the 17th Meeting of the Committee endorsed the guiding documents prepared by the Secretariat, accepted its recommendations concerning the potential reform of the reporting process, and encouraged it to continue pursuing capacity-building initiatives.Footnote ⁸⁴

Given the above examples, the Second Protocol Committee may not take action despite the fact that it has requested the Secretariat to carry out preparatory work that would facilitate such action, or if it does, it may adopt the Secretariat’s recommendations and suggestions without mandating any other action based on its own initiative. A similar observation, which also touches upon the points raised above regarding the consideration of reports by the Committee, is included in the 2024 evaluation report of UNESCO’s periodic reporting by the IOS. Specifically, the report notes that while national reporting is included in the agenda of the governing bodies of all UNESCO conventions, little time is allocated to discussion and follow-up.Footnote ⁸⁵ Given this situation, the recommendations provided by the IOS note that “follow-up measures that motivate States to improve both in reporting and in implementation” could help strengthen the reporting process alongside other steps.Footnote ⁸⁶

The analysis carried out in this section has demonstrated that certain challenges experienced by the reporting systems of other international treaties are also applicable to the 1954 Hague Convention and its Second Protocol. These include low reporting rates, the overlap of information relevant to the implementation of these instruments in the current reporting form, and the superficial consideration of national reports by monitoring bodies. In addition, the examination of the reporting process under the 1954 Hague Convention and its Second Protocol has underlined the importance of an institutional framework and mechanisms to support the operation and efficiency of the reporting system.

Weapons conventions

States party to weapons conventions must comply with reporting requirements often referred to as “transparency measures”.Footnote ⁸⁷ This is the case for all weapons-related conventions examined in this article.Footnote ⁸⁸ In the context of these instruments, information-sharing takes place through the submission of declarations, initial and annual reports or confidence-building measures.Footnote ⁸⁹

The reporting requirements either form part of the treaty obligations accepted by States Parties when the relevant instrument was adopted, or they have been introduced at a later stage.Footnote ⁹⁰ For instance, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) did not provide for a reporting procedure at the time of its adoption.Footnote ⁹¹ In 1986, its Second Review Conference agreed on the implementation of “politically binding” confidence-building measures by States Parties with the objective of “prevent[ing] or reduc[ing] the occurrence of ambiguities, doubts and suspicions, and in order to improve international co-operation in the field of peaceful bacteriological (biological) activities”.Footnote ⁹² Subsequent Review Conferences of the States Parties to the BWC elaborated the format and content of confidence-building measures, which consist in the submission of annual reports covering various topics such as “exchange of information on research centers and laboratories” and “declaration of legislation, regulations and other measures”.Footnote ⁹³ In addition, the Sixth Review Conference that took place in 2006 established an Implementation Support Unit, composed of staff of the UN Department of Disarmament Affairs, which, among other functions, serves as the Secretariat for the Meetings of States Parties to the BWC and assists with the exchange of confidence-building measures.Footnote ⁹⁴

National confidence-building reports constitute “the core and formal mechanism” on the basis of which States party to the BWC exchange information.Footnote ⁹⁵ However, as one commentator submits, “the overall participation rates have been low, and the politically binding nature of the … process is contested, with a number of states considering participation voluntary instead”.Footnote ⁹⁶ Indeed, the reporting rate for the year 2022 was 54%, a percentage that has slightly increased to 57% in 2023 and 60% in 2024.Footnote ⁹⁷

Concerning other treaties prohibiting weapons of mass destruction,Footnote ⁹⁸ the reporting obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) are “elaborate and demanding” and the information submitted by States Parties is verified by the Convention’s implementation body, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).Footnote ⁹⁹ In the case of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, its reporting obligations are limited except in instances where a nuclear-armed State, or a former one, becomes party to it.Footnote ¹⁰⁰

Other weapons conventions, such as the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (AP Mine Ban Convention), the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM), Amended Protocol II on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) and Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War to the CCW, have directly incorporated reporting obligations for their States Parties.Footnote ¹⁰¹ For instance, States party to the CCM, the reporting requirements of which are modelled after those included in the AP Mine Ban Convention,Footnote ¹⁰² undertake to provide information on national implementation measures, the number of cluster munitions owned or possessed, their technical characteristics, the location of contaminated areas, and the status of programmes for the destruction and clearance of cluster munitions remnants, as well as the measures adopted to provide risk education.Footnote ¹⁰³ At the same time, its States Parties are also requested to report “on newly discovered stockpiles, victim assistance, national points of contact, national resources, and international cooperation and assistance”.Footnote ¹⁰⁴ Because of this, the reporting obligations under the CCM have been considered to introduce “a new baseline for transparency measures in future humanitarian and disarmament treaties”.Footnote ¹⁰⁵

It is also worth noting that, as with the BWC, the meetings of States party to the instruments mentioned in the above paragraph have also established Implementation Support Units.Footnote ¹⁰⁶ In the case of the CCW, the Implementation Support Unit provides, among other functions, administrative support to the Meetings and Conferences of the High Contracting Parties to the CCW, Amended Protocol II and Protocol V, and serves as “a focal point for submission of information by and to the High Contracting Parties related to the Convention and its annexed Protocols”.Footnote ¹⁰⁷ Moreover, the Conference of High Contracting Parties to Protocol V has adopted a Guide to National Reporting under CCW Protocol V which consists of a checklist of questions to assist States Parties in completing the national reporting forms.Footnote ¹⁰⁸ Similarly, the guide to reporting adopted by the Meeting of the States Parties to the AP Mine Ban Convention provides simplified and up-to-date guidance to States on how to fulfil their reporting duties, aiming to “consolidate and streamline over 16 years of decisions on reporting”, “ease the reporting burden” and “promote transparency”.Footnote ¹⁰⁹ While acknowledging the progress achieved by States Parties in their reporting practices, the Fifth Review Conference of States Parties to the AP Mine Ban Convention held in 2025 noted that “improvements can be made to align [States Parties’] reports more closely to the Guide to Reporting adopted by the States Parties”.Footnote ¹¹⁰

Concerning States’ compliance with their reporting obligations, seventy-six out of 161 parties to the AP Mine Ban Convention submitted a report in 2018, setting the reporting rate at 47%.Footnote ¹¹¹ In 2022, 46% of States Parties submitted reports, a percentage that increased to 49% in 2023.Footnote ¹¹² These figures show that, as the Fifth Review Conference noted, the “global reporting rates continue to stagnate at approximately 50%”.Footnote ¹¹³

In their reports, States party to the AP Mine Ban Convention must provide information on the implementation of core obligations applicable to them, including mine clearance, stockpile destruction, victim assistance, retention of anti-personnel mines for permitted purposes, and national implementation measures.Footnote ¹¹⁴ Compliance with reporting requirements under some of the above thematic areas has been high:Footnote ¹¹⁵ in 2018, for instance, the reporting rates in relation to mine clearance and stockpile destruction by States Parties implementing such obligations were 90% and 100% respectively.Footnote ¹¹⁶ However, in other areas such as the retention of anti-personnel mines and national implementation measures, the reporting rates for States Parties concerned were significantly lower, at 62% and 18.9% respectively.Footnote ¹¹⁷ The 62% reporting rate for mine retention remained approximately the same in 2024 – specifically, as of 15 September 2024, only thirty-six out of sixty-one parties retaining mines (59%) had complied with their reporting requirements.Footnote ¹¹⁸ Given the above, reporting on the retention of anti-personnel mines and national implementation measures remains a priority for States Parties concerned.Footnote ¹¹⁹

Concerning States Parties’ compliance with the reporting requirements under Protocol V to the CCW, the report by the Implementation Support Unit of the CCW notes that “on average, each year, 55% of High Contracting Parties [to Protocol V] submitted a national annual report since the adoption of the Protocol in 2005”.Footnote ¹²⁰ The reporting rates under Protocol V, along with those under the AP Mine Ban Convention and the BWC, therefore highlight that, on average, approximately half of the parties to the above instruments provide national reports.

In terms of monitoring activities that complement information-sharing by States Parties, it is only in the context of the CWC that the information submitted by States Parties is verified by the treaty’s implementation body, which in this case is the OPCW.Footnote ¹²¹ In other weapons conventions, the reporting function is linked to the work undertaken by other bodies, particularly the COPs. For instance, the Meetings of the States Parties to both the AP Mine Ban Convention and the CCM are mandated to convene on a periodic basis and consider, among other issues, matters that arise from the submission of national reports.Footnote ¹²² The above observation also applies to Amended Protocol II and Protocol V to the CCW.Footnote ¹²³

The plenary fora for States party to Protocol V, namely the Conferences of the High Contracting Parties, have established informal Meetings of Experts as a consultation and cooperation mechanism focused on specific implementation issues, including national reporting; the outcomes of these meetings are then considered by the annual conferences.Footnote ¹²⁴ For example, the section titled “National Reporting” included in the report of the 2022 Meeting of Experts discusses the reporting obligations of States party to Protocol V, the importance of the reporting function, and the number of reports submitted at the time the Meeting of Experts was convened.Footnote ¹²⁵ Following a presentation by the Implementation Support Unit in relation to the reporting rate, which, as mentioned above, is approximately 55%, the president-designate of the Meeting of Experts stated that “he intends to reach out to all High Contracting Parties which irregularly or rarely submit national annual reports, to assist in identifying issues, and possible solutions”.Footnote ¹²⁶ The 16th Conference of the High Contracting Parties to Protocol V, held in 2022, took note of the Meeting of Experts’ report and decided that “High Contracting Parties are to continue with their efforts to encourage a higher rate of national reporting”, including reflecting on measures to enhance their reporting methodology.Footnote ¹²⁷ The need to implement transparency measures and increase reporting rates was also stressed during the Meeting of Experts in 2024.Footnote ¹²⁸

The Meeting of States Parties to the AP Mine Ban Convention has also established Standing Committees of Experts in order to “[facilitate and support] the functioning of the Convention by maintaining practical work at a high level and with particular emphasis on international cooperation among governments, international organizations and non-governmental organizations”.Footnote ¹²⁹ For example, in response to the low reporting rates on national implementation measures under the AP Mine Ban Convention, one of the Standing Committees, namely the Committee on Cooperative Compliance, organized a workshop to reflect on the status of implementation and to promote awareness of the significance of reporting on this topic and the tools available to States in this regard.Footnote ¹³⁰

Based on the analysis carried out in this section, the following trends can be observed. First, all treaties examined include a reporting component, a fact which confirms that national reporting is a “staple” of weapons conventions, aimed at promoting transparency among parties and enhancing confidence within the treaty regime.Footnote ¹³¹ Notwithstanding the strong focus on transparency and information exchange, the reporting systems of the instruments analyzed are impacted by low reporting rates similar to other treaties. Second, supervision of the reporting procedure varies across the instruments analyzed, with the majority of them relying on mechanisms that focus on consultations, cooperation and regular exchanges among parties. The establishment of an elaborate verification process in the case of the CWC is the exception. Third, similar to the observations drawn in relation to the 1954 Hague Convention and its Second Protocol, the analysis of the reporting systems of weapons-related conventions underlines the importance of an institutionalized framework that provides support to States Parties in fulfilling their reporting obligations, oversees the reporting process and facilitates exchanges among parties on key implementation issues including national reporting.

Reports submitted to the UN General Assembly on the status of the Additional Protocols

As explored above, the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their 1977 Additional Protocols do not include a mandatory periodic reporting system. This absence could be explained both by the historical context in which the Geneva Conventions were adopted, a period in which reporting activities were uncommon, and by the lack of an institutionalized meeting of the States Parties devoted to their review, as the International Conferences have not been envisaged to accommodate potential reporting reviews.

Nonetheless, reporting activities have progressively emerged in other venues, particularly within the UN. This trend originated from the ratification process of the Additional Protocols, after the UN General Assembly requested the UN Secretary-General to report on the state of signatures and ratifications of these treaties in 1977.Footnote ¹³² This task was originally arranged by the Secretary-General through a list provided by Switzerland, but in 1982, the General Assembly adopted a resolution introducing this issue as an item that has been biannually present in General Assembly sessions since then.Footnote ¹³³ Its purpose was still to invite States to adhere to such treaties, but on that occasion the Secretary-General was instructed to arrange a report “on the status of the Protocols based on information received from Member States”. Therefore, even if the official list of signatures and ratifications was (and still is) included in the Secretary-General’s reports, States had the opportunity to directly provide information, mentioning preparatory activities, ongoing bills, or reasons for not yet endorsing the Additional Protocols, or communicating positive ratification processes. The success of this initiative was, however, quite limited: while twelve States submitted information in 1984,Footnote ¹³⁴ for multiple subsequent reports less than ten States engaged in this reporting activity. Numbers dropped dramatically in 1998, when only Uruguay provided information.Footnote ¹³⁵

Still, before long, States had started to use this survey exercise to also provide information on other domestic activities helpful for the implementation of IHL. An early example can be found in the second Secretary-General’s report submitted in 1986, where Denmark, which in 1984 had already communicated its ratification of the Additional Protocols,Footnote ¹³⁶ did not miss the opportunity to inform on the constitution of its National IHL Committee, highlighting that body’s competence, membership and early activities.Footnote ¹³⁷ It was not until the 1990s, however, that other examples of reports used to share information on national initiatives, along with ratification status, could be identified. For instance, in 1992 Hungary carried out an extensive overview of domestic legislation, activities by the Hungarian Red Cross, and IHL training and dissemination to armed forces and the public,Footnote ¹³⁸ and in 1994 Bolivia and Sweden reported on the establishment and activities of their National IHL Committees.Footnote ¹³⁹ This was followed by similar information provided in 1996 by Australia and Ukraine,Footnote ¹⁴⁰ and in 1998 by Uruguay.Footnote ¹⁴¹

In the 2000s, this reporting exercise was mainly used to facilitate the sharing of information on domestic and international initiatives rather than to provide an update on the ratification of the Additional Protocols. In 2000, for instance, six out of the eleven reporting States (Austria, Hungary, Italy, Norway, Portugal and Venezuela) included information related to activities such as law-making efforts, National IHL Committees, training and dissemination for the armed forces and the population, engagement in international fora, and partnership with the ICRC and other actors, including a general plea of political support for IHL.Footnote ¹⁴² Also in 2000, for the first time, lengthy information provided by the ICRC on its activities was included in the UN Secretary-General’s report, based on the possibility provided in the 1998 General Assembly resolution.Footnote ¹⁴³ In the subsequent report, in 2002, only one State (Mexico) reported on the ratification of the Additional Protocols, while Burkina Faso, Chile, Croatia, Mauritius, Nicaragua and the Philippines provided qualitative information on national or international activities,Footnote ¹⁴⁴ a trend that has been constantly present in subsequent reporting cycles.

This shift of focus was also reflected in the content of biannual UN General Assembly resolutions. Even if they were still calling for the ratification of the Additional Protocols, these resolutions progressively became omnibus IHL resolutions highlighting international initiatives and reiterating political endorsement for IHL. In particular, since 1998,Footnote ¹⁴⁵ operative paragraphs of General Assembly resolutions have been used to mention and commend international IHL initiatives carried out in the reporting period, mark the adoption of new treaties and invite States to ratify them, celebrate periodic International Conferences, and encourage States to engage in a series of activities. This trend is exemplified through General Assembly Resolution 79/123 of 2024, which encourages States to accept the International Fact-Finding Commission and to ratify the 1954 Hague Convention, its Protocols, and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights to Child, and welcomes resolutions adopted at the 34th International Conference, the activities of the ICRC Advisory Service and efforts made by States to implement IHL.Footnote ¹⁴⁶

Engagement by States on this reporting exercise has continued to attract attention, with an average of twenty States contributing to the Secretary-General’s reports for each biannual cycle since the beginning of the 2000s (at a peak of thirty-seven States in 2010),Footnote ¹⁴⁷ even if a more significant number of States actively engage in dialogues during meetings at the General Assembly’s Sixth Committee. For instance, while reports in 2022 and 2024 contained written information provided by twenty-six and nineteen States respectively, oral debates at Sixth Committee sessions involved thirty-two and thirty-four States respectively,Footnote ¹⁴⁸ with some of them also speaking on behalf of broader groups of States. Indeed, the Sixth Committee has become a complementary venue to the Secretary-General’s reports for presenting information and engaging in political dialogue on IHL.

In this way, the Sixth Committee’s sessions have now assumed a twofold character. On the one hand, debates permit some States to complement at a later stage the set of information already shared by other States with the Secretary-General. Indeed, information included in their statements, focusing on their national and international initiatives, is not dissimilar in content to documents included in the Secretary-General’s reports.Footnote ¹⁴⁹ On the other hand, activities at the Sixth Committee have a more political dimension, as they are also used to reiterate political commitment toward values enshrined in IHL rules, highlight the contemporary relevance of some IHL issues, endorse ongoing international initiatives, and express concerns for alleged violations, globally or with regard to specific armed conflicts. This latter element might lead to a partial politicization of the process, as recorded in the past,Footnote ¹⁵⁰ such as in 2022Footnote ¹⁵¹ and 2024.Footnote ¹⁵² Specific concerns for compliance with IHL can also emerge in the same national reports. Reference could be made to the 2024 submission provided by Azerbaijan, almost totally devoted to alleged violations suffered in hostilities involving Armenia,Footnote ¹⁵³ while this latter State included similar claims in its 2022 report, along with information highlighting efforts for domestic implementation.Footnote ¹⁵⁴

Some final remarks on this reporting initiative are warranted. First, States largely autonomously engaged in transforming it beyond the original purpose provided by the General Assembly, which was limited to pushing for the ratification of the Additional Protocols. Indeed, States progressively recognized the merit of externally presenting domestic measures aimed at facilitating compliance with IHL and information related to their engagement in international initiatives, based on a trend that is now fully consolidated. Second, statements related to reporting activities held at the General Assembly’s Sixth Committee progressively included a political component, reaffirming the commitment of States toward IHL, providing an endorsement for ongoing initiatives or, conversely, expressing concerns about alleged violations. Third, taking advantage of the biannual character of this reporting initiative, the Sixth Committee permits a recurrent opportunity for States to engage with IHL, also allowing small and medium-sized States to easily contribute to debates through their Permanent Missions present at the UN. Additionally, this reporting initiative has the merit of permitting States interested in sharing their good practices to take advantage of a facilitated procedure, one that is certainly less cumbersome than the national voluntary reports examined in the next section. Indeed, even if States are encouraged, for the purposes of facilitating standardization, “to consider the convenience of using a questionnaire as drafted by Member States, with the assistance of the ICRC”,Footnote ¹⁵⁵ with an indirect reference to the template developed by the UK,Footnote ¹⁵⁶ no mandatory formats are in place. States are therefore able to be flexible in providing only selective information on the most relevant updates rather than a comprehensive overview.

Still, some caveats should be made. First, there is no oversight mechanism for information shared by States. This might raise concerns about the accuracy and consistency of such information, with the additional potential flaw of making submissions and statements a static exercise that lacks engagement on their content, even if, as mentioned above, statements have sometimes led to debates. Second, States are totally free to identify what to report, and as a result, the quality and amount of shared information can vary drastically. Third, the numbers of involved States and their geographical representation could apparently be qualified as limited. For instance, in 2024, ten out of nineteen States that submitted reports belonged to States of the UN Eastern European Group and Western European and Others Group, while in 2022, fourteen States out of twenty-six that shared reports belonged to those groups.Footnote ¹⁵⁷ Still, such quantitative data can be complemented by States’ engagement at the UN General Assembly Sixth Committee in order to provide a broader overview. As mentioned above, in 2022, thirty-two States participated in oral debates at the Committee, a number that increased to thirty-four in 2024, with several of them speaking on behalf of other States.Footnote ¹⁵⁸ Even if a certain number still belong to the Eastern European Group and the Western European and Others Group, a very significant portion of intervening States are outside these areas, making sessions more geographically balanced.

In any case, regardless of potential flaws, it is hard to dispute that the reporting mechanism linked to this General Assembly agenda item has started to play a significant role in this area, not only providing a way to engage in technical analysis on the implementation of some IHL obligations but also vesting this process with a more political dimension and making it a recurrent event in the agenda of IHL reporting activities.

National voluntary reports

Apart from initiatives managed within multilateral fora, further reporting activities have autonomously been carried out by States through national voluntary reports, which the ICRC defines as

Some early examples of voluntary reports can be identified in those arranged by Germany and Poland since the early 2000s.Footnote ¹⁶⁰ However, a major shift can be recorded in recent times, linked to the proposal tabled in 2015, at the 32nd International Conference, to establish a “Meeting of States on IHL”. The Concluding Report related to draft Resolution 2, which should have endorsed the initiative, maintained that “[a] periodic reporting function is an important tool for strengthening respect for IHL and should be an essential component of a regular Meeting of States”.Footnote ¹⁶¹ Unfortunately, the overall proposal was ultimately not endorsed,Footnote ¹⁶² but it does shed light on potential initiatives in this area, as maintained in the 2019 Resolution 1 adopted by the 33rd International Conference, recommending that States should share good practices.Footnote ¹⁶³ This plea for action has indeed been adopted by a series of States that have recently adopted their first voluntary report or have updated early documents (Argentina, 2024;Footnote ¹⁶⁴ Bulgaria, 2021;Footnote ¹⁶⁵ Canada, 2024;Footnote ¹⁶⁶ Costa Rica, 2024;Footnote ¹⁶⁷ Germany, fourth report in 2020;Footnote ¹⁶⁸ Italy, 2023;Footnote ¹⁶⁹ Poland, fifth report in 2024;Footnote ¹⁷⁰ Romania, 2021;Footnote ¹⁷¹ Switzerland, 2020 and 2024;Footnote ¹⁷² Ukraine, 2024;Footnote ¹⁷³ United Kingdom, 2019 and 2024;Footnote ¹⁷⁴ Uruguay, 2022Footnote ¹⁷⁵), complemented by some experiences in Africa through reports not made public.Footnote ¹⁷⁶ This process was consolidated at the 34th International Conference in 2024, where Resolution 1 encouraged States “to consider drafting voluntary reports on their domestic implementation of IHL”.Footnote ¹⁷⁷ It could therefore be expected that voluntary reports may become commonplace in IHL reporting activities.

Regarding the actors to be involved, the ICRC maintains that such documents should have official endorsement by States’ authorities and must imply their involvement. This is commonly achieved under the aegis of National IHL Committees, as recognized in several voluntary reports.Footnote ¹⁷⁸ This official character is also reflected in forewords written by ministers of foreign affairs, as occurred for the British (co-signed by the Ministry of Defence), Bulgarian, Costa Rican, Italian, Polish and Swiss reports. In other instances, the Ministry of Defence, rather than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, could take the lead, as exemplified by the Ukrainian report.Footnote ¹⁷⁹

In some cases, it is possible to recognize the complementary role played by National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (National Societies) through support for research and drafting activities, as exemplified by the British, Bulgarian and Italian reports.Footnote ¹⁸⁰ Furthermore, multi-stakeholder consultations have often been carried out. Apart from entities formally present in National IHL Committees, other governmental and non-governmental entities, as well as academics, have been consulted, as mentioned in the Italian, Polish and Swiss reportsFootnote ¹⁸¹ and exemplified by credits to multiple actors in the Italian and Polish reports.

Concerning the structure of voluntary reports, it should be noted that there is no fixed model, even if mentoring activities in this area, such as the report toolkit elaborated by the UK government and the British Red CrossFootnote ¹⁸² or the structure template provided by the ICRC Advisory Service,Footnote ¹⁸³ could favour standardization. Generally speaking, reports typically provide a review of the implementation of IHL at the domestic level, with focuses on mapping ratification of IHL instruments; identifying domestic IHL stakeholders, including National IHL Committees and National Societies; IHL military training and dissemination; protection of persons and objects, including emblems; means and methods of warfare; and war crimes. Analytic reviews are commonly complemented by tables listing relevant IHL treaties and domestic implementing instruments, sometimes including a list of non-binding IHL political declarations endorsed by the State, thus confirming the relevant role of those latter instruments.Footnote ¹⁸⁴ There are exceptions to this common structure, however, as exemplified by Costa Rica’s report: this report mainly maps relevant national institutions and political efforts at the international level, clearly in light of Costa Rica being one of the few States without any armed forces.

Even though reports routinely address common key areas, nothing prevents States from tailoring such instruments to highlight specific elements of interest both in relation to distinctive substantive IHL areas and in relation to the political commitment of the concerned State toward IHL. On the one hand, regarding the substantive content, the introduction to the 2024 UK report mentions how the updating process was an opportunity to focus on “new topics”, such as media professionals in armed conflict, public curiosity, and new technologies,Footnote ¹⁸⁵ while the updated Swiss report has added a new section on “Current Issues”, such as humanitarian exemptions to sanctions, missing persons, and new technologies.Footnote ¹⁸⁶ On the other hand, a recurring characteristic of voluntary reports is their use to highlight, for an external audience, the diplomatic activities carried out by the concerned State in this area, providing a political dividend for that State. In some cases, this element is addressed in separate sections in order to accentuate its relevance. For instance, the Polish report includes more than ten pages on IHL issues addressed by Poland at UN fora,Footnote ¹⁸⁷ in line with similar sections elaborated by UruguayFootnote ¹⁸⁸ or by Costa Rica, whose report is half-devoted to its involvement in international initiatives.Footnote ¹⁸⁹ Aside from such distinctive drafting techniques, multiple national reports do not fail to highlight the engagement of States in several universal fora,Footnote ¹⁹⁰ including paying specific attention to pledges presented at International Conferences, as exemplified by the Italian and Polish reports.Footnote ¹⁹¹ Similarly, some reports have increasingly emphasized, as distinctive elements, domestic good practices, both through separate boxes, as in the Italian and Swiss reports, or in the main narrative, as in the UK and Canadian reports. While good practices are usually linked to legislation or domestic documents, concrete practice developed in relation to armed conflicts may also be present, as exemplified by the Ukrainian report.Footnote ¹⁹²

The absence of fixed models is reflected in the length and narrative style of States’ voluntary reports. These instruments are commonly limited to a few dozen pages, though regular updating can sometimes make them more substantial. An example of this is provided by the fifth Polish report, which reached around 130 pages, adding roughly thirty pages in comparison to the previous 2019 edition; the second UK report, meanwhile, has almost doubled the previous edition in page length. Voluntary reports are commonly elaborated in plain language. This choice is intentional, as highlighted by Romania emphasizing that its report was drafted “in an accessible way to anyone interested in such matters, including the public”,Footnote ¹⁹³ or by the United Kingdom, which through “the question-and answer format seeks to provide a record of the United Kingdom’s implementation in an accessible way to anyone with an interest in IHL matters”.Footnote ¹⁹⁴ This Q&A model has since also been adopted by Ukraine.

States commonly make reports publicly available, including in an electronic format for posting on the websites of relevant institutions. This can permit them to expand their outreach both within the same institutions involved in the drafting process, originally limited to top-level and technical offices, and with external stakeholders, such as members of parliament or non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Sometimes voluntary reports cannot be publicly disclosed, however, potentially in light of challenges to obtaining political clearance or an interest in keeping the conversation internal among concerned stakeholders; this has occurred for some reports on file with the ICRC Advisory Service.Footnote ¹⁹⁵ For States deciding to publish their reports, translation into English is a common practice, and currently only the reports by Uruguay and Costa Rica are solely available in their original language. Translation into English permits a broader circulation of relevant practices among States and allows States to promote themselves at the global level, making their voluntary reports an instrument for furthering their legal and political agendas.

Some follow-up can also be expected. First, voluntary reports may be updated, keeping these instruments alive. Examples of recurrent reports can be noted for Germany (six reports since 2002) and Poland (five reports since 2009), recently complemented by Switzerland and the UK, which each launched their second report ahead of the 34th International Conference. It could be expected that periodic International Conferences would be a suitable occasion for States to present an updated version of their reports – this has already been mentioned in the pledge presented by Italy and the Italian Red Cross wherein they have agreed to “[c]ooperate in the updating of the Italian Voluntary report … to be published ahead of the next International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent”.Footnote ¹⁹⁶

Second, some voluntary reports include sections devoted to recommendations on future actions to be realized at the domestic level. Such sections could be a natural outcome of the extensive review and discussions held with relevant stakeholders, creating a background for identifying gaps and establishing the required trust for accepting such suggestions. That said, there is no uniform approach on this critical issue. For instance, the Bulgarian report includes detailed recommendations separately proposed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Bulgarian National Society and academics, thus permitting actors to adopt different approaches to proposed recommendations.Footnote ¹⁹⁷ In other cases, recommendations could be more general in tone, with voluntary reports identifying the main areas where further actions could be helpful. For instance, the concluding section of the Italian report mentions how “the results of the Report highlight some areas that might imply further initiatives …. Among these: the training of the Armed Forces, also through the updating of military manuals.”Footnote ¹⁹⁸ This latter suggestion has subsequently been endorsed by the Italian Ministry of Defence, which has set up a working group for drafting a new IHL military manual.Footnote ¹⁹⁹

Voluntary reports can also list actions that are already planned, as for UruguayFootnote ²⁰⁰ or Costa Rica, whose report lists forthcoming initiatives by States and National Societies, including ongoing bills.Footnote ²⁰¹ In some cases the voluntary report has acted as a blueprint for setting out a national IHL agenda; the 2024 Swiss report, for instance, notes that the process of its drafting and updating “led to the adoption by the [National IHL Committee] of new action plans to consolidate Switzerland’s implementation of IHL”.Footnote ²⁰² Even if States have developed actions plans outside the parallel engagement in voluntary reports,Footnote ²⁰³ it is clear that the stocktaking exercise linked to voluntary reports can be a good opportunity for elaborating such plans.

Voluntary national reports can thus be expected to become commonplace in IHL reporting initiatives, as also highlighted by the current Global Initiative to Galvanise Political Commitment to International Humanitarian Law.Footnote ²⁰⁴ This initiative’s workstream devoted to National IHL Committees mentions voluntary reports as a positive asset, making their drafting process an activity to be recommended in the envisaged Universal Charter for National Committees.Footnote ²⁰⁵ Still, voluntary reporting initiatives have their pros and cons.

The benefits of voluntary reports can be identified at both the international and domestic levels. In the international arena, voluntary reports demonstrate tangible political attention paid by the concerned States toward IHL, emphasizing their willingness to move from its static endorsement to active engagement at a time when IHL is under multiple threats. Voluntary reports could also stimulate dialogue on IHL issues, foster transparency on IHL application and highlight good practices. At the same time, from a more selfish perspective, voluntary reports increase the political visibility of concerned States, particularly for those currently acting as forerunners.

At the domestic level, voluntary reports play multiple positive roles. First, they represent an important self-assessment tool in identifying areas requiring better implementation, particularly when States decide to move from mapping exercises to concrete actions. In addition, drafting exercises significantly strengthen the role of National IHL Committees, permitting active cooperation among stakeholders on a concrete output rather than mere involvement in their formal meetings.

Still, such instruments come with some challenges. First, a certain political commitment by governmental stakeholders is required to kick off the process and endorse its output. Furthermore, drafting a report has direct and indirect costs, requiring States to devote human and financial resources to this activity, involve dedicated staff with IHL expertise, and accept a time-consuming process; these elements might represent a challenge for some States. In this regard, the supporting role played by National Societies could be instrumental to filling potential gaps.

Finally, a potential shortcoming of voluntary reports is inherent in their characteristics. While they share with treaty-based reporting initiatives the self-evaluating character of such documents, voluntary reports are not accompanied by any follow-up or external oversight on their content, and this might further encourage States to present an overly optimistic assessment. For instance, in relation to the Canadian report, one scholar has maintained that it paints “an overall positive picture of Canada’s efforts without sufficiently acknowledging the obstacles or shortcomings it would face”, also referring to issues which have apparently been overlooked.Footnote ²⁰⁶ This assessment might have some merits, but it probably fails to recognize how voluntary reports are a State-driven initiative aimed at serving other purposes than independently scrutinizing domestic compliance with international standards.

In this area, the exceptional character of reports published by States involved in ongoing armed conflicts could create some distinctive challenges. For instance, the Ukrainian report, while largely devoted to measures adopted by that State to comply with IHL, cursorily also refers to violations attributed to Russia,Footnote ²⁰⁷ making reference to international documents.Footnote ²⁰⁸ So as to avoid transforming voluntary reports in a politicization process, it could be suggested that they focus their content on measures involving the concerned State.

Reporting by armed groups

As mentioned above,Footnote ²⁰⁹ the multifaceted character of stakeholders in some areas of international law implies that self-reporting activities could also involve soft-law instruments and non-State actors interested in showing their commitment to respecting international standards, identifying problems and shortcomings, promoting transparency and building trust in the relevant constituency. IHL could apparently offer fertile ground for reporting activities in light of the relevance that non-State armed groups (NSAGs) have in this area. So far, however, only one relevant experience can be mentioned, namely the self-reporting system managed by Geneva Call.

As is well known, Geneva Call engages with NSAGs in an effort to promote respect for IHLFootnote ²¹⁰ through several innovative tools such as the Deeds of CommitmentFootnote ²¹¹ or unilateral declarations by NSAGs as a way to reinforce their commitment to positive change. Within this framework, Geneva Call has engaged with reporting activities by NSAGs, and the characteristics of these activities have progressively evolved; over time, Geneva Call has also changed into a primarily field-based organization with missions in areas affected by non-international armed conflict (NIAC), a situation that entails regular contact and direct engagement with NSAGs.

One of the elements included in Geneva Call’s Deeds of Commitment is the consent provided by NSAGs “to allow and cooperate in the monitoring and verification of our commitment”, particularly though implementation plans which outline the measures that the NSAG will adopt, the support required from Geneva Call for capacity-building, and a timeline for regular progress reports and revisions. Within this broader context, where Geneva Call also takes advantage of its in-field presence to gather information through interactions with other actors (governments, NGOs, media, affected communities), the Deeds of Commitment also mention self-reporting activities by NSAGs, through “the provision of the necessary information and reports, as may be required for such purposes in the spirit of transparency and accountability”.Footnote ²¹² This mechanism is complemented by “incident reporting, and follow-up on reported incidents”,Footnote ²¹³ similarly to the ad hoc reporting activities included in some treaties analyzed above related to events detrimental to the concerned international instrument.Footnote ²¹⁴ Through its activities, Geneva Call has thus fostered the emergence of an additional example in international law of reporting activities carried out by non-State entities in relation to soft-law instruments.

Reporting activities are a component of a broader continual engagement with NSAGs, particularly through implementation plans tailored for them, enhancing the effectiveness of the Deeds of Commitment (and unilateral declarations) through procedural and monitoring activities aimed at facilitating concrete dialogue on implementation. However, due to the sensitive character of the information at stake, and the need not to jeopardize both the complex engagement with NSAGs and the safety of staff in country missions, self-reports are not made public. Still, Geneva Call has from time to time provided some information that allows us to grasp the essence of this self-reporting mechanism.Footnote ²¹⁵

In particular, it can be noted that, similarly to treaty provisions, the wording of relevant provisions in the Deeds of Commitment is quite laconic, lacking details on timing of, forms of, or methods for sharing information. The management of this procedure is thus left to the practice of Geneva Call and has been adapted based on its evolving experience. For instance, regarding the first Deed of Commitment, devoted to anti-personnel landmines, Geneva Call originally used a reporting form modelled on the one used for reporting obligations provided by Article 7 of the AP Mine Ban Convention,Footnote ²¹⁶ thus requiring information on numbers and types of anti-personnel landmines stockpiled, progresses in required activities such as stockpile destruction, possible cases of non-compliance, etc. However, based on dialogues with NSAGs, this rather bureaucratic format was simplified, making it possible to collect all the relevant information in a one-page document, potentially complemented by annexes, with each NSAG asked to appoint a focal person or group of individuals for this purpose. Similarly, so as to facilitate activities, no specific mechanism for sharing information is mandated; instead, it is possible to provide information through written correspondences (emails, letters, reports), during Meetings of Signatories to the Deeds of Commitment or in the framework of bilateral dialogues with Geneva Call. However, also in light of the development of new Deeds of Commitment, some of them not related to specific treaties or monitoring activities for States, Geneva Call has adapted the reporting templates to different typologies of Deeds and required activities provided by the tailored implementation plan.

While it is not possible to record statistics on submitted reports, past data provided by Geneva Call have emphasized significant success for this initiative. For instance, at the occasion of the first Meeting of Signatories of the anti-personnel mine Deed of Commitment held in autumn 2004, it was noted that since “the reporting format was first circulated to signatory groups in the spring of 2004, more than half of the groups have submitted compliance reports”.Footnote ²¹⁷ This percentage significantly increased in later years, as in 2011 it was reported that around 90% of the signatories of this Deed (thirty-eight out of forty-one NSAGs involved at the time) provided reports, with some of the non-reporting NSAGs having basically dissolved after their past signing of the document. Similarly, in the report for the most recent Meeting of Signatories, held in 2014, it was mentioned that “[n]early all signatories have abided by their obligations to report on their implementation of the Deeds of Commitment”,Footnote ²¹⁸ an assessment confirmed by Geneva Call staff in 2020.Footnote ²¹⁹ Quantitative data must, however, be complemented by qualitative ones. Reports have presented a variegated approach: from detailed reports including additional information to what is required in the sample form, as some NSAGs also clarified the general landmine situation and needs of technical assistance, to fragmented and partial information in other reports.Footnote ²²⁰ Still, a general proactive and constructive engagement by NSAGs has continued to be recorded.

As for follow-up activities, self-reports are part of the regular monitoring activities addressing NSAGs carried out by field missions, commonly arranged on an annual basis, and are thus helpful for engaging in dialogue with NSAGs within the framework of the implementation plan. As already recognized at the occasion of the first Meeting of Signatories, “[t]he interplay between self-monitoring, independent third party monitoring and verification missions is designed to compensate for any weakness inherent in the individual monitoring tools”.Footnote ²²¹ Self-reporting initiatives can thus play a positive role in engaging NSAGs with IHL.

Apart from the initiative managed by Geneva Call, however, IHL is short of mechanisms permitting self-reporting activities for NSAGs, regardless of their crucial role in this area. To some extent this could be due to the erratic character of NSAGs, militating against the establishment of cumbersome reporting activities in light of the potential short-lived nature of such groups. As experienced by Geneva Call, some signatories of Deeds of Commitment did not report, as they vanished after their official commitments.Footnote ²²² However, in several scenarios, NSAGs have been able to be parties to NIACs for several years, if not decades. Therefore, lack of reporting activities tailored for NSAGs is just a component of the State-centric perspective of several areas of IHL, which is structurally limited in terms of incorporating NSAGs into its mechanisms, even in beneficial areas such as their potential engagement with IHL compliance.