At the core of promissory representation lies a fragile yet powerful contract between citizens and those who represent them. This foundational idea rests on the belief that political parties must be held accountable for the promises they make to the electorate. It is through this promise keeping mechanism that citizens shape the direction of government policies. The integrity of democracy hinges on this exchange, where voters’ trust in their representatives’ promises is matched by representatives’ obligation to fulfill those promises once in office. Voters expect their leaders to deliver on their campaign promises or face the consequences for failing to do so at the ballot box. The expectation is straightforward yet profound: In return for political power, parties must deliver what they promised. This cyclical process of promise, action, and electoral judgment is what breathes life into democratic representation, keeping it vibrant, responsive, and linked to public opinion. Without it, the fabric of promissory representation unravels.
For this bond to hold, and for promissory representation to work, three key assumptions must hold. First, parties must have sufficient agency to make campaign promises that appeal to significant parts of the electorate. This means that parties must have the autonomy to design policies without being overly constrained by external forces. Without this agency, promises made during election campaigns would fail to resonate with voters, leaving voters disenchanted with the choices they face. Second, parties must have a reasonable level of certainty that they can keep the promises they make. This assumption hinges on governing parties’ control over the levers of public policies and the stability and predictability of the political and economic environment in which they operate. If parties cannot keep their campaign promises, they cannot reliably promise specific policies in the first place. Moreover, when parties do make and then break campaign promises, they undermine voters’ trust. Broken promises signal to voters that their representatives lack the governing competence to anticipate which policies are feasible and practically implementable when holding executive office. Third, voters must hold parties to account for their performance in terms of making promises that appeal to them and for keeping or breaking the promises they previously made if they were in office. For electoral accountability to hold, parties must make campaign promises that are clear enough for voters to assess whether they have been kept. If promises are too vague, voters will struggle to determine whether a party has fulfilled its commitments. Clear promises also allow voters to evaluate whether parties’ proposed policies align with their own preferences. When parties fail to make clear promises, the accountability mechanism of democracy breaks down, as voters lose the ability to select parties based on their policies and to sanction parties based on their performance in terms of promise keeping.
These assumptions are the pillars that uphold the system of democratic representation. When they hold true, voters can hold parties accountable for their actions, and elections serve as a tool for ensuring that public policies are broadly in line with public opinion, at least of those citizens who supported the parties that hold executive power. But when these assumptions are weakened, the effectiveness of democratic representation erodes.
Globalization and the Breakdown of Democratic Representation
Globalization has fundamentally undermined these pillars, thereby disrupting democratic representation as it is understood from the perspective of mainstream promissory representation. As countries become more deeply integrated into global markets, parties increasingly face constraints that limit their ability to make and keep their campaign promises. These constraints come in many forms: international trade agreements, the pressures of global financial markets, the demands of multinational corporations, the interdependencies of global supply chains, and the rising expectations of citizens in response to globalization’s economic risks. The autonomy of national governments to implement policies has been reduced, especially when those policies conflict with global economic imperatives. The debate over globalization’s impact on democracy is polarized; some argue that globalization fosters democracy by promoting economic growth, while others contend that it erodes national sovereignty and accountability. Our research firmly supports the view that globalization poses a threat to meaningful democratic representation in established democracies.
Globalization undermines the quality of democratic representation in several ways. It reduces governing parties’ ability to deliver on the promises they made during previous election campaigns. Voters punish governing parties for breaking promises, although it seems that much of this is beyond the control of governing parties, particularly when they promise leftist policies. At the same time, mainstream parties’ responses to the constraints of globalization are undermining the potential for meaningful choice and accountability. Ideological competition is narrowing, while obfuscation in the form of ambiguous electoral appeals has increased. Mainstream parties, particularly those on the center-right, have increased their use of populist rhetoric in response to the constraints of globalization. Mainstream parties’ failure to formulate and keep credible campaign promises has not led voters to eschew promise keeping as a way of assessing governing parties’ performance. On the contrary, electoral rewards for succeeding or (more commonly) punishments for failing to fulfill promises are even larger in the context of globalization. Parties’ attempts to avoid electoral punishment for promise breaking, including the use of strategic ambiguity and populist rhetoric, erode accountability, as these reduce the presentation of clear and feasible policy alternatives to voters. This erosion of accountability strikes at the core of promissory representation.
Our analyses, which draw on a diverse range of methods and data – including large-n observational studies, in-depth case studies, and controlled survey experiments – demonstrate several ways in which globalization undermines promissory representation:
First, globalization reduces the likelihood that governing parties keep their campaign promises. The constraints of global economic systems, including international trade agreements and financial dependencies, limit the ability of governing parties to enact the policies they promised during campaigns. This is particularly evident in economic policies, where global market forces often override national priorities. However, the constraining effects of globalization reach far beyond economic policies narrowly defined, as governments’ attention may be diverted by international crises, and fiscal constraints imposed by market forces affect a broad range of policy areas.
Second, voters punish governing political parties that fail to deliver on their promises. In highly globalized contexts, holding parties accountable for their ability to keep promises has become even more important to voters, who increasingly rely on this as a measure of governing competence. Ironically, this shift is partly because governing parties have less impact on their countries’ general economic performance in the context of intense international economic integration. Many voters are aware that the general state of the economy is at most only partly attributable to government policies and often more influenced by the state of the global economy. However, while parties may attempt to deflect blame by attributing broken promises to the constraints of globalization, our results show that this strategy offers limited protection. Voters still penalize parties for failing to follow through on their commitments and do so even more harshly in the context of globalization.
Third, parties moderate their ideological positions on economic policies, often moving toward the center. As globalization has deepened, many parties, particularly those on the right, have adjusted their promises to appeal to citizens who demand more protection from the economic risks associated with open economies. This ideological moderation often comes at the cost of clarity, as parties attempt to balance competing demands from business elites and middle- and lower-income voters who feel left behind by globalization. The adoption of populist rhetoric by mainstream center-right parties is one way they attempt to navigate this tension. This also further undermines the potential for accountability, as populist rhetoric is largely devoid of substantive and feasible policies, instead attempting to evoke an emotional response from potential supporters.
Fourth, mainstream parties increasingly use ambiguous language in their electoral appeals in response to the constraints of globalization, making it more difficult for voters to hold them accountable. Using ambiguous language helps parties to remain flexible once in office, allowing them to adjust their policies in response to global pressures. However, ambiguity is of limited use to addressing the fundamental problem. Notwithstanding the increased use of ambiguous language, most parties still feel compelled to make large numbers of specific campaign promises, many of which they cannot keep when they take control of the executive after elections. One of the reasons that parties continue to make many specific promises is that voters are unlikely to be persuaded by general statements alone. Concrete proposals are still necessary. Moreover, where ambiguous language is used, voters struggle to determine which parties they agree with and whether or not governing parties have kept their previous promises in those areas. This undermines the key accountability mechanisms that are central to promissory representation.
We arrived at these key insights through a multi-method approach that combines large-n quantitative analysis, survey experiments, and qualitative insights:
In Chapters 4 and 5, we examine the difficulties governing parties face in keeping their promises due to the constraints of economic integration. Using large-n observational data, we analyze the fulfillment of election pledges across different countries and time periods. To probe the underlying theoretical mechanisms, we complement this quantitative analysis with a qualitative study based on archival material and elite interviews. This allows us to gain deeper insight into how globalization constraints influence the decision-making of party leaders and government officials. We find that promises related to social welfare, labor protections, and economic redistribution are particularly difficult to keep, especially for center-left parties whose platforms often conflict with global market forces. The combination of large-scale data and qualitative insights reveal that economic integration restricts governing parties’ policy autonomy, making it harder for them to follow through on key electoral commitments, and demonstrate that these effects are driven by the constraining forces of globalization.
In Chapter 6, we employ a combination of large-n observational research, experimental methods, and an in-depth case study to explore the electoral consequences of broken promises. We analyze voting behavior using a dataset of election results and party performance in terms of pledge fulfillment in globalized contexts. Complementing this, our survey experiment directly tests how voters respond when politicians break their promises, showing that voters punish politicians more severely in highly globalized environments. Our qualitative interviews with citizens further reveal the complex and lasting impact of promise breaking. Even decades after a prominent case of promise breaking, voters display disappointment and disillusionment, even when combined with sophisticated understanding and loyalty. Taken together, these analyses provide strong evidence that parties face immediate and lasting consequences for breaking campaign promises.
Chapters 7 and 8 focus on the ideological shifts that globalization has prompted in right-leaning parties. Through large-n quantitative analysis of parties’ election programs, we track how these parties have moderated their socioeconomic positions, moving toward centrist policies on socioeconomic policy themes. At the same time, they have increasingly adopted populist rhetoric, particularly on issues related to immigration and national identity, as they seek to appeal to a broader voter base. These chapters highlight the strategic recalibration parties undergo in response to globalization, showing how economic moderation is balanced with cultural populism.
Chapters 9 and 10 focus on parties’ increasing use of vagueness in their electoral appeals as their countries have become more exposed to economic globalization. In Chapter 9, we analyze party manifestos and political speeches across six Western democracies using text analysis and large-n statistical analysis. We find that as globalization increases uncertainty in governance, parties are increasingly using vague language in their appeals. This vagueness allows them to avoid making clear commitments, providing flexibility in policy implementation and helping shield them from the electoral consequences of broken promises. Chapter 10 builds on this by analyzing the electoral consequences of political ambiguity, using experimental data to show how voters respond to vague promises. Vagueness reduces voters’ ability to hold politicians accountable for breaking promises. By obfuscating their campaign messages, politicians can escape the full extent of electoral punishment that voters typically impose on governing politicians who break their promises.
This multimethod approach – combining quantitative analysis, survey experiments, and qualitative case studies – offers a broad perspective on how globalization affects democratic representation. The integration of different methods provides a nuanced understanding of the complex dynamics between political parties, voters, and global economic forces.
Counterarguments Are Complacent
There are two main counterarguments in response to the far-reaching conclusion that globalization has significantly undermined the practice of democracy, particularly as it is understood through the lens of promissory representation. Both responses engage with the idea that parties are increasingly constrained by global economic forces, limiting their ability to make and keep promises, but they differ in how they perceive the future of these constraints and the ideal of promissory representation.
Deglobalization
The first response is that we are entering an era of deglobalization, where states are reclaiming control over their economies and reducing their dependence on international markets (Bello Reference Bello2002; Bremmer Reference Bremmer2007; Rodrik Reference Rodrik2012; Stiglitz Reference Stiglitz2018). Unlike periods of reduced globalization due to temporary crises (e.g., the COVID-19 pandemic and some measures following the 2008 financial crisis), deglobalization is viewed as a structural shift, driven by changes in policies, political ideologies, and economic strategies. The increasing geopolitical tensions between major powers, notably the United States and China, have led to a movement toward “selective decoupling,” where countries are attempting to protect strategic sectors (such as technology, energy, and critical infrastructure) from global market forces (Baldwin Reference Baldwin2016; Tooze Reference Tooze2021). According to this view, the COVID-19 pandemic further accelerated deglobalization trends in certain industries by exposing the vulnerabilities of global supply chains. Countries implemented travel restrictions, lockdowns, and trade barriers that disrupted global trade and investment flows. The crisis led many governments to emphasize economic self-sufficiency, particularly in critical sectors like medical supplies, food, and technology (Evenett Reference Evenett2020). Politicians from populist parties have further promoted deglobalization, arguing that globalization has led to job losses, income inequality, and loss of national sovereignty. They have also led to increased support for antiglobalization measures, as seen in the United States under Donald Trump and the United Kingdom with Brexit (Norris and Inglehart Reference Norris and Inglehart2019; Rodrik Reference Rodrik2018). The resurgence of nationalism has manifested itself in trade restrictions, withdrawal from global agreements (e.g., the United States pulling out of the Paris Climate Agreement under Trump), and a focus on “self-sufficiency” (De Vries and Hobolt Reference De Vries and Hobolt2020; Helleiner Reference Helleiner2019).
Deglobalization could reduce the pressures that globalization places on national governments, potentially allowing parties to regain some autonomy in policymaking and promise keeping. It may thereby alleviate some of the constraints that have eroded democratic representation. Parties could once again make campaign promises with a greater degree of confidence that they will have the agency to fulfill them. This would reinvigorate the mechanisms of accountability that are central to promissory representation, as voters could vote for parties knowing that those parties will keep their promises. In this scenario, the relationship between parties’ campaign promises and government policies could be restored, leading to a revival of promissory representation.
Although there are signs of selective decoupling, particularly in strategic industries and between certain major economies, the broader forces of economic integration have remained constant. The most sophisticated measure of the degree of overall economic globalization to which countries are exposed is the Konjunkturforschungsstelle (KOF) Globalization Index, which we used throughout our analyses. This measure shows no marked downward shift for the set of established democracies that are the focus of our inquiry. In fact, despite political rhetoric suggesting a retreat from globalization, there is limited empirical evidence that supports the idea of sustained or broad-based deglobalization. What we observe instead is a transformation in the structure of globalization, away from unregulated liberalization and toward more managed forms of global economic governance. Countries may be more cautious about certain dependencies (e.g., in semiconductors or energy), but they continue to deepen trade and investment relations in other areas, especially services and digital economies.
This evolving nature of globalization means that the structural constraints we highlight remain salient, even in an era of increased protectionist rhetoric. Governments may pursue more interventionist policies, but they continue to face binding international rules, economic interdependence, and market pressures that limit their room to maneuver. For instance, while US President Donald Trump imposed tariffs as part of his “America First” agenda, many of these measures were either scaled back, waived, or circumvented in response to backlash from domestic industries, diplomatic pushback, and international supply chain disruptions. Similarly, Brexit was framed by its proponents as a move to restore sovereign control – particularly over migration – but in practice, UK governments have struggled to gain meaningful autonomy over migration policy. Labor shortages, legal commitments, and political pressures have undermined its ability to radically diverge from pre-Brexit patterns. In fact, net migration to the United Kingdom has increased since Brexit: Between 2020 and 2023, net migration rose from 111,000 to 906,000, far exceeding pre-Brexit levels and undermining promises to “take back control” of the country’s borders. Much of this increase was driven by non-European Union migration, including new visa schemes for health and care workers, students, and humanitarian routes (e.g., for Ukrainians and Hong Kongers), reflecting persistent economic and geopolitical pressures. Rather than regaining control, the United Kingdom has simply shifted the composition of migration without significantly reducing its scale. This demonstrates how even dramatic institutional breaks do not necessarily increase governments’ policy autonomy in a globalized world.
Selective decoupling from China also does not liberate Western governments from the broader constraints of international economic integration. On the contrary, such decoupling often leads to a reconfiguration – rather than a retreat – of globalization. Governments seeking to reduce dependence on China have intensified economic cooperation with like-minded allies, forging new agreements on supply chains, semiconductors, and critical minerals. For example, European countries have deepened collaboration within the European Union on securing access to rare earth elements and safeguarding technological sovereignty. These are all moves that sustain, and even amplify, international interdependence. Similarly, the United States has expanded trade and investment ties with strategic partners in Asia and the Americas, reinforcing its integration into alternative global networks. These shifts suggest not the end of globalization but its evolution into more politically curated and strategically aligned forms.
Even in a selectively deglobalized world, the interdependencies created by decades of globalization will not disappear, and the challenges to promissory representation will persist. Global trade, finance, and supply chains remain deeply embedded in the institutional and economic frameworks of advanced democracies. International agreements and the disciplining pressures of global markets continue to shape domestic policy options, meaning that the fundamental constraints on promise making and promise keeping that we identify in this book remain firmly in place – even in an era of selective deglobalization.
Promissory Representation Has Always Been Flawed
The second response takes a more skeptical view of promissory representation itself. This response suggests that democratic representation has never functioned according to the principles of promissory representation, even before the rise of globalization (Achen and Bartels Reference Achen and Bartels2016; Riker Reference Riker1982). Chapter 2 discusses these critiques of promissory representation extensively, where we acknowledge that the practice of democratic representation has long differed from the ideal of promissory representation. Parties have always faced complex challenges in making and keeping promises, due to factors such as the need to share power with other parties in coalitions, unforeseen economic crises, and the inherent complexity of governance. In this view, the ideal of promissory representation has always been unattainable, as parties could rarely anticipate the full range of challenges they would face once in government.
While this critique holds merit, and there are theoretical and empirical reasons to question whether democratic systems have ever fully embodied the principles of promissory representation, globalization has undeniably exacerbated the difficulties that parties face in keeping their promises. Global economic forces have introduced new constraints that further reduce the capacity of parties to deliver on their campaign commitments. These constraints are not simply a continuation of long-standing difficulties in governance but represent a fundamental shift in the relationship between national governments and their electorates. Globalization has deepened the disconnection between parties’ promises and subsequent public policies, making it even harder for voters to hold parties accountable.
Even if promissory representation has always been a challenging ideal to attain, it remains a central framework for understanding democratic accountability. Voters continue to expect that political parties will keep their promises, and political scientists and policymakers continue to use promissory representation as a benchmark for understanding how democratic representation works and for evaluating democratic performance. The fact that globalization has further diminished the potential for promissory representation to be realized in practice only underscores the need to address the consequences of this trend.
Harnessing Populism’s Challenge to Restore Democratic Accountability
The breakdown of promissory representation has been accompanied by rising support for populist parties. Globally, public support for populist parties has grown from around 2 percent in 1980 to nearly 25 percent today (Chwieroth and Walter Reference Chwieroth and Walter2019). In Europe, the average vote share of right-wing populist parties in legislative elections has more than tripled from 5.4 percent in the 1970s to close to 17 percent today and their share of legislative seats tripled to 12 percent today (Milner Reference Milner2021b; Norris and Inglehart Reference Norris and Inglehart2019). Populist movements thrive by criticizing the inability of mainstream parties to deliver on their promises and by portraying themselves as champions of the common people against corrupt elites (Mudde Reference Mudde2004; Norris and Inglehart Reference Norris and Inglehart2019). In France, Italy, and Hungary, among other countries, populist parties have gained significant traction by leveraging economic discontent and fears about immigration, while in the United States, Donald Trump’s successive presidential campaigns tapped into voter anger over globalization, loss of manufacturing jobs, and perceived national decline (Hobolt and Tilley Reference Hobolt and Tilley2014). A cornerstone of Trump’s appeal was his blunt, bold messaging, which often contrasted with the ambiguous and technocratic language of the political establishment. He criticized both the Republican and Democratic parties for failing to deliver on key issues like job creation and immigration control, blaming this on a mix of corruption, incompetence, and globalist interests. Trump’s slogan, “drain the swamp,” encapsulated his message that mainstream politicians were dishonest and incapable of delivering on their promises. He critiqued the trade deals of previous administrations as harmful to US workers, promising bold actions like pulling out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership and renegotiating the North American Free Trade Agreement.
In France, the rise of the radical right in the form of the National Front (subsequently rebranded as the National Rally) has been traced to the broken promises of the Socialist government of the 1980s, which we examined in Chapter 6 (Hargreaves Reference Hargreaves2012). Marine Le Pen, leader of the National Rally, has long criticized mainstream French parties, especially the center-right Republicans and the Socialist Party, for their failure to protect jobs, improve living conditions, and control immigration. She has argued that these parties make vague, noncommittal promises and fail to take decisive action once in power. Her 2017 presidential campaign was built around strong, direct promises such as leaving the Eurozone and curbing immigration, in stark contrast to what she framed as the “wishy-washy” stances of her opponents, including Emmanuel Macron. Across these contexts, populists have built support by offering clear sounding and radical policy proposals, often focused on rejecting global economic integration, reducing immigration, and reasserting national control over economic and political decision-making (De Vries and Hobolt Reference De Vries and Hobolt2020).
A range of institutional reforms have been proposed to counter voters’ disaffection with conventional politics and to enhance electoral accountability. Some proponents of electoral reforms argue that proportional representation systems, as opposed to majoritarian systems, help to ensure that electoral outcomes more accurately reflect public opinion (Lijphart Reference Lijphart1999). Additionally, reforms such as recall elections and referendums allow voters to hold parties accountable more frequently, outside the regular election cycle (Bowler and Donovan Reference Bowler and Donovan2000). These mechanisms can provide voters with a way to demand accountability in real-time, rather than waiting for the next general election. Deliberative democracy initiatives, such as citizens’ assemblies or participatory budgeting, have been suggested as ways to involve citizens in policy discussions and thereby increasing their efficacy (Fishkin Reference Fishkin2011; Smith Reference Smith2009; Warren and Pearse Reference Warren and Pearse2008). While such institutional reforms are in many cases meritorious, the practical challenges to implementing them, which often include constitutional amendments requiring broad support, can make them unfeasible. Moreover, they do not directly address the causes of the present malaise, which we contend lie mainly in political elites’ responses to the constraints of globalization.
Likewise, efforts to promote political education and civic engagement among citizens are laudable and part of the remedy but not a panacea (Delli Carpini and Keeter Reference Delli Carpini and Keeter1996; Galston Reference Galston2001; Goodman Reference Goodman2017; Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry Reference Nie, Junn and Stehlik-Barry1996). Voters need to be knowledgeable about the political process and the constraints that governing parties face. This equips them to hold parties accountable without falling prey to populist simplifications. Engaging voters more deeply in political processes also fosters a stronger connection between citizens and their representatives. Political knowledge helps citizens identify both the promises political parties make and whether political parties in government fulfilled their promises (Duval and Pétry Reference Duval and Pétry2018, Reference Duval and Pétry2023; Thomson Reference Thomson2011). Althaus (Reference Althaus2003) found that political education and awareness of constraints help voters better distinguish between feasible commitments and empty rhetoric or emotional appeals. However, we did not find evidence that voters are unable to hold governing politicians accountable for broken promises. On the contrary, they are effective at doing so, particularly in contexts that are highly exposed to the constraints of globalization.
Citizens are not generally the root of the malaise that afflicts many established democracies; mainstream political elites are, especially for the ways in which they have responded to the constraints of globalization and the populist challenge. A recent comparative study concluded that while public support for populist parties has increased, public support for populist values has remained relatively constant (Bartels Reference Bartels2023). There have long been significant minorities of the public who hold illiberal values or are at least impressionable. The behavior of mainstream political elites has enabled these illiberal sympathies to fester and develop into the populist disease that is rampant in many liberal democracies. Mainstream parties, particularly those on the left, have made promises they could not keep due to the constraints of globalization. Many mainstream parties on the right have adopted more populist language (Bale and Rovira Kaltwasser Reference Bale and Kaltwasser2021; Bakker, Jolly, and Polk Reference Bakker, Jolly, Polk, Hobolt and Rodon i Casarramona2021; Kriesi et al. Reference Kriesi, Grande, Dolezal, Helbling, Höglinger, Hutter and Wüest2012; Mudde Reference Mudde2019). Mainstream parties across the ideological spectrum have used vaguer language, albeit for different reasons. These strategies have exacerbated the problem, fueling the populist flame. Instead of winning back voters, mainstream parties have come across as insincere or opportunistic when trying to appeal to populist sentiments. This has not only failed to quell the populist surge but has, in some cases, further legitimized populist narratives by reinforcing the perception that mainstream parties are merely adapting their rhetoric to win votes rather than genuinely addressing the issues at hand (Albertazzi and McDonnell Reference Albertazzi and McDonnell2015; Meguid Reference Meguid2005).
While this book is mainly about diagnosing the illness rather than formulating the cure, an outline of the remedy can be detected in the main findings. The first step is to recognize that mainstream parties’ current responses to the constraints of globalization are readily explicable based on their core concerns with office seeking and policy seeking within prevailing institutional constraints. At the same time, these responses have been counterproductive. Rational parties seek to minimize the risks of electoral punishment for failing to fulfill campaign promises in a globalized economic environment with all the constraints that brings. In response, they have chosen ambiguity coupled with many hundreds of smaller campaign promises, often with a distracting topping of vacuous populist rhetoric. This gives them flexibility when they hold government office after elections but also makes it harder for voters to hold them accountable. In stark contrast, populist parties offer simple, direct, and emotionally charged solutions to complex problems, which stand out compared with the ambiguous and technocratic language of mainstream parties. By focusing on restoring national sovereignty and taking strong stances against globalization, populist leaders promise to return control to “the people,” a message that resonates deeply with voters who feel abandoned by traditional politics.
A more effective response to the crisis brought by globalization is for mainstream parties to reinvigorate the key elements of promissory representation through a coherent strategy that consists of both self-promotional and combative measures. A realistic and effective response would acknowledge the political imperatives that have driven mainstream parties to their current responses. These include the changing political landscape that has accompanied the rise of populist movements, and the costs as well as the benefits of countries’ exposure to economic globalization.
The self-promotional part of an effective response by mainstream parties refers to the ways in which they present their campaign promises and their record of promise keeping. Mainstream parties should commit to highlighting coherent sets of key campaign promises that are both ambitious and fulfillable. This would be a major departure from many parties’ current practice, which consists of making many hundreds of detailed promises combined with vague language that obscures priorities. Detailed and technical policies have important roles to play in relation to maintaining internal party cohesion and providing a blueprint for government, but they are generally ineffective forms of communication in the face of populist parties’ seemingly bold guarantees. Party strategists need to get better at formulating their key messages in language that resonates more broadly with citizens. This includes being more rigorous and clearer about which campaign promises to highlight. The findings from Chapter 10 show that ambiguity serves a function for mainstream parties; it insulates them from electoral punishments for breaking clear promises. However, the underlying research that we discussed also shows that voters value transparency and support parties that make clear policy proposals, even if those proposals are constrained by external factors. If implemented judiciously, making fewer but more compelling clear promises could serve the same function as using vague language to avoid the negative sanctions that follow the breaking of many campaign promises. The success of this approach depends on parties being upfront about the constraints imposed by globalization, while still outlining the main policies they intend to pursue within those constraints.
Mainstream parties’ key campaign promises should include clear stances on the issues that populist parties have campaigned on without resorting to divisive populist rhetoric. The findings from Chapters 7 and 8, taken together, indicate that this is possible. In response to globalization’s constraints, many mainstream parties on both the left and right have increased the attention they devote to themes typically associated with populist parties, including support for a strong military, nationalist values, traditional morality, and law and order. This increasing prominence of nonsocioeconomic themes has also been documented in previous research (e.g., Ezrow and Hellwig Reference Ezrow and Hellwig2014; Hellwig Reference Hellwig2015). However, while right-of-center parties have also embraced the use of populist rhetoric, leftist parties generally have not. Moreover, leftist parties have remained broadly consistent in their support for their core ideological principles in response to deepening globalization. This indicates that mainstream parties can address issues associated with nationalism and traditional values without resorting to populist language. Mainstream parties have the potential to develop nationalist visions that usurp populists’ nascent ownership of this narrative while preserving liberal principles. Although mainstream parties’ alternative nationalist visions should be derived from their own core ideological principles, this will involve direct confrontation and contrast with the divisive narratives put forward by populists.
More effective self-promotion extends to the coverage of mainstream parties’ records of promise keeping when they are in government. Governing parties themselves should highlight this performance more prominently when they stand for reelection. There are also benefits to institutionalizing public monitoring of promise keeping. Our research indicates that mainstream governing parties, particularly those on the left, have often struggled to keep their campaign promises due to the constraints of globalization (Chapters 4 and 5). Parties therefore need to ensure that their key campaign promises balance ambition with realism, in the sense that they can be fulfilled within the prevailing constraints faced by governments. If parties were to make fewer but more compelling promises, as we suggest they should, they would be in a stronger position when it comes to reporting on their own performance in terms of keeping their previous campaign promises. Political scientists and media organizations have an important role to play here too. Online promise trackers have successfully reported on the extent to which campaign promises have been kept or broken, making valuable contributions to public discourse. These efforts are commendable and should be expanded with more sustained funding. The institutionalization of tracking the fate of campaign promises could include greater legislative scrutiny or even independent auditors, whereby the government’s performance in relation to the fulfillment of governing parties’ campaign promises is assessed independently.
Combative measures, which involve direct confrontation with populist parties, are also part of a more effective response by mainstream parties. Beyond denying populists an effective monopoly on nationalism, mainstream parties should home in on populists’ weaknesses far more aggressively than they have done in the past. Populists often make bold, straightforward promises that resonate with voters’ immediate concerns. This is both a strength and an Achilles heel. The clarity of these promises – such as promises to reduce immigration, boost local industries, or dismantle perceived elite-driven systems – makes them highly vulnerable. The clear and unequivocal nature of populists’ campaign promises leaves little room for reinterpretation or justification when governments’ actions and outcomes fall short of expectations, as they often do. Voters tend to dislike this pattern of overpromising and underdelivering, which can lead to declining public support if voters receive trusted information on populists’ poor performance.
Notwithstanding the constraints of globalization, populist parties in government, like their mainstream counterparts, often fulfill significant numbers of their campaign promises. The frontal attack on populist parties should extend to cases in which populist governing parties keep their campaign promises and pursue their broader agendas, because they are vulnerable here too. The fulfillment of some populist promises has undermined democratic norms and constitutional principles, including freedom of speech and the rule of law. While citizens know that promise keeping is important, they are also aware that other things matter too, including being governed by parties that are responsible and competent. In some contexts, efforts to dismantle democratic institutions have provoked widespread civic mobilization and renewed support for democratic norms. These reactions suggest that while populism poses a significant threat, it can also awaken public resistance and revitalize demands for transparency, accountability, and effective governance. Particularly in places where populists have gained governing power, mainstream parties should do more to nurture and grow public resistance to populist agendas.
There are notable examples where mainstream parties have adopted some elements of the strategy outlined here, and in doing so have regained ground against populist challengers. These cases highlight how mainstream parties can respond effectively to the rise of populism through clear campaign promises that address voters’ concerns. For example, in the lead-up to the 2019 general election, Spain faced a significant rise in populism, especially from the far-right party Vox. To counter this, and rather than resorting to populist rhetoric,Footnote 1 the mainstream Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE), led by Pedro Sánchez, made clear promises on social policies, particularly around employment, pensions, and gender equality. Their focus on clear economic and social reforms helped to distinguish their election program from the more extreme rhetoric of populist parties and was one factor that helped PSOE secure enough seats to form a government after the election. Similarly, facing Marine Le Pen’s populist National Front, Emmanuel Macron’s campaign in the 2017 presidential election centered around clear, centrist promises on reforming the French labor market, increasing European cooperation, and modernizing the economy (BBC News 2017). His specific, progressive agenda on economic reforms and European cooperation distinguished him from Le Pen’s protectionist and nationalist agenda. Macron’s clarity on these issues played a crucial role in securing his victory, as voters gravitated toward a centrist alternative to populism.
There is no foolproof strategy that will lead to victory over populists every time. Party strategists need to be aware of the distinction between the long-term strength of an effective strategy and tactical errors that can cost them dearly in a particular election. In the 2024 US presidential election, mainstream candidates aimed to clarify their policy positions to counter the rise of populism, particularly from candidate President Trump and others in the Republican Party. In their successive campaigns, President Joe Biden and then Vice President Kamala Harris both presented sharp messages on economic recovery, job creation, and protecting democracy. These Democratic candidates made clear and specific promises around bolstering the middle class, combating inflation, and improving infrastructure through continued investment in projects like those funded by the bipartisan Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act. They also emphasized the clear gains from these policies, distinguishing the Democratic Party platform from the vague and populist promises by Trump’s Republicans. The Democrats’ platform was perhaps too long and detailed, which meant the campaign messaging that voters received from campaigners was not as sharp as it could have been. However, the basic strategy of highlighting responsible promises and performance in the face of populist vacuousness was sound. Pundits have offered a profusion of diagnoses of the errors that cost the Democrats the White House, and we do not intend to add to these. What we can glean from our analyses, and we think it is important enough to state boldly, is that mainstream parties generally benefit from outlining their plans in clear and feasible ways and then demonstrating that they delivered on those plans.
When faced with the growing threat of populism, mainstream parties should sharpen their messaging by focusing on smaller numbers of key promises that address citizens’ concerns while rejecting populist rhetoric. Mainstream parties need to mount more aggressive frontal attacks on populist contenders, homing in on populists’ inherent weaknesses on two fronts. The first is that populists often make promises that they break when they enter government. The second is that populists tend to make promises that, if kept, do not address the underlying issues and, moreover, assault values that are widely shared in democratic societies. Mainstream parties can differentiate themselves from their populist rivals through clarity and decency, which would allow them to reconnect with a disillusioned electorate eager for authenticity and competence. The path forward for mainstream parties lies not in echoing populist rhetoric, but in reinvigorating the foundational principles of accountability and representation. As we confront the challenges of a globalized world, with all its complexities and constraints, mainstream parties must rise to the occasion. At this pivotal moment, the future of democratic governance hangs in the balance, resting on whether mainstream parties choose to embrace clarity and transparency or continue down the path of ambiguity and avoidance that has brought democracy to the brink. It is a choice not only for their political survival but for the preservation of democracy itself.