Book contents
- the cambridge history of Rights
- The Cambridge History of Rights
- The Cambridge History of Rights
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Contributors to Volume I
- General Introduction
- Introduction to Volume I
- 1 To Claim to Protect Claims
- 2 The Individual and the Communal
- 3 Human Rights in the Hebrew Bible?
- 4 Greek Subjective Rights?
- 5 Aristotle on Subjective Rights
- 6 Do Rights Exist in Hellenistic Philosophy?
- 7 Rights in Ptolemaic Egypt
- 8 Rights in Roman Republican Thought
- 9 Ius in the Subjective Sense in Classical Roman Law
- 10 Rights and Dignity in Late Ancient Thought
- 11 Rights in Late Ancient Law?
- 12 Rabbinic Judaism
- 13 Sasanian Law
- Index
- References
9 - Ius in the Subjective Sense in Classical Roman Law
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 31 January 2026
Book contents
- the cambridge history of Rights
- The Cambridge History of Rights
- The Cambridge History of Rights
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Contributors to Volume I
- General Introduction
- Introduction to Volume I
- 1 To Claim to Protect Claims
- 2 The Individual and the Communal
- 3 Human Rights in the Hebrew Bible?
- 4 Greek Subjective Rights?
- 5 Aristotle on Subjective Rights
- 6 Do Rights Exist in Hellenistic Philosophy?
- 7 Rights in Ptolemaic Egypt
- 8 Rights in Roman Republican Thought
- 9 Ius in the Subjective Sense in Classical Roman Law
- 10 Rights and Dignity in Late Ancient Thought
- 11 Rights in Late Ancient Law?
- 12 Rabbinic Judaism
- 13 Sasanian Law
- Index
- References
Summary
In Latin ius (like droit in French, diritto in Italian, Recht in German) can mean a whole body of normative rules, a legal order, as well as “right,” in the many senses of the English word. Early in the last century, Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld proposed that English speakers resolve the ambiguity about the meaning of “right,” at least in precise legal language, by using the word “right” only where there was a correlative “duty” in another or others. If there was no correlative duty, but simply an absence of right in someone else (a “no-right”), Hohfeld preferred to say that the subject had a “privilege.” Hohfeld also proposed four other “fundamental legal categories”: “power” (another word that is sometimes encompassed in “right”), “immunity” (also sometimes encompassed in “right”), “liability,” and “disability,” categories that referred to the subject’s ability or lack thereof to change the first set of categories.
Keywords
Information
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Cambridge History of Rights , pp. 237 - 256Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2025
References
Further Reading
The Digest of Justinian, Mommsen, T. and Krueger, P. (eds.), A. Watson (ed., trans.), 4 vols. (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1985).Google Scholar
Donahue, C., “Ius in the Subjective Sense in Roman Law: Reflections on Villey and Tierney,” in Maffei, D., Birocchi, I., Caravale, M., Conte, E., and Petronio, U. (eds.), A Ennio Cortese (Rome, Il Cigno, 2001), vol. 1, pp. 506–35.Google Scholar
Edelstein, D., and Straumann, B., “Roman Rights Talk: Subjective Rights in Cicero and Livy,” History of Political Thought 43/4 (2022), 637–59.Google Scholar
Hohfeld, W. N., “Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning [i],” Yale Law Journal 23 (1913), 16–59, reprinted in W. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning and Other Legal Essays (New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1923), pp. 23–64.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hohfeld, W. N., “Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning [ii],” Yale Law Journal 26 (1917), 710–70, reprinted in W. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning and Other Legal Essays (New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1923), pp. 65–114.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Honoré, T., Ulpian: Pioneer of Human Rights, 2nd ed. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kaser, M., “Zum ‘Ius’-Begriff der Römer,” in Essays in Honor of Ben Beinart 2 (= Acta Juridica [1977]), 63–81.Google Scholar
Straumann, B., Roman Law in the State of Nature: The Classical Foundations of Hugo Grotius’ Natural Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2015).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tierney, B., The Idea of Natural Rights: Studies on Natural Rights, Natural Law and Church Law, 1150–1625 (Atlanta, Scholars Press, 1997).Google Scholar
Villey, M., “L’Idée du droit subjectif et les systèmes juridiques romains,” Revue historique de droit français et étranger, 4e sér. 24–5 (1946–7), 201–28.Google Scholar
Villey, M., “Du sens de l’expression jus in re en droit romain classique,” in Mélanges Fernand de Visscher, 2 (=Revue internationale des droits de l’antiquité, 1er sér. 3) (1949), 417–36.Google Scholar
Villey, M., “Le ‘jus in re’ du droit romain classique au droit moderne,” in Conférences faites à l’Institut de droit romain en 1947 (Paris, l’Institut, 1950), pp. 187–225.Google Scholar
Villey, M., “Suum jus cuique tribuens,” in Studi in onore di Pietro de Francisci (Milan, Giuffrè, 1956), pp. 361–71.Google Scholar
Vocabularium Iurisprudentiae Romanae, 5 vols. in 7 (Berlin, G. Reimeri and W. de Gruyter, 1903–87).Google Scholar
Accessibility standard: Inaccessible, or known limited accessibility
Why this information is here
This section outlines the accessibility features of this content - including support for screen readers, full keyboard navigation and high-contrast display options. This may not be relevant for you.Accessibility Information
The HTML of this chapter is known to have missing or limited accessibility features.
We may be reviewing its accessibility for future improvement, but final compliance is
not yet assured and may be subject to legal exceptions. If you have any questions,
please contact
accessibility@cambridge.org.
Content Navigation
Table of contents navigation
Allows you to navigate directly to chapters, sections, or non‐text items through a linked table of contents, reducing the need for extensive scrolling.
Allows you to navigate directly to chapters, sections, or non‐text items through a linked table of contents, reducing the need for extensive scrolling.
Index navigation
Provides an interactive index, letting you go straight to where a term or subject appears in the text without manual searching.
Provides an interactive index, letting you go straight to where a term or subject appears in the text without manual searching.
Reading Order & Textual Equivalents
Single logical reading order
You will encounter all content (including footnotes, captions, etc.) in a clear, sequential flow, making it easier to follow with assistive tools like screen readers.
You will encounter all content (including footnotes, captions, etc.) in a clear, sequential flow, making it easier to follow with assistive tools like screen readers.
Structural and Technical Features
ARIA roles provided
You gain clarity from ARIA (Accessible Rich Internet Applications) roles and attributes, as they help assistive technologies interpret how each part of the content functions.
You gain clarity from ARIA (Accessible Rich Internet Applications) roles and attributes, as they help assistive technologies interpret how each part of the content functions.