Hostname: page-component-76d6cb85b7-vdhp9 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-07-11T16:05:15.189Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Clients and Communities

The Political Economy of Party Network Organization and Development in India’s Urban Slums

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 November 2015

Get access

Abstract

India’s urban slums exhibit dramatic variation in their levels of infrastructural development and access to public services. Why are some vulnerable communities able to demand and secure development from the state while others fail to? Based on ethnographic fieldwork and original household survey data, the author finds that party networks significantly influence the ability of poor urban communities to organize and demand development. In slums with dense party networks, competition among party workers generates a degree of accountability in local patron-client hierarchies that encourages development. Dense party networks also strengthen organizational capacity and provide settlements with vertical connectivity to politicians and officials. The presence of multiparty networks, however, may attenuate the positive influence of party network density. Interviews with political elites and the survey data suggest that politicians are less likely to provide services to slums with multiparty networks. From within settlements, partisan competition also creates perverse incentives for rival networks to undermine each other’s development efforts. This article contributes to scholarship on clientelism, which has overlooked variation in the density and partisan balance of patron-client networks across poor urban communities and the resulting divergences in democratic responsiveness and development that face those communities. It also contributes to research on distributive politics and the political economy of development.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 2015 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable

Supplementary material: PDF

Auerbach supplementary material

Auerbach supplementary material 1

Download Auerbach supplementary material(PDF)
PDF 37 MB