Schumpeter argued that the norms of what he called the ‘classical’ theory were unrealisable within modern societies and offered what he believed to be a more realistic alternative. However, his critics accuse him of confusing ‘is’ with ‘ought’. This paper seeks to save him from this criticism. It shows that Schumpeter's attack on the classical model rested on a correct appraisal of the constraints on individual autonomous action within modern societies. Unlike the ‘competitive theory’ of Downs and others, Schumpeter's own alternative cannot be treated as a naive apologia for contemporary parliametary party democracy. He was well aware that such systems easily degenerate into oligopolies. Indeed he welcomed this development, viewing the party elections as means for moulding rather than responding to the people's will. Nevertheless, a series of procedural norms underlay his theory which are elucidated with reference to Wittgenstein's account of language.

The paper offers a favourable re-assessment of the thought of Gaetano Mosca, a most unfashionable thinker. Three elements of his thought are examined: (1) his ‘historical method’, (2) his ‘unmasking’ of the democratic ideal, and (3) his critique of Marxian socialism. It is argued that his model of an objective political science, based on empirical observation, was essentially sound, though he himself did not live up to its rigorous requirements. Whatever the flaws in his methodology, however, his analysis of the parliamentary system seems convincing enough. As for his complaints against marxism and socialism, these cannot be dismissed as the fulminations of a reactionary, for the simple reason that most of them have been echoed, in one form or another, by Marxists and socialists themselves. It is concluded that social critics could learn much from Mosca, in spite of his conservative leanings.

This article examines the contradictions Schmitt holds to exist between liberalism and democracy. The authors first examine Schmitt's descriptions of liberalism and democracy. They then proceed to his analysis of the political domain, which provides the basis of his criticism of liberal democracy. Following an evaluation of his argument, they propose a democratic conception of liberalism which both draws on Schmitt's account of the political while defending the viability of the union of liberalism and democracy.

Schumpeter's account of the relationship between capitalism, socialism and democracy is reviewed by means of a critical analysis of four contemporary neo-liberal theorems about the market and democracy. It is argued that they each embody partial truths that can only be accepted with considerable qualifications, which the paper seeks to provide. The connection of the four theorems with Schumpeter's work is then traced through the continuities of the liberal political tradition.

This article attempts to examine the supposed causal connection between capitalism and democracy as assumed by Schumpeter, among others. An intellectual link might be traceable to the Utilitarians; but no causal connection between corporate capitalism and democracy emerges. In general they are separate concepts. Any indirect association arises from their ‘liberal’ roots.

The paper provides an account of Marx's position of Schumpeter's three categories: capitalism, socialism and democracy. Marx's conception of capitalism is established as more wide-ranging than sometimes thought, covering any form of society where commodities predominate, and implying a polarized class structure independent of considerations of manual or lowly labour. It is not therefore essentially a political conception, nor does its application turn on the question of private ownership. Socialism, for Marx, involves the abolition of commodities and therefore of money and the wages system. Accordingly, his conception of socialism is not one of state ownership or nationalization, as Schumpeter claims. His commitment to democracy arises from the nature of socialist society and sets him apart from vanguardist political theory. It is therefore more deeply-rooted than Schumpeter suggests.