Introduction
The collaborative nature of US business lobbying underwent severe fragmentation between the 1970s and early 2000s (Mizruchi Reference Mizruchi2013). Instead of collective business lobbying, large firms increasingly sought after their own interests when politically active. This rise of firm lobbying, led to a transformative shift in business political demands, from a moderate, pragmatic orientation, emphasizing long-term stability for the broader business community as well as society, to a situation where individual firms gained mostly short-term and concentrated benefits for themselves (see Drutman Reference Drutman2015; Hart Reference Hart2004; Kim Reference Kim2017; Mizruchi Reference Mizruchi2013; Osgood Reference Osgood2017). The groundbreaking study conducted by Gilens and Page (Reference Gilens and Page2014) highlights what the potential consequences of such developments are. Large firms see their interests disproportionately represented in American politics during this period, mostly at the expense of average citizens, small and medium-sized businesses, labor unions, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
This raises a straightforward but important question: has this trend endured? Have firms become even more active and central lobbyists in American politics or not? Thus far, no study has addressed this basic yet important question. In this research note, we therefore analyze the evolving involvement of firm lobbing in US politics over the first two decades of this century. We hereby focus on two key components of firms’ political involvement: their relative activity within the lobby community vis-à-vis business associations and other interest groups, and the centrality of firms within issue networks.
While empirical accounts tracing the evolution of firm lobbying in US politics are absent (but see Hasija and Brown Reference Hasija and Brown2024 for an exception on foreign firms), there is certainly no lack of theorizing about the evolving importance of firms in American politics. In this research note we identify – and test – the four most dominant views on how firms might have altered their activities in American politics over the past two decades, each derived from a different disciplinary field.
Empirically, we use a novel dataset of over 180,000 lobbying records in US politics from 1999 to 2018. Drawing on the LobbyView database (Kim Reference Kim2018), we randomly sampled 5,000 entries per year. All organizations were coded by economic or social sector and classified by type, including firms, business associations, labor unions, professional associations, and citizen groups. This coding allowed us to examine our core research question: Have firms increased their relative share and centrality in the US lobbying community over the past two decades?Footnote 1
Four Contrasting Views on Firm Involvement in US Politics
In our study, we distinguish between two critical factors associated with firm involvement in American politics: their relative lobby activity and their centrality within issue networks. Relative lobby activity focuses on how intensely firms lobby compared to other actors in the same domain. It measures the intensity of lobbying across different interest group types. For interest groups, this activity is crucial as it determines how effectively their demands are communicated to policy makers (see Hansen and Mitchell Reference Hansen and Mitchell2000; Halpin and Nownes Reference Halpin and Nownes2021; Lawton et al. Reference Lawton, McGuire and Rajwani2013). Centrality, on the other hand, indicates the importance of a firm within the network of interest groups lobbying within the same issue area. It assesses how well-connected a firm is to other organizations within the system. A high centrality score indicates that the firm holds a significant position in the eyes of policy makers and has strong ties with other groups in the political landscape. Indeed, policy makers often value the demands of centrally positioned interest groups, considering them important players within the system as they tend to be well equipped to communicate the encompassing policy views of a network of interest organizations (see Braun and Beyers Reference Beyers and Braun2014; LaPira et al. Reference LaPira, Thomas and Baumgartner2014).
Based on these two indicators, we identify four broad theoretical models predicting whether firms have become more dominant lobby participants in American politics over the past two decades or whether this has not substantially changed over time. Table 1 summarizes the corresponding hypotheses.Footnote 2 We discuss these in turn.
Summary of hypotheses based on expected level of activity (column) and centrality (row)
The first theory framework is best summarized as the firm-capture hypothesis. Within organizational studies, the influential work of Mark Mizruchi (Reference Mizruchi2013) stands out, in which he compellingly argues that the political ambitions of the business community after World War II were driven by unity and responsibility. In the post-war era, businesses, motivated by a sense of obligation amidst economic growth and the expansion of the middle class, collaborated in associations, adopting a moderate, long-term approach in their political demands. This co-operative approach involved close collaboration with labor unions and citizen groups, as Mizruchi argues, and was driven by a shared urgency and belief in the necessity of a well-functioning society.
However, the dynamics shifted during the 1970s and 1980s due to economic challenges such as stagnation, government deficits, and international competition. Corporate elites moved towards a less co-operative strategy to counter excessive government spending and labor regulations, achieving success by weakening the labor movement and thwarting government regulation. Consequently, the once-cohesive American corporate elite began to fragment, with companies pursuing their specific interests, leading to a decline in the collective, pragmatic character of the business community (Hanegraaff et al. Reference Hanegraaff, Poletti and Aizenberg2023; Hanegraaff et al. Reference Hanegraaff, Poletti and Van Ommeren2024; Mizruchi Reference Mizruchi2013). The lack of a unified business association mandate resulted in reduced importance for business associations in the political sphere. This perspective highlights a scenario where firms, having captured the policy process, become more active and central in the US political system, diminishing the key role and influence of business associations.
A parallel perspective in the political economy literature attributes business fragmentation to different causes. Since the 1990s, globalization has increasingly intertwined firms across borders, diversifying interests within sectors and leading to divergent views on trade protectionism. This reduces incentives for firms to align domestically, prompting more individual lobbying. Studies like Madeira (Reference Madeira2016) show that industry associations become less active as intra-industry trade rises, due to conflicting member preferences. Firms increasingly advocate for their own interests (Bombardini Reference Bombardini2008; Osgood Reference Osgood2018; Vesa et al. Reference Vesa, Hanegraaff, Binderkrantz and Vehka2025). As globalization expands, firms’ political roles strengthen while associations weaken (Hanegraaff and Poletti, Reference Hanegraaff and Poletti2021; Osgood Reference Osgood2017). Together, these perspectives underpin our first hypothesis on the evolution of firm involvement in the United States over the past two decades.
Hypothesis 1: Firm capture hypothesis: Firms increase their relative activity over time and become more central lobbyists in the US political system.
The second hypothesis, which we refer to as the firm-specialization hypothesis, builds on the work of Mancur Olson, most importantly his 1982 book: The Rise and Decline of Nations. In contrast to the firm-capture hypothesis, this hypothesis places much more emphasis on the organization of the state. According to Olson, as societies and economies progress, firms tend to become more specialized in their functions and operations. Specialization allows firms to focus on their core competencies, leading to increased efficiency and productivity. This specialization often arises from a competitive market environment where firms strive to excel in specific areas to gain a competitive edge over others. Olson (Reference Olson1982) further emphasizes the importance of inclusive economic institutions in fostering specialization among firms. In inclusive economic systems, there is a level playing field where firms can compete based on their merit and innovation. In such environments, specialization is encouraged because it allows firms to refine their expertise and contribute significantly to economic growth (Grier et al. Reference Grier, Munger and Roberts1994).
Olson’s (Reference Olson1982) work underscores the government’s role in fostering a conducive environment for economic activity (see also Woll Reference Woll2008). Inclusive institutions that ensure fair competition, property rights, and the rule of law enable economic specialization, innovation, and growth. This perspective holds that as firms specialize, they become more politically active to defend their narrow interests (Baumgartner and Leech Reference Baumgartner and Leech2001; Heinz Reference Heinz1993). However, unlike the firm-capture model, this does not make them more central actors, as each operates within its niche. Associations remain necessary to co-ordinate broader political issues and retain their central role (Hanegraaff and van der Ploeg Reference Hanegraaff and van der Ploeg2020). This logic informs our second hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2: Firm specialization hypothesis: Firms increase their relative activity over time, but do not become more central lobbyists in the US political system.
Third, Lowery and Gray (Reference Gray and Lowery1996) apply concepts from population ecology to the study the evolution of interest group communities. Their view on how interest communities develop over time is shaped by the principles of population ecology, a field in biology that studies the processes of birth, growth, and death within animal populations. The authors argue that interest group communities, like biological populations, undergo similar processes of birth, growth, decline, and adaptation (Nownes Reference Nownes2004). They contend that the development of interest communities is influenced by factors such as resource availability, competition, and government activity. A key tenet of this view is that over time an equilibrium will emerge in which the interest community stabilizes, similar to what is observed in ecological systems, as the availability of resources and the structure of government begin to dictate the shape and size of the interest group system.
Importantly, this notion of equilibrium resonates with a broader literature that treats lobbying itself as an equilibrium phenomenon (Austen-Smith Reference Austen-Smith1993; Austen-Smith and Wright Reference Austen-Smith and Wright1994). In this perspective, the effects of lobbying depend crucially on the assumed reaction of other interest groups, as lobbying by one actor is usually met with counteractive lobbying by others. This dynamic of mutual offsetting creates a kind of strategic rigidity or inertia in lobbying behavior, even in the face of major political or economic events. As such, lobbying systems may appear surprisingly stable, not despite external pressures, but because actors anticipate and adapt to those pressures in equilibrium fashion. This helps explain the stability observed in many interest group systems and reinforces the population ecological prediction of macro-level stability.
Accordingly, this model emphasizes system-level continuity over individual-level volatility. While individual organizations may enter or exit the system, this turnover is not expected to affect the overall structure of the interest group community unless major external shocks occur (Halpin and Jordan Reference Halpin and Jordan2009). Such shocks might include a coup, a complete overhaul of electoral institutions, or economic collapse – as seen, for instance, in Greece or Argentina over the past decades. By contrast, events such as the financial crisis in the United States may not be sufficiently disruptive to alter the structure of the interest group system if equilibrium dynamics in lobbying behavior act as a stabilizing force (LaPira Reference LaPira2014). That is, even if certain organizations adjust their lobbying strategies, others are likely to respond in kind, thereby maintaining the overall balance of the system. This leads to our third hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3: Population ecology hypothesis: Firms do not increase their relative activity over time, nor do they become more central lobbyists in the US political system.
The fourth hypothesis, the business substitution hypothesis, highlights growing fragmentation within the business community, making it harder for associations to represent a unified position. As a result, associations may lose centrality within both the business community (Aizenberg and Hanegraaff Reference Aizenberg and Hanegraaff2020a; Aizenberg and Hanegraaff Reference Aizenberg and Hanegraaff2020b; Chalmers Reference Chalmers2020; Young and Pagliari Reference Young and Pagliari2017) and policy-making arenas (Grömping and Halpin Reference Grömping and Halpin2019). However, this shift does not lead associations to abandon political activity. Instead, they continue to engage politically, but in new or adjusted roles. This view builds on Streeck and Schmitter’s (Reference Streeck and Schmitter1984) seminal work, which shows that while associations have long faced major environmental shifts, they have also proven highly adaptable (see also Bennett Reference Bennett2016). Consequently, if corporations assume a more central role in policy making, this does not imply the exclusion of associations from the political arena. Rather, these associations adjust (Halpin and Jordan Reference Halpin and Jordan2009; Poletti et al. Reference Poletti, De Bièvre and Hanegraaff2016). Literature in this domain outlines two plausible trajectories of adaption: first, associations may enhance their emphasis on services provision, comprising activities such as political monitoring or co-ordination, as suggested by Bennett (Reference Bennett2016). Alternatively, they may prioritize the concerns of their affluent members to sustain their core revenue streams (DeBièvre et al. 2016). In either scenario, associations persist in their political activities, albeit in a less central position than before. Consequently, this logic gives rise to the fourth hypothesis.
Hypothesis 4: Business substitution hypothesis: Firms do not increase their relative activity over time, but they do become more central lobbyists in the US political system.
Data and Methods
To test our hypothesis, we rely on data from the Lobby Disclosure Act, made accessible via Lobby View (Kim Reference Kim2017). We bulk-downloaded a random set of 5,000 lobby activities over a nineteen-year period: 1999–2018. In the next step, we classified organizations according to their group type and the sector in which they are active. For group type, we made a distinction between ‘firms’, ‘business associations’ (organizations representing firms), and ‘others’ such as citizen groups and labor unions (Binderkrantz et al. Reference Binderkrantz, Christiansen and Pedersen2015). For sectors, we rely on ISIC rev. 4 codesFootnote 3 and we coded the organizations based on two-digit codes. This includes sectors, in no particular order, such as ‘Manufacture of food products’ (code 10), ‘Air transport’ (code 51) and ‘Telecommunication’ (code 61). The coding process was conducted by students, where all organizations were coded by two different coders. If coders disagreed, we made the final decision based on our expertise. Cronbach’s Alpha for coding of the organizations was >0.93 and for sectors was >0.91.
From the original 181,504 instances of lobby activity, we excluded all governmental organizations, universities, religious groups, hobby and leisure groups, and dropped cases with missing organizational types. This means the dataset for this paper comprises 176,499 instances of lobbying activity between 1999 and 2018, across 13,652 firms, 2,786 business associations, and 8,103 other types of organizations involved in lobbying activities from 1999 to 2018. These organizations lobby for a variety of issues, with the most popular ones being budget, taxation, health issues, defense, and transportation (see Appendix 1 for a detailed overview of the different issues).
To test our hypotheses, we create yearly snapshots of the lobbying networks. In the networks we analyze, nodes represent organizations, and edges indicate lobbying for the same policy domain (see Figure 1). To assess the activity of organizations, we calculate the annual percentage of lobbying acts by different types of organizations. For evaluating organizational centrality, we employ the network degree centrality measure, a classic metric for assessing a node’s position in social network research (Freeman Reference Freeman1978). Network degree centrality is operationalized as the ratio of the number of ties a node has to the maximum possible number of ties the node could have within the network. We normalize degree centrality scores to a range from 0 to 1, where 1 signifies that the node is connected to all other nodes in the network. Upon calculating centrality for each node, we determine the average centrality for each organizational group. To provide a detailed description of the lobbying networks’ structure, we compare network snapshots over four- to five-year intervals using a variety of conventional social network metrics, list the most central nodes, and offer visualizations.
Illustration of the network analyzed in this study. Note: On the left, the structure of the dataset is depicted, and on the right, we show the network under examination. Nodes in the network represent firms, business associations, and other types of organizations. Edges indicate lobbying for the same issue.
Results
Activity and Centrality of Organizations
When examining the organizational activity as a percentage of all lobbying acts per year, it is evident that the distribution remains relatively stable across the three organizational groups (Figure 2). On average, business associations are responsible for approximately 20 per cent of all lobbying acts annually, firms for around 45 per cent, and the remaining acts are carried out by other organizations. Despite being relatively few within our dataset, business associations account for the highest number of lobbying acts compared to firms or other types of organizations, highlighting their significant level of activity (Figure 3).
Lobbying activity as a percentage of lobbying acts per year.
Number of organizations and activities of lobbyists in the dataset. Note: (A) Number of organizations in the dataset. (B) Average number of lobbying acts per type.
Upon examining the centrality of organizations, we observe relative stability in centrality across all organizational types (Figure 4). A slight increase in centrality is observed, but it becomes more pronounced only after 2014 and it applies to all organizational types. Over time there is minimal variance between firms and business associations (and others), with their centrality levels being comparable at varying moments in time.
Average network degree centrality.
Structure and Properties of Lobbying Networks
Our analysis of lobbying networks reveals a consistently high level of network density and clustering across all four snapshots, indicating a closely knit structure where many organizations co-lobby frequently, forming tightly connected groups around common issues or interests (see Appendix 2). This is further evidenced by the average degree across snapshots being around 600, suggesting that each organization, on average, lobbies for the same issue as approximately 600 other organizations.
Moreover, the average path length within these networks is notably short, slightly less than two. This implies that any organization can reach another within just one or two intermediary steps, highlighting a highly efficient network structure. Such efficiency might facilitate the rapid dissemination of information or influence, promoting effective co-ordination among organizations. This interconnectedness is attributed to the data structure, which features a large number of organizations lobbying on a very small number of issues. Interestingly, no issues are exclusive to one organization; most lobby on nearly all issues, albeit to varying extents, contributing to a typical small-world network structure marked by high clustering and a short average path length.
The stability observed in most network properties suggests that lobbying activities have not undergone significant changes over time. This stability is underscored by the presence of only one connected component in all snapshots, indicating a non-fragmented, highly clustered network without isolated groups or organizations.
These observations are confirmed by densely clustered network visualizations (Figure 5). Notably, firms and business associations are equally central, with no apparent clustering of specific types of organizations across different network segments. In examining the most central nodes within these networks, we find a predominance of firms, with only a few business associations or other types of organizations featured (see Appendix 2). Nonetheless, the average centrality levels between firms and business associations are similar, as previously mentioned (see Figure 4).
Lobby networks across four time periods. Note: Network visualizations of four snapshots using the ForceAtlas2 algorithm. Only edges with a weight greater than twenty are shown. Nodes represent organizations, and edges indicate lobbying for the same issue. Blue nodes are firms, green nodes are business associations, and pink nodes are other types of organizations. Larger node size indicates higher degree centrality of a node.
In the appendices, we run several statistical tests highlighting the lack of variation in activity and centrality among firms (Appendices 3 and 4). The results confirm our descriptive analyses: there is no substantial change in firm activity and centrality over time compared to business associations. Moreover, we run all analyses for subsets of the dataset, namely for Agricultural, Manufacturing, and Services (see Appendices 5–7) to see whether our results are driven by a particular type of sector. There are, however, no notable differences across these sectors: all show high levels of stability in firm activity and centrality over time. Finally, we conducted a series of robustness checks by analyzing our network data using three additional, yet widely recognized, measures of centrality: betweenness, closeness, and eigenvector centrality (Wasserman and Faust Reference Wasserman and Faust1994; see Appendix 8.1–8.6). These measures each capture different dimensions of structural importance within a network. Closeness centrality tracks how easily a node can reach others; betweenness centrality identifies potential brokers or bridge actors between otherwise disconnected groups; and eigenvector centrality highlights actors connected to other influential actors (Newman Reference Newman2010). The patterns across all three additional measures confirm the core findings of our study. Firms generally maintain relatively high centrality levels, but there is no consistent trend of increasing centrality over time. In fact, betweenness centrality – unlike degree, closeness, or eigenvector centrality – shows no statistically significant difference between firms and other types of organizations, suggesting that firms do not occupy more brokerage positions in the network. Furthermore, these findings hold across sector-specific analyses (agriculture, manufacturing, and services), with only marginal differences observed. Taken together, these robustness checks affirm the central conclusion of our study: the structure of US lobbying networks has remained remarkably stable over the past two decades, regardless of the specific centrality metric used.
Conclusion
This research note examined whether firms have become more active and central players in US lobbying networks between 1999 and 2018. Drawing on a unique dataset of over 176,000 lobbying records, we compared the activity and network centrality of firms to business associations and other organizations. Contrary to prominent theoretical expectations – particularly those predicting a continued rise in firm dominance – we found remarkable structural stability in both the relative activity and the network centrality of firms. Our findings align most closely with the population ecology perspective and broader equilibrium theories of lobbying, which suggest that systemic structures remain stable unless disrupted by major external shocks.
The implications of these findings are significant. While much of the literature highlights growing corporate political power, our evidence suggests that at the macro level, the US interest group system exhibits strong resilience. Despite notable political and economic shocks – including 9/11, the financial crisis, and rising political polarization – no substantial reconfiguration of the system occurred in terms of who lobbies or how central they are within lobbying networks. Rather than a continued fragmentation of the corporate elite or a surge in firm influence, we see an enduring equilibrium in how interest representation is structured.
At the same time, this study opens several important avenues for future research. First, while we observe macro-level stability, the mechanisms behind this resilience remain unclear. For instance, theories of counteractive lobbying suggest that strategic responses by opposing actors may neutralize each other’s influence, producing an observable equilibrium (Austen-Smith Reference Austen-Smith1993; Austen-Smith and Wright Reference Austen-Smith and Wright1994). Future work should investigate these dynamics at the meso (policy domain) or micro (organizational incentives and strategy) levels to better understand how equilibrium is maintained in practice.
Second, and related, our data capture co-lobbying on broad issue categories but do not reveal whether organizations support or oppose specific policies within those domains. Shared engagement on a topic does not necessarily imply shared policy preferences (Young and Pagliari Reference Young and Pagliari2017; Chalmers Reference Chalmers2020, author). As such, we cannot determine whether observed co-lobbying patterns reflect collaboration, competition, or strategic neutrality. In addition, the use of broad issue categories may mask important specialization patterns at the firm level, as firms could be highly active within specific policy niches that remain invisible in aggregated data. Combined with the high overall network density, this aggregation makes it more difficult to detect subtle structural changes over time. These limitations also affect our ability to empirically distinguish between the firm specialization and population ecology hypotheses, since organizations lobbying on the same broad issue may in fact be engaging in distinct sub-issues within that domain. Future research leveraging position-coded data or bill-specific lobbying disclosures could disentangle these dynamics. Such finer-grained data would help determine whether co-lobbying ties indicate genuine co-operation or merely parallel but uncoordinated activity, offering a stronger basis to test between competing theoretical explanations. As such, this would enable scholars to further understand the causal mechanisms underlying the striking stability of the US lobbying community at the aggregate level.
Third, our analysis focuses on patterns of activity and network structure, not political influence per se. While network centrality may correlate with access, it is not a direct measure of policy impact (Heaney Reference Heaney2006). Future research should examine whether structural stability in the lobbying system is matched by similar patterns in political influence and policy outcomes. It is entirely possible that firms have not increased their centrality in the network but have still gained disproportionate sway over decision-making processes.
Fourth, although we find little change in the relative positions of different actor types, our study does not assess the absolute volume of lobbying over time (Lowery et al. Reference Lowery, Gray and Fellowes2005). A steady relative share of activity by firms could still coincide with an overall expansion of the lobbying ecosystem, thereby altering the aggregate pressure on policy makers. Future research should address the extent to which macro-level growth in lobbying activity may affect system responsiveness, legislative capacity, or policy outcomes.
Fifth, while our study takes a system-level perspective on the evolution of firm and business associational lobbying, notable changes may have occurred within specific policy domains. Subsystems such as environmental regulation, trade, or healthcare may have seen greater disruptions – particularly in response to domain-specific crises or rising political and public attention. Thus, although our findings indicate macro-level stability, they do not rule out substantial shifts within particular domains, which future studies should explore.
Finally, a key limitation of our study is the exclusion of campaign contributions. While we focus on lobbying and network centrality, campaign donations are another crucial channel of corporate political influence (Austen-Smith Reference Austen-Smith1995; McKay Reference McKay2018). Firms may treat lobbying and donations as substitutes or complements, depending on issue salience or electoral timing. Omitting this dimension may obscure shifts in broader corporate engagement. That is, organizations lobbying on the same issue may in fact hold opposing positions, which could alter the theoretical interpretation of ‘co-lobbying’ and the meaning of network centrality. This limitation constrains the precision of our empirical tests and underscores the need for future work using position-coded or bill-level data to clarify whether observed structural stability reflects co-operation, competition, or both. Future research should therefore examine how lobbying and campaign finance interact with each other, and combining these data sources could yield a fuller picture of firms’ strategies for political access and influence.
Overall, our findings challenge the prevailing expectation of a continued rise in firm dominance within American lobbying. Instead, the US interest group system appears robust, integrated, and resilient – remarkably stable despite significant political and economic shocks. While this is a critical finding, it should not be treated as the final word. Rather, we see this study as an important point of departure for future work exploring more fine-grained meso- and micro-level mechanisms that sustain systemic equilibrium. Understanding how specific policy domains, organizational strategies, and countervailing dynamics contribute to this stability will be essential to fully grasp the evolving nature of corporate political engagement.
Supplementary material
The supplementary material for this article can be found at https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123426101409.
Data availability statement
Replication data for this paper can be found at https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/HMY2LE.
Financial support
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency, commercial or not-for-profit sectors.
Competing interests
None.
Open access
