A. Historical Debates of Centralism versus Regionalism

The arrangement set out in Articles 52–54 of the Charter represents an international consensus reached, although not fully worked out, at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in late 1944 and at the San Francisco Conference that adopted the Charter in June the following year. Anthony Arend’s summary of the early debates about a ‘new world order’ that preceded the establishment of the United Nations is instructive – particularly on the evolution of the thinking on the part of the major powers at the time on the role of regional organisations in conflict management.Footnote ⁶ There were two opposing views. One, championed by British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, advocated the idea of both a centralised organisation and a series of ‘regional councils’, but with the regional councils assuming primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in their regions and the centralised organisation playing a supporting role. The other view, favoured by US Secretary of State Cordell Hull, was for a strong global organisation that would play the primary role in conflict management, while ‘regional agencies’ could play a part in addressing local conflicts, but in a clearly subordinate role and consistent with the authority of the global body.

At the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, which prepared the first draft of the UN Charter, the four powers that subsequently became permanent members of the Security Council – namely, China, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) – adopted Hull’s vision in its totality.Footnote ⁷ They did so despite concerns from Latin American states, which advocated for the incorporation of a provision requiring states to submit regional disputes to regional organisations before submitting them to the United Nations and which were opposed to the proposal that regional organisations should undertake enforcement action only with the authorisation of the Security Council.Footnote ⁸

B. Partnership Peacekeeping as a Return of Regionalism

The four powers thus opted for a model that accorded the proposed Security Council primary responsibility over the management of conflicts and the maintenance of international peace and security, and which granted regional organisations a subordinate role. They privileged the centre at the expense of the periphery, thereby ordaining centralism as the paradigm for the management of the post-war order. Leaving aside the concessions to regionalism, the UN Charter vested the key organ of the newly established global organisation with unprecedented authority and paramountcy over the management of conflicts.

Since the creation of the United Nations, the Security Council has authorised the establishment of 71 peacekeeping operations as part of its function of maintaining international peace and security. Just over half of these operations (36) have been authorised in the period since 1995.Footnote ⁹ There are two main explanations, both reflecting a changing politics, for this explosion in UN peacekeeping operations. First is the change of power dynamics in the Security Council following the end of the Cold War. For roughly the next two decades, this change unblocked the political impasse between the two superpowers that had made it difficult for the veto-carrying permanent members to agree on major decisions affecting international peace and security. Second is the rise in complex conflicts around the world, including intra-state civil conflicts, crying out for attention and action from the reinvigorated and activist Security Council.

The change of power dynamics in the Security Council resulted, first and foremost, in the disappearance of the old East–West ideological rivalries led by the USSR and the United States, respectively. Another consequence was the increasing assertiveness of a hitherto fairly inactive permanent member, China, as well as the non-permanent members of the Security Council, discussed by Cai and Van den Herik in their chapters in this volume. I return to this later. In the realm of peace operations, these developments enabled the emergence of the notion of partnership peacekeeping, which involves two models:

1. (i) the ‘subcontracting’ model, whereby the United Nations outsources peace operations to regional agencies; and

2. (ii) the ‘collaborative’ model, whereby the United Nations and regional organisations deploy peace operations jointly and, among other things, share planning, personnel, and resources.

In a sense, partnership peacekeeping represents a return to regionalism – although not a diminution of the centrality of the Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security as such. The pivotal development was the adoption of General Assembly Resolution 49/57, the Declaration on the Enhancement of Cooperation between the United Nations and Regional Arrangements or Agencies in the Maintenance of International Peace and Security.Footnote ¹⁰ The Declaration was adopted based on the conviction that it would help to strengthen the role and enhance the effectiveness of both the United Nations and regional arrangements or agencies in the maintenance of international peace and security.

The adoption of Resolution 49/57 was a logical follow-up to the proposals laid out by UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his report An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping in 1992.Footnote ¹¹ Among other things, Agenda for Peace recognised that part of the solution to the problems faced by the United Nations in its post-Cold-War management of conflicts lay in reconsidering how regional organisations interacted with the global organisation, including in matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security.

C. Relevance of the International Rule of Law in the Security Council’s Operations and Decision-Making Processes

Before turning in section III to the Security Council’s practice in selected partnership operations with the African Union, a related question for preliminary consideration concerns the relevance and application of the ‘international rule of law’ in the operations of the Security Council. This question is significant because the ability of the Security Council to impose its authority and primacy on regional organisations such as the African Union may – at a political level, at least – be influenced by perceptions of the legitimacy of its actions and decision-making processes. Legitimacy is a relevant factor for understanding the meaning of the ‘international rule of law’, especially in the context of international institutions.

I do not propose to offer a detailed analysis of this question in this limited discussion. Suffice it to say that the issue has recently received some attention in the legal literature, and it has been invoked by member states in their statements both in the Security Council and General Assembly.Footnote ¹² At the national level, the rule of law requires a government of laws, the supremacy of the law, and equality before the law – that is, the idea that both the governors and the governed are subject to regulation by the same law. Yet this is only a shorthand description: there are differences in how, at the domestic level, the rule of law is understood in common law and civil law systems, as well as in other legal traditions.

When applied to the international system, the rule of law may be understood as the application of some, although not all, of the principles of the domestic concept of the rule of law to relations between states and other subjects of international law.Footnote ¹³ This, too, is a sweeping description that does not precisely define the term. Adopting a very specific meaning for the purposes of their discussion, Heike Krieger and Georg Nolte acknowledge the difficulty of defining ‘the international rule of law’ thus: ‘We are aware that the term “the international rule of law” has been given many meanings, just like the term “rule of law” itself.’Footnote ¹⁴ Needless to say that the understanding of the international rule of law I have noted above, which I share, is adequate only for the purposes of this chapter.

While the domestic model arose as a response to the dangers of centralised authority by the state, the international rule of law arose as an institutional solution to the opposite problem of decentralised authority. Under the latter, numerous independent, legally equal, and sovereign states interact and produce decisions separately or through institutions that they have collectively established and endowed with certain powers.Footnote ¹⁵ The most significant and powerful such institution is the Security Council, which is empowered by the UN Charter to decide if a given situation constitutes a threat to peace and security, and if so, what action to take to address such a threat. In this sense, the Security Council enjoys an unassailable status in the international system, sitting atop an international legal hierarchy. Yet this does not mean that it is unconstrained by international law when exercising its powers. Although there has been a long-running debate on how far the Security Council is bound by international law, there seems to be agreement on two basic propositions: first, that the powers of the Security Council are constrained by the Charter; and secondly, that, at the very least, it is also bound by rules of international law that have the status of ius cogens. This is a cautious position, which recognises that the Charter itself does not, as such, spell out the relationship between the Security Council and international law more generally.Footnote ¹⁶ I agree with this position.

Although the General Assembly adopted a declaration calling for the rule of law to be applied internally to the United Nations in 2012, the Security Council is yet to establish a rule-of-law framework to govern its decision-making process.Footnote ¹⁷ Some commentators have proposed a set of specific criteria for determining the international rule of law in the context of Security Council decision-making, drawing from some of the elements of the domestic model.Footnote ¹⁸ A common thread running through these discussions is the notion of legitimacy: the argument that satisfaction of these elements ensures legitimacy and enhances acceptance of the Security Council’s decisions, in the same way as perceptions of compliance with the rule of law in domestic systems increases the chances of obedience to the law.

Legitimacy is an elusive concept. In the context of institutions, such as the Security Council, it has more to do with how certain audiences perceive the acceptability of the institution’s particular acts or decisions, sometimes from a purely political point of view, than about their normative goodness or moral rightness. Despite this subjectivity, I would argue that perceptions of legitimacy should matter as a core defining feature of the international rule of law for the Security Council. As Ian Hurd puts it:

The broader audience for the Security Council resolutions for whom the question of compliance with the international rule of law potentially matters is the entire UN membership. A substantive part of my discussion in the next section is on Resolution 1973, which authorised intervention in Libya.Footnote ²⁰ The paradox of this Resolution is that it was at once one of the most consequential decisions ever adopted by the Security Council in the context of UN–AU relations and the most contested in terms of its legitimacy and, by implication, its compliance with some of the presumed international rule-of-law requirements among the most affected audience for the Resolution – namely, the African states.

A. Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union and the Primacy of the Security Council

On 11 July 2000, members of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) – the African Union’s predecessor – adopted the Constitutive Act of the African Union in Lomé, Togo.Footnote ²⁴ Article 4(h) AU Constitutive Act provides for ‘the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity’. Further, Article 4(j) provides for ‘the right of Member States to request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and security’. The incorporation of the right to intervention in Article 4(h) was partly a response to African states’ disappointment over the failure of the Security Council to deal with the most traumatic event to have occurred on African soil since the end of the Cold War: the Rwanda genocide of 1994.

By incorporating the right to intervene in Article 4(h), African states sought to move beyond the OAU era, when adherence to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states precluded intervention, and the shadow of the Rwanda genocide. While the debate over the status of the right of humanitarian intervention continues, Article 4(h) nevertheless represents a substantial legal innovation. Although it is phrased as a ‘right to intervene’, in essence it should be construed as a ‘right of humanitarian intervention’. The provision has crystallised into a treaty norm a diffuse set of ideas and concepts that are similar to, and form the basis of, the related R2P principle, but it is not an expression of that principle as such. I return to the R2P in the next section.

I have previously argued that, in an era in which post-independence Africa had witnessed the horrors of genocide and ethnic cleansing on its own soil and against its own kind, with memories of the Rwanda genocide still fresh, it would have been absolutely remiss for the AU Constitutive Act to remain silent on the question of the right to intervene in respect of grave circumstances such as genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.Footnote ²⁵ Before discussing the implications of Article 4(h) for the relationship between the Security Council and the African Union in the maintenance of international peace and security, it is worth recalling the two interventions carried out by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) without prior Security Council authorisation. ECOWAS intervened in Liberia and Sierra Leone in 1990 and 1998, respectively.Footnote ²⁶ These interventions undoubtedly contravened Article 53(1) UN Charter, which provides in part: ‘The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilise such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorisation of the Security [Council].’ Nevertheless, the Security Council neither condemned them nor, significantly, did it expressly grant them ex post facto authorisation.Footnote ²⁷

The question of whether the Security Council, having failed to act, subsequently helped to legitimise ECOWAS’s interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone has been the subject of debate. Some scholars have suggested that, by means of this action, African states were the first to force the pendulum to swing towards a ‘regional’ doctrine of intervention that overrides state sovereignty to protect human rights and democracy. Jeremy Levitt has argued that the Security Council placed a ‘retroactive de jure seal on the ECOWAS intervention’.Footnote ²⁸ Ben Kioko shares this interpretation and has asserted that ‘the UN Security Council has never complained about its powers being usurped, [apparently] because the interventions were in support of popular causes and were carried out partly because the Security Council had not taken action or was unlikely to do so at the time’.Footnote ²⁹ Ademola Abass and Mashood Baderin have gone further to assert that the absence of protest by the Security Council and members of the regional organisation, in the case of such a ‘quasi-Article 39’ of the UN Charter determination, ‘must be accepted as a development of new norms of State practice’.Footnote ³⁰ Abass and Baderin are referring to practice purporting to support a new norm of intervention by regional organisations without Security Council authorisation. Like Levitt and Kioko, they conclude that the absence of condemnation by the Security Council implies that it effectively endorsed the practice. I do not share this view. If the Security Council had wanted to endorse these interventions ex post facto, it would have done so by way of an explicit decision, instead of letting such a consequential conclusion be inferred from its silence.

I would also argue that the proposition that there is now a regional norm permitting the African Union to use force for humanitarian intervention without Security Council authorisation, based on either Article 4(h) AU Constitutive Act or new state practice, rests on a faulty premise. It suggests that a regional treaty norm can usurp the UN Charter, which would contravene its Article 103. Alternatively, it suggests that the Charter prohibition of the use of force in Article 2(4) – generally characterised as a rule of ius cogens or a peremptory norm of international law – can be superseded by a new customary rule permitting humanitarian intervention based on changes in state practice. As a legal matter, a peremptory norm can be changed only by another peremptory norm. There is no agreement that the right of humanitarian intervention has attained that status.

In my view, Article 4(h) AU Constitutive Act purports to establish a right of humanitarian intervention of an auto-determinative nature. Unsurprisingly, following its adoption, there was concern that a regional organisation was attempting to usurp the authority of the Security Council and that this did not accord with the view that regional arrangements can never, under any circumstances, override the primacy of the Security Council, in terms of Article 53(1) UN Charter.Footnote ³¹ As it happens, in the two decades since the adoption of its Constitutive Act, the African Union has not actually invoked Article 4(h) intervention involving the use of force in any situation, despite the existence of at least four occasions on which it could arguably have done so. For a host of different reasons in each of these cases, the African Union did not find it either expedient or pertinent to invoke Article 4(h) and intervene unilaterally without Security Council authorisation.Footnote ³² The fear that it would usurp the authority of the Security Council has not materialised, and I argue that this is unlikely ever to happen and that such action would violate the UN Charter.Footnote ³³

To appreciate the potential ramifications of Article 4(h) on the AU–UN relationship, and my prediction that the African Union is not likely to usurp the authority of the Security Council, it is necessary to examine the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union.Footnote ³⁴ The Peace and Security Protocol was adopted in 2002 to establish the operational structure to implement effectively the decisions taken by the AU Assembly pursuant to the authority conferred upon it by Article 9(1)(g) AU Constitutive Act regarding the ‘management of conflicts, war and other emergencies and the restoration of peace’.Footnote ³⁵

Under Article 17(1) Peace and Security Protocol, AU member states pledge that, in fulfilment of the African Union’s mandate to promote and maintain peace and security in Africa, the PSC ‘shall cooperate and work closely with the United Nations Security Council, which has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security’.Footnote ³⁶ However, in his reading of the subsequent clauses of Article 17, Jean Allain concludes that the relationship envisaged between the PSC and the Security Council is neither on an equal footing nor one that places the latter over the former.Footnote ³⁷ Furthermore, he asserts that, for the PSC, the Security Council is simply one of many UN bodies that it is supposed to work with closely, and that its interaction is meant to be first and foremost of a logistical nature.Footnote ³⁸ To the latter point, he notes that, in fact, Article 17(2) does not speak of the need to seek Security Council authorisation to use force; rather, it calls on the United Nations to provide assistance.Footnote ³⁹ Allain sees a diffusion and dilution of the primacy of the Security Council, vis-à-vis the PSC, in the wording of Article 17(3) and (4), whose essence is that the role of the Security Council is to assist the PSC and not vice versa.Footnote ⁴⁰ He concludes categorically:

I disagree with Allain. As a practical matter, it is inconceivable that if the African Union were to invoke Article 17(1) Peace and Security Protocol, the United Nations would be satisfied with its role being limited merely to that of providing financial, logistical, and military support without allowing the Security Council to address the issue of authorisation of the use of force. The argument that, by enshrining Article 4(h) in its Constitutive Act, the African Union has subverted the primacy of the Security Council rests on an interpretation of two seemingly irreconcilable provisions. While Article 17(1) recognises the primacy of the Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security, Article 16(1) provides that the African Union ‘has the primary responsibility for promoting peace, security and stability in Africa’. From this, Christian Wyse, like Allain, has concluded that, despite the AU Peace and Security Protocol’s repeated references to cooperation with the United Nations, it never actually states that the African Union should seek the approval of the Security Council prior to intervention and it fails to clarify how the latter is viewed.Footnote ⁴² Wyse reached this conclusion despite the fact that the African Union had clarified the issue in 2005, when it adopted ‘The Common African Position on the Proposed Reform of the United Nations: “The Ezulwini Consensus”’.Footnote ⁴³

The ‘Ezulwini Consensus’ was endorsed by a decision of the AU Assembly three years later as a common policy position addressing various issues, including, principally, Security Council reform.Footnote ⁴⁴ In this context, it addresses the issue of collective security and the use of force. In terms of this common policy, the African Union reaffirmed the primacy of the Security Council in matters of collective security, including the R2P and the legality of the use of force.

Three points in the ‘Ezulwini Consensus’ deserve emphasis. First, the AU Executive Council agreed that, since the General Assembly and the Security Council are often far from the scenes of conflicts and may not be in a position to undertake effectively a proper appreciation of the nature and development of conflict situations, it is imperative that regional organisations, in areas of proximity to conflicts, are empowered to take actions in this regard. Secondly, the AU Executive Council also agreed that intervention by regional organisations should take place only with the approval of the Security Council. At the same time, however, it recognised that, in some situations and in circumstances requiring urgent action, the Security Council could grant its approval ex post. Thirdly, it acknowledged the potential tension between the R2P principle and state sovereignty by reiterating the obligation of states to protect their citizens but not use this principle as a pretext to undermine the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of states.Footnote ⁴⁵ In sum, the ‘Ezulwini Consensus’ reaffirmed the UN Charter’s provisions on collective security, the circumstances circumscribing the use of force, the primacy of the Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security, and the obligation incumbent upon the African Union to seek the Council’s approval before invoking Article 4(h).

The AU Assembly endorsed the Executive Council’s recommendations at its summit in July 2005, thus making the ‘Ezulwini Consensus’ a formal AU policy decision.Footnote ⁴⁶ I argue that this policy framework provides the broader context for understanding Article 4(h) AU Constitutive Act, and I do not share the view that ‘the statements about intervention therein are no more than either political manoeuvring or a statement of what would be true if the UNSC were actually effective’.Footnote ⁴⁷

B. The Security Council, the African Union, and the Libyan Conflict of 2011

C. China’s Position in the Security Council Regarding UN Peacekeeping in Africa

Cai has examined China’s expanding power and global interests, and its growing engagement within the Security Council. He has argued that, since the 2010s, China has exhibited a new image in the Security Council as evidenced by, among other things, its growing financial and personnel contributions to UN peacekeeping operations,Footnote ¹³⁹ as well as its more frequent use of the veto.Footnote ¹⁴⁰ I propose to build on these insights specifically with reference to the role that China currently plays in the Security Council with regard to the AU–UN partnership and peacekeeping operations in Africa in the post-Cold-War era.

As a P5 member, China has traditionally taken a reactive position on issues relating to peace and security in Africa, with the result that it has not been able to set the agenda let alone take up the role of penholder in the Security Council. Nevertheless, because of its advocacy and support for African causes, and its growing economic and strategic interests in Africa, the P3 often do consider China’s (along with Russia’s) positions to ensure smooth passage of proposed resolutions on situations in Africa. As Cai has noted, for the first decade of its membership of the Security Council – from 1971, when it replaced the Republic of China, until 1980 – China was largely a passive member, sitting on the fence when it came to peacekeeping issues. It usually abstained from voting on peacekeeping resolutions and did not contribute funds or personnel to UN missions. For some scholars, this stance of neutrality sometimes translated into inactivity, if not outright hostility to UN peace operations.Footnote ¹⁴¹ This changed in 1980, with Deng Xiaoping’s policy of opening up to the West.Footnote ¹⁴² China launched this new policy with its first contribution to the United Nations’s assessed funds for peacekeeping in 1982.

Since the end of the Cold War, China has increasingly deployed units to participate in UN peace operations. Beginning in 2000, China has contributed enabler units, such as engineering, logistics and medical personnel, to various UN missions around the world.Footnote ¹⁴³ More recently, it has also deployed force protection units and troops, mostly in Africa, even as it has reiterated repeatedly its strict interpretation of the twin principles of respect for state sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of states. While the numbers are relatively modest compared to those of other traditional troop-contributing countries, China’s contributions to UN peace operations today surpass those of Russia, as well as the P3 members, who prefer to contribute funds, equipment, and logistics rather than military personnel. China’s deployments in Africa have included UN missions in the Central African Republic (the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic, or MINUSCA), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (the Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, or its French acronym MONUSCO), Mali (the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, or MINUSMA), Sudan (the UN–AU Mission in Darfur, or UNAMID), South Sudan (the United Nations Mission in South Sudan, or UNMISS), and Western Sahara (United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara, or its French acronym MINURSO). As of 31 May 2021, the total personnel contributions of the P5 to UN peace missions worldwide stood at: China, 2,471; France, 622; United Kingdom, 550; Russia, 71; and United States, 31. The P2 powers have tended to adopt a common approach to African causes and to support the positions of the A3, and the African Union, in the Security Council. Yet China’s participation in peacekeeping operations in Africa is well ahead that of Russia. Table 2 offers a snapshot of this comparison in six current or recent UN peace operations in Africa (the UNAMID mission ended on 31 December 2020).Footnote ¹⁴⁴

I should note that, outside the UN framework, China’s support for the African Union in security matters is also manifested in the financial and logistical assistance it has given to AU peacekeeping missions, for example in Sudan and Somalia. Moreover, starting with a US$100 million pledge in 2015, China is committed to supporting the African Standby Force, which the African Union has been developing since 2004 as a key part of its APSA.Footnote ¹⁴⁵

I think four factors explain China’s change of policy and attitude towards engagement with UN peacekeeping in Africa. First, in the same year that the African states adopted the AU Constitutive Act establishing the African Union in 2000, China initiated the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) as part of its new drive for economic cooperation with the African continent.Footnote ¹⁴⁶ In his opening speech to the first ministerial FOCAC meeting on 10 October 2000, President Jiang Zeming reaffirmed the two principles of state sovereignty and non-interference as among the guiding principles of its relations with African states.Footnote ¹⁴⁷ At the same time, one of the most significant normative changes brought about by establishment of the African Union was the move away from the principle of non-interference, which had been enshrined in Article III(2) OAU Charter, to the principle of non-indifference articulated in Article 4(h) AU Constitutive Act. This normative shift allowed China to adopt a more flexible approach towards the question of non-interference and primacy of state sovereignty, and it removed the pretext for China’s reluctance to get involved in peace operations in Africa as a violation of these principles.

The second factor is China’s growing economic power and its extensive economic, investment, and trading relations across Africa – especially over the two decades since FOCAC’s inception.Footnote ¹⁴⁸ China has been the African continent’s largest trading partner and source of direct foreign investment since 2000.Footnote ¹⁴⁹ By 2016, for example, China’s exports to and imports from Africa stood in real terms at 15 per cent and 20 per cent of Chinese global trade estimates, respectively; roughly this translated to US$82.9 billion, while imports from the continent were valued at US$54.3 billion.

The need to protect its economic interests in some of the fragile states in Africa that face security challenges is driving China’s increasing participation in, and contributions to, peacekeeping in Africa. To this point, in 2011 a non-governmental organisation noted:

Three years after publication of this commentary, unconfirmed reports emerged in 2014 to the effect that China had sought to deploy UN peacekeepers to protect its oil instalments in South Sudan following allegations that Chinese workers had suffered terrorist attacks there.Footnote ¹⁵¹

Thirdly, China’s growing support for, and participation in, peacekeeping in Africa can be seen as an aspect of its ideological positioning and self-identification as a leader of the Global South and a champion of South–South cooperation. Its new assertiveness as a P5 member has not, however, diminished its preference for diplomatic and peaceful solutions in inter-state and intra-state conflicts in Africa or its traditional support for the principle of ‘African solutions to African problems’. By maintaining this position, China can demonstrate not only that its national economic interests in Africa are not the sole determining factor in its decision-making, but also that it is a responsible power invested in African development and security. Furthermore, unlike some of the P5 powers that have been accused of imposing paternalistic solutions in Africa, China is more inclined to take its cue from African states when addressing peace and security issues there. It is thus more willing to participate in peace operations that have unmistakable buy-in and support from the A3 and the African Union, recognising the central role of the African states themselves. Significantly, China has never used its veto to block a resolution on peace and security issues or peacekeeping in Africa. My discussion here reinforces Cai’s analysis of China’s growing assertiveness in the Security Council, as evidenced in its increasing participation in voting on resolutions and contributions to UN peacekeeping missions in terms of budget and personnel.Footnote ¹⁵²

Fourthly, China’s concerns about security in some states in Africa go beyond the protection of its economic interests and investments. For example, one can explain its participation in the operation in Mali (MINUSMA) in terms of another phenomenon: the global fight against terrorism. It is trite that the events of 11 September 2001 (i.e., 9/11) galvanised an international consensus on the fight against terrorism. Some commentators have observed that the 2001 terrorist attacks helped to forge a more united front between the P2 and P3 in peace operations on the African continent, especially when the conflicts in question have an element of international terrorism.Footnote ¹⁵³ To this, I would add that China’s support for such operations becomes more certain when African states themselves request the involvement of the Security Council to authorise action to help them deal with terrorist threats or attacks in their territories.

I also believe that, for China, as for Russia, participation in UN-led efforts to fight terrorism in Africa and elsewhere affords a cover of legitimacy for their own campaigns against alleged terrorist groups at home (for China) or in the so-called near-abroad (for Russia). The P2 supported all of the resolutions on Mali and the somewhat controversial re-hatting of AU peacekeepers to establish MINUSMA. Like the other members of the Security Council, they viewed the crisis as arising not only from a failure of governance that lay the conditions for a coup d’état but also, and more importantly, because of a terrorist insurgence mounted by three groups operating in northern Mali and across the Sahel region. They understood that the insurgency by Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA), and Ansar Dine posed a serious threat to the peace and security of the broader region, and they supported the ECOWAS and AU plans for political negotiations, as well as, later, the Security Council proposal for a robust mission.Footnote ¹⁵⁴ To be sure, both had concerns with some aspects of the mission – in particular, the African Union was not altogether happy with the timing and process of handing over an AU peace operation to the United Nations. Yet neither China nor Russia considered abstaining from, let alone vetoing, the re-hatting resolution.Footnote ¹⁵⁵ Moreover, neither raised their usual concerns about interventionist action that ignored state sovereignty. In any case, any objection on that ground would have been untenable because the beleaguered Mali government had requested the intervention by the United Nations and France.Footnote ¹⁵⁶

In conclusion, I submit that the new Chinese assertiveness in the Security Council that Cai has comprehensively discussed has not been detrimental to the African Union’s efforts to forge an institutionalised and more effective strategic partnership with the United Nations. On the contrary, China has been among the foremost advocates in the Security Council for strengthening this partnership and for the notion of connecting the centre to the periphery in matters pertaining to the maintenance of international peace and security – perhaps more so than any other P5 member. With the pivot to the principle of non-indifference by African states under the AU Constitutive Act, China has increasingly adopted a more flexible position regarding the principle of state sovereignty and become more tolerant of African peace operations, including robust peacekeeping mandated by the Security Council. The outcome of the convergence of China’s economic and strategic interests in Africa and its rise as a global power and a more assertive P5 member has been the elevation of issues and positions advocated by the African Union, the A3, and key African actors to the Security Council for debates. These debates do not always yield the desired outcomes – but they do open the door for China and the A3, along with other like-minded members, to act collectively as agenda-setters and norm-shapers, rather than simply as norm-takers following an agenda and resolutions crafted by others as penholders.

The other chapters in this volume also both comprehensively address the issue of sanctions, albeit from different perspectives. Cai has offered a comprehensive history of China’s participation in the adoption of sanctions resolutions by the Security Council and its general opposition to the imposition of sanctions. Van den Herik has noted that there is a divide regarding unilateral sanctions, which she describes as a tool mostly used by the West.Footnote ¹⁵⁷ African states have tended to join China in opposing unilateral sanctions, especially, viewing the trend as encouraging a turn to unilateralism.

The reticence of African states towards some UN sanctions must be understood in its proper context. In the post-Cold-War era, the highest number of UN sanctions have targeted African states, entities, groups of people, and individuals. A recent study found that, of the 63 UN targeted sanctions imposed in the first decade after the Cold War, between 1991 and 2013, 43 (68 per cent) were applied against African states.Footnote ¹⁵⁸ The data also reveals that UN sanctions in Africa are characterised by features that set them apart from other UN sanctions regimes and practice. In particular, whereas non-African sanctions pursue a variety of goals, UN sanctions in Africa are imposed to support the Security Council’s primary objective of addressing threats to international peace and security in the form of internal armed conflicts, mostly in the context of UN peace support operations.Footnote ¹⁵⁹

I agree with Van den Herik that unilateral sanctions are likely to remain a divisive issue in the United Nations. African members of the Security Council may continue to oppose or abstain on sanctions resolutions (as South Africa did on Resolution 1706 on Darfur and on a draft resolution on Myanmar, which China and Russia vetoed in 2007). The exceptions are situations in which the AU member states themselves have requested the sanctions, for example to deal with rebel and terrorist groups, such as Al-Shabab in Somalia, as part of the African Union’s peace operations supported or authorised by the United Nations.

D. Russia’s Rising Presence in Africa

I have noted above that China and Russia share a self-image as advocates and supporters of Africa’s causes in the Security Council. In their relations with Africa, both seek to present themselves as an alternative to the West, while playing down accusations that they wish to recreate Cold-War-era proxy state clientelism or to initiate a neo-colonial partition. As the world’s second biggest economy and superpower, China has a clear advantage over Russia in its quest for influence. Given that, in the decade between 2005 and 2015, its trade and investment in Africa witnessed a growth of 185 per cent, however, the phenomenon of Russia’s rising presence in Africa cannot be doubted.Footnote ¹⁶⁰

This rise can be examined from three perspectives: economic/trade (the entry of Russian companies in the extractive industries); diplomatic/political (engagement between Russia and African countries bilaterally and multilaterally through the Russia–Africa summit format); and military/security (direct involvement by the state and through state-linked private military contractors). These engagements enable Russia to pursue three goals: projecting power on the global stage, accessing raw materials and natural resources, and increasing its arms exports and security footprint. These interests are intertwined, but since the focus of this chapter is on issues of peace and security, in this section I will limit my brief comments to Russia’s involvement in the military and security sectors.

In October 2019, Russia hosted the inaugural Russia–Africa Summit in Sochi, which was attended by 43 heads of state or government. In hosting the summit, Russia was following the template of organising and institutionalising Africa summits set by other powers who seek to increase their engagement on the African continent, such as the European Union, China, France, India, Japan, and Turkey. According to Russian sources, the summit spawned $12.5 billion business deals, largely in arms and grains.Footnote ¹⁶¹ Despite half of the AU membership voting to condemn its invasion of Ukraine at the United Nations,Footnote ¹⁶² Russia still sees Africa as a powerful voting bloc that can strengthen the Kremlin’s image on the international stage. Unsurprisingly, even as the war in Ukraine was ongoing, Russia hosted the second Russia–Africa Summit, initially scheduled for October 2022, in St. Petersburg on 27 and 28 July 2023.Footnote ¹⁶³

Since 2015, Russia has been the most dominant supplier of arms to Africa, accounting for 49 per cent in sales to at least 21 countries.Footnote ¹⁶⁴ In terms of its military presence through participation in UN peacekeeping missions in Africa, Russia lags way behind China, as Table 2 shows. But even its relatively modest personnel contributions to UN peacekeeping worldwide, which stood at 71 as at 31 May 2021, is more than that of the United States, at 31. More than half of these personnel are deployed in Africa.Footnote ¹⁶⁵ As regards the presence of Russian private military contractors, the Wagner Group has become the vanguard of a major Russian push into Africa and is currently operating in several states, including Central African Republic (CAR), Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, and Sudan. The Wagner Group’s operations were said to be funded by a company owned by the late Yevgeny Prigozhin, a Kremlin-linked oligarch and former close confidant of Russian President Vladimir Putin. Prigozhin died in a plane crash on 23 August 2023. The company’s involvement in the mining, gas, and oil industries in CAR, Libya, Mali, and Sudan helps to finance its operations.Footnote ¹⁶⁶ It is possible to draw the general conclusion that Russia’s resurgence in Africa has benefited largely from the rise of Islamist terrorism in parts of the continent, from the Sahel in the west to Mozambique in the east. Russia has taken advantage of fragile states and ongoing conflicts to secure arms deals and concessions, formally through negotiating military agreements with governments and informally through deals negotiated by private military contractors – principally, the Wagner Group.Footnote ¹⁶⁷

The presence of private military contractors in these countries raises certain questions from an international law perspective and presents political problems for Russia, the concerned African states, and international community. First, legally speaking, private military contractors are not mercenaries, provided that they are properly registered as business entities under the relevant laws of the concerned states. The Wagner Group, which operates as a network of companies and individuals, does not officially exist because it is not registered in Russia or anywhere else. Yet it is common cause that, as a paramilitary group, it operates in support of Russian interests or foreign policy and has close links to the Russian government. Consequently, it is generally regarded by the outside world as a network of Russian-backed mercenaries.

Howsoever one views the Wagner Group, its operations raise questions under international law, including its status as a non-state actor involvement in armed conflict, its responsibility for violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law, and the prohibition of mercenarism under relevant UNFootnote ¹⁶⁸ and AUFootnote ¹⁶⁹ treaties. The Wagner Group has been accused of human rights violations, including extrajudicial killings and torture, and civilian massacres in the CAR and Mali, by other governments and UN human rights experts.Footnote ¹⁷⁰ Russia’s use of Wagner Group mercenaries creates an enabling environment in which countries that are parties to the UN convention (Libya) and the OAU convention (Libya, Madagascar, and Sudan) can violate their treaty obligations.

Secondly, there are political problems arising from alleged contacts and interactions between private military contractors and UN peacekeepers, which the host governments encourage. In both the CAR and Mali, UN human rights experts have been alarmed by the ‘proximity and interoperability’ between the contractors and the UN peacekeepers.Footnote ¹⁷¹ The United States and the European Union have also complained about their presence and activities, leading them to impose sanctions against the Group.Footnote ¹⁷²

Overall, from the perspective of African states, Russia’s increasing presence in Africa is beneficial. For many, Russia is a partner they are familiar with from their anti-colonial struggles. For some, Russia allows them to diversify their sources of foreign investment to avoid becoming too dependent on their Western partners or China, India, and others. For others still, an even more attractive aspect of these engagements is that, unlike Western governments, Moscow does not offer them its economic and military support with political conditionalities requiring them to respect democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. On the contrary, Russia mostly seems to target countries with abysmal records of democracy and good governance.

E. AU–UN Collaboration in Fighting International Terrorism through Peace Operations

A. The African Quest for Permanent Seats on the Security Council

As an organisation whose members comprise the largest regional bloc of the UN membership, with 54 of the 193 members, the African Union has pushed for greater visibility, influence, and recognition of its interests within the world body. Apart from efforts by the A3 to assert their voices on issues of direct concern to Africa in Security Council decision-making and calls for strengthening the AU–UN relationship, the African Union has also demanded permanent seats for the African region on the Security Council. The African Union regards this as a necessary step to make the Security Council more representative and legitimate, and to give Africa its rightful place in the balance of power in a reformed United Nations.

Reform of the Security Council has been back on the agenda since 2005, following the collapse of the Razali Plan in 1997.Footnote ²²¹ UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan presented his report, In Larger Freedom, in March 2005 to set the agenda for the September 2005 World Summit. The report proposed an agenda involving a broad package of institutional reforms, including two models for the Security Council.Footnote ²²² Under either model, all UN geographical regions except Africa would have at least one member with veto power.

The ‘Ezulwini Consensus’, to which I referred earlier in connection with Article 4(h) AU Constitutive Act, is premised on the argument that the current configuration of the Security Council is undemocratic and unable to protect weaker states against the major powers. This characterisation of the Security Council is, of course, not limited to the African states; other UN member states have expressed similar sentiments in the debates that have ensued over the years and have also responded with their own counter-proposals. I sketch the core demands of these respective groups only briefly.Footnote ²²³

• The G4 plan (of Brazil, India, Germany, and Japan) seeks to add to the Security Council six permanent members, who would forgo the veto for the first 15 years of their membership or possibly longer, and four-non-permanent members.

• The Uniting for Consensus (UfC) group (comprising 12 members, including Argentina, Canada, Italy, Mexico, Pakistan, South Korea, Spain, and Turkey) opposes the G4 proposal to add any new permanent seats and advocates instead for the addition of only ten non-permanent seats, bringing the total membership of the Security Council to 25, and for the abolition of the veto or at least restricting its use.

• The L69 group (consisting of 25 developing countries from various regions of the world, and including Brazil and India) proposes six new permanent seats and six new non-permanent seats, distributed across the regions. Like the African group, the L69 would prefer to abolish the veto or extend it to all permanent members.

• A group of 22 Arab states demands a permanent seat for the Arab region but offers no suggestions about the veto, although it is highly critical of it.

In 2013, a group of states emerged as an informal caucus to advocate for improved Security Council working methods. The group replaced an earlier group of five small states (S5) – namely, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Costa Rica, Singapore, and Switzerland. The Accountability, Coherence and Transparency (ACT) Group, as the larger group is known, was launched on 2 May 2013, comprising small and medium-sized countries from all continents. It aims at enhancing the effectiveness of the Security Council by means of improvement of its working methods, including limiting the use of the veto. Coordinated by Switzerland, the ACT Group builds on the S5’s many years of effort and addresses both the Security Council’s internal functioning, as well as its relations to the broader UN membership. The ACT Group’s core objective is to ensure that the Security Council really ‘acts on their behalf’, as stated in Article 24(1) UN Charter, and is a well-functioning organ that keeps all UN members involved in the decision-making process. The Group has also proposed a code of conduct on the use of the veto by the P5 that I discuss below.Footnote ²²⁴

The African Union has rejected the models presented in Secretary-General Annan’s proposals – especially the lack of a veto power for an African member. Instead, it demands the allocation of two permanent seats to Africa, with all of the prerogatives and privileges of permanent membership, including the right of veto. It also demands five non-permanent seats, in what would become a 26-member Security Council. Notably, the ‘Ezulwini Consensus’ spells out that ‘[even] though Africa is opposed in principle to the veto, it is of the view that so long as it exists, and as a matter of common justice, it should be made available to all permanent members of the Security Council’.Footnote ²²⁵ Furthermore, overlooking the selection criteria proposed in the report, In Larger Freedom, the African Union has demanded the right to establish its own criteria for African members and to select its representatives to the Security Council. The African Union, however, has not yet defined these criteria nor has it clarified if it expects other regions too to establish their own criteria. The ‘Ezulwini Consensus’ provides only that it shall take into consideration ‘the representative nature and capacity of those chosen’.Footnote ²²⁶ The AU Assembly reaffirmed this position at its summit on 9–10 February 2020.Footnote ²²⁷

The General Assembly has debated Security Council reform annually since 2009, based on Decision 62/557, adopted by the General Assembly in 2008 ‘to commence intergovernmental negotiations (IGN) in informal plenary of the General Assembly’.Footnote ²²⁸ The Decision stipulates that the negotiations should seek ‘a solution that can garner the widest possible political acceptance by Member States’.Footnote ²²⁹ The most recent debate, which took place on 16–17 November 2020 during the 75th Session of the General Assembly, once again heard many delegates call for limits on the veto power and improved geographical representation in the Security Council, particularly for Africa. As in previous debates, African delegates, to a person, echoed the long-standing position of the African Group, as expressed in the ‘Ezulwini Consensus’. Significantly, support for the common African position during this debate did not come only from countries of the Global South but also from Global North members, including Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Japan, and the United Kingdom.Footnote ²³⁰

Formally, almost all UN member states continue to profess their support for reform. Yet, because of obvious self-interest, there does not appear to be any prospect of imminent consensus on what that reform should look like. Clearly, the P5 members, which have a stake in maintaining the status quo, will prefer to guard jealously their coveted positions and the veto power in the Security Council, effectively resisting any change that threatens their hegemony. Their critics accuse them of engaging in double-speak: they speak publicly of their support for reform in official diplomacy, while pursuing their real agenda behind the scenes in unofficial diplomacy.Footnote ²³¹ I argue that regional rivalries and the multiplicity of alliance groups with seemingly irreconcilable proposals have been just as culpable in stalling reform.

For the African Union, Security Council reform appears to have become a debate without end, but the African states cannot escape blame. I see the maximalist positions that many member states have adopted on this question – and this includes the common African position – as an added problem. The paradox here is that the ‘Ezulwini Consensus’ demands a share in the veto power while reiterating the African Union’s opposition to the veto as a matter of principle. At the same time, anecdotal evidence suggests that ‘[it] seems many African countries are more interested in having increased influence when it comes to peacekeeping missions on the African continent, than they are in obtaining the veto right’.Footnote ²³² Assuming this to be the case, I would agree with Bjarke Winther’s observation that the addition of veto rights to more countries would be more a symbolic act than a measure equalising the current zenith of global power.Footnote ²³³ Even in an expanded Security Council with more veto-possessing members, none of the other members would match the global power and influence that goes with the military might of China, Russia, and the United States. They also would be hard-pressed to justify using their veto on the pretext of protecting their national interests to prevent the global community from taking action to deal with situations threatening international peace and security – which is quite possibly part of the explanation why France and the United Kingdom effectively do not use their veto power.

In my view, the maximalist demand that the African Union should set its own criteria for selection of its representative and that the African Union select them is problematic. The Security Council is empowered to take decisions that bind all UN members in terms of Article 25 UN Charter. Allowing one region alone to select its representatives to the Security Council and denying all other UN members a vote in their selection would ironically negate the democracy and legitimacy that the African Union claims to be the motivation for its demand for Security Council reform.

B. The Russian Invasion of Ukraine: Ramifications for African Perceptions of the Security Council

For the African Union and African states, nothing exemplifies the unfairness of the current Security Council structure and the potential of the P5 members to abuse the veto power better than the failure of the Council to adopt a decision condemning the Russian invasion of Ukraine. On 25 February 2022, the day following the invasion, the Security Council held a debate.Footnote ²³⁴ Russia vetoed a draft resolution that would have demanded Moscow immediately stop its attack on Ukraine and unconditionally withdraw all of its troops. While 11 of the Council’s 15 members voted in favour of the draft text,Footnote ²³⁵ China, India, and the United Arab Emirates abstained. Russia vetoed it, even though the word ‘condemns’ was replaced by ‘deplores’ and a reference to Chapter VII UN Charter was deleted to water it down to gain more support.

In the context of the foregoing discussion, I would make two observations. The first is that the A3 – namely, Gabon,Footnote ²³⁶ Ghana,Footnote ²³⁷ and KenyaFootnote ²³⁸ – all spoke unequivocally in their condemnation of the invasion as a violation of Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, and as a violation of both the UN Charter and international law. They were, of course, neither speaking for the African Union nor conveying a collective African common position. The second observation is that China abstained rather than use its veto in support of its P2 ally. Notably, however, in his statement to the Council, China’s representative reaffirmed its respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states and the need to uphold the purposes and principles of the Charter. China also called upon all parties to resolve their problems peacefully and encouraged efforts for a diplomatic solution through negotiations between Russia and Ukraine.Footnote ²³⁹

On its part, on the day of the invasion, the African Union issued a joint statement by AU chair, President Macky Sall of Senegal, and the chairperson of the AU Commission expressing ‘their extreme concern at the very serious and dangerous situation created in Ukraine’, calling upon ‘the Russian Federation and any other regional or international actor to imperatively respect international law, the territorial integrity and national sovereignty of Ukraine’, and urging ‘the two Parties to establish an immediate ceasefire and to open political negotiations without [delay]’.Footnote ²⁴⁰ It is plausible to argue that the joint statement outlined a possible common stance. The reality is that the African Union did not adopt an African common position on the Ukraine war.

After the failure of the Security Council to adopt the draft resolution, some members called for an emergency session of the General Assembly to discuss the matter. On 27 February 2022, the Council members voted in favour of the General Assembly convening to discuss the crisis.Footnote ²⁴¹ By an overwhelming majority of 141 in favour, 5 against, and 35 abstentions, on 2 March 2022, the 11th Emergency Session of the General Assembly adopted a resolution deploring the Russian invasion of Ukraine and demanding that Russia immediately end its military operations there.Footnote ²⁴² In doing so, the General Assembly utilised the ‘Uniting for Peace’ procedure to address a situation representing a grave breach of international peace and security after the Security Council’s failure to take a decision, consistent with Article 11(2) UN Charter, which empowers it to discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security.Footnote ²⁴³

The voting positions of African states revealed an equal split between those who supported the Resolution and those who did not. Of the 54 African members, 27 voted in favour, 1 voted against, 17 abstained, and 9 were absent. Four possible explanations may be offered for the countries that did not support the Resolution by voting negatively, abstaining, or being absent. First, several of the opposing or abstaining countries – especially the southern African states (i.e., Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe) – remain grateful for the former Soviet Union’s support for their national liberation struggles. Thus, on the one hand, South Africa was unequivocal in its demand for Russia’s withdrawal from Ukraine.Footnote ²⁴⁴ On the other hand, however, it also expressed sympathy for the argument, probably shared by many abstainers, that if NATO had taken greater account of Russia’s security interests and given it the assurances that had been promised since the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the crisis might never have arisen.Footnote ²⁴⁵

Secondly, there seemed to be a reluctance among many African states to be drawn into any resurrection of the Cold War in which some of them were used as proxies. This reluctance stems from the desire of African states to stick to the principles of non-alignment between East and West. Ironically, however, the differences in the positions adopted in the General Assembly may have exposed emerging ‘new Cold War’ divisions within the African continent.

The third factor is Russia’s growing influence in Africa, which I discussed earlier. On this point, one may wonder whether the African states that did not support the Resolution were motivated solely by their wish to please Russia or, more probably, the desire not to offend China – the more significant partner for most of these states, given the latter’s position on the invasion, which Cai has discussed in admirable detail.Footnote ²⁴⁶ Here, it is notable that China uses Russia’s characterisation of its invasion of Ukraine as ‘a special military operation’, as does Cai, instead of describing it as ‘a war’, the term used by most UN member states and legal commentators. If the ramifications of the war in Ukraine escalate globally and a ‘new Cold War’ including China settles in, African countries will likely split into antagonistic blocs defined by their support for or opposition to Russia – an outcome that would negate the non-alignment that they traditionally proclaim.

A final factor that may have played a part in the motivations behind the voting was the perception of double standards on the part of some members of the Security Council – in particular, the P3. This can be viewed through two lenses: one, the perception that, even as one acknowledged the gravity of the situation caused by the unprovoked aggression of a nuclear-powered P5 member against a less powerful neighbour, one might recall that some past aggressions by other P5 members in other parts of the world were never seriously challenged or condemned by the Security Council; the other, the view that the attention given to the plight of victims of these past aggressions by Western powers was nowhere near that accorded to Ukrainians affected by the war.

This latter sentiment had been expressed by the representative of Kenya in his address to the Security Council during the 25 February 2022 session. In remarks that did not attract any comment at the time, he recalled the Council’s 2011 authorisation of intervention in Libya and its consequences:

I agree with this sentiment up to a point, because it accords with some of the observations and criticism that I have advanced regarding the NATO intervention in Libya. I do not agree, however, with the implied suggestion of a moral equivalence between the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which undoubtedly violated the Charter and international law (a point accepted even by those who support or sympathise with Russia’s rationalisation of its action), and the intervention in Libya. The latter, as I have argued, was justifiably authorised by the Security Council within its Chapter VII powers, even if the manner of its execution by NATO tainted its legality and legitimacy.

Despite the absence of an AU or African common position, there was subsequent engagement between both parties to the conflict and representatives of the African Union. On 3 June 2022, the AU chair and the chair of the AU Commission met with Russian President Vladimir Putin. President Sall of Senegal was reported to have pleaded Africa’s cause, telling the Russian president that the continent was threatened by an unprecedented food crisis resulting from the blockading of Ukrainian ports and the Western sanctions on Russia, and to have asked Putin ‘to be aware that [African] countries, even if they are far from the theatre [of action], are victims of the crisis at the economic level’.Footnote ²⁴⁸ Subsequently, on 20 June 2022, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky addressed the Bureau of the AU Assembly in a closed-door virtual meeting in which he reiterated that Ukraine was a victim of ‘a brutal war – a war of invasion’ by Russian troops – and acknowledged that Ukraine was aware of the economic difficulties and food crisis that some African countries were facing as a result.Footnote ²⁴⁹

The impact of the war for many developing countries, especially in Africa, as measured in terms of rising food and fuel prices and the knock-on effects of the sanctions imposed on Russia, may be long-lasting. Consistent with their traditional opposition to unilateral sanctions, African countries did not support these sanctions. The AU chair underscored this when he addressed an EU summit on 31 May 2022, warning that Western sanctions had made it difficult for African countries to buy grain from Russia, and that this only compounded the difficulties and slowdown in economic growth that African countries already faced from the effects of the climate crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic.Footnote ²⁵⁰

As regards the sanctions, it may also be noted that neither the African Union nor any individual African state publicly supported Russia’s argument, echoed by China, that the sanctions were illegal and a breach of international law. This argument reprised the position that Russia took when the European Union and the United States imposed sanctions against it following its annexation of Crimea in 2014. The Russian position was premised on the argument that only the Security Council can decide on sanctions and that, if it has not done so, any sanctions adopted are, by definition, unilateral and illegal.Footnote ²⁵¹ I do not share this view. The argument implies that sanctions could never be legally adopted against a permanent member of the Security Council, since it is inconceivable that any P5 state would forgo its veto and allow the Council to adopt a decision that would harm that state. To my mind, the non-UN sanctions imposed by the European Union and other Western countries were legal and legitimate countermeasures to the Russian invasion, which represented a violation of a peremptory norm of international law prohibiting the use of force.

One of the lessons from the Security Council’s handling of the war in Ukraine is that it is unable to deal with threats to international peace and security in which the principal or sole offender is its permanent member. For Africa, the most immediate ramification of the war was the understandable decision by Ukraine to withdraw its 250-strong contingent and eight helicopters that made up a third of the UN fleet from the UN peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO).Footnote ²⁵² Although MONUSCO was already expected to end its operations in 2024, Ukraine’s withdrawal did not augur well for the DRC’s deteriorating security situation. Ukraine also pulled out of the UN missions in Mali and South Sudan.

C. The Problem of Security Council Inaction and Failure to Decide

The failure of the Security Council to act to prevent or stop the Rwanda genocide was a painful reminder that, while the founders established it as the organ with the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, when faced with a crisis within the scope of its mandate, it has no obligation to decide whether to act or not. Although it was a domestic genocide perpetrated by domestic actors, few would argue that the Rwanda crisis did not fall within the scope of Article 39 UN Charter. The Charter gives the Security Council legal authority to authorise binding measures necessary to restore peace and security, but it does not establish any obligation requiring it to decide on any measures in any situation. Yet failure by the Security Council to decide is itself a form of decision. Put differently, the Security Council ‘speaks’ both when it takes a decision and when it does not. ‘Inaction’ is a perverse form of ‘action’ – and it is a legally relevant omission.Footnote ²⁵³

Most of the discussion on Security Council reform by UN member states and scholars has focused on substantive issues, such as its outdated membership structure and the use of the veto power; not as much attention has been given to exploring the possibility of procedural reforms. Such reforms could take the form of amendments to the Security Council’s Rules of Procedure and Working Methods, without necessitating the more complex process of amending the Charter provided for under Articles 108 and 109. Anna Spain and Anne Peters are among the few scholars who have written on the issue of procedural reforms to improve the Security Council’s decision-making.Footnote ²⁵⁴ Specifically, Spain proposes that the Security Council adopt three new procedural duties: the duty to decide; the duty to disclose; and the duty to consult to improve its decision-making processes. Peters proposes the duty to give reasons.Footnote ²⁵⁵

According to Spain, the duty to decide would require the Security Council to decide affirmatively whether it will take action to deal with crises falling within the scope of its authority. The duty to disclose would require it to explain publicly its reasons should it not do so. Finally, the duty to consult would obligate it to engage in broader dialogue with affected parties before taking serious action, aiming to understand the will of the people whom the Security Council’s decisions may affect, so as to integrate their preferences into its decision-making.Footnote ²⁵⁶ Spain argues that: ‘[These] duties would serve as a commitment mechanism that would encourage the UNSC to make decisions or explain to the public its justifications for not doing so.’Footnote ²⁵⁷

The proposal is cogent and viable. I think, however, that the third duty proposed, the duty to consult, may prove the most problematic, because it requires the Security Council to go beyond governments of the states concerned as interlocutors and engage directly with the people in those states ‘to understand their will’. The politics and practicalities of achieving this engagement may prove to be a difficult – perhaps even an insurmountable – challenge. Leaving aside this quibble, in my reading, the idea of the Security Council adopting internal procedural reforms establishing procedural duties is consistent with some of the proposals advanced by member states, such as the S5 and ACT Group. The ACT Group’s position is particularly apposite in this respect. As noted in the previous section, the core objective of the ACT Group initiative is to improve the working methods of the Security Council. An important aspect of this is to encourage more Arria formula meetings and improve the relationship between the Security Council and the broader UN membership. As Van den Herik has rightly argued, these meetings provide opportunities for other states to participate and to mobilise.Footnote ²⁵⁸

African states and many others rightly faulted the United Nations generally for its inaction in Rwanda and the Security Council specifically for failing to adopt any decision as the genocide was unfolding. But the inaction was not the result of a P5 member using the veto to block a draft resolution on the issue; the Council did not even deliberate the need for such a resolution.

Regarding more recent situations involving allegations of genocide, for example in Syria and Myanmar, the use of the veto on multiple occasions by the P2 members has prevented the Security Council from authorising any action. Since 2011, when the P5 united to adopt Resolution 1973 on Libya, Russia and China have used their veto power 13 and 7 times, respectively, to block resolutions addressing war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Syria. These instances have increased the calls among UN member states for there to be a restraint on the use of the veto by the P5 in situations of mass atrocity. For example, at the 70th Session of the General Assembly in 2015, France and Mexico presented a proposal entitled ‘Political Statement on the Suspension of the Veto in Case of Mass Atrocities’ and invited UN member states to sign it.Footnote ²⁵⁹ At the same time, the ACT Group launched a draft code of conduct regarding Security Council action against genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes. The Code of Conduct, launched officially on 23 October 2015, calls upon all members of the Security Council, both permanent and non-permanent, not to vote against any credible draft resolution intended to prevent or stop mass atrocities.Footnote ²⁶⁰ Prior to the ACT Group’s campaign, Anne Peters had argued for the Security Council’s ‘duty to intervene’, as a moral or even legal obligation, to protect populations against genocide or crimes against humanity. The existence of such a duty would preclude the use of the veto by the P5 in relevant situations.Footnote ²⁶¹

The ACT Code of Conduct is a legally non-binding instrument to which UN member states voluntarily commit themselves. On the one hand, until all of the P5 members make that pledge and abide by it, the veto power will remain a potential tool for some members of the Security Council to use against resolutions aimed at addressing future situations of genocides, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. On the other hand, if all of the P5 members were to embrace it (which is most unlikely), the Code of Conduct would in effect be a procedural reform of the working methods of the Security Council without formal Charter amendment. Such a development would have enormous political significance but little normative consequence for the law of peace and war and for the system of collective security. Statements made by states at the General Assembly pledging their support for the Code of Conduct, or signing it, are not resolutions of the General Assembly, still less of the Security Council.Footnote ²⁶² To date, only France and the United Kingdom, among the P5 members, have signed the ACT Code of Conduct.

From the perspective of the African states, the voluntary pledge requested of permanent and non-permanent members of the Security Council is of huge symbolic significance, even if it yields no immediate normative outcomes. Article 4(h) was incorporated into the AU Constitutive Act to address the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, which are widely regarded as violations of peremptory norms of general international law (i.e., ius cogens).Footnote ²⁶³ Given this fact, it is surprising that there are only 22 AU member states among the current 122 signatories to the Code of Conduct.Footnote ²⁶⁴ That list does not include Rwanda – the country whose painful experience in 1994 was arguably a critical factor behind the adoption of Article 4(h). This illustrates the double bind of voluntary pledges: some states sign such pledges precisely because of their non-binding nature and hence lack of normative consequences; others choose not to sign them because they see no point in committing to a pledge that has no binding legal effect and carries no enforceable obligations. Yet, in my view, the ACT Code of Conduct remains a valuable vehicle for garnering the necessary international consensus that may help, over time, to push both the General Assembly and Security Council in the right direction towards a norm-creating trajectory. To this extent, the Code will remain a relevant negotiating point in future deliberations on UN reform.

In an unrelated move, in April 2022, the General Assembly adopted by consensus a resolution co-sponsored by 83 countries mandating an automatic meeting in the event of any Security Council veto.Footnote ²⁶⁵ Under Resolution 76/262, the General Assembly decided to meet automatically within ten days if the veto is used in the Security Council by one or more of the P5, inviting the concerned P5 members to account to the meeting for the circumstances behind its use of the veto, so that all UN members might have an opportunity to scrutinise and comment on it. The General Assembly also decided to include in the provisional agenda of its 77th Session an item entitled ‘Use of the veto’.Footnote ²⁶⁶ Liechtenstein led this initiative, which it had embarked upon with a core group of states more than two years earlier out of growing concern that the Security Council had found it increasingly difficult to carry out its work in accordance with its mandate under the Charter.Footnote ²⁶⁷

Two brief observations may be made about this Resolution. First, although not formally directed at Russia, its adoption came in the wake of Russia’s use of the veto of the draft Security Council resolution on Ukraine. Since General Assembly Resolution 76/262 is non-binding, it is unlikely that any concerned P5 member will feel compelled to explain themselves in the General Assembly other than, perhaps, to reiterate their earlier justifications given in the Security Council. Yet by deciding to maintain, on the agenda of its future sessions, an item on the use of the veto, the General Assembly will ensure that the debate about the veto power of the P5 remains alive. This will be symbolically significant.

Secondly, Resolution 76/262 followed the General Assembly’s adoption of Resolution ES-11/1 on 2 March 2022, in which it demanded that Russia cease its invasion of Ukraine and withdraw its troops immediately. There is thus an implied link between the two resolutions. Both highlight two critical issues that Van den Herik and I have raised and on which we agree: broadening the inclusion of other voices beyond the Security Council, and the Council’s inevitable dysfunction when a permanent member is involved in the crisis.

D. Unconventional Global Threats: The Climate Crisis and Climate Security

The notion of unconventional threats to security is elastic and their identification depends on whether one adopts a narrow or expansive conception of security. A few candidates emerge in most accounts of such threats, including health pandemics, cyber tools, artificial intelligence, biotechnology, transnational organised crime, the climate crisis, and autonomous or unmanned systems, to mention only a few. By their nature, most of these new threats are transnational and potentially impact all regions of the world.

Climate – or the climate crisis – is one of the most transnational of these threats and is currently of particular concern to the African region. I regard this as a new threat that deserves serious attention from both the African Union and the United Nations going forward. This is not to suggest that the other unconventional threats are of no consequence or matter less to Africa. Global pandemics and epidemics, such as malaria, tuberculosis, and HIV-AIDS, or more recently Ebola and COVID-19, are of equal concern to African states as threats to their security. However, there appears to be a consensus, which African countries share, that global health issues are for the World Health Organization (WHO) to deal with. The impacts of the climate crisis – desertification, land degradation, droughts, and so on – have affected communities across most of the African continent for decades and continue to do so. These impacts are more visible and observable, and more enduring, and thus make the climate–security nexus obvious and urgent. It is for this reason that I propose to devote the remainder of this section to this issue.

Van den Herik has given a succinct account of the first open debate in the Security Council, convened by the United Kingdom, on the relationship between energy, security, and climate in 2007, at which many delegations expressed concern and resistance against any suggestion of the Security Council expanding its remit to deal with these matters. She rightly points out that the concerns expressed by some members were twofold: fear of Security Council mission creep; and the potential weakening of the UN system that would result from letting the Security Council deal with matters falling under the mandates of other UN agencies.Footnote ²⁶⁸ Van den Herik quotes the representative of Sudan, who, speaking on behalf of the African Group, expressed the fear that the ‘increasing and alarming encroachment by the Security Council on the mandates of other United Nations bodies [compromises] the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter and is also undermining the relevant bodies’.Footnote ²⁶⁹ A decade later, subsequent open session debates and discussions on climate and security in the Security Council suggest a growing acceptance among states that this is a legitimate issue for the Security Council to take on.Footnote ²⁷⁰

There is widespread agreement that, although it contributes least to global warming in comparison to other regions, Africa is disproportionately vulnerable to the impact of climate change. Moreover, some of the countries most affected by the climate crisis are also among the most politically fragile and prone to conflicts.Footnote ²⁷¹ The African Union recognises that climate and ecological crises have led to forced displacement and migration, food and water insecurity, inter-communal conflicts between herders and farmers, and the scourge of violent extremism and terrorism.Footnote ²⁷² The war in Darfur was an early example of a climate-related conflict. In a resolution on Darfur adopted some 15 years after the start of the conflict, the Security Council still recognised the ‘adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes and natural disasters, among other factors, on the situation in Darfur, including through drought, desertification, land degradation and food insecurity’.Footnote ²⁷³

Since 2015, the African Union has officially included the climate crisis as a security threat on its agenda. The APSA Roadmap 2016–20, adopted by the PSC, identifies the climate crisis as one of the cross-cutting issues in peace and security, and addresses ‘the issues of continental coordination, collaboration and research to mitigate the impact of climate change as a threat to peace and security in Africa’.Footnote ²⁷⁴ Furthermore, the APSA Roadmap characterises the climate crisis as a ‘threat multiplier that exacerbates security trends, tension and stability’.Footnote ²⁷⁵ Since 2016, the PSC has held open sessions on climate change. At these meetings, AU members have acknowledged, among other things, ‘the inextricable link between climate change, peace and security in Africa’, and ‘stressed the importance of the AU Commission to mainstream climate change in all its activities, particularly in early warning and conflict prevention efforts’.Footnote ²⁷⁶ Members have also essentially described the climate crisis as an existential threat to all countries and regions in Africa, and to continental peace, security, and stability.Footnote ²⁷⁷ In 2018, the PSC proposed the appointment of an AU Special Envoy for Climate and Security to work with the Committee of African Heads of State and Government on Climate Change.Footnote ²⁷⁸

The debates in the PSC compare with the open session debates on climate convened by the Security Council since the first meeting in 2007. It is notable that the 2019 Security Council debate introduced the notion of ‘threat multiplier’ to describe the impacts of the climate crisis on global security – a notion already incorporated into the APSA Roadmap in 2015. Apart from two other open session debates held in 2011 and 2018, the Security Council has convened special events on climate-related security risks.Footnote ²⁷⁹ The president of the Security Council has also issued statements addressing the climate–security nexus following meetings on country- or region-specific situations in Africa. An early example was the statement on West Africa and the Sahel, issued on 30 January 2018, in which the Security Council recognised the link between the climate crisis and violence in the regions.Footnote ²⁸⁰ This was reiterated most recently in another presidential statement issued on 3 February 2021, in which the Security Council recognised ‘the adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes and natural hazards on the stability of West Africa and the Sahel region’.Footnote ²⁸¹ More importantly, despite refraining from officially addressing the climate crisis, several Security Council resolutions and missions since 2017 have operated on the premise of the adverse effects and implications of climate change, natural disasters, and other ecological changes on stability and security in relation to specific countries or regions. In addition to the resolution on Darfur mentioned earlier,Footnote ²⁸² these include resolutions on some of the conflict situations discussed in this chapter – namely, MaliFootnote ²⁸³ and SomaliaFootnote ²⁸⁴ – and others, such as in the Lake Chad Basin Region,Footnote ²⁸⁵ the CAR,Footnote ²⁸⁶ and the DRC.Footnote ²⁸⁷

Some African states have also taken the initiative both individually and as African members of the Security Council to advocate for the climate crisis as an issue of importance to not only their own national security but also that of all other countries. Thus, in April 2020, two recently elected African members of the Security Council, Niger and Tunisia, participated in a Security Council Arria formula meeting that they co-hosted with other Council members on climate security risks.Footnote ²⁸⁸ Building on the fact that the Security Council’s Resolution 2349 on the Lake Chad Basin Region had already, in 2017, acknowledged the link between the climate crisis and violence,Footnote ²⁸⁹ the representative of Niger underlined the need to consider the climate crisis as a threat to peace and security, pointing towards the situation of ‘climate driven conflicts’ in the Sahel region.Footnote ²⁹⁰ Although Tunisia did not mention the climate crisis as one of its priority issues at its election as a member of the Security Council, focusing instead on conflict prevention and settlement, and terrorism, it advocated during the meeting for the inclusion of the topic within the Security Council’s remit. It also acknowledged that the impacts of the climate crisis can ‘exacerbate existing conflicts’ and supported the appointment of a special envoy for climate security to improve coordination with the UN system,Footnote ²⁹¹ separate from the current UN envoy on climate action and finance.Footnote ²⁹²

South Africa rejoined the Security Council for its third term in 2019–20, during which it set out to position Africa as a strong, resilient, and influential global player by bolstering the African Union’s relationship with the United Nations.Footnote ²⁹³ During its previous tenures in the Security Council in 2007 and 2011, South Africa had questioned whether it was appropriate that the Council should deal with the climate crisis, arguing that such an issue went beyond its mandate and that other UN forums were better placed to address it. South Africa repeated these concerns in 2019, but it shifted its position in the April 2020 Arria formula meeting. The South African representative stated there that, ‘while it is still important to question the exact role of the Security Council, it has become clear that climate change is a matter of security that acts as a “conflict multiplier” and is contributing to conflicts, for example in the Sahel, Lake Chad, and the Horn of Africa’.Footnote ²⁹⁴

The African Union has declared its determination to factor this threat into its conflict prevention and management, and post-conflict peacebuilding strategies. The PSC has made clear recommendations on how to mainstream the climate crisis and address these impacts. Alongside its request for the appointment of an AU special envoy for climate and security, the PSC requested – in the context of the implementation of the APSA Roadmap – the AU Commission to undertake a study on the nexus between the climate crisis and peace and security in the continent.Footnote ²⁹⁵ Yet, to date, these recommendations have not been translated into actionable commitments. On its face, one could attribute this to lack of political commitment on the part of the political leaders at the levels of both the institution and member states. Another obstacle is the lack of dedicated funding within the AU Peace Fund, established under Article 22 Peace and Security Protocol, for climate-related security issues.Footnote ²⁹⁶ In addition, I would also argue that the delay in implementing the recommendations is partly because of the limited understanding of the full nature of climate-related risks and how they impact policy processes. Lack of funding and limited institutional capacity clearly impact the ability of the African Union and other regional organisations in the Global South to operate effectively, especially with regards to managing threats to regional peace and security. Cai is right to note that I do not discuss whether and how the African Union might strengthen its institutional capability. I allude to it, but I believe a discussion of this question falls outside the scope of this chapter.Footnote ²⁹⁷

In my view, the African Union’s delay in implementing its own recommendations is an opportunity for it to engage more effectively with the Security Council to find common cause on an issue that both bodies have embraced more clearly in recent years than they did barely a decade ago. I echo Van den Herik’s observation, made in connection with the Security Council’s resolution on the Lake Chad Basin Region – namely, that the Security Council has shown that ‘there is a willingness to consider the security implications of the climate crisis in concrete situations’.Footnote ²⁹⁸ This willingness should provide a basis for the African Union and the United Nations to address climate security issues concretely in peace operations in Africa in situations in which the impacts of the climate crisis are a factor. This would be another aspect of the realisation of the partnership between the centre and the periphery for the maintenance of international peace and security.