Introduction
Both elected and unelected leaders appoint top officials within the state’s decision-making structures as a consistent tactic to maintain control over the permanent bureaucracy.Footnote 1 Politicians place individuals in crucial government roles to directly manage state agencies and effectively steer policy agendas.Footnote 2 The duration for which senior officials hold their government positions is vital for successfully implementing the government’s political agenda.Footnote 3 Specialised research on ministerial stability has significantly enhanced our understanding of the phenomenon within democratic regimes, with recent studies increasingly focusing on presidential systems.Footnote 4 Explanations for why ministerial stability does or does not exist within democracies differ based on factors such as ideological polarisation,Footnote 5 party and electoral systems,Footnote 6 coalition dynamics,Footnote 7 the minister’s professional background and experienceFootnote 8 and crises.Footnote 9 An area that remains largely unexplored in existing literature is the understanding of ministerial instability within autocratic regimes.Footnote 10
This study explores how various autocratic regimes influence the stability of government ministries, spotlighting Argentina as a unique case in Latin America. Since the conclusion of the Second World War, numerous Latin American nations have alternated between autocratic and democratic governance, providing a valuable framework for comparing political systems in the region. We utilised Pedro Feliú Ribeiro and Camilo López Burian’s (2023) database,Footnote 11 which records the tenure of ministers in Economy, Education, Foreign Policy and Health from 1945 to 2020 across Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay. This comprehensive data set enabled us to select Argentina as our focal point for examining the relationship between different types of autocracies and ministerial stability.
The selection of these four ministries allows for a longitudinal comparison across countries, focusing on the duration of ministerial appointments and the consistency of their roles over time and across national contexts.Footnote 12 We use the data to create a Kaplan–Meier curve illustrating ministerial survival, enabling a comparison between autocratic and democratic regimes.Footnote 13 Kaplan–Meier survival curves are used to estimate the likelihood of ministers remaining in office over time under different political regimes. Figure 1 presents the survival functions for autocracy (depicted by the black line) and democracy across all countries in the sample, encompassing the four previously mentioned portfolios. The horizontal axis indicates the number of months a minister remained in their governmental position, while the vertical axis shows the proportion of ministers who departed office within each time interval.
Figure 1. Kaplan–Meier Survival Estimates by Country and Political Regime (1945–2020)
Figure 1 shows that autocratic regimes generally enjoy more stable ministerial tenures than democratic ones. This observation is supported by other studies, which indicate that autocracies often emphasise continuity and control within their cabinets to sustain power and legitimacy. In particular, countries such as Brazil, Paraguay, Mexico and Peru demonstrate consistent ministerial survival rates under autocratic rule, highlighting a systemic tendency to maintain cabinet stability in contrast to the higher turnover seen during democratic periods.Footnote 14
Chile and Uruguay exhibit a slightly different trend. For the first 30 months, autocratic regimes have a higher proportion of ministers remaining in office compared to democratic regimes. Interestingly, this ratio reverses between 30 and 60 months. The exceptional ministerial stability observed in Chile’s recent democracy can be attributed to specific characteristics of the Concertación coalition, which help explain the enduring tenure of ministers in this democratic context.Footnote 15 In Uruguay, up to 20 months, there is a higher proportion of ministers in office in autocracies when compared to democratic regimes, with an intercalation between political regimes from 20 to approximately 35 months, after which autocratic regimes once again present a higher proportion of ministers surviving in office.
Argentina emerges as an outlier in this study, with its autocratic eras showing greater ministerial turnover than during democratic periods, contrary to the broader regional pattern. Although the gap between the grey and black lines is relatively narrow in Argentina, this unusual trend warrants a closer examination of the unique political and institutional factors that defined its autocratic regimes, especially during the 1960s and 1970s. These regimes grappled with significant internal strife, factionalism and potentially weaker institutional structures, which compromised their ability to maintain stable leadership within key ministries. The elevated rates of ministerial change during Argentina’s autocratic periods underscore the distinctive political dynamics at work, making the country a vital case for understanding why some autocratic regimes struggle to achieve ministerial stability. This study seeks to illuminate these unique political dynamics in Argentina, analysing the circumstances under which autocratic governments fail to sustain stable ministerial appointments.
Throughout the twentieth century, Argentina experienced considerable turmoil. In 1955, a military coup ousted Juan Domingo Perón, leading to a series of unstable civilian and military governments. Between 1966 and 1973, Argentina was governed by Presidents Onganía (1966–70), Levingston (1970–1) and Lanusse (1971–3). In 1970, General Levingston overthrew General Onganía, only to be succeeded by General Lanusse. Lanusse eventually broke the cycle of military dictatorship by calling for democratic elections in 1973. This initial military regime, known as the Argentine Revolution (1966–73), was characterised as a ‘bureaucratic-authoritarian state’.Footnote 16 After a short-lived return to Peronist leadership, another military coup took place in 1976, leading to the National Reorganisation Process (Proceso de Reorganización Nacional, PRN), or ‘El Proceso’, which continued until 1983.Footnote 17
The institutional framework of the Argentine Revolution (1966–73) markedly differed from that of the PRN. While the former concentrated substantial power in the President’s hands, the latter adopted the 33% rule,Footnote 18 evenly distributing authority among the armed forces. In this article, we delve into the Argentine autocratic regime by analysing classified documents released by Argentina’s Ministry of Defence in 2014, comparing two distinct military administrations within the same country.
One of the primary challenges in analysing autocracies is avoiding the perception of these regimes as a uniform entity.Footnote 19 Some scholars posit a positive correlation between autocratic governance and ministerial stability, suggesting that authoritarian regimes typically feature fewer checks and balances, thereby reducing the pressure on presidents to dismiss their ministers.Footnote 20 Additionally, a less fragmented system of ruleFootnote 21 may enable ministers to remain in office longer compared to their counterparts in democratic cabinets. However, these arguments do not hold true for Argentina, where ministerial instability was more pronounced during periods of dictatorship than in democratic eras.
The institutionalisation of leadership successions varies as significantly as it does among different types of democratic countries.Footnote 22 Geddes (1999) contends that variations among autocratic regimes have influenced democratic transitions throughout Latin America. Additionally, some scholars have investigated the internal political dynamics within autocracies, particularly military dictatorships.Footnote 23 Building on the main arguments in the literature regarding ministerial turnover and autocratic governance, we examine whether (1) a fragmented system of rule, (2) rivalries within the military and/or (3) institutional arrangements affected ministerial turnovers during both the Argentine Revolution and El Proceso.
This article is structured into four sections. Firstly, we review the existing literature on the three primary hypotheses previously discussed. Secondly, we outline our use of process tracing to investigate the Argentine case. In the next section, we evaluate whether a fragmented system of governance accounts for ministerial instability during the Argentine Revolution and El Proceso by examining two case studies: ‘El Cordobazo’ and Law No. 21.431. El Cordobazo was a major uprising in Córdoba in 1969 against the military regime, marking a pivotal moment of popular resistance and exposing the inherent weaknesses of Onganía’s governance strategy. By attempting to incorporate civilian groups into his administration through ‘corporativismo inclusivo’ (inclusive corporatism), Onganía aimed to stabilise his rule but inadvertently increased political competition among Catholic associations, the economic elite, liberals and developmentalists. This competition directly contributed to heightened ministerial turnover rates, demonstrating how fragmentation undermined the regime’s cohesion. Similarly, Law 21.431, enacted during the PRN, reveals the complexities of power-sharing between the military and civilian groups. The law institutionalised the representation of both the armed forces and civilian sectors in key government positions. However, instead of fostering stability, this approach intensified rivalries, leading to 20 ministerial replacements during the PRN. The detailed examination of these episodes underscores the centrality of fragmented rule systems in explaining ministerial instability. Subsequently, we explore alternative explanations, including military rivalries and institutional arrangements. Finally, we offer our concluding remarks.
Literature Review
Consistent leadership within ministries is essential for the successful implementation of public policies, providing ministers with the necessary skills for effective management.Footnote 24 Frequent turnover often leads to the regular replacement of senior ministry officials, causing disruptions in administrative functions and impeding the implementation of ministry programmes.Footnote 25 In Southern Cone countries, research consistently points to the relevance of a minister’s personal characteristics. Notable examples include studies by Marcelo Camerlo (2013) on Argentina, Lúcio Rennó and Stefan Wojcik (2015) on Brazil,Footnote 26 Bastián González-Bustamante and Alejandro Olivares (2016) on ChileFootnote 27 and Daniel Chasquetti (2001) on Uruguay.Footnote 28
The type of political regime and its effect on the stability of ministerial positions remains a contentious issue. Critics claim that authoritarian leaders encounter fewer pressures to remove ministers for performance-related reasons, whereas their democratic counterparts are typically more attuned to public opinion and responsive to voters’ demands.Footnote 29 Under this premise, authoritarian regimes are generally expected to ensure greater stability in ministerial positions, despite exceptions like those seen in Chile’s democratic Concertación governments.
The literature has increasingly drawn attention to the study of authoritarian regimes.Footnote 30 The increasing number of authoritarian regimes with multiparty elections and the economic rise of autocratic regimes are incentives for a renewed research agenda on autocracies.Footnote 31 Recent works have addressed some topics such as regime survivalFootnote 32 and ministerial turnover.Footnote 33 The study of political appointments and ministerial stability has long been central to the study of autocracy,Footnote 34 mainly because a minister’s accumulated experience is considered an essential asset in implementing public policies.Footnote 35
Scholars have analysed cabinets within Argentina’s dictatorships,Footnote 36 shedding light on various issues from the religious factions that supported Onganía’s coup d’état to the structural features of authoritarian regimes. Drawing on existing research, we explore three primary factors contributing to regime instability in Argentine dictatorships: a fragmented rule system, rivalries among the armed forces and the military’s institutional arrangements.
Various arguments examine how autocracies influence the stability of individual ministers. Proponents of a positive link between autocratic regimes and ministerial stability highlight several factors: (a) politicians are not subject to elections,Footnote 37 (b) there are fewer checks and balances to pressure the president into dismissing ministersFootnote 38 and (c) with a less fragmented governing system, ministers tend to remain in office longer under autocratic regimes than in democracies.Footnote 39 These arguments centre on two main ideas regarding autocracies. Firstly, reduced involvement of external actors in government allows ministers to stay in office longer. Secondly, a less fragmented rule system ensures that ministers serve extended tenures.
A fragmented ruling system can disperse a nation’s power among various, sometimes conflicting, groups. The more factions compete for control, a variable referred to by some scholars as ‘the selectorate’,Footnote 40 the greater the likelihood of national instability.Footnote 41 A lingering question remains: why would a military junta allow additional political leaders into the decision-making process if it might undermine their authority? Research indicates that authoritarian regimes require some level of civilian support to sustain their power. Notably, Verónica Baudino (2012) explores the political influence of Argentina’s Unión Industrial, while Guido Ignacio Giorgi and Fortunato Horacio Mallimaci (2012) investigate how different Catholic and nationalist organisations impacted military rule, particularly within the Ministry of Health.Footnote 42 Bove and Rivera (2015) argue that power-sharing introduces internal threats to political survival, as the interactions between the armed forces, economic elites and powerful civilian groups increase the risk of internal conflicts.Footnote 43 Additionally, Jay Ulfelder (2005) uses event history models to examine how contentious collective actions contribute to the breakdown of authoritarian regimes.Footnote 44
Research indicates that personalist regimes generally remain in power longer than military juntas, which are plagued by greater internal instability.Footnote 45 However, dissatisfaction within the armed forces and broader society can lead to robust opposition, as civilian elites pursue their own interestsFootnote 46 and may seek to seize power regardless of the circumstances.Footnote 47 Dictatorships that rely solely on force to maintain control are only sustainable for a limited time. Consequently, authoritarian regimes must distribute economic and political benefits to secure the loyalty of their coalition partners and to neutralise threats from both civilians and the military. To reinforce their coalition, autocrats may employ democratic institutions. Furthermore, authoritarian governments are more likely to make policy concessions when the threat of rebellion escalates,Footnote 48 including establishing institutional mechanisms for nominating ministers.
Institutional design can lead to varying levels of ministerial stability. The military may establish a complex set of rules where officers share decision-making power or select a leader for the military junta based on adherence to protocols rather than personal charisma. In Argentina, Eugenio Palazzo and Guillermo Schinelli (1976) examined how constitutional norms evolved from 1966 to 1976, focusing on El Proceso.Footnote 49 Reynaldo Bignone (1992) provided key insights through testimonials during El Proceso.Footnote 50 This paper explores the institutional arrangements of the Argentine Revolution and the PRN to identify the characteristics that may explain Argentina’s unique situation.
There is ongoing debate in academic circles about whether military dictatorships inherently value unity strongly or weakly.Footnote 51 While the military might seek cohesion and coordination after relinquishing power,Footnote 52 divisions among the ruling elite occur more frequently in military dictatorships compared to other authoritarian regimes.Footnote 53 In the context of Argentina, Andrés Fontana (1987) explored political decision-making within the Argentine armed forces.Footnote 54 Additionally, Paula Canelo (2008) and Benjamín García Holgado (2011) made significant contributions to understanding political rivalries and the diverse interests within the military.Footnote 55 This study examines whether internal rivalries among the armed forces have led to instability among ministers. Our hypotheses are formulated based on the literature outlined in Table 1. The next section will discuss the methods and data employed in this research.
Table 1. Literature Overview
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
See: Auriol and Platteau, ‘Religious Co-Option in Autocracy’; Baudino, ‘Burguesía nacional y Estado’; Reynaldo B. Bignone, El último de facto: la liquidación del Proceso: memoria y testimonio (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992); Bueno de Mesquita et al., ‘Testing Novel Implications’; Paula Canelo, ‘Los efectos del poder tripartito: la balcanización del gabinete nacional durante la última dictadura militar argentina’, Prohistoria, 17 (2012), pp. 129–50; Canelo and Franco, ‘Las “Actas de la dictadura”’; Francisco Corigliano and Carlos Escude (eds.), Historia general de las relaciones exteriores de la República Argentina (Buenos Aires: Grupo Editor Latinoamericano, 2003); Debs, ‘Living by the Sword’; Guido Di Tella and Rudiger Dornbusch (eds.), The Political Economy of Argentina, 1946–83 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1989); Benjamín García Holgado, ‘Construyendo instituciones autoritarias: lógica de gobierno y planes políticos en los sistemas políticos militares de la Argentina (1976–1983) y Chile (1973–1990)’, BSc. thesis in Political Science, Universidad de San Andrés, Buenos Aires, 2011; Gandhi and Lust-Okar, ‘Elections Under Authoritarianism’; Giorgi and Mallimaci, ‘Catolicismos, nacionalismos y comunitarismos’; Gabriela D. Gomes, ‘El Onganiato y los sectores populares: funcionarios, ideas y políticas de la Secretaría de Estado de Promoción y Asistencia a la Comunidad (1966–1970)’, Anuario del Centro de Estudios Históricos ‘Prof. Carlos S. A. Segreti’, 11: 11 (2011), pp. 279–302; ‘Un estudio comparativo de la presencia de ideas corporativistas en regímenes dictatoriales latinoamericanos: Argentina (1966–1973) y Chile (1973–1988)’, Master’s thesis in Latin American Studies, Universidad Nacional de San Martín (UNSAM), Buenos Aires, 2013; ‘Las trayectorias políticas de los funcionarios nacional-corporativistas del Onganiato’, Master’s thesis in Latin American Studies, Universidad Nacional de San Martín (UNSAM), Buenos Aires, 2013; Daniel Gutman, Tacuara: Historia de la primera guerrilla urbana Argentina (Buenos Aires: Sudamericana, 2012); Maria Cecilia Miguez, ‘La Sociedad Rural Argentina y el golpe de estado de 1966: El accionar político de una corporación económica’, Revista Cadernos de Estudos Sociais e Políticos, 3: 6 (2014), pp. 20–39; Marcos Novaro and Vicente Palermo, La dictadura militar (1976–1983): del golpe de estado a la restauración democrática (Buenos Aires: Paidós, 2003); Isidro J. Odena, Libertadores y desarrollistas, 1955–1962, vol. 27 of Memorial de la Patria (Buenos Aires: Ediciones La Bastilla, Editorial Astrea de A. y R. Depalma, 1977); O’Donnell, ‘Estado y alianzas’; Palazzo and Schinelli, Las normas constitucionales; Hugo Quiroga, El tiempo del ‘Proceso’: conflictos y coincidencias entre políticos y militares 1976–1983, (Santa Fe: Fundación Ross Ediciones, 1994); Mario Rapoport et al., Historia económica, política y social de la Argentina, 1880–2003 (Buenos Aires: Emecé, 2007); David Rock et al., La Derecha argentina: nacionalistas, neoliberales, militares y clericales (Barcelona and Buenos Aires: Javier Vergara, 2001); Alain Rouquie, Poder militar y sociedad politica en la Argentina II – 1943–1973 (Buenos Aires: Emecé, 1997); Juan Carlos Portantiero, ‘Economía y política en la crisis argentina: 1958–1973’, Revista Mexicana de Sociología, 39: 2 (1977), pp. 531–65.
A Process-Tracing Analysis of the Root Causes of Ministerial Instability
Utilising process-tracing methods from existing research, we pinpointed the exact moments when the majority of ministers departed their roles during both El Cordobazo and the period following the ratification of Law Nº 21.431. Both El Cordobazo and Law 21.431 were selected for their historical importance and because they coincide with critical peaks in ministerial turnover. From these instances, we drew descriptive and causal inferences based on diagnostic evidence.Footnote 56 We then examined the contextual factors and immediate causes behind the ministers’ exits. Following Luis Schenoni (2017), we employed hoop and smoking gun tests.Footnote 57 The hoop test acts as a necessary, though not sufficient, criterion – it cannot confirm a hypothesis but can rule it out. In contrast, the smoking gun test serves as a sufficient criterion, undermining rival hypotheses.Footnote 58 Our principal findings are presented in Table 2.
Table 2. Process-Tracing Analysis of Ministerial Instability in the Argentine Dictatorships
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
Table 2 presents a summary of the process-tracing analysis results for the primary hypotheses. Hypothesis H1 posits that a fragmented ruling system accounts for the turnover of ministers during the specified period. Throughout the Argentine Revolution, although the institutional framework was designed to concentrate power in the president’s hands, Onganía and his successors distributed authority by appointing various civilian groups to key ministerial roles.Footnote 59 This approach, known as ‘inclusive corporatism’, refers to a strategy by which the regime sought to co-opt civilian groups such as unions and industry associations into governance. Similarly, during the PRN era, the military junta faced pressure from civilian factions despite the implementation of the 33% rule. The Cordobazo crisis of 1969 and Law 21.431 of 1976 were responsible for the majority of ministerial changes during this timeframe. These case studies strongly support H1, demonstrating that civilian groups gained influence within the government while the military continued to govern alongside them, each pursuing distinct interests. Both the Cordobazo crisis and Law 21.431 provide definitive ‘smoking gun’ evidence, directly linking the context of these events to the turnover of ministers during this period.
In this paper, we examined several rival hypotheses drawn from existing literature. H2 suggests that rivalries within the armed forces are a key factor behind the instability of ministers’ positions.Footnote 60 Some scholars contend that, despite the implementation of the 33% rule, disagreements persisted among the military during this period. Specifically, the three branches of the military competed for governmental positions, particularly following the enactment of Law 21.431. Consequently, conflicts between the Navy and the Army may have contributed to the turnover of ministers. Evidence of these disputes, uncovered in classified documents, provides some support through hoop tests, as illustrated in Table 2. However, our findings indicate no direct link between internal military rivalries and ministerial turnovers during both the Cordobazo and post-Law 21.431 periods. We conducted process tracing tests on both case studies, which are detailed in the following sections.
H3 examines the institutional reforms introduced by the military junta during the PRN. Their primary objective was to prevent the concentration of power within the President’s office.Footnote 61 Both the military and the financial sector, specifically the Argentine Bank Association (Asociación de Bancos Argentinos, ADEBA),Footnote 62 attributed the significant governmental instability during the Argentine Revolution to the previous centralisation of authority in the president’s hands. From this perspective, Onganía’s decision to include various opposing civilian groups in the government weakened the ruling structure and heightened instability. Post-1976, the PRN implemented the 33% rule. As part of the smoking gun test, we anticipated minimal ministerial turnovers during the PRN era due to this new institutional framework. However, our findings revealed notable disagreements among the armed forces and an increase in civilian participation within the government during the PRN period. Consequently, our results indicate ministerial instability in both dictatorships, despite the institutional reforms, a phenomenon we will further explore in the subsequent sections.
Our research draws on historical accounts and primary sources from the ‘Actas de la dictadura’, a collection of secret documents unveiled by the National Directorate of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law at Argentina’s Ministry of Defence in 2014. This compilation is divided into six main volumes (Tomos), each containing various meeting minutes (Actas) from 1976 to 1983 in PDF format. Recognised as one of the most vital primary sources on the Argentine dictatorship, these documents record all minutes of the military junta’s meetings, including confidential documents and intelligence reports.Footnote 63 We examined 280 meeting minutes, ranging from Tomo 1 (Actas 1 to 35) to Tomo 6 (Actas 256 to 280).Footnote 64 Initially, these documents appear to pertain solely to the PRN period (1976–83) rather than the Argentine Revolution (1966–73). However, some military junta meetings reference the Argentine Revolution as a failed endeavour, influencing certain decision-making processes. For example, the military established the 33% rule to prevent excessive power concentration in the hands of a single president. As stated in a 1978 ADEBA report to the junta, the statute for the PRN was designed to balance power among the armed forces and enhance the regime’s efficiency by explicitly depersonalising authority and reinforcing internal cohesion through shared institutional commitments.Footnote 65
A Fragmented System of Rule
A fragmented ruling system was a fundamental aspect of the Argentine dictatorship, resulting in significant political disunity.Footnote 66 By a fragmented ruling system, we refer to opposing political interests competing for control over the government’s decision-making processes. Following the Argentine Revolution, the government included a mix of civilian groups and military interests. The prohibition of political parties bolstered Catholic organisations, labour unions and student groups. With a wider range of interests at play, managing Argentina became a daily challenge. Contrary to expectations in the literature, bureaucratic stability was not achieved in these autocratic regimes.Footnote 67 A letter from the Argentine Bank Association to the military junta in the late 1970s illustrates how business interests alluded to the failure of earlier military governments as they lobbied the new one:
Since the last decade of the 19th century, and throughout practically the entire 20th century, the society, the State, and the country have experienced an almost uninterrupted succession of social conflicts that have profoundly disrupted the nation in all its fundamental facets … The origin of the historical crisis that the country is experiencing must also be linked to the existence of solid opposition among social groups in their attempts to monopolise political power, whether it be because they each consider themselves the most suitable to govern, as a means to social ascension, or as an instrument of revenge and fear of returning to a past that was rejected.Footnote 68
Since the mere presence of conflicting groups does not fully explain ministerial turnover, we examined two case studies to illustrate how a fragmented ruling system caused instability among ministers within Argentine dictatorships – the Cordobazo uprising of 1969 and Law 21.431 of 1976. We assert that a fragmented ruling system accounts for the unexpected instability observed during both the Argentine Revolution and El Proceso. Although these periods featured different institutional frameworks, both were marked by political fragmentation, which was the main driver behind most ministerial changes in both dictatorships.
Through process tracing, we confirmed that a fragmented ruling system was the primary factor explaining ministers’ turnovers in both cases. These case studies acted as smoking gun tests for the theory of political fragmentation. Our findings indicate that most ministerial turnovers were linked to conflicting interests between civilian groups and the military, stemming from the extensive fragmentation of the ruling system. As a secret document states:
It should be clear, then, that almost all the important problems that Argentina faces are manifestations of that main evil. It is so to such an extent that when the etiology of some of those first-order ills that plague the country is examined … (they can) be attributed to factors intimately linked to the struggle for power in an environment of political anarchy.Footnote 69
The Argentine Revolution
In 1966, the military junta was disbanded after fulfilling the objectives of the Argentine Revolution, allowing General Onganía to assume leadership of the government.Footnote 70 Onganía declared his administration’s intent to eradicate political corruption by implementing significant structural reforms across Argentine society. Although one of his first actions was to ban political parties, other key civilian organisations, including the General Economic Confederation (Confederación General Económica, CGE), the Argentine Rural Society (Sociedad Rural Argentina, SRA) and the Argentine Agrarian Federation (Federación Agraria Argentina, FAA), became integral to the government. Several union leaders supported the military coup, such as Augusto Vandor, Secretary of the Unión Obrera Metalúrgica (Metallurgical Workers Union, UOM), José Alonso, representative of the Clothing Union, Francisco Prado, Secretary of the Confederación General de Trabajadores (General Confederation of Workers, CGT) and Juan José Taccone of the Federación Argentina de Trabajadores de Luz y Fuerza, a trade union of the electrical power sector commonly known as just Luz y Fuerza (Light and Power). These characters were all present at the official ceremony inaugurating Onganía’s tenure. Even Juan Domingo Perón initially endorsed the revolution and Onganía’s government as a means to eliminate his rivals.Footnote 71 As a result, the 1966 transition was characterised by its diversity, with liberals, nationalists, trade unionists and right-wing Catholic groups backing and becoming part of the new government.Footnote 72
Onganía’s government was made up of various factions within Argentina’s economic elite. The most influential decision-makers were civilians and retired military officers,Footnote 73 with each civilian group controlling different ministries and political positions. For example, Krieger Vasena, who served as Minister of Economy from 1967 to 1969, was affiliated with the Unión Industrial Argentina (Industrial Organization of Argentina, UIA), while Jorge Salimei, Minister of Economy from 1966 to 1967, was part of the CGE. Additionally, segments of the labour movement and unions supported Onganía.Footnote 74 The Argentine bureaucracy was described as a ‘civilian-military-religious coup’, characterised by political disputes and conflicts over ministerial appointments.Footnote 75 Multiple ideologies competed for influence within the government, primarily among liberals, the military and civilians associated with developmentalism and Catholic nationalist groups. Catholics from various factions,Footnote 76 along with military actors and civilians linked to developmentalist and nationalist agendas, contested political roles and influence against the liberals.Footnote 77 The developmentalist movement of the 1960s remained a significant force during Onganía’s administration.
The UIA emerged as a pivotal economic organisation wielding substantial influence within the government. From the outset of the 1966 coup, the UIA played an active role, with its significance growing throughout the Onganía administration. The UIA regularly held meetings with key government officials, including Minister of Labour Juan Pedro Tamborenea, Minister of Social Welfare Roberto Petracca (UIA member), Minister of Housing Ernesto García Olano and President Onganía.Footnote 78 Although the UIA supported Adalbert Krieger Vasena as Minister of the Economy – thereby exerting considerable sway over the new government’s economic policies – other significant civilian actors also contested influence within the administration.Footnote 79 Nationalist Catholic organisations, such as Ateneo de la República,Footnote 80 Catholic City, Opus Dei and Cursillos de Cristiandad, became primary recruitment grounds. According to a confidential document from the Argentine Bank Association sent to the military junta, ‘The political interests at stake flow into the great sea of confusion … The terrible infectious virus of political instability rages in the body of the State …’Footnote 81
Catholic organisations, liberals and proponents of developmentalism played significant roles in the removal of ministers, particularly after 1967. The replacement of Roberto Petracca as Minister of Health serves as a clear example of the influence exerted by Catholic groups during Onganía’s administration. Following Petracca’s death in March 1967, Onganía appointed Julio Álvarez as his successor amidst pressure from both liberal factions and Catholic associations. While liberals, including Minister Krieger Vasena, advocated for Raúl Ondart, the Ateneo de la República, a prominent Catholic group, supported Raúl Puigbó, who was affiliated with the Ateneo.
Despite academic accounts characterising Onganía’s appointment of Julio Álvarez as a ‘Solomonic decision’,Footnote 82 implying a compromise that did not fully align with either the Ateneo or liberal factions, Álvarez remained more closely affiliated with Catholic groups than with liberal interests. Consequently, it was unsurprising that Álvarez later took on the role of president of Cáritas Argentina, the official Catholic organisation.
The Catholic Right’s impact on Onganía’s administration becomes apparent when examining the religious affiliations of four Ministers of Social Welfare from 1966 to 1970: Roberto Petracca (June 1966–January 1967), Julio E. Álvarez (January–March 1967), Conrado Bauer (April 1967–June 1969) and Carlos Consigli (June 1969–June 1970).Footnote 83 Additionally, the Catholic Right championed the replacement of political parties with community-based participation, a vision that Onganía himself endorsed:
The political parties will one day have to be replaced by other organisations, equally political, based on ideals rather than on prejudice, whose primary and lively loyalty is to the Nation rather than to the group and who look more to the Argentina that we have to build than the Argentina that we have left behind. … The disappearance of political parties, the National Congress, etc., means that the country does not tolerate empty forms of content’.Footnote 84
The majority of the bureaucracy within the government could be categorised as either nationalists or liberals, encompassing both civilian and military personnel. Tensions surfaced following Onganía’s inaugural cabinet, with the Ministry of Economy serving as a prime example. This ministry was deemed one of the most pivotal, yet it also saw the highest level of civilian participation during this period. Here, conflicts between liberal and nationalist factions were most pronounced. In the early years of Onganía’s administration, Generals Alsogaray and Lanusse, along with economic organisations such as the UIA, SRA, CGE and Acción Coordinadora de las Instituciones Empresarias Libres (Coordinating Association for Free Businessmen's Institutions, ACIEL), expressed dissatisfaction with the initial appointments of officials to ministerial and other political roles. They had anticipated a more market-oriented approach following the revolution; however, Onganía predominantly appointed nationalists to his government. Jorge Salimei’s appointment as Minister of Economy triggered significant backlash among the elites and the Army’s liberal sector. Liberals had expected the liberal Álvaro Alsogaray to assume the position instead.Footnote 85
Alsogaray had previously served as Minister of Economy under Arturo Frondizi’s administration from 1960 to 1961 and again in 1962, as well as Minister of Labour from 1959 to 1960. However, Onganía deliberately chose not to appoint Alsogaray again, fearing a repetition of the latter’s experience under Frondizi where the president felt ‘imprisoned by his Minister’.Footnote 86 This reluctance was likely due to Alsogaray’s prominent standing in Argentine politics and his strong connections with liberal factions and the economic elite. In contrast, Salimei was relatively obscure to the public and pursued a state-oriented monetary policy. Consequently, most financial organisations and the liberal sector of the Army opposed Salimei’s policies, pressuring Onganía to remove him from his position. Responding to this liberal pressure, Onganía replaced Salimei with Krieger Vasena, a liberal-oriented economist, and appointed Guillermo Borda as Minister of the Interior. While the Army’s nationalist faction viewed these new appointments as contrary to the revolution’s aims, the liberal faction regarded the ministerial changes as a significant victory.Footnote 87 These shifts in governance were closely followed by waves of cabinet reshuffles, evidencing ministerial instability due to political realignments.
After several years in power, Onganía’s legitimacy was eroded among Argentina’s elite and broader society. Rising taxes, factory closures, increasing unemployment and the Cordobazo uprising culminated in a significant political crisis. Recognising the government’s inability to manage the escalating social and political unrest, certain military factions orchestrated a coup to remove Onganía. General Levingston was appointed to lead the country and restore stability. However, his tenure proved ineffective in addressing the opposition. During his brief administration, the country experienced an average of 50 violent incidents each month.Footnote 88 On 22 March 1971, Levingston stepped down after a mere nine months in office. During his short period of leadership, there was one change in the Ministry of Economy – replacing Carlos Llerena with Aldo Ferrer – and two alterations in the Ministry of Health, appointing Francisco Manrique in place of Amadeo Frúgoli, and later replacing him with Oscar Puiggrós.
El Cordobazo
Following the 1966 coup, the new government formally banned Peronism. This led to escalating political opposition from various actors, including Peronist working-class groups and unions.Footnote 89 Onganía endeavoured to balance these diverse interests within his administration, embodying what has been described as a ‘Bonapartist experience’ aimed at achieving intra-bourgeois peace and restoring hegemony.Footnote 90 However, Onganía’s approach ultimately failed as tensions between the liberal and nationalist factions within the Army and among civilians intensified daily.Footnote 91 Even Peronist union leaders, such as Augusto Vandor of the UOM, had supported the coup against President Illia in an attempt to stabilise political tensions by rekindling the alliance between the armed forces and the unions, a cornerstone of Peronist governments in the 1940s and 1950s.Footnote 92 Social unrest among unions and students surged between 1967 and 1968 in Córdoba. Many who had initially endorsed the coup against President Illia were taken aback by Onganía’s restrictive labour policies. From 1966 onwards, political opposition and social tensions in Argentina reached unprecedented levels.
In 1968, various Peronist working-class movements and discontented unions across Argentina began organising protests, particularly in Córdoba. Alongside Buenos Aires, Córdoba was one of the country’s two main financial hubs. Since the mid-1950s, the province had become home to key automobile factories, fostering robust working-class movements in the city. One of Córdoba’s most significant factories, IKA-Renault, capitalised on Onganía’s economic and labour policies in 1967 by cutting wages, dismissing nearly a thousand workers and reducing the workweek. These measures intensified unrest, culminating in large-scale riots on 29 May 1969 in Córdoba, known as El Cordobazo. The protests were driven by mounting frustrations among workers, students, political activists and the general populace against the military regime.Footnote 93
The government responded with a severe crackdown, resulting in increased violence, particularly among leftist groups such as the Frente Argentino de Liberación (Argentine Liberation Front). Political opposition was also mounting within the government itself. Consequently, Guillermo Borda, then Minister of the Interior, consented to incorporate key societal sectors into the administration.Footnote 94 By allowing civilian participation in both national and local decision-making through a mechanism known as ‘inclusive corporatism’, the aim was to prevent further turmoil among civilians and the elite.Footnote 95 As a result, Onganía replaced nearly all the ministers in the government.Footnote 96 Among the ministries examined in this study, Adalbert Vasena (Economy), Conrado Bauer (Health), José Astigueta (Education) and Nicanor Méndez (Foreign Affairs) did not remain in their positions during this period. However, by introducing more civilians into the government, Onganía began addressing a growing array of interests from various sectors of Argentine society, ranging from the military to the unions. As stated in its own 1978 confidential document, the Argentine Bank Association described Onganía’s strategy as unsuccessful, asserting that:
The politicisation of the great social institutions is at the root of the emergence of ‘States within the State.’ The most powerful force that has tried to overcome the powers of the State during the last thirty years has been the General Confederation of Workers (CGT). The CGT has not allowed anyone to rule for eighteen years, from the fall of Perón until his return to office. Even during the presidency of the late Perón himself, and of course it [the CGT] continued to harass and advance on the State even more during the last Peronist Government until causing its legitimate fall.Footnote 97
The PRN/El Proceso
Alejandro Lanusse succeeded Levingston, promising to hold democratic elections as part of an extensive government initiative named ‘Acuerdo Nacional’, a plan for democratic transition.Footnote 98 Ultimately, Lanusse lifted the ban on the Peronist party ahead of the elections. During his administration, there were three Ministers of the Economy (Juan Quilici, Cayetano Licciardo and Jorge Wehbe), two Ministers of Health (Francisco Manrique and José Puiggrós) and two Ministers of Foreign Affairs (Luis Pardo and Eduardo Loughlin). Juan Domingo Perón assumed office on 17 October 1973, but the Peronist movement and leftist groups became uncontrollable. For instance, the Montoneros plotted to assassinate union leaders and police chiefs in 1973.Footnote 99 Perón passed away on 1 July 1974 and was succeeded by his wife, Isabel. However, the Montoneros intensified their violence and opposition against her government. Ultimately, in March 1976, the military executed a new coup, establishing an entirely different institutional arrangement from that of the Argentine Revolution.
In a 1978 memorandum addressed to the military junta, ADEBA lamented the deepening crisis of political instability and criticised what it termed ‘political anarchy’. Yet the irony here is striking: while the bankers condemned disorder, in lobbying the government for favourable appointments, they were themselves contributing to the very ministerial instability they decried:
‘The armed Forces … assumed the responsibility of … restoring the essential values that serve as the foundation for the integral leadership of the State, emphasising the sense of morality, suitability, and efficiency, essential to reconstruct the content of the Nation’s image, eradicate subversion and promote the economic development of national life based on the balance … and progress of the Argentine people’.Footnote 100
After the failed experiment of the Argentine Revolution, the military concluded that concentrating too much power in the hands of a single political figure, such as Onganía, led to increased fragmentation and instability within the government. Consequently, during El Proceso, the primary objective was to depersonalise the exercise of power.Footnote 101 While ‘Onganía was a King, Galtieri was a Prime Minister.’Footnote 102 The military aimed to ‘re-found’ the republicFootnote 103 by eliminating personalism through an institutional design that guaranteed the equal participation of the Army, Navy and Air Force in both political leadership and state administration. Scholars have described El Proceso as resembling ‘a feudal regime’.Footnote 104
The distribution of ministerial positions during El Proceso was proportional, with eight ministries divided evenly among the armed forces. The Army was given control of the Ministries of Labour and the Interior, headed by Generals Horacio Tomás Liendo and Albano Harguindeguy, respectively. The Navy managed the Ministries of Foreign Affairs (César Guzzetti) and Health (Julio Bardi), while the Air Force took charge of the Ministries of Defence and Justice, with José María Klix and Julio Arnaldo Gómez respectively in office. In Acta no. 22 of 1976, the Air Force’s General-in-Chief outlined the criteria for selecting the new Minister of Health, which included: (1) alignment with the objectives and purposes of the PRN; (2) personal and professional background; (3) evaluation of the current situation, including immediate and long-term action plans (up to five years); and (4) selection of a team of collaborators for each area of the military.Footnote 105 This final criterion underscores the importance of a control mechanism that ensured participation from other military branches within any given ministry.
The civilian sectors were allocated control of the two remaining ministries. To prevent internal conflict, the military divided the Ministries of Economy and Education between liberals and nationalists. José Alfredo Martínez de Hoz, a liberal, was appointed Minister of Economy, while Ricardo Pedro Bruera, a nationalist, was given the Ministry of Education. The liberals were assigned to the more ‘technical’ roles, such as the Ministry of Economy and key secretaries in areas like Industry and Agriculture. In contrast, the nationalists were entrusted with the ‘political’ positions, including the Ministry of Education and, later, the Ministries of Interior and Culture.Footnote 106
Law Nº 21.431
Several contradictions regarding the 33% rule are worth noting. A few months after the military coup, Videla’s administration undertook a reorganisation of the state apparatus by increasing the number of ministries and granting more power to the Army and civilian sectors. In September 1976, Law Nº 21.431 established the Ministry of Planning, intended to coordinate the activities of other ministries. The creation of this new ministry resulted directly from Videla’s response to the pressures surrounding the 33% rule. The Army had been pressing Videla for greater influence in the government, given their control over the apparatus of repression, torture and imprisonment, which they saw as a critical responsibility in the fight against leftist movements. At the same time, the economic elite demanded more ministerial positions in exchange for their continued support.
The establishment of the Ministry of Planning was highly contentious, not only because it disrupted the PRN’s institutional arrangement but also due to the numerous conflicting interests involved. The Ministry of Economy opposed the creation of this new ministry, as it would add more than 600 employees, two secretaries and nine undersecretaries, significantly increasing government expenditure. Furthermore, the creation of the ministry was seen as a triumph for nationalists over liberals, who opposed greater state control of the economy. Early in the PRN, liberals held sway over the Ministry of Economy, advocating for liberal economic principles, such as reducing state intervention and downsizing the state apparatus. One of Argentina’s most influential newspapers, La Nación, also opposed the creation of the new ministry, warning that it would exacerbate bureaucratisation.
The Ministry of Planning proposed a law that would elevate it to a ‘super-ministry’, allowing it to overstep jurisdictions and intervene in various areas of government. However, the executive branch blocked the law. The proposal had to pass through the Ministry of Economy before it could receive the president’s sanction, which led to its obstruction. On 30 December 1977, Minister Ramón Genaro Díaz Bessone resigned as Minister of Planning,Footnote 107 and General Carlos Enrique Laidlaw took over the position. In October 1978, facing mounting pressure from other ministries, Videla’s administration ultimately closed the Ministry of Planning.
Despite the formal division of power between the armed forces and civilian sectors, the reality diverged. Videla initiated a significant reshuffle of the administration, replacing nearly all government officials, with only the Ministers of Economy, Labour and the Interior remaining in office. Civilian sectors emerged as the biggest winners of this process, increasing their influence within the government. In a secret document dated 8 August 1978, the military junta discussed nominations for ministerial positions.
Ministers: it will be desirable that the National Cabinet formed as of 1 August 78 be designated to carry out these functions during the 1978/81 period. This does not rule out applying a criterion of gradualism in the incorporation of civilian personnel to the Cabinet in the face of possible movements of military personnel for different reasons.Footnote 108
After October 1978, the civilian sectors held control of key ministries, including Economy (José Alfredo Martínez de Hoz), Culture and Education (Juan Rafael Llerena Amadeo) and Justice (Alberto Rodríguez Varela). In 1979, the military junta convened to address the growing civilian involvement in the government. During this meeting, the military made it clear that, in order for civilians to participate in the administration, they must align with the general rules and ideology of the dictatorship. ‘Gradualism is the progressive increase in citizen participation in the function of Government, pursuant to the growing understanding and identification with the Doctrinal Bases and Programmatic Bases that the Armed Forces sustain as the foundations of Argentine society.’Footnote 109
The strategy behind appointing civilians to ministerial positions was crucial to the regime’s long-term goals. According to a secret document, the objective was to ‘consolidate the national opinion movement and uphold a robust constitutional movement which, aligned with the Objectives, Doctrinal Bases and Programmatic Bases of the PRN, would ensure broad adhesion and support from the population.’Footnote 110 The military junta believed that sharing power with civilian sectors was essential for fostering cohesion among the populace. On 13 November 1979, the military junta declared in a secret document that the transfer of government positions to trusted civilians was one of the PRN’s objectives.Footnote 111 To accomplish this, the PRN would need to coordinate with political parties, unions, entrepreneurs and other sectors.Footnote 112 However, a few years later, in a meeting held on 14 February 1983, the military junta admitted that the PRN had lost political influence. Upon analysing the causes of the crisis, the military concluded: ‘In this generalised deterioration, which has led the republic to a crisis, errors and omissions have been added by all the intervening elements, among which the armed forces bear responsibility, as do the National Government and the sectors that make up the political and socioeconomic panorama of the country.’Footnote 113
Alternative Hypotheses
This article argues that a fragmented ruling system (H1) was the primary cause of ministerial instability during the Argentine Revolution and El Proceso. As discussed in the literature review, this hypothesis is drawn from existing studies on authoritarian regimes. However, recent scholarship on the Argentine dictatorships has introduced new perspectives that may help explain why Argentina remained unstable even under authoritarian rule. Notably, two alternative explanations for regime instability have emerged: rivalry within the military (H2) and changes in the institutional framework (H3). In this section, we examine both H2 and H3.
In a secret document sent to the PRN, the Argentine Bank AssociationFootnote 114 discussed the political instability in Argentina, noting that the armed forces had been drawn into political disputes during the Argentine Revolution. The document stated: ‘… In short, the politicisation of the armed forces and the collapse of political parties weakened the backbone of the nation’s structure, putting it at immense risk of succumbing to any of the vicissitudes of which fate is constantly full, and undermining the genuine military spirit, which later becomes so incredibly difficult to restore …’Footnote 115 Regarding the PRN, secret documents revealed concerns among the military about maintaining cohesion within the armed forces. Acta 248 highlighted this worry: ‘The preservation of prestige and cohesion within and between the armed forces is essential to ensure the stability of democracy and to make any future political project viable.’Footnote 116
The political struggle within the military was a significant issue leading up to the Argentine dictatorship in 1966. Onganía’s supporters, known as the ‘Azules’, represented a faction of the Army that gained prominence following a series of internal conflicts within the armed forces. In 1962, Onganía and the Azules took control of Buenos Aires, advocating for a more active military role,Footnote 117 in contrast to those who preferred a more passive stance for the armed forces. Despite this internal friction, Onganía managed to maintain unity by focusing the military’s efforts on eliminating the ‘internal enemy’, the leftist movements. Although there were isolated disagreements within the armed forces,Footnote 118 we find no substantial evidence that ministerial turnovers during the Argentine Revolution were directly caused by rivalry or competition among military factions. As discussed in previous sections, the Cordobazo uprising was primarily a result of confrontations between the military and civilian groups. During this time, the military remained united in their efforts to suppress union and student demonstrations in Córdoba.
After the establishment of the PRN, the armed forces agreed on a system of governance that allowed for equal participation among all branches. As previously mentioned, Law 21.131, which was responsible for many of the ministerial turnovers during this period, was less about internal military conflicts and more about the rivalry between nationalists and liberals, who were competing for control of the state’s economic policies. General Menéndez’s revolt in 1979 against the commander-in-chief of the Army, Eduardo Viola, is a clear example of the unity within the military.Footnote 119 Menéndez’s rebellion failed due to a lack of support from other military factions.Footnote 120 However, between 1978 and 1979, secret documents revealed some disagreements between the Army and Navy. Acta 59 records that the Navy advocated for a more proactive approach to replacing governors and ambassadors who were not fulfilling their duties, but they clarified that this stance should not be seen as a conflict with the Army or General Videla. Furthermore, there was no mention of potential disagreements over ministerial appointments. In fact, the Air Force explicitly stated that the nomination of ministers should be respected.Footnote 121
It is important to note, however, that disputes among the military became a significant concern toward the end of the PRN, particularly following the defeat in the Falklands war (Guerra de las Malvinas). By that time, the dictatorship was already in a weakened state. Both the Air Force and the Navy officially withdrew their support from the government as a consequence of the war, effectively ending the 33% rule. The Air Force even proposed appointing a civilian president as a solution to the growing political crisis.Footnote 122 As a result, democracy was fully restored about a year after the war, in 1983. However, during the Argentine Revolution and El Proceso, rivalry within the military was not a key factor in explaining ministerial turnovers. The military’s internal disagreements failed to meet the smoking gun test. Throughout most Argentine dictatorships, the armed forces largely cooperated in managing pressures from civilian sectors.
The main difference between the two military dictatorships refers to institutional changes made by the military during El Proceso. As previously mentioned, the military saw the Argentine Revolution as a failure. During the PRN, the ultimate goal was to avoid the concentration of power in the hands of one single officer, especially to the extent that it had been during Onganía’s administration. Therefore, after 1976 the armed forces divided the power into different areas of influence, each holding a separate area of the state apparatus.Footnote 123 Craig Arceneaux (1997) characterised this ‘“feudal” arrangement’ as ‘three near equal pyramids’ juxtaposed, representing the different arms, ‘each of which independently extended deep into the government’ in a capillary and autonomous way.Footnote 124
The military introduced a new institutional arrangement to enhance regime stability. In this context, we examine whether this institutional structure influenced ministerial instability (H3). In this paper, ‘institutional arrangement’ refers to the new bureaucratic procedures or laws that reshaped the balance of power between the executive, the military junta, the ministries and the legislative branch (see Table 3). At the apex of each power structure was the commander-in-chief, who, along with the other commanders-in-chief, formed the highest governing body of the state, the military junta.Footnote 125 This emphasis on reorganisation, new bureaucratic procedures and national planning was a recurrent theme in many of the military junta’s meetings (Actas 1, 3 and 4), particularly in 1976 when ‘El Proceso’ began.Footnote 126 In a meeting held on 29 June 1977, the military junta discussed:
‘Rarely in its history has the Republic had such a need for its prestige to be defended abroad; because never before have so many been interested in disfiguring before the world the triumph of Argentina in the arduous and delicate task of fully recovering its dignity as a nation, after having suffered the organised attack of those who tried to seize the freedom of all its inhabitants.’Footnote 127
Table 3. Institutional designs
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on Secretaria de Estado de Gobierno, Acta de la Revolución Argentina con sus anexos, Secretaría de Estado de Gobierno, Dirección General de Provincias, Departamento Difusión Provincial, 1966: https://www.argentina.gob.ar/sites/default/files/acta_de_la_revolucion_argentina-1966.pdf, Ministerio de Defensa, Actas de la dictadura, Tomo 3, Acta 72, p.48 and Ministerio de Defensa, Ley 21256/1976 Estatuo para la Reorganizacion Nacional, Honorable Congreso de la Nacion Argentina, 26 March 1976: https://www.argentina.gob.ar/normativa/nacional/ley-21256-303517/texto.
The members of the government were subordinate to the military junta, which held the authority to remove the president.Footnote 128 The military junta exercised both executive and legislative powers.Footnote 129 Although there was a Legislative Advisory Commission (Comisión de Asesoramiento Legislativo, CAL), its members were also part of the military junta.Footnote 130 The junta permitted the president to appoint most of his governing body, including provincial governors and ambassadors, provided he maintained an equalised presence of the three armed forces. This division of power was formalised through the 33% rule, which ensured that positions in the military junta, CAL, ministries, national secretariats, governorships, social services, unions, media and public companies were evenly distributed among the Army, Navy and Air Force.
As shown in Table 3, the institutional arrangement of the PRN differed significantly from that of the Argentine Revolution. While power was concentrated in the hands of the president during the Argentine Revolution, the PRN distributed power according to the 33% rule. Despite this new framework, there were still numerous ministerial reappointments during the second dictatorship, as illustrated in the table. The 33% rule and the revised institutional arrangement were insufficient to reduce ministerial instability.
Table 4 lists the total number of Ministers of Economy, Education, Foreign Affairs and Health who served during the PRN. According to this data, the PRN remained unstable, with 20 different ministers taking office during this period. To test H3, institutional change would need to be a necessary condition for ministerial turnover and a reduction in turnover due to these changes would confirm the hypothesis. However, despite the institutional shift from the Argentine Revolution to the PRN, the regime remained unstable. Thus, the institutional arrangement alone does not explain the ministerial turnover in Argentina.
Table 4. Ministerial turnover during the PRN (1976–83)
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
Conclusion
Our database reveals that Argentina was the only country where ministers had longer tenures during democratic years, indicating that the Argentine dictatorships of 1966 and 1976 were marked by instability. Drawing on the literature’s key arguments regarding ministerial turnovers in autocracies, we tested whether a fragmented rule system (H1), rivalries within the military (H2) and institutional arrangements (H3) influenced ministerial instability during both the Argentine Revolution and El Proceso. Our first hypothesis was confirmed through process-tracing secret documents released by Argentina’s Ministry of Defense in 2014 and by comparing these two distinct military regimes within the same country. Additionally, we tested the primary hypothesis through two case studies, each corresponding to one of the dictatorship periods.
We argue that the fragmentation of the rule system led to competition for ministerial positions and explains the instability of ministerial positions during Argentina’s military rule. Political sectarianism was a defining feature of Argentine society under military dictatorship. The increasing fragmentation of power began with Onganía’s strategy of incorporating civilian sectors into his government, a tactic referred to in the literature as ‘corporativismo inclusivo’. Onganía and his administration believed that involving key societal sectors in governance would benefit the country and secure his political survival, especially after the Cordobazo protests. However, this approach backfired, as the inclusion of more civilians led to fierce competition for political positions among Catholic associations, the economic elite, liberals and developmentalists. We provided empirical evidence showing how these power struggles contributed directly to the downfall of ministers during this period.
Most of the ministerial turnovers in both case studies were driven by disputes among various groups, including Catholic associations, liberals and nationalists.Footnote 131 This article highlights how Argentina’s authoritarian regimes were deeply fragmented and unable to consolidate a stable coalition, unlike more cohesive autocracies. The case of Argentina supports the arguments of authors who suggest that authoritarian regimes are more likely to make policy concessions when facing significant threats of rebellion,Footnote 132 including changes to institutional arrangements for appointing ministers. These scholars contend that the primary threats to political survival come from insiders, and that the relationship between the armed forces, the economic elite and powerful civilian groups influences the risk of instability – in this case, ministerial turnover. In our first case study, we demonstrated how Onganía was pressured to share power with civilian groups, especially after the violent Cordobazo protests. Later, during the PRN, Law Nº 21.431 was enacted in response to Videla’s push for the 33% rule. The tensions surrounding the creation of the Ministry of Planning exemplified the complexities of this power-sharing dynamic.
Finally, we tested two alternative hypotheses by examining whether rivalries within the armed forces (H2) and the institutional changes implemented during the PRN (H3) contributed to ministerial turnovers. While the literature offers no consensus on whether military dictatorships tend to favour unity strongly or weakly,Footnote 133 our analysis shows that the military largely acted in concert during both the Argentine Revolution and the PRN. Significant internal disagreements only surfaced near the end of the regime, following Argentina’s defeat in the Falklands war. However, we found no consistent evidence of disputes between the Army and Navy over ministerial appointments.
Though the institutional design changed dramatically from the Argentine Revolution to the PRN – shifting from power concentrated in the hands of a single general to shared governance among the military junta – the PRN remained unstable, with 20 ministerial replacements. Thus, the institutional design, whether centralised or shared among the junta, did not have a consistent impact on ministerial stability in Argentina. Despite the institutional reforms of 1976, ministerial instability persisted, as shown in Table 4. In both dictatorships, power was shared with various civilian groups, leading to increased competition for ministerial positions due to a fragmented rule system.
Acknowledgements
This research was supported by the Sao Paulo Research Foundation (FAPESP), grant numbers 18/18278-9 and 20/10529-2. We would like to express our sincere gratitude to all the anonymous reviewers whose thoughtful comments and suggestions greatly contributed to strengthening this article.
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