1. Despite the difficulties involved in accessing Chinese sources, plausible studies do exist in the field. With privileged access to “information available to the author” drawing on “hard intelligence,” Whiting, Allen S., in The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Vietnam (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1975)Google Scholar, ch. 6, draws an impressively accurate picture, judged by new Chinese sources, of the scope and nature of China's involvement with the Vietnam War from 1965 to 1968. In a recent article, “China's role in the Vietnam War,” (in Jayne, Werner and David, Hunt (eds.), The American War in Vietnam (Ithaca: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, 1993), pp. 71–76)Google Scholar, Whiting further checks the conclusions of his study in light of the opinion of Vietnamese scholars. The first three volumes of Smith's, R. B. comprehensive study, An International History of the Vietnam War (London: Macmillan, 1983–91)Google Scholar, offer an excellent treatment of the international dimension of the war, including the Chinese connection. Useful information and plausible analyses can also be found in Duiker, William J., China and Vietnam: The Roots of Conflict (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, 1986Google Scholar); Ross, Robert S., The Indochina Tangle: China's Vietnam Policy, 1975–1979 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988)Google Scholar; and Gilks, Anne, The Breakdown of the Sino-Vietnamese Alliance, 1970–1979 (Berkeley: Center for Chinese Studies, 1992).Google Scholar

2. Jian, Chen, “China and the First Indo-China War, 1950–54,” The China Quarterly, No. 133 (March 1993), pp. 85–110.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

3. For discussions of Hanoi's adoption of a “southern revolution” strategy in 1958–60, see Duiker, William J., The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981), pp.186–190Google Scholar; Smith, An International History of the Vietnam War, Vol. 1, chs. 8 and 10; and Chen, King C., “Hanoi's three decisions and the escalation of the Vietnam War,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 90, No. 2 (Summer 1975).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

4. For a more extensive analysis, see Chen Jian, “China and the First Indo-China War,” pp. 107–109; see also Qiang, Zhai, “China and the Geneva Conference of 1954,” The China Quarterly, No. 129 (March 1992).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

5. For example, in meeting Ho Chi Minh and Pham Van Dong on 18–22 November 1956, Zhou Enlai repeatedly emphasized that “the unification should be regarded as a long-term struggle,” and that “only when the North had been consolidated with extensive efforts, would it become possible to talk about how to win over the South and how to unify the country.” See Zhongquan, Shi, Zhou Enlai de zhuoyue fengxian (Zhou Enlai's Outstanding Contributions) (Beijing: CCP Central Academy Press, 1993), p. 286.Google Scholar See also Ming, Guoet al., ZhongYueguanxiyanbiansishinian (Forty-Year Evolution of Sino-Vietnamese Relations) (Nanning: Guangxi People's Press, 1992), pp. 65–66.Google Scholar

6. The Editorial Group for the History of Chinese Military Advisers in Vietnam, (ed.), Zhongguo junshi guwentuan yuanyue kangfa douzheng shishi (A Factual Account of the Participation of Chinese Military Advisory Group in the Struggle of Assisting Vietnam and Resisting France) (Beijing: People's Liberation Army Press, 1990), pp. 142–43.Google Scholar

7. Guo Ming et al., Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishinian, p. 66; for a Vietnamese version of the story, see The Truth about Vietnamo-Chinese Relations over the Past Thirty Years (Hanoi: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1979), pp. 29–33.

8. Guo Ming et al., Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishinian, p. 67; and the Institute of Diplomatic History under Chinese Foreign Ministry (eds.), Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong dashiji, 1949–1975 (A Chronicle of Zhou Enlai's Important Diplomatic Activities) (Beijing: World Affairs Press, 1993), pp. 279–280.Google Scholar

9. See Zheng, Huang, Hu Zhiming yu Zhongguo (Ho Chi Minh and China) (Beijing: People's Liberation Army Press, 1987)Google Scholar, ch. 6.

10. In late 1958, during the Taiwan Straits crisis, Mao Zedong introduced the concept of “noose strategy.” According to this concept, overseas American military presence served as hangman's nooses for the United States. Every military commitment abroad would add one I, more noose to the Americans, and finally strangle the “U.S. imperialism.” Mao therefore believed that the overextension of America's strength would lead to the final failure of the U.S. foreign policy in general and its policy toward China in particular. See Zedong's, Mao speech to the Supreme State Council, 8 September 1958, Jianguoyilai Mao Zedong wengao (Mao Zedong's Manuscripts since the Formation of the People's Republic, 8 vols.) (Beijing: The Central Press of Historical Documents, 1987–93Google Scholar), Vol. 7, pp. 391–92. For detailed discussions of the “noose strategy,” see Shuguang, Zhang Deterrence and Strategic I Culture: Chinese-American Confrontations, 1949–1958 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992Google Scholar), ch. 8.

11. Ke, Li and Shengzhang, Hao, Wenhua dageming zhong de renmin jiefangjun (The People's Liberation Army during the Cultural Revolution) (Beijing: CCP Historical Materials Press, 1989), pp. 408–409.Google Scholar This work offers one of the best accounts of China's military development from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s. As the authors were alleged to have released confidential information without proper authorization, the book was withdrawn from circulation shortly after its publication.

12. Guo Ming et al., Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishinian, p. 69; Xiangen, Wang, Kang Mei yuanyue shilu (A Factual Account of Resisting America and Assisting Vietnam) (Beijing: International Cultural Development Press, 1990), pp. 25–26Google Scholar; see also Beijing Review, 2b November 1979.

13. Aiguo, Qu, “Chinese supporters in the operations to assist Vietnam and resist America,” Junshi shilin (The Circle of Military History), No. 6 (1989), p. 40.Google Scholar

14. Zhengqing, Hu, Yige waijiaoguan de riji (Diaries of a Diplomat) (Jinan: Yellow River Press, 1991), p. 5Google Scholar; and Yanchi, Quan and Weidong, Du, Gongheguo mishi (Secret Mission Dispatched by the Republic (Beijing:Guangming ribaoPress, 1990), pp. 13–14.Google Scholar

15. Li Ke and Hao Shengzhang, Wenhua dageming zhong de jiefangjun, p. 418.

16. Qu Aiguo, “Chinese supporters in the operations to assist Vietnam and resist America,” p. 40.

17. Attending the meeting were Zhou Enlai, Chen Yi, Wu Xiuquan, Yang Chengwu and Tong Xiaopeng from the Chinese Communist Party; Ho Chi Minh, Le Duan, Truong Chinh, Pham Van Dong, Vo Nguyen Giap, Nguyen Chi Thanh, Hoang Van Hoan and Van Tien Dung from the Vietnamese Workers’ Party; and Kaysone Phomvihane, Prince Souphanouvong and Phoumi Vonvichit from the Laotian People's Revolutionary Party. See Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong dashiji, p. 413.

18. Ke, Li, “Chinese people's support in assisting Vietnam and resisting America will be remembered by history,” Junshi ziliao (Military History Materials), No. 4 (1989), p. 30Google Scholar; interviews with Beijing's military researchers in August 1993 and July 1994. Whiting reports that, according to the information offered by Vietnamese scholars, Beijing promised Hanoi in 1964 that it would provide North Vietnam with an air cover against American air attack, but it backed down from the promise in June 1965 (Whiting, “China's role in the Vietnam War,” p. 73). Neither Chinese sources now available nor my interviews in Beijing can confirm this report. One Chinese military researcher points out that considering China's limited air combat capacity in the 1960s, it is doubtful if Beijing would offer the Vietnamese any such promise in the first place.

19. Jin, Cong, Quzhe qianjin de shinian (The Decade of Tortuous Advance) (Zhengzhou: Henan People's Press, 1989), pp. 505–524.Google Scholar

20. Ibid. pp. 525–546.

21. For example, in the summer of 1958, when the Taiwan Straits crisis developed at the same time the Great Leap Forward was under way, Mao stressed that “besides its disadvantageous side, a tensed [international] situation could mobilize the population, could particularly mobilize the backward people, could mobilize the people in the middle, and could therefore promote the great leap forward in economic construction.” Mao Zedong's Speech to the Supreme State Council, 5 September 1958, Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, Vol. 7, pp. 389–390.

22. Qian, Zheng, “The nation-wide war preparations before and after the CCP's Ninth Congress,” Zhonggong dangshi ziliao (CCP History Materials), No. 41 (April 1992), p. 205Google Scholar; and Cong Jin, Quzhe qianjin de shinian, pp. 502–504.

23. In this report, Wang argued that in its management of the Vietnam crisis, Beijing should learn from the lessons of the Korean War. During the initial stage of the Korean crisis, according to the report, Stalin encouraged China to enter the war by promising that the Soviet air force would cover Chinese ground troops in Korea; but when Beijing made the decision to enter the war, Stalin reneged on the promise. Wang warned that Khrushchev was repeating Stalin's trick by pushing China into another confrontation with the United States in Vietnam. See Wang Jiaxiang's report to the CCP Central Committee, 29 June 1962; the original of the document is kept at Chinese Central Archives. An abridged version of the report is published in Wang Jiaxiang xuanji (Selected Works of Wang Jiaxiang) (Beijing: People's Press, 1989), pp. 446–460, which, however, omits the part on Chinese policy towards Vietnam.

24. Cong Jin, Quzhe qianjin de shinian, pp. 576–77, 579.

25. Ibid. pp. 322–371; see also Allen S. Whiting, “The Sino-Soviet split,” in Roderick, MacFarquhar and Fairbank, John K. (eds.), The Cambridge History of China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), Vol. 14, pp. 478–538.Google Scholar

26. For a discussion, see Jian, Chen, China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994)Google Scholar, ch. 1.

27. This idea was first openly suggested by D. N. Aidit, chairman of the Indonesian Communist Party, but was quickly widely adopted by Beijing.

28. Li Ke and Hao Shengzhang, Wenhua dageming zhong de jiefangjun, p. 408; Qu Aiguo, “Chinese supporters in the operations to assist Vietnam and resist America,” p. 40; and Beijing Review, 30 November 1979, p. 14.

29. Dinglie, Wanget al., Dangdai Zhongguo kongjun (Contemporary Chinese Air Force) (Beijing: Chinese Social Sciences Press, 1989), p. 384.Google Scholar

30. Yuti, Liu and Hongguang, Jiao, “Operations against invading American planes in the Chinese-Vietnamese border area in Guangxi,” in Renshen, Wangetal., Kongjun: huiyi shiliao (The Air Force: Memoirs and Reminiscences) (Beijing: People's Liberation Army Press, 1992), pp. 559–560.Google Scholar Liu was then the Seventh Army’ s deputy commander and Jiao was deputy political commissar.

31. Wang Dinglie etal., Dangdai Zhongguo kongjun, p. 384. Right after the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, it was noted by American intelligence that China had moved 36 MiG fighters to the newly built airfield at Phuc-Yen in North Vietnam, and had substantially strengthened its air strength in southern China. See Smith, , An International History of the Vietnam War, Vol. 2, p. 300Google Scholar; and Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence, p. 176.

32. Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence, pp. 176–78.

33. Renmin ribao, 7 and 12 August 1965.

34. For a comprehensive discussion of the emergence and development of Third Front phenomenon, see Naughton, Barry, “The Third Front: defence industrialization in the Chinese interior,” The China Quarterly, No. 115 (September 1988), pp. 351–386.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

35. Cong Jin, Quzhe qiangjin de shinian, p. 465; and Naughton, “The Third Front,” p. 353.

36. Cong Jin, Quzhe qiangjin de shinian, p. 46.

37. Interviews with Beijing's military researchers, August 1992.

38. Renmin ribao, 25 March 1965.

39. Ibid. 30 March 1965.

40. Zhou Enlai's conversation with Ayub Khan, 2 April 1965, Zhou Enlai waijiaowenxuan (Selected Diplomatic Papers of Zhou Enlai) (Beijing: The Central Press of Historical Documents, 1990), pp. 436–443.

41. Policy makers in Washington did note these messages, and thus felt the pressure to act with extreme caution in attacking the North, lest a direct confrontation with China should take place. See Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence, ch. 6.

42. Zheng Qian, “The nation-wide war preparations before and after the CCP's Ninth Congress,” p. 205; Qu Aiguo, “Chinese supporters in the operations to assist Vietnam and resist America,” p. 41; and Wang Dinglie et al., Dangdai Zhongguo kongjun, p. 412.

43. It seems that the visit was divided into Cwo parts. In early April, Le Duan and Vo Nguyen Giap arrived in Beijing secretly, and met Liu Shaoqi and other Chinese leaders on 8 April. The Vietnamese delegation then travelled to Moscow on 10 or 11 April, and stayed there until 17 April to hold a series of talks with Soviet leaders. They then came back to Beijing on 18 April to continue their visit to China in an open manner. For a summary of the delegation's visit to the Soviet Union and the second half of its visit to China, see Smith, An International History of the Vietnam War, Vol. 3, pp. 92–97.

44. Li Ke and Hao Shengzhang, Wenhua dageming zhong de jiefangjun, p. 415; Wang Xiangen, Kang Mei yuanyue shilu, p. 44; Huaizhi, Hanet al., Dangdai Zhongguo jundui de junshi gongzuo (The Military Affairs of the Contemporary Chinese Army) (Beijing: Chinese Social Sciences Press, 1989), Vol. 1, pp. 539–540Google Scholar; Yingfu, Shi, Mimi chubing yare conglin (Sending Troops Secretly to the Sub-tropical Jungles) (Beijing: People's Liberation Army Literature Press, 1990), pp. 14–16.Google Scholar

45. In the spring and summer of 1965, the Beijing leadership ordered Chinese air units that had entered the Chinese-Vietnamese border area not to cross the border under any circumstances. See Liu Yuti and Jiao Hongguang, “Operations against invading American planes in the Chinese-Vietnamese border area in Guangxi,” p. 563.

46. Wang Xiangen, Kang Mei yuanyue shilu, pp. 39–44; and Li Ke and Hao Shengzhang, Wenhua dageming zhong de jiefangjun, p. 422.

47. Andong is a border city on the Yalu. During the Korean War, Chinese and Soviet air forces used bases on the China side of the Sino-Korean border to fight the American air force over northern Korea. This was known as the “Andong model.”

48. Li Ke and Hao Shengzhang, Wenhua dageming zhong de jiefangjun, p. 417. Whiting reports that Vietnamese scholars claim that the Chinese informed Hanoi in June 1965 that “it would be unable to defend the North against U.S. air attack” (Whiting, “China's role in the Vietnam War,” p. 73). The Chinese sources cited here clearly defer from this Vietnamese claim.

49. For a discussion of Luo Ruiqing's purge and its possible connections with Beijing's strategies toward the Vietnam War, see Harry Harding and Melvin, Gurtov, The Purge ofLo Jui-ch'ing: The Politics of Chinese Strategic Planning (Santa Monica: The Rand Corp., R-548-PR, February 1971).Google Scholar

50. After Luo Ruiqing's purge, Li Xiannian became the real head of the group. During the years of the Cultural Revolution, both Bo Yibo and Liu Xiao were purged, and thus were unable to play a role in the group. Some members, such as Ji Dengkui, a Cultural Revolution star, were added. Zhou Enlai frequently took charge of the group's activities himself. Wang Xiangen, Kangmeiyuanyue shilu, p. 48; Li Ke and Hao Shengzhang, Wenhua dageming zhong de jiefangjun, p. 413; and interviews with Beijing's military researchers, August 1992.

51. Wang Xiangen, Kang Mei yuanyue shilu, p. 48.

52. Li Ke and Hao Shenghang, Wenhua dageming zhong de jiefangjun, p. 418.

53. Mao Zedong ordered in 1965 that only the best Chinese engineering and anti-aircraft artillery troops should be sent to Vietnam. See ibid. pp. 409–410.

54. Qu Aiguo, “Chinese supporters in the operations to assist Vietnam and resist America,” p. 41; Wang Xiangen, Kang Mei yuanyue shilu, p. 45; and Li Ke and Hao Shengzhang, Wenhua dageming zhong de jiefangjun, p. 418.

55. Wang Xiangen, Kang Mei yuanyue shilu, p. 45.

56. Han Huaizhi et at, Dangdai Zhongguo jundui de junshi gongzuo, Vol. 1, p. 545; Li Ke and Hao Shengzhang, Wenhua dageming zhong dejiefangjun, p. 421; and Wang Xiangen Kangmei yuanyue shilu, pp. 100–101.

57. Wang Xiangen, Kang Mei yuanyue shilu, p. 46; and Li Ke and Hao Shengzhang, Wenhua dageming zhong de jiefangjun, p. 422.

58. Han Huaizhi et al., Dangdai Zhongguo jundui de junshi gongzuo, Vol. 1, p. 548.

59. Qu Aiguo, “Chinese supporters in the operations to assist Vietnam and resist America,” p. 41.

60. Han Huaizhi et al., Dangdai Zhongguo jundui de junshi gongzuo, Vol. 1, pp. 545–47; and Qu Aiguo, “Chinese supporters in the operations to assist Vietnam and resist America,” pp. 41–42.

61. Li Ke and Hao Shengzhang, Wenhua dageming zhong de jiefangjun, pp. 418–19, and Han Huaizhi et al., Dangdai Zhongguo jundui de junshi gongzuo, Vol. 1, pp. 540—41.

62. Li Ke and Hao Shengzhang, Wenhua dageming zhong de jiefangjun, p. 420; and Han Huaizhi et al., Dangdai Zhongguo jundui dejunshi gongzuo, Vol. 1, p. 543; for discussions of American knowledge of Chinese involvement in the construction of the air base, see Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence, p. 188; and “China's role in the Vietnam War,”p. 75.

63. Han Huaizhi et al., Dangdai Zhongguo jundui dejunshi gongzuo, Vol. 1, p. 548; Qu Aiguo, “Chinese supporters in the operations to assist Vietnam and resist America,” pp. 41–42.

64. Han Huaizhi et al., Dangdai Zhongguo jundui de junshi gongzuo, Vol. 1, p. 550.

65. Ibid. pp. 540–41; and Qu Aiguo, “Chinese supporters in the operations to assist Vietnam and resist America,” p. 42.

66. Li Ke and Hao Shengzhang, Wenhua dageming zhong de jiefangjun, p. 420; and Qu Aiguo, “Chinese supporters in the operations to assist Vietnam and resist America,” pp. 41–42.

67. Li Ke and Hao Shengzhang, Wenhua dageming zhong de jiefangjun, p. 423.

68. Ibid, and Han Huaizhi etal., Dangdai Zhongguo jundui dejunshi gongzuo, Vol. 1, p. 550.

69. Han Huaizhi et at., Dangdai Zhongguo jundui de junshi gongzuo.Vol. 1, p. 551; and Wang Dinglie et at., Dangdai Zhongguo kongjun, p. 397.

70. This summary of the operations of Chinese anti-aircraft artillery forces in Vietnam is based on the following sources: Han Huaizhi et al., Dangdai Zhongguo jundui de junshi gongzuo. Vol. 1, pp. 550–53; Qu Aiguo, “Chinese supporters in the operations to assist Vietnam and resist America,” p. 43; and Wang Dinglie et al., Dangdai Zhongguo kongjun, ch. 17.

71. Li Ke and Hao Shengzhang, Wenhua dageming zhong de jiefangjun, p. 341.

72. Yang Chengwu's report to Zhou Enlai and the CCP Central Committee, 9 April 1965, and Mao Zedong's remarks on Yang Chengwu's report, 9 April 1965, Mao Zedong junshi wenji (A Collection of Mao Zedong's Military Papers) (Beijing: Military Science Press, 1993), Vol. 6, p. 403.

73. Li Ke and Hao Shengzhang, Wenhua dageming zhong de jiefangjun, pp. 341–42.

74. Ibid. p. 344; and Wang Dinglie et al., Dangdai Zhongguo kongjun, p. 392; for a comparison between American and Chinese records, see Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence, p. 179.

75. Cong Jin, Quzhe qianjin de shinian, p. 467.

76. Li Ke and Hao Shengzhang, Wenhua dageming zhong de jiefangjun, pp. 410–11.

77. For a detailed discussion, see Garver, John W., “Sino-Vietnamese conflict and the Sino-American rapprochement,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 96, No. 3 (Fall 1981), pp. 445–464.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

78. In his study, Whiting points out that a total of 50,000 Chinese troops were sent to Vietnam, but Vietnamese sources claim that there had only been 20,000 (see Whiting, “China's role in the Vietnam War,” p. 74).

79. Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence, pp. 194–95; and Garver, “Sino-Vietnamese conflict and the Sino-American rapprochement,” pp. 447–48.

80. Wang Xiangen, Kang Mei yuanyue shilu, pp. 61–72.

81. Ibid. p. 74.

82. Ibid. p. 255.

83. For a discussion, see Smith, An International History of the Vietnam War, Vol. 2, ch. 12 and Vol. 3, ch. 9; and Chen, King C., “North Vietnam in the Sino-Soviet dispute, 1962–1964,” Asian Survey, Vol. 4, No. 9 (September 1964), pp. 1023–1036.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

84. Recent Russian scholarship confirms that after 1965, Soviet military and economic support to Vietnam increased steadily and, as a result, the relationship between Hanoi and Moscow became much closer. See Ily a V. Gaiduk and Oganez V. Marinin, “The Vietnam War and Soviet-American relations,” paper presented at international conference on New Sources on the Cold War, Moscow, January 1993, pp. 8–9, 12–13.

85. For a more detailed description of Mao's conversation with Kosygin, see Cong Jin, Quzne qianjin de shinian, pp. 607–608.

86. For a detailed record of Miyamoto's visit to China and Vietnam in spring 1966, see Masaru, Kojima (ed.), The Record of the Talks between the Japanese Communist Party and the Communist Party of China: How Mao Zedong Scrapped the Joint Communique (Tokyo: The Central Committee of the Japanese Communist Party, 1980).Google Scholar

87. In a meeting with Lu Duan in April 1966, Zhou Enlai mentioned that the Chinese had noted that the Vietnamese media had recently strengthened the propaganda about China's invasion of Vietnam in the past. Zhou warned that such propaganda had violated the fundamental interests of the Vietnamese and Chinese people in their common struggle against the U.S. imperialists. Guo Ming et al., Zhong-Yue guanxi yanbian sishinian, p. 102.

88. See Wang Xiangen, Kang Mei yuanyue shilu, p. 225.

89. Ibid. pp. 255–56.

90. Zhou Enlai made it clear in his meeting with Le Duan in April 1966 that as China's own railway system was overloaded the Chinese were not in a position to establish a united transport system with the Soviets in handling Soviet materials going through Chinese territory. Ibid. p. 226.

91. According to official Chinese sources, during the entire period of the Vietnam War, China “helped transfer 5,750 train trucks of materials in aid from other socialist countries to Vietnam, including materials from the Soviet Union.” Ibid.

92. Here is an example: in April 1968, a Chinese unit stationed in Dien Bien Phu area ran into a confrontation with a group of Soviet officers there. Chinese soldiers temporarily detained the Soviets, and, following the practice of the Cultural Revolution, held a denunciation meeting criticizing the “Soviet revisionists.” The local Vietnamese authorities were greatly offended, and protested to the Chinese in strong words, including the allegation that the Chinese “had impinged upon Vietnamese sovereignty.” The Chinese denied this allegation immediately. See ibid. pp. 229–235.

93. Quan Yanchi and Du Weidong, Gongheguo mishi, pp. 249–251; and Hu Zhengqing, Yige waijiaoguan de riji, pp. 161–66.

94. Quan Yanchi and Du Weidong, Gongheguo mishi, pp. 250–51.

95. Foragood discussion of Mao's changing domestic agendain 1968 and 1969, see Nianyi, Wang, Dadongluan de shinian (The Decade of Great Chaos) (Zhengzhou: Henan People's Press, 1989Google Scholar), chs. 8 and 9.

96. In early 1969, with Mao's approval and under Zhou's direct supervision, Beijing started to reassess its relations with the United States. For a more detailed discussion, see Xiong Xianghui, “The prelude to the opening of Sino-American relations,” Zhonggong dangshi ziliao, No. 42 (June 1992), pp. 56–96. See also Garver, “Sino-Vietnamese conflict and the Sino-American rapprochement.”

97. Guo Ming et al., Zhong-Yue guanxi yanbian sishinian, p. 68; see also Garver, “Sino-Vietnamese conflict and the Sino-American rapprochement,” pp. 448–450.

98. The Institute of Diplomatic History under Chinese Foreign Ministry (comp.), Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong dashiji, 1949–1975, p. 524.

99. Ibid. pp. 524–25.

100. Qu Aiguo, “Chinese supporters in the operations to assist Vietnam and resist America,” p. 43.

101. Ibid.', Guoyu, Yanget al., Dangdai Zhongguo haijun (Contemporary Chinese Navy) (Beijing: Chinese Social Sciences Press, 1988), pp. 421–29Google Scholar; and Faxiang, Ma, “Zhou Enlai directs the operations of helping Vietnam sweep mines,” Junshi lishi (Military History), No. 5 (1989) pp. 35–37.Google Scholar