¹ M Draghi (Global Investment Conference, London, 26 July 2012). Available at: www.ecb. int/press/key/date/2012/html/sp120726.en.html.

² Ruffert, M, ‘The European Debt Crisis and European Union Law’ (2011) 48 CML Rev 1777–806Google Scholar.

³ Burley, A and Mattli, W, ‘Europe before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration’ (1993) 47 International Organization 41–76CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴ Case C-370/12 Pringle v Government of Ireland (ECJ, 27 November 2012) [135]; the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) confirmed that each Eurozone state remained responsible for its own sovereign debts and bore sole budgetary responsibility for ensuring that it maintained sound public finances.

⁵ The failure to adhere to arts 121 and 126 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the Stability and Growth Pact are discussed in M Larch, P van den Noord and L Jonung, ‘The Stability and Growth Pact: Lessons from the Great Recession’ (European Economy Economic Papers, 429/2010, European Commission, 2010).

⁶ M Emerson, ‘One Money, One Market: An Evaluation of the Potential Benefits and Costs of Forming an Economic and Monetary Union’ (European Economy, No. 44, DG Economic and Financial Affairs, European Commission, October 1990) 162, http://ec.europa. eu/economy_finance/publications/publication7454_en.pdf: ‘the only remaining limitation in EMU consists in a long-run solvency constraint of companies, households and governments. The current account may for a long time be in disequilibrium as long as there is the expectation that in the end the foreign debt will be repaid’.

⁷ S Barnes, ‘Resolving and Avoiding Unsustainable Imbalances in the Euro Area’ (2010) OECD Economics Department Working Papers No 827.

⁸ Eichengreen, B, ‘European Monetary Integration with the Benefit of Hindsight’ (2012) 50 Journal of Common Market Studies 123–36CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁹ The evidence suggests that, Greece apart, the collapse in fiscal positions was largely a consequence of the external private credit shock rather than fiscal indiscipline. See G Zezza, ‘The Impact of Fiscal Austerity in the Eurozone’ (2012) Review of Keynesian Economics 37–54. Economically, the pre-crisis fiscal picture was mixed: fast-growing economies, such as Ireland (where the public debt fell from 48.3 per cent GDP to 25 per cent GDP) and Spain (where it fell from 62.3 per cent GDP to 36.1 per cent GDP) used the fruits of growth to lower their stock of debt over the period 1999–2007. Even Greece could support its high level of debt (rising from 94 per cent GDP to 107 per cent GDP) and fund persistent deficits. With growth rates over seven per cent per annum and historically low interest rates, capital markets lent freely to such countries. Member States with slower growth were vulnerable for different reasons. Portugal (49.6 per cent to 68.3 per cent GDP) had low savings and relied on foreign investors. Italy (113.7 per cent to 103.6 per cent GDP) had high savings, but a very high debt burden. L Schuknecht, P Moutot, P Rother and J Stark, ‘The Stability and Growth Pact: Crisis and Reform’, ECB, Occasional Paper Series, No 129, September 2011 argue that the fiscal regime was too lax even whilst noting that over the period 1998–2007, average Eurozone deficits fell from −2.3 per cent GDP to −0.7 GDP and gross debt fell from 73.2 per cent to 66.8 per cent GDP (8). They argue that this disguised unsustainable (private) housing booms in some countries, but this is an argument for reviewing the whole economic framework of the Eurozone, not simply fiscal discipline.

¹⁰ J Stark (Speech at the Forecaster Club, New York, 2 December 2011): ‘In my view solving the current sovereign debt crisis is primarily in the hands of governments. Its root cause lies in lax fiscal policies and associated deteriorating public finances in some euro area countries. Stability criteria were violated, fiscal rules ignored and statistics tweaked.’ For a critique of this thinking, see P de Grauwe ‘Balanced Budget Fundamentalism’ (CEPS Commentary, Centre for European Policy Studies, 5 September 2011).

¹¹ The ESCB balance sheet showed that between January 2007 and March 2013, lending to Eurozone banks increased from €440 billion to €990 billion, whilst direct holdings of securities rose from €78 billion to €605 billion. By contrast, the central rescue fund of the Eurozone, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), will see €80 billion of capital phased in over five years.

¹² Their unique position can be explained by the fact that they achieved record growth in the years before the crisis, which made cuts more politically acceptable. They were outside the euro, but chose to maintain parity with the single currency and had to institute huge reductions in consumption to correct the balance of payments. Their unemployment tripled to over 20 per cent and GDP fell by a similar amount. Mass migration and nominal wage cuts followed. The current account returned to surplus in 2010 on the basis of export growth and import cuts.

¹³ See Buiter, W and Rahbari, E, ‘Why Does the ECB Not Put its Mouth Where its Money is? The ECB as Lender of Last Resort for Euro Area Sovereigns and Banks’ (2012) 50 Journal of Common Market Studies 6 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, which argues that this studied ambiguity has meant that the cost to the ECB of improving the bond market in Europe has been higher than an explicit commitment would have been.

¹⁴ This has been predicted by commentators in advance of the euro. See D Folkerts-Landau and P Garber, ‘The European Central Bank: A Bank or a Monetary Policy Rule’ (Working Papers Series No 416, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1992).

¹⁵ See Pisani-Ferry, J, ‘Only One Bed for Two Dreams: A Critical Retrospective on the Debate over the Economic Governance of the Euro Area’ (2006) 44(4) Journal of Common Market Studies 823–44CrossRefGoogle Scholar for a discussion of the actual debates.

¹⁶ Strictly speaking, the economic consensus is that a central bank cannot become economically insolvent in the sense of being unable to pay its liabilities because it holds the monopoly on issuance of new currency. See W Buiter, ‘Can Central Banks Go Bust?’ (Policy Papers No 24, Centre for Economic Policy Research, 2008), who rightly argues that unless they hold large volumes of foreign-denominated liabilities, central banks can always print money to recapitalise because their hidden assets include the net present value of seigniorage revenues which they can raise by creating inflation. This solution might, however, be incompatible with the central bank’s primary goal of price stability, in which case recapitalisation by the sovereign is the only option to enable it to continue to fulfil its mandate.

¹⁷ The largest capital contributions are Germany at 19 per cent, followed by France (15 per cent) and Italy (14 per cent).

¹⁸ See Protocol (No 4) on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank [2008] OJ C115/230 OJ, art 28, where the original capital was set at a modest €5 billion, and art 33(2): ‘In the event of a loss incurred by the ECB, the shortfall may be offset against the general reserve fund of the ECB and … against the monetary income of the relevant financial year.’

¹⁹ Goodhart, C, ‘Myths about the Lender of Last Resort’ in Goodhart, C and Illing, G (eds), Financial Crises, Contagion, and the Lender of Last Resort (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002) 227–45Google Scholar.

²⁰ Bernanke, B, Essays on the Great Depression (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2000)Google Scholar.

²¹ Quaglia, L, Eastwood, R and Holmes, P, ‘The Financial Turmoil and EU Policy Co operation in 2008’ (2009) 47 Annual Review Journal of Common Market Studies 63–87CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²² ‘Guidelines of the European Central Bank of 31st August 2000 on Monetary Policy Instruments and Procedures of the Eurosystem’ (ECB/2000/7, European Central Bank, 2000). Chapter 6 sets out the guidelines for eligible collateral which ‘must meet high credit standards … the ECB takes into account … available ratings by market agencies’ (6.2).

²³ Trichet, J-C, ‘The ECB’s Enhanced Credit Support’ (Keynote address, University of Munich, 13 July 2009)Google Scholar.

²⁴ Decision of the European Central Bank ECB/2010/3 of 6 May 2010 on temporary measures relating to the eligibility of marketable debt instruments issued or guaranteed by the Greek Government [2010] OJ L117/102.

²⁵ ELA is the inherent power of the national central banks to create money through loans to their banks. It must be notified to the Governing Council of the ECB, but can only be overturned by a two-thirds majority. It is resorted to when the collateral offered by banks is less than adequate for the ECB. Germany, Ireland and Greece have all used it extensively and, although its terms and conditions are opaque, the Governing Council has never refused to endorse it.

²⁶ ‘Convergence Report’ (European Central Bank, May 2008) 24.

²⁷ In 2013, the Irish government, facing huge repayment costs, sought the ECB’s permission to withdraw these promissory notes and replace them with less onerous long-dated sovereign bonds. The ECB acceded, even though this was in effect a write-off of government debt held by the Irish central bank, and hence technically a form of ‘illegal’ monetary financing.

²⁸ See P de Grauwe, ‘The New Bail-in Doctrine: A Recipe for Banking Crises and Depression in the Eurozone’ (CEPS Commentary, Centre for European Policy Studies, 4 April 2013), which argues that depositors are not like normal creditors of banks because their funds are part of the payments system inherent to the economy. In weaker economies, the risk of bailing-in depositors is likely to cause depressions as capital flees in the face of solvency fears. For another view, see D Gros, ‘The Meaning of Cyprus: Towards a Banking Union?’ (CEPS Commentary, Centre for European Policy Studies, 8 April 2013), who argues that successful bailing-in will bring forward a true banking union with deposit guarantees for smaller savers.

²⁹ S Fischer, ‘On the Need for an International Lender of Last Resort’ in Goodhart and Illing (n 19).

³⁰ For an explanation of how governments may simply print money to finance themselves, see Lerner, A, ‘Functional Finance and the Federal Debt (1943)’ in Colander, DC (ed), Selected Economic Writings of Abba P. Lerner (New York, New York University Press, 1983)Google Scholar.

³¹ ‘Annual Report’ (European Monetary Institute, 1994).

³² Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Protocol No 4 on the Statute on the European System of Central Banks of the European Central Bank (n 18).

³³ Otto-Pohl, K, ‘The Philosophy of Central Banking: A Panel Discussion’ in Capie, F, Goodhart, C, Fischer, S and Schnadt, N (eds), The Future of Central Banking (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994)Google Scholar. Otto-Pohl was Governor of the Bundesbank at the time.

³⁴ Emerson (n 6).

³⁵ Statute on the European System of Central Banks of the European Central Bank (n 18) art 10.

³⁶ P Taylor, ‘Top German Quits ECB over Bond-Buying Row’ (Reuters, 9 September 2011). Available at: www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/09/us-ecb-stark-idUSTRE7883DF20110909.

³⁷ Article 263 TFEU.

³⁸ Decision of the European Central Bank (n 24). Article 1 simply states that the ‘minimum requirements for credit quality thresholds … shall be suspended’. Article 2 confirms that: ‘Such assets shall constitute eligible collateral … irrespective of their external credit rating.’ This was also applied to bank loans guaranteed by the government. Similar decisions were made for Irish and Portuguese debt.

³⁹ R Ruparel and M Persson, ‘A House Built on Sand? The ECB and the Hidden Cost of Saving the Euro’ (Open Europe, June 2011).

⁴⁰ Opinion of the European Central Bank (2011/C 140/05) of 17 March 2011 on a draft European Council Decision amending Article 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union with regard to a stability mechanism for Member States whose currency is the euro [2011] OJ C140/8, para 9.

⁴¹ BVerG, 2 BvR 1390/12 vom 12.9.2012, Absatz-Nr (1-319). Available at: www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rs20120912_2bvr139012.html.

⁴² Introductory Remarks, ECB, monthly meeting 5 July 2012. Available at: www.ecb.int/press/pressconf/2012/html/is120705.en.html.

⁴³ D Gros and T Mayer, ‘Refinancing the EFSF via the ECB’ (CEPS Commentary, Centre for European Policy Studies, 2011).

⁴⁴ H Sinn and T Wollmershauser, ‘Target Loans, Current Account Balances and Capital Flows: The ECB’s Rescue Facility’ (2011) CESifo Working Paper No 3500. Available at: www. cesifo-group.de/ifoHome/publications/docbase/details.html?docId=16042389.

⁴⁵ See Decision of the European Central Bank ECB/2007/2 of 26 April 2007 Guideline on the Trans-European Automated Real-Time Gross Settlement Express Transfer System (TARGET2) [2007] OJ L237/1.

⁴⁶ There was around €13 trillion eligible collateral in the Eurozone at the end of 2011 (ECB, 2012). The critics would like to prevent these balances from growing by legal changes to the ESCB. Under the US Federal Reserve system, regional banks must clear their balances annually by providing hard assets such as gold certificates or government bonds to those in credit. It is argued that TARGET2 imbalances would not have been able to continue to grow as peripheral central banks ran out of such assets. This interpretation of the US system is generally rejected by most commentators on the basis that the rebalancing occurs as an accounting entry through reallocation of the portfolio of assets held by the Federal Reserve amongst all the regional banks. The system does not prevent regional payment imbalances persisting year on year. See W Buiter, E Rahbari and J Michels, ‘The Implications of the Intra Euro Area Imbalances in Credit Flows’ (Policy Insight No 57, Centre for Economic Policy Research, 2011).

⁴⁷ See J Weidmann, ‘What is the Origin and Meaning of the Target2 Balances?’ (Guest Contribution, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 13 March 2012). Available at: www.bundesbank. de/Redaktion/EN/Standardartikel/Press/Contributions/2012_03_13_weidmann_FAZ_FD.html. See also Bundesbank Monthly Bulletin, March 2011, 34–35 for a detailed explanation.

⁴⁸ J Bibow, ‘Germany and the Euroland Crisis’ (2013) Levy Institute Working Paper No 767.

⁴⁹ Homburg, S, ‘Notes on the TARGET2 Dispute’ (2012) 13 CESifo Forum (Special Issue, January 2012) 50 Google Scholar. Available at: www.cesifo-group.de/ifoHome/publications/journals/CESifoForum/Archiv/CESifo-Forum-2012.html.

⁵⁰ Merler, S and Pisani-Ferry, J, ‘Sudden Stops in the Euro Area’ (Bruegel Institute, 29 March 2012)Google Scholar.

⁵¹ D Gros, ‘Speculative Attacks within or outside a Monetary Union: Default versus Inflation (What to Do Today)’ (CEPS Policy Brief No 257, Centre for European Policy Studies, 16 November 2011).

⁵² M Draghi, ‘Continuity, Consistency and Credibility’ (21st Frankfurt European Banking Congress, ‘The Big Shift’, Frankfurt am Main, 18 November 2011).

⁵³ M Draghi, ‘Introductory Statement’ (Hearing before the Plenary of the European Parliament on the Occasion of the Adoption of the Resolution of the ECB’s 2010 Annual Report, European Parliament, 1 December 2011).

⁵⁴ ‘Reinforcing Economic Governance in the Euro Area’ (Note from the ECB to the Council, European Central Bank, 10 June 2010). Available at: www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/reinforcingeconomicgovernanceintheeuroareaen.pdf.

⁵⁵ Opinion of the European Central Bank (CON/2011/13) of 16 February 2011 on economic governance reform in the European Union, paras 4–6. See also ECB Monthly Bulletin, March 2011. Available at www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/reinforcingeconomicgovernanceintheeuroareaen. pdf, which stated that: ‘The global financial crisis exposed weaknesses in the economic governance framework of the EU… and shortcomings in its implementation.’ See n 9 above for more details of the lack of evidence to show fiscal policy caused the sovereign debt crisis.

⁵⁶ ‘Annual Report 2011’ (European Central Bank, 2012).

⁵⁷ The most important papers were A Alesina and S Ardagna, ‘Large Changes in Fiscal Policy: Taxes versus Spending’ (2009) NEBR Working Papers 15438; and C Reinhart and K Rogoff, ‘Growth in a Time of Debt’ (May 2010) American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 573–78. These argued that cuts in deficits could increase growth and that growth stagnates above a 90 per cent debt/GDP ratio.

⁵⁸ Jean-Claude Trichet reflected this argument that austerity might be growth promoting: ‘the idea that austerity measures could trigger stagnation is incorrect … everything that helps to increase the confidence of households, firms and investors in the sustainability of public finances is good for the consolidation of growth and job creation … confidence inspiring polices will foster and not hamper economic recovery’. E Polidori, Interview with J-C Trichet, President of the ECB, and La Repubblica, 16 June 2010. Available at: www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2010/html/sp100624.en.html.

⁵⁹ L Schuknecht, S Moutot, P Rother and J Stark, ‘The Stability and Growth Pact: Crisis and Reform’ (Occasional Paper Series No 129, European Central Bank, September 2011).

⁶⁰ Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union.

⁶¹ It said that ‘the reforms should have gone further’. ‘Annual Report’ (n 55) 133.

⁶² L Barber and R Atkins, Interview with M Draghi, President of the ECB (Frankfurt, 14 December 2011). He said that this is ‘obviously not equivalent to the ECB stepping-up bond buying’.

⁶³ European Financial Stability Facility, the lending institution that was established in 2010 as the precursor to the ESM.

⁶⁴ The ESM Treaty did not mandate ‘private sector involvement’, but does require an assessment of debt sustainability and write-offs where this is considered to be the only means of restoring solvency. See art 14.

⁶⁵ ‘Annual Report’ (n 55) 69: ‘Overall, fiscal consolidation strategies must adhere strictly to the provisions laid down in the Stability and Growth Pact to restore financial market confidence. In particular, the countries receiving EU-IMF financial assistance need to fully comply with their programme commitments. All countries subject to an excessive deficit procedure need to ensure full compliance with their budgetary targets.’

⁶⁶ Buiter and Rahbari (n 13).

⁶⁷ Euro Area Summit Statement, 29 June 2012. Available at: www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/131359.pdf.

⁶⁸ In fact, Weidmann was quite open about this, giving interviews and evidence to the German Constitutional Court in its hearings on the legality of the OMT programme; see Steen, M, ‘ECB Warns Against Opening Debate on its Mandate’ Financial Times (London, 12 June 2013)Google Scholar, which cites Weidmann’s submission to the Court, arguing that it should ask the German government to seek to amend art 123 to constrain OMT. See also EvansPritchard, A, ‘Germany’s Brother Gladiators Battle over Euro Destiny in Constitutional Court’ Daily Telegraph (London, 11 June 2013)Google Scholar. The case is still pending, but in essence seeks to argue that the OMT programme renders Germany at risk if bond defaults lead to the ECB being under-capitalised. Jorg Asmussen, the German Executive Board Member, told the Court that the OMT has sufficient safeguards, emphasising that it only allowed one-to three-year bonds to be purchased. See BvR 1390/12 and others (press release available at: www.bverfg. de/pressemitteilungen/bvg13-029).

⁶⁹ Chancellor Merkel referred to the ECB’s actions as securing financial stability. Any potential legal constraint posed by the views of the German Constitutional Court has also not been brought to bear on the ECB. In its ESM ruling, the Court said that the ECB could not lawfully make loans to the ESM, but it did not comment on the previous bond-buying programmes, even though it was asked to do so. See above n 41.

⁷⁰ See the Bundesbank TARGET2 balance of €588 billion at 31 March 2013.

⁷¹ See P de Grauwe and Y Ji, ‘Panic-Driven Crashes in the Eurozone and its Implications’ (Vox, 21 February 2013). Available at: www.voxeu.org/article/panic-driven-austerityeurozoneand-its-implications.

⁷² See P de Grauwe and Y Ji, ‘Mispricing of Sovereign Risk and Multiple Equilibria in the Eurozone’ (CEPS Working Document No 361, Centre for European Policy Studies, 2012).

⁷³ See P de Grauwe, ‘Governance of a Fragile Eurozone’ (CEPS Discussion Paper, Centre for European Policy Studies, May 2011), who shows that Spain and the UK had similar debt profiles, but that the latter experienced much lowering borrowing costs because of the policy of the Bank of England to buy up sovereign debt.

⁷⁴ The most common use of the double effect doctrine is in relation to medical treatments involving abortion and euthanasia where the death of a person is foreseen but not intended; rather, the primary intention is to relieve pain or save the life of another.

⁷⁵ The complexity of the arrangements between the Irish government, its central bank, Anglo Irish bank, and its successor, the Irish Bank Resolution Corporation, was such that the ECB may have felt that the real nature of the write-down would not be apparent. For a detailed account, see Whelan, K, ‘Ireland’s Promissory Note Deal’ (Forbes, 11 February 2013)Google Scholar. Available at: www.forbes.com/sites/karlwhelan/2013/02/11/irelands-promissory-note-deal.

⁷⁶ Bank of England, Interview with Charlie Bean, Deputy Governor for Monetary Policy (July 2009). Available at: www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetarypolicy/Pages/qe/askqa.aspx.

⁷⁷ Adair Turner, ‘Mansion House Speech’ (FSA Banquet at the Mansion House, London, 11 October 2012). Available at: www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/speeches/2012/1011-at. shtml.

⁷⁸ See P de Grauwe P and Y Ji, ‘What Germany Should Fear Most is its Own Fear: An Analysis of Target2 and Current Account Imbalances’ (CEPS Working Document No 368, Centre for European Policy Studies, 2012), which argues that Target2 credits are not a source of real wealth backing the currency in Germany, but merely paper claims whose destruction would not change the real value of German residents’ assets in any break-up of the Eurozone so long as inflation were controlled upon any redenomination of the currency. The deposit flight to Germany from peripheral states means that the Bundesbank would have to decline to convert foreign deposits for fear of stoking inflation.

⁷⁹ Fischer (n 29).

⁸⁰ Available at: www.cesifo-group.de/ifoHome/publications/journals/CESifo-Forum/Archiv/CESifo-Forum-2012.html.

⁸¹ Sauter, W, ‘The Economic Constitution of the European Union’ (1998) 4 Columbia Journal of European Law 43–56Google Scholar; Herdegen, M, ‘Price Stability and Budgetary Restraints in the Economic and Monetary Union: The Law as Guardian of Economic Wisdom’ (1998) 35 CML Rev 19 Google Scholar.

⁸² Note that Cypriot banks were not well integrated into the financial system, relying mainly upon Russian and domestic depositors for their funds, with only small levels of senior debt held by banks.

⁸³ L Schuknecht, S Moutot, P Rother and J Stark, ‘The Stability and Growth Pact: Crisis and Reform’ (Occasional Paper Series No 129, European Central Bank, September 2011).

⁸⁴ W Buiter, ‘Can Central Banks Go Bust?’ (2008) Centre for Economic Policy Research, Policy Insight No 24.

⁸⁵ A Belke, ‘How Much Fiscal Backing Must the ECB Have? The Euro Area is Not the Philippines’ (2010) German Institute for Economic Research, Discussion Paper 996. Available at: http://ideas.repec.org/p/diw/diwwpp/dp996.html.

⁸⁶ Buiter and Rahbari (n 13).

⁸⁷ Pringle (n 4) [135].

⁸⁸ Ibid [136].

⁸⁹ See J Bibow, ‘At the Crossroads: The Euro and its Central Bank Guardian (and Saviour?)’ (2012) Levy Institute Working Paper No 738, which argues that the ECB’s construction as very independent and focused solely upon price stability was a peculiar product of Bundesbank thinking that attributed German economic success to such a model. In fact, that success owes more to an export-led growth model that by definition cannot be achieved by all Eurozone members at once. Keynesian perspectives see the central bank as an organ of economic policy with a responsibility to coordinate monetary policy with the treasury to provide sustainable growth and employment.

⁹⁰ P de Grauwe and Y Ji, ‘Mispricing of Sovereign Risk and Multiple Equilibria in the Eurozone’ (CEPS Working Document No 361, Centre for European Policy Studies, 2012).

⁹¹ O Blanchard and D Leigh, ‘Growth Forecast Errors and Fiscal Multipliers’ (2013) IMF Working Paper 13/1, which confirms that budget cuts produce larger reductions in GDP than previously thought. See also T Herndon, M Ash and R Pollin, ‘Does High Public Debt Consistently Stifle Economic Growth? A Critique of Reinhart and Rogoff’ (2013) PERI, University of Massachusetts Working Paper Series No 322, which showed that the argument that debt/GDP ratios above 90 per cent led to a fall-off in growth was statistically unsound; G Zezza, ‘The Impact of Fiscal Austerity in the Eurozone’ (2012) Review of Keynesian Economics 37–54.

⁹² European Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. European Semester: Country-Specific Recommendations. Moving European Beyond the Crisis’ COM(2013) 350 final, which pushes back by two years the dates for compliance with the three per cent GDP deficit target.

⁹³ Regulation (EU) No 1173/2011 of 16 November on the effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area [2011] OJ L306/1; Regulation (EU) No 1174/2011 of 16 November on enforcement measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area [2011] OJ L306/8; Regulation (EU) No 1175/2011 of 16 November amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and co-ordination of economic policies [2011] OJ L306/12; Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 of 16 November on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances [2011] OJ L306/25; Council Regulation (EU) No 1177/2011 of 16 November amending Regulation (EC) 1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure [2011] OJ L306/33; Council Directive 2011/85/EU of 8 November 2011 on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States [2011] OJ L306/41.

⁹⁴ See C Volkery, ‘Battling the Crisis: Disunity Plagues EU Banking Talks’ (Spiegelonline International, 16 May 2013). Available at: www.spiegel.de/international/europe/european-finance-ministers-split-on-way-forward-for-banking-union-a-899924.html.

⁹⁵ Sinn and Wollmershauser (n 44) 36: ‘A bit more courage to let the market processes run their course would have saved the ECB the huge problems posed by the stock of dubious collateral it now has to live with.’