¹ This is the claim of Susan L. Shirk, in her The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).Google Scholar

² In a later publication (see n. 89), as Shirk reminded me in a personal communication, she talks about “the envy created by geographic particularism as a powerful motivator of a reform bandwagon.” This interpretation would imply that central politicians had a clear strategy from the start of eventually benefiting all the provinces; the evidence from the early 1980s, however, does not bear out such a definite plan. On this, see Barry, Naughton, Growing Out of the Plan(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995); andGoogle ScholarThomas G. Rawski, “Implications of Chinas reform experience,” The China Quarterly (hereafter CQ)No. 144(December 1995), pp. 1150–73.Google Scholar

³ For instance, some have emphasized declines in the proportion of national income falling under the control of the central government. On this, see Wang Shaoguang, “Central–local fiscal politics in China,” in Jia, Hao and Lin, Zhimin (eds.), Changing Central–Local Relations in China: Reform and State Capacity(Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 91–112. Others point to provincial politicians resistance to and haggling over orders from the top. This appears in much of the reporting from Hong Kong; it is also the theme in Jia Hao and Lin Zhimins book, above. For examples from the Hong Kong press just in the years 1983 and 1994, see “Regions said resisting efforts to cool economy,” South China Morning Post(hereafter SCMP),10 June 1993, p. 10 in U.S. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (hereafter FBIS), 10 June 1993, pp. 290; “Central authority in atrophy,” SCMP, in FBIS, 24 June, pp. ortedly facing local opposition,“rity program suspended due to local opposition,” to fight recentralization, 2 February, 9, in FBIS, 21 July and “Article views conflicts between Beijing, provinces,”.Google Scholar

⁴ See Christine P.W. Wong, Central–local relations in an era of fiscal decline: the paradox of fiscal decentralization in post–Mao China, CQ,No. 128 (December 1991), pp. 691–715; Dali Yang, “Reform and the restructuring of central–local relations,” in David S.G. Goodman(eds.),China Deconstructs: Politics, Trade and Regionalism(London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 59–98;Google Scholar

⁵ Dali L. Yang, “Reforms, resources, and regional cleavages: the political economy of coast–interior relations in mainland China,” Issues Studies,Vol. 27, No. 9 (1991), pp.43–69.Google Scholar

⁶ According to China Daily,17 May 1995, p. 4, reprinted in FBIS, 17 May 1995, p. 3: “From 1979 to 1991, only 9.5% of projects involving overseas investment located in inland areas. The governments investment to the region also was limited, with most going to energy and primary industries. These produced few profits because the central planned price system was designed for the easts interests.”

⁷ Interview with the Municipal Planning Commission of Wuhan, 28 May 1984 (hereafter, plan interview, May 1984). Li Chonghuai states that as of the end of 1982, the value of the citys industrial and agricultural output was placed fourth among that of the top 25 cities of the country. This is in Li Chonghuai, Li Chonghuai wenxuan (Li Chonghuais Selected Writings)(Wuhan: Wuhan University Press, 1993), p. 143.

⁸ Guojia tongjiju bian (State Statistical Bureau) (ed.), Zhongguo tongji nianjian 1993 (Chinese Statistical Yearbook, 1993)(Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1993), pp. 691–92.

⁹ Calculated from Ibid.p. 31.

¹⁰ Wuhan nianjian bianzuan weiyuanhui zhubian (Wuhan yearbook editorial committee) (ed.), Wuhan nianjian (Wuhan Yearbook)1993 (Wuhan: Wuhan daxue chubanshe, 1993), p. 46 (hereafter, this and other Wuhan yearbooks will be cited as Wuhan Yearbook.

¹¹ This term comes from Yang, “Reforms, resources, and regional cleavages,” p. 44. He ncoined it to characterize the system by which raw materials from the inland were procured via state–fixed prices by the central planning apparatus, allocated to the coast to be converted) into coastal manufactured products and then resold in the interior, while the manufacturing industries were more steeply taxed, and monies from the coast were redistributed to the interior in the form of investment funds. See also Nicholas R. Lardy, Economic Growth and Distribution in China(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978) for the classic description of this system.

¹² Yang, “Reforms, resources, and regional cleavages,” pp. 54–55 very astutely points out the absence of true marketization in Beijings regional policies in the reform period.

¹³ Li Chonghuai, Li Chonghuai wenxuan.

¹⁴ See Christine Wong, “Financing local government: feasts, famines, and growing regional disparities in post–Mao China,” unpublished paper, November 1994.

¹⁵ These observations were made by one of my anonymous readers.

¹⁶ Plan interview, May 1984.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Li Chonghuai, Li Chonghuai wenxuan,p. 143.

¹⁹ Ibid.p. 267 reveals that technology in widespread usage at that time dated from the 1950s and 1960s. This, at least, is a distinct improvement over the situation a decade ago, when even major plants still struggled with machinery dating back to the models of the 1920s and 1930s. See my From Lathes to Looms: Chinas Industrial Policy in Comparative Perspective(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), pp. 60–68.

²⁰ Hu Jizhi, “On capital constraints on Wuhans economic development,” Jianghan luntan (Jianghan Forum)(Wuhan) (hereafterJHLT), No. 2 (1989), p. 15; Li Chonghuai, Li Chonghuai wenxuan,p. 267. Hu states that in 1986 a third of the enterprise equipment had been in use for more than 15 years, and that a fifth was still being used despite being in poor repair. Tax interview, 9 August 1994 also referred to backward equipment and lack of funds to upgrade it.

²¹ Wuhan City Industrial Structure Readjustment Task Group (hereafter Wuhan Structure Task Group), “Readjusting the industrial structure is an important issue in speeding up Wuhans economic development,” Xuexi yu shijian (Study and Practice)(Wuhan) (hereafterXXYSJ), No. 2 (1994), p. 16.

²² Finance interview, 8 August 1994.

²³ Li Chonghuai, Li Chonghuai wenxuan,p. 262.

²⁴ Dai Wutang, “Develop the urban economy and strengthen cooperation between Wuhan and Hong Kong,” XXYSJ,No. 11 (1992), p. 26. For a recent example, see Kari Huus, “Bureaucracy stalls Wharfs plans for Wuhan,” Far Eastern Economic Review(hereafterFEER),10 November 1994, pp. 58–59.

²⁵ Dai Wutang, “Develop the urban economy,” p. 26.

²⁶ See Solinger, From Lathes to Looms.

²⁷ 1985 Wuhan Yearbook, p. 390. According to plan interview, May 1984, in 1978 Wuhans light industry accounted for 44.8% of GVIO; by 1981, as a result of the readjustment programme, it was as high as 52.5%.

²⁸ George T. Crane, The Political Economy of Chinas Special Economic Zones(Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1990), p. 95.

²⁹ Yang, “Reforms, resources, and regional cleavages" characterizes inland provinces as places richly endowed with resources which were extracted from them to feed coastal manufacturers, but which were, in turn, heavily subsidized. See pp. 44, 46, 50.

³⁰ Peng Xiangyuan, “Fully develop the role of the central city,” JHLT,No. 9 (1983), p. 10; Li Chonghuai, “Rely on the two tongs to fly, build Wuhan into an economic center that internally links Central China, externally connects with the ocean,” Wuhan daxue xuebao (Wuhan University Journal),No. 6 (1983), p. 77; and Guo Wuxin, “Wuhan: a case study in Chinese urbanization,” University of California, Berkeley, Institute of Urban&Regional Development, Working Paper, No. 418 (October 1983), pp. 15, 18. Also, interviews with the Wuhan Bureau of Machine–Building, 24 May 1984, and the Wuhan Bureau of Textiles, 26 May 1984.

³¹ Guo Wuxin, Wuhan,p. 19.

³² Li Chonghuai, Li Chonghuai wenxuan,p. 152. Figures in the 1985 Wuhan Yearbook, p. 167, show that in 1984 (the year in which, on 1 September, Wuhan was granted the power of a province), the citys total income came to 1.44 billion yuan,but that it contributed as much as 1.22 billion to the central government and the province, or 84%.

³³ Peng Xiangyuan, “Fully develop the role,” p. 10.

³⁴ Li Chonghuai, Li Chonghuai wenxuan,pp. 141, 145.

³⁵ Peng Xiangyuan, “Fully develp the role,” p. 10.

³⁶ Renmin ribao (Peoples Daily),1 June 1984, p. 4. On the 14 cities, see Crane, Political Economy,pp. 95, 175, n. 12.

³⁷ Li Chonghuai, Li Chonghuai wenxuan,p. 143.

³⁸ Foreign Affairs Office of Wuhan Municipal Government, “Wuhan: the centre of economic geography of China,” June 1994, pp. 11–12.

³⁹ Yang, “Reforms, resources, and regional cleavages,” p. 47.

⁴⁰ And yet it is only fair to mention the waning significance of water transport as compared with the 1920s and 1930s, when Wuhans port ranked second in volume of foreign trade to Shanghais (see Zhao Yifeng, “Comparison and countermeasures: from Pudongs opening look at Wuhans opening,” XXYSJ,No. 8 (1992), p. 11). Water transport today accounts for less than 20% of both cargo and passenger traffic for Wuhan, according to this account. Some believe that with this development, Wuhan has already had to relinquish its old position of being a geographical centre that travellers were forced to traverse (see Xia Zhenkun et al.,"Orient ourselves through comparison: speed up the progress of the internationalization of inland cities,” JHLT,No. 2 (1994), p. 19)%.

⁴¹ Another attractive point about the city is its comparatively low wages and lower costs than in the cities along the coast. On the other hand, this has to be weighed against the higher return on capital along the coast. See Paul Mooney, “At Chinas crossroads: neglected Wuhan city enters the spotlight,” FEER, 19 November 1992, p. 66 and system reform commission interview, 10 August 1994.

⁴² Interview with Municipal Planning Commission, 11 August 1994.

⁴³ “Territorial actors as competitors for power: the case of Hubei and Wuhan,” in Kenneth G. Lieberthal David M. Lampton, Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in Post–Mao China(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), p. 293.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ See Wuhan Structure Task Group, “Readjusting the industrial structure,”.

⁴⁵ Zhao Yifeng, “Comparison and countermeasures,” p. writing on the prospect of technical co–operation with Shanghai in the wake of the central governments 1990 decision to create the Pudong district: “Wuhan is losing out in market competition with Shanghai, especially in industry and foreign trade, in equipment and skill, and even more in management, so theres not much co–operation.”

⁴⁶ Wuhan City Capital Movement Task Group, “The situation of capital movement and countermeasures in Wuhan citys economic development,” XXYSJ,No. 2 (1994), p. 16.

⁴⁷ Yang, “Reforms, resources, and regional cleavages,” p. 55.

⁴⁸ Li Chonghuai, Li Chonghuai wenxuanhas many references to local leaders pleading for powers to the central government. More on this to follow.

⁴⁹ Background on this policy and the decision to grant this power to Wuhan, as well as the nature of its implementation in Wuhan, can be found in Schroeder, Territorial actors,” pp. 283–307, and in my Chinas Transition from Socialism: Statist Legacies and Market Reforms, 1980– 1990(Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), chs, 8 and 9.

⁵⁰ See my article, “Wuhan: inland city on the move,” hina Business Review, pp. 27–30.

⁵¹ 1 discuss this in Solinger, Transition,p. 176.

⁵² Li Chonghuai, Li Chonghuai wenxuan,pp. 256, 260.

⁵³ Ibid.p. 256.

⁵⁴ Mooney, “At Chinas crossroads,” p. 67.

⁵⁵ Solinger, Transition,p. 176.

⁵⁶ The foregoing information on markets all comes from FBIS, 27 December 1993, p. 62, a translation from Xinhua, 24 December 1993.

⁵⁷ Piloted in Shenyang, but picked up quickly in Wuhan. See Solinger, Transition,p. 141.

⁵⁸ Ibid.p. 181. At that time, there were only 11 firms nation–wide that had been targeted for bankruptcy.

⁵⁹ 1991 Wuhan Yearbook, p. 235.

⁶⁰ Ibid.Also, Solinger, Transition,p. 140; and FBIS, 27 December 1993, p. 62.

⁶¹ 1993 Wuhan Yearbook, p. 51. In the year 1992 alone (the first year of the reform), this experiment was carried out in over 20 Wuhan firms (1993 Wuhan Yearbook, p. 59). Not only was the scheme itself novel, it also represented the first time nationally that a Chinese enterprise was controlled and managed by a Hong Kong company (Hung Ta), possible because of Hung Tas 51% share ownership (Joint Publications Research Service (hereafter JPRS) CAR 94–036, p. 38).

⁶² Information on these policies can be found in Crane, Political Economy; Foreign Trade and Economic Reform in China, 1978–1990(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 42–57 and 84–88; The World Bank, China: Foreign Trade Reform(Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1994)Google Scholar; and One Step Ahead: Guangdong Under Reform(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989). For documentation, see Lawrence C. Reardon (ed. and trans.), “Chinas coastal development strategy, 1979– 1984 ” Chinese Law and Government,Vol. 27, Nos. 3 and 4 (May–June, Iuly–Aug»st 1994).Google Scholar

⁶³ See Crane, Political Economy,p. 32 on the 1980 regulations for the Special Economic Zones. On the 14 cities along the coast which got the right to lower tax rates and relax duty requirements in zones that they established, see Ibid.p. 95. See also Vogel, One Step Ahead,pp. 84–86, 144–46 and 151–53, plus the contribution by John Kamm on “Reforming foreign trade,” especially pp. 351–52, 361 and 376.

⁶⁴ This is Hu Jizhi, “On capital constraints,” p. 18. On the treatment of foreign investment in general throughout most of the decade of the 1980s, see Margaret Pearson, Joint Ventures in the Peoples Republic of China: The Control of Foreign Direct Investment Under Socialism(Princetonr: Princeton University Press 1991).

⁶⁵ This argument is found in Ma Daqiang, “Speculations on the exercise of the division of powers between the Center and the localities,”JHLT,No. 7 (1990), p. 40.

⁶⁶ This is also discussed in Lardy, Foreign Trade and Economic Reform,pp. 54–56. 67. Ibid.Yang, “Reform, resources, and regional cleavages,” p. 68 mentions the fact that inland products were often exported by coastal foreign trade corporations which bought these up at higher purchase prices than inland corporations could afford.

⁶⁸ One article from early 1989 that warned of this effect was Hu Jizhi, “On capital constraints,” p. 15. Tax interview, 9 August 1994 discussed the recent manifestations.

⁶⁹ Hu Jizhi, “On capital constraints,” p. 15.

⁷⁰ Wang Shouhai, “Tightly rely on science and technologys progress to realize Wuhans economys speedy development,”XXYSJ,No. 5 (1994), p. 5.

⁷¹ The policy was pronounced ended in the summer of 1993. See FBIS, 12August 1993. 16.Also, plan interview, 11 August 1994 revealed that the decision to end the policy had been under consideration since 1992, with province and city battling it out. When the end Wuhan was allowed a two–year grace period, 1994–95, to phase out the powers it had enjoyed under the policy.

⁷² Li Chonghuai, Li Chonghuai wenxuan,p. 259.

⁷³ Solinger, Transition,p. 176 (see FBIS, 5 February 1986, p. K7).

⁷⁴ Plan interview, May 1984.

⁷⁵ By 1994, Wuhan was permitted to exercise 100% discretion in authorizing any domestic investment projects below the limit of 100 million yuan,or for foreign investment items worth under $30 million (plan interview, 11 August 1994).

⁷⁶ FBIS, 12 August 1993, p. 16; also bank interview, 12 August 1994

⁷⁷ Plan interview, 11 August 1994.

⁷⁸ Schroeder,“Territorial actors,” pp. 294–96.

⁷⁹ Ibid.p. 295; Solinger, Transition,p. 212. Schroeder states that other cities could kee. 30 to 40%; my interviews from 1988 note that the range for the jihua danliecities as a whole was 16 to 30%. A Wuhan economist offered the following figures on 27 June 1987: Shangha. 18, Tianjin 21, Guangzhou 24, and Shenyang 23.

⁸⁰ Wuhans ratio has variously been cited as 17% as in Li Chonghuai, Li Chonghuai wenxuan,p. 267, and in system reform commission interview; as 20% (at first) and 16.4% (after 1988), in Schroeder, “Territorial actors,” pp. 295 and 296; and as 14% (interview, 1987 with a Wuhan economist, quoted in Solinger, Transition,p. 1999).

⁸¹ 1985 Wuhan Yearbook, p. 167. Unfortunately, here and later (for the years 1991 and 1992 discussed below), the yearbooks do not provide a breakdown of how much went to the province, how much to the Centre.

⁸² Beijing Review,No. 9 (1988), p. 19 states that Shanghais retention ratio was then 23.54%, raised from 15% previously;FEER,21April 1988, p. 70 states that in 1985 Shanghais rate was raised to 24% from 10. J. Bruce Jacobs and Lijian Hong, “Shanghai and "–P ai ai87 nd heDespite Decentralization 21 of the enunciation of the policy affording special status to 14 coastal cities, of which Shanghai was one.82 The absolute disadvantage was that, though Wuhan did receive the right to use some of its own resources, the old strains between the two administrations continued to simmer and even to worsen.83 Hubei continued to interfere with Wuhans authority to set prices. And even if the province could no longer directly “balance” export opportunities among its subordinate cities, it was still in a position to order the other cities under its management to “boycott” trade in some of Wuhans products; there were also conflicts over the distribution of raw materials. These battles led to a severing of the prior complementary relationship and close economic ties between Wuhan and its fraternal urban places in the province, as in the use and sharing of electrical power and iron.84 Hubei also refrained from investing in Wuhan, because it would no longer get any benefit from it.85 This was a sharp switch from the pre–reform days, when, for instance, in 1981, Wuhan received 21.6 per cent of total Hubei investment for capital construction though its population represented a mere 8.6 per cent of the provinces total.86 So in some ways there was a trade–off that came with the policy: Wuhan was deprived of some of the economic interchange it had once enjoyed with its provincial government and other cities in its vicinity. When the policy was terminated for capital cities in the summer of 1993, an announcement sensitive to these interactions was made, explaining that: the State Councils recent decision is primarily aimed at preventing contradictions between the provincial governments and the provincial capital cities from intensifying as well as at restoring to the provincial governments certain economic powers enjoyed by the provincial capital cities [under the prior policy].87 Once the policy ended, Wuhan officials believed that Wuhans future ability to succeed economically would depend heavily upon obtaining the Lower Yangzi Valley,” in Goodman and Segal, China Deconstructs,p. 231 state that from "S it: 1950 to 1983 Shanghai retained only 13.2% of its funds while the Centre took 86.8%, but that in 1985 Shanghai was able to get the Centre to raise its retention rate to 23.2%.

⁸³ On the background to the Wuhan–Hubei relationship, see Schroeder, Territorial actors,” pp. 293–95 and Li Chonghuai, Li Chonghuai wenxuan.

⁸⁴ Guo Wuxin, Wuhan,pp. 18–19 describes the pre–1984 situation.

⁸⁵ Schroeder, “Territorial actors,” pp. 298–99; Solinger, Transition,pp. 216–17; and system reform commission interview, 10 August 1994.

⁸⁶ Guo Wuxin, Wuhan,p. 19.

⁸⁷ FBIS, 12 August 1993, p. 16. See also FBIS, 9 November 1993, p. 33, also discussing the termination of the policy, but this time attributing the decision to the need to meet the requirements for entry into GATT. The reasoning was ihatjihua danliewas a policy fitting to the era of the planned economy, affording special, unequal powers to particular cities. This announcement says that there were at that time 22 cities holding the status, of which only eight were provincial capitals. It held that the policy had “encouraged the cities to perform better in a bid to compete with other cities across the country. However, it had resulted in an uneasy relationship between provincial capitals and their respective provincial governments.

⁸⁸ Plan interview, 11 August 1994. The official from the finance bureau that I interviewed, though, thought that Hubei would lend its support, and that that would be an advantage Wuhan would enjoy over its situation in the days of thejihua danliepolicy. The prospect was not necessarily dim for this. In early 1992, Hubei earmarked money and announced policies supporting the construction of Wuhans international airport and Yangzi bridge; and promised to assist the city in acquiring sufficient electricity and in management of its port. At the same time it suggested (or warned?) that, “Wuhan should be part of Hubei,” a reference to a decade–long battle in which Wuhan strove for more autonomy than Hubei was prepared to allow. This is in FBIS, 19 February 1992, p. 58. Soon afterwards Provincial Party Secretary Guan Guangfu proclaimed that, “Hubeis economy depends on Wuhan,” evincing that it was ready to integrate Wuhan back into the provincial economy. A meeting of Party committees throughout the province was held to discover means whereby Wuhan could draw investment funds from cities and counties across Hubei, including Wuhans use of preferential policies, its openness to joint ventures and an invitation to share–holding, as well as soliciting the creation of new firms in its technological development zone at Donghu. See FBIS, 2 March 1992, p. 61. Li Chonghuai, Li Chonghuai wenxuan,p. 261, in an essay written in August 1992, states that “Recently, [provincial Party] Secretary Guan [Guangfu] suggested that Wuhan serve as the dragonhead... we hope we can strengthen relations.” The 1993 Wuhan Yearbook, p. 50 notes that the Hubei Party committee would fully develop Wuhans “dragon–head” role, and alluded to an “important resolution” to this effect.

⁸⁹ Susan L. Shirk, How China Opened its Door: the Political Success of the PRCs Foreign Trade and Investment Reforms(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1994), p. 39 notes resentment in Shanghai for its lack of special policies going back to at least 1984.Google Scholar

⁹⁰ Jacobs and Hong, “Shanghai and the Lower Yangzi Valley,” p. 234 list the separate policies granted in each year.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² 1993 Wuhan Yearbook, p. 50 mentions that “nationally strategy is shifting from the coast to the River.” It also lists Pudongs opening and the huge Three River Gorges dam project as potential opportunities for Wuhan.

⁹³ This point is also made in Brantly Womack and Guangzhi Zhao, “The many worlds of Chinas provinces: foreign trade and diversification,” in Goodman and Segal, China Deconstructs, p. 169: “The inherent disparities are compounded by national pricing and taxation policies that in the 1980s have been much heavier on the inland provinces.” See also Willy Wo–lap Lam, in SCMP, 25 April 1995, pp. 1, 8, reprinted in FBIS, 25 April 1995, pp. 21, who quotes a Mr Hu, a Chinese Academy of Sciences economist and adviser to Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji, as saying that, since the early 1980s, central and western provinces had been discriminated against on two counts: disadvantageous tax and investment policies; and next to no representation on central bodies such as the Politburo.

⁹⁴ Jacobs and Hong, “Shanghai and the Lower Yangzi Valley,” p. 228.

⁹⁵ Figures are taken from 1992 and 1993 Wuhan Yearbooks, pp. 253 and 346, respectively.

⁹⁶ For instance, see Zhao Yifeng, “Comparison and countermeasures,” p. 11.

⁹⁷ FBIS, 8 February 1994, p. 16.

⁹⁸ Mooney, “At Chinas crossroads,” p. 66. Yang, “Reforms, resources, and regional cleavages,” pp. 67 –69 notes that in the post–Tiananmen period, and especially in the Eighth Five–Year Plan (1991–95), the central government de–emphasized the coastal strategy, in the hope of gaining support from the interior.

⁹⁹ FBIS, 21 June 1994, p. 37 and 27 June 1994, pp. 76–77.

¹⁰⁰ On this anger, see Thomas P. Bernstein, “In quest of voice: Chinas farmers and prospects for political liberalization,” paper presented at the University Seminar on Modern China, Columbia University, 10 February 1994.

¹⁰¹ Joint Inspection Group, “Study coastal cities progressive experience; strive to manage well Wuhans economic technical development zone,”.

¹⁰² Chonghuai, Li Chonghuai wenxuan,pp. 221, 257–58.

¹⁰³ Ibid.p. 356.

¹⁰⁴ FBIS, 30 April 1980, p. 2.

¹⁰⁵ Li Chonghuai, Li Chonghuai wenxuan,pp. 355–59.

¹⁰⁶ 1985 Wuhan Yearbook, p. 145.

¹⁰⁷ I have described this in my article, “Wuhan: inland city on the move.”

¹⁰⁸ Joint Inspection Group, “Coastal cities progressive experience,” p. 45

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.p. 45.

¹¹⁰ 1992 Wuhan Yearbook, p. 32. 111. Ibid.p. 219.

¹¹² Ibid.p. 218.

¹¹³ Ibid.p. 103.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.p. 218.

¹¹⁵ Dai Wutang, “Develop the urban economy, p. 26.

¹¹⁶ Jacobs and Hong, “Shanghai and the Lower Yangzi Valley,” p. 234 also found that, “new [central] policies have brought considerably more capital, both domestic and foreign, into Shanghai” in the early 1990s. I

¹¹⁷ Finance interview, 8 August 1994; Foreign Affairs Office of Wuhan Municipal Government, “The chance for investment and preferential policies in Wuhan,” Wuhan, June 1994, pp. 1–2.

¹¹⁸ Jacobs and Hong, “Shanghai and the Lower Yangzi Valley,” p. 231.

¹¹⁹ 1993 Wuhan Yearbook, pp. 50–51. See also Mooney, “At Chinas crossroads,” pp. 66–68.

¹²⁰ 1993 Wuhan Yearbook, pp. 50–51.

¹²¹ JPRS–CAR 94–036 (10 June 1994), p. 38.

¹²² The Economist,July 1992, p. 32. See also Huus, “Bureaucracy,” pp. 58–59. According to Huus, “the Ministry of Communications, which objects to Wharfs controlling stake in the port [a container terminal project], has stalled approval for nearly two years.” At the same time, Beijing tied up two power plants in battles over investment returns.

¹²³ 1993 Wuhan Yearbook, pp. 320, 46.

¹²⁴ Ibid.p. 320.

¹²⁵ Ibid.p. 61.

¹²⁶ Sanzifirms are those financed by three forms of capital: Chinese and foreign joint ventures; wholly foreign firms; and Chinese–foreign co–operative enterprises, including those with capital from Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macao.

¹²⁷ 1993 Wuhan Yearbook, p. 320.

¹²⁸ Ibid.p. 168.

¹²⁹ Ibid.p. 320. Inexplicably, the same volume, p. 46, states that actually utilized foreign capital in 1992 came to 214 million, an increase of 1.1–fold. Where I found variation in figures in the same source (also in Tables 6 and 7), in the interest of comparability, I chose the figure that appeared in the section of the text of that yearbook that corresponded to other years treatment of the same data.

¹³⁰ This is the percentage given in 1993 Wuhan Yearbook, p. 319. My own calculations, based on their numbers for foreign exchange earned, yield a slightly different percentage, as presented in my Table 7.

¹³¹ Finance interview, 8 August 1994. See also JPRS–CAR 94–036, p. 38.

¹³² 1992 Wuhan Yearbook, p. 103.

¹³³ Ibid.p. 219.

¹³⁴ Tiantian ribao (Everyday Daily),1 July 1994.

¹³⁵ System reform committee interview, 10 August 1994.