Trade-related investment measures (TRIMs) have been a key issue in regional and multilateral trade negotiations, but they have received little attention in theoretical work to date. This article analyzes the political economy of TRIMs to illuminate why regional arrangements have been a popular framework for eliminating them. The main argument is that multinational firms often demand safeguards when TRIMs are being liberalized, particularly if they have large sunk costs due to asset specificity. In general, regional arrangements are better equipped than multilateral rules to incorporate the safeguards these firms demand: regionalism requires governments to make binding commitments, and it creates opportunities to discriminate against outsiders. A case study of lobbying by U.S. companies with FDI in Canada from the early twentieth century to the negotiation of the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement illustrates these points. The article concludes that regional arrangements are likely to remain more active, and more successful, than multilateral discussions in managing the commitment problems inherent in liberalizing TRIMs.

We discuss the political and legal environment surrounding Internet wine sales, and consider the arguments in the debate over direct shipment bans on wine by investigating the wine market in the Northern Virginia suburbs of Washington, DC. Using a sample of wines identified by Wine and Spirits magazine's annual restaurant poll, we find that 15 percent of wines available online were not available from retail wine stores within 10 miles of McLean, Virginia during the month the data were collected. Our results also indicate that Virginia's direct shipment ban, which was in place until 2003, prevented consumers from purchasing some premium wines at lower prices online. Aggregate cost savings depends on the consumer's shopping strategy, the price per bottle, the quantity of wine ordered, and the shipping method chosen. For the entire sample, online purchase could result in an average savings of as much as 3.6 percent or an average premium of as much as 48 percent. A comparison shopper who considers both online and offline retailers could save an average of 1.6-9.7 percent. These results help explain why consumers and producers have found it worthwhile to challenge interstate direct shipment bans, which tend to benefit wine wholesalers.

The battle between the recording industry and those illegal sharing music over the Internet has gripped headlines over the last few years like few others related to the digital age. At its core, it is a battle about the meaning of property and thus a battle over the heart of the emerging information economy. This article critically examines the double punch of law and technology – the simultaneous and interwoven deployment of legal and electronic measures to protect digital content – and asks whether it is merely a defense strategy against piracy, as the industry asserts, or rather an attempt to fundamentally redefine the producer-consumer relationship. Based on some initial evidence for the latter proposition, the article analyzes reasons for concern, outlines the current politics of copyright policymaking that have given producers the upper hand, and sketches elements of a strategy to fight music piracy that does not infringe on basic consumer rights.

Restrictive policies aimed at reducing the likelihood of bank failure during recessions tend to increase the probability of a credit crunch. In this paper we infer governments' policy responses to this dilemma by studying the cyclical behavior of bank capital in 1369 banks from 28 OECD countries during the period 1992–98. We find significant differences across countries. In the US and Japan, bank capital is counter-cyclical, that is, the typical bank strengthens its capital base during periods of weak economic activity. In the other countries, there is no relationship between the level of macroeconomic activity and bank capital. From these findings we infer that severe banking crises in the US and Japan may have made policymakers there more vigilant towards “unhealthy” banks, even when this implies an increase in the risk of a credit crunch. In countries without such crisis experience, policymakers seem to be less concerned about future banking crises. Our results suggest that the strong push by the US for the 1988 Basle Accord may have been a reflection of this increased sensitivity. They also suggest that, to the extent business cycles do not develop in synchronicity across countries and policymakers respond differently to the banking crisis-credit crunch dilemma, current reforms of the Basle Accord, which are designed to tighten regulatory requirements, may encounter difficulties.