Robert Ebert’s Champion of the Lark is a detailed look at the management of two American auto brands during a period of fierce competition and market contraction. Ebert focuses on the presidency of Harold Churchill, a career Studebaker employee who became chief executive as the company teetered on the edge of bankruptcy. Under Churchill’s leadership, the company shut down the declining Packard brand and returned to modest profitability. He personally oversaw the launch of the pioneering Lark, a compact car, and attempted to carve out an enduring niche for Studebaker as a producer of practical, durable economy cars. However, Churchill and the other leading men of Studebaker ultimately could not overcome the daunting obstacles that faced small auto producers in the postwar era. Churchill resigned in 1961, and production of Studebaker vehicles ended for good in 1966. Champion of the Lark is not only a useful guide to the twilight years of Studebaker and Packard for fans of both marques but it is also a valuable contribution to the general history of the auto business in the United States. Through careful research, Ebert helps to further explain why so many auto brands were discontinued in the 1950s and 1960s despite widespread economic prosperity. Market competition, internal disagreement over the future of the company, and missteps in quality and product planning all contributed to the downfall of Studebaker-Packard.
Although focused on Harold Churchill’s presidency, Champion of the Lark provides background on the entire history of Studebaker and Packard. Starting with their origins in the late nineteenth century, Ebert traces their history through the merger of both companies in 1954. That merger was a product of the wave of consolidation that struck the American auto industry in the 1950s. Relatively small companies like Studebaker, Packard, Hudson, and Nash struggled to compete against the scale and market reach of the Detroit Big Three. Studebaker and Packard merged primarily out of financial necessity, and Hudson and Nash combined to form American Motors. Ebert relates that James Nance, president of Studebaker-Packard before Harold Churchill, attempted to engineer a merger with American Motors but was rebuffed. Nance also attempted to transform Studebaker-Packard into a true full-line automaker in the mold of General Motors, a move that proved disastrous. Quality and production issues plagued new models, and the loss of government contracts for defense production put further downward pressure on the company’s bottom line. Nance resigned, and Harold Churchill was elevated to the role of president. Churchill inherited a company that was rapidly losing money and the faith of its creditors.
Churchill, an engineer, laid out a plan to rescue the company by refocusing resources on a few key products. He allowed Packard models to be built using Studebaker body shells until 1958, when the marque was discontinued. Churchill was a strong advocate for compact and economy cars, which he believed were an underserved market. He pushed for development of the compact Lark, which was based on a shortened 1953 Studebaker body shell. The launch of this model in 1959 provided a lifeline to the struggling company, as it had a strong reception with consumers. Studebaker’s short-term success mirrored that of competitor American Motors, which had introduced the compact Rambler. Even so, Studebaker-Packard quickly found itself in financial trouble again. Demand for the Lark waned and competitors responded with their own compact cars. Churchill pushed for the company to develop an all-new Lark with a four-cylinder engine, a design that reached the prototype stage. Despite this, Churchill was forced to admit that the financial investment did not make sense. Ebert argues that Churchill put the financial well-being of Studebaker stockholders ahead of his own ambitions when he decided to cancel the four-cylinder Lark replacement. Ebert argues that Churchill’s other efforts at product development were generally successful within the context of the company’s limited budget and market share. Through an assessment of contemporary reviews of Studebaker and Packard products in automotive enthusiast magazines, Ebert finds that the company’s cars were generally compared favorably to their competitors from other marques with a few exceptions. Even so, declining consumer interest and the overwhelming advantages of the Detroit Three pushed Studebaker toward irrelevancy. Lower trade-in values, a lack of marketing reach, and an ever-shrinking dealer network all contributed to the downfall of Studebaker.
After Churchill’s resignation in 1961, the automotive side of the company entered a period of managed decline. The original South Bend, Indiana, Studebaker plant was closed in 1963. Production of automobiles ceased completely in 1966, but other divisions of the company that focused on appliances and industrial products lived on. Churchill made a valiant effort to keep the Studebaker auto business alive, but his company ultimately lacked the scale and resources to survive.
Champion of the Lark is a valuable addition to the scholarship on America’s small- and medium-sized auto companies and to midcentury American business in general. It compares favorably to Charles K. Hyde’s Storied Independent Automakers: Nash, Hudson, and American Motors (Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press, 2009), which has a similar focus on a medium-sized auto firm. The events described in Champion of the Lark help to explain why so much American industrial production concentrated in huge corporations after World War II, as the endless quest for greater profit margin and efficiency through production drove smaller firms out of business. It also demonstrates the impact that individual executives can have on the direction of their firms. In any case, Ebert’s work is a must-read for fans of Studebaker and Packard and a useful addition to the scholarly literature on the American auto industry.
