The Italian political elites and Europe

Despite the emergence, in the 1990s, of Euro-scepticism, during the nation's so-called Second Republic, Italy's political elites were perceived as substantially supportive of the European integration process, and in perfect keeping with the legacy of pro-European feelings that had characterized the governing parties during the First Republic (Isernia, Reference Isernia, Cotta, Isernia and Verzichelli2005; Brunazzo and Della Sala, Reference Brunazzo, Della Sala, Magone, Laffan and Schwerger2016b). Over the last decade, however, this attitude has significantly mutated, with the emergence of a much more varied range of political parties standing for election, including successful parties and movements characterized by Eurosceptic stances. These emergent actors have transformed the European issue into a salient theme, and one that has been accompanied by a considerable restructuring of the political spectrum, with new or transformed forces aiming to win the support of those voters most critical towards the EU (Di Mauro, Reference Di Mauro2014; Di Mauro and Memoli, Reference Di Mauro and Memoli2016; Conti, Reference Conti, Pasquinucci and Verzichelli2017).

To map this evolution, Brunazzo and Della Sala (Reference Brunazzo and Della Sala2016a: 116) have proposed a three-stage scan of how parties have established their positions on European integration over the course of time. The first phase concerns the period from the 1950s to the early 1970s, when the Christian Democrats and other governing parties actively supported the integration process (Conti and Verzichelli, Reference Conti, Verzichelli, Cotta, Isernia and Verzichelli2005; Quaglia, Reference Quaglia, Szczerbiak and Taggart2008; Conti, Reference Conti, Best, Lengyel and Verzichelli2012) in order to guarantee the country growth and stability, as well as its anchorage to the liberal democratic West rather than to the Eastern communist bloc. The second phase ran from the turn of the 70s until the early 90s, and was characterized by an exponential growth in support for European integration, although during this period it featured – among the political elite – more celebratory, rhetorical tones (Conti and Verzichelli, Reference Conti, Verzichelli, Cotta, Isernia and Verzichelli2005). During this second period, the narrative moved from the theme of democratic anchoring to that of policy performance, that is to say, the opportunities for economic growth and modernization offered to Italy by its subscribing to the common European project; this was the external constraint capable of producing positive externalities despite a blocked national political system (Ferrera and Gualmini, Reference Ferrera and Gualmini2004; Brunazzo and Della Sala, Reference Brunazzo and Della Sala2016a). The third phase, on the other hand, coincided with the foundation of the Second Republic and the launching of the Maastricht Treaty. This was a political period characterized by the ‘rescued by Europe’ approach, according to which Italy was to implement a massive economic and social overhaul in order to satisfy the Maastricht criteria for membership of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) (Ferrera and Gualmini, Reference Ferrera and Gualmini2004). At the same time, this was the moment when a certain divergence emerged among Italy's political parties in regard to their narratives and attitudes concerning Europe.

During the second phase, the main governing parties – the Christian Democrats and the Socialists – despite their substantial Europeanism, began to display more variegated positions on the form of European integration. There were internal divisions which, as the First Republic came to an end to be succeeded by the Second Republic, clearly manifested themselves as intra-coalition divisions (Conti and Verzichelli, Reference Conti, Verzichelli, Cotta, Isernia and Verzichelli2005), with the emergence of different degrees of Europeanism both on the centre-left and the centre-right. Generally speaking, the third phase was characterized by the marked pro-Europeanism of the centre-left, which is in line with the general revision of the social-democratic positions in favour of European integration that began in the 1980s (Gabel and Hix, Reference Gabel and Hix2002); this contrasted with the more lukewarm positions adopted on the centre-right (Conti and Verzichelli, Reference Conti, Verzichelli, Cotta, Isernia and Verzichelli2005; Conti, Reference Conti, Pasquinucci and Verzichelli2017). The element uniting the latter two phases is therefore a less enthusiastic, more complex involvement of Italy's political elites in the integration process (Conti and Verzichelli, Reference Conti, Verzichelli, Cotta, Isernia and Verzichelli2005). This state of affairs was the long-term result of Italy's shift in position, from being one of the leading players in the integration process, to being part of the support cast located on the periphery of the European system (Brunazzo and Della Sala, Reference Brunazzo, Della Sala, Magone, Laffan and Schwerger2016b).

The third phase is the one characterized by a greater degree of oscillation in the way that Europe is viewed. While a substantially positive judgement of the integration process was widespread among those coalitions competing for the government of the country up until 2013, in recent years, critical voices have emerged within the political spectrum (especially on the centre-right) in regard to issues such as the functioning of EU institutions; the fact that some policy decisions taken at a supranational level could damage Italy; the role of the Euro; and the EU's power to interfere in the country's democratic life (Bellucci, Reference Bellucci, Cotta, Isernia and Verzichelli2005).

From the mid-1990s onwards, there was a growing wave of criticism against the EU culminating in the 2008 crisis. The EU suddenly became a strongly politicized issue utilized within the framework of the inter-party competition, in a process of transformation of Italy's party system (Brunazzo and Della Sala, Reference Brunazzo and Della Sala2016a).

From this point of view, the attitude of the Italian political elite was ambivalent since, as Conti (Reference Conti, Pasquinucci and Verzichelli2017) mentions, on the one hand, there was the will to maximize consensus during the electoral phase by intercepting the new Eurosceptic stance of the electorate, while at the same time, politicians acting within institutions adopted a pragmatic approach to the EU. This latter aspect can be ascribed to parties' awareness – when in government – of EU power in terms of ties and conditionality. The question is: can this general positivity towards the EU outside the electoral competition, on the part of the Italian political elite, still be found? (Conti, Reference Conti, Pasquinucci and Verzichelli2017).

As Brunazzo and Della Sala (Reference Brunazzo and Della Sala2016a) point out, the conflict over the EU has been taking place in a political context characterized by certain specific, contrasting narratives permeating the Italian public debate on Europe: (a) the EU is still seen as an instrument with which to strengthen the Italian position and protect its interests; (b) the more openly Euro-sceptical approach of the Lega Nord (Northern League – LN), which in its new nationalist, non-regionalist version (Albertazzi et al., Reference Albertazzi, Giovannini and Seddone2018), identifies the issue of EU interference (the single currency, constraints, etc.) as detrimental to the country as a whole (Chari et al., Reference Chari, Iltanen and Kritzinger2004; Quaglia, Reference Quaglia, Szczerbiak and Taggart2008; Albertazzi et al., Reference Albertazzi, Giovannini and Seddone2018); (c) the Euro-pragmatic approach that puts the emphasis on the centrality of national interests, but affirms that such should be pursued within, and not against, the EU (Brunazzo and Della Sala, Reference Brunazzo, Della Sala, Harmsen and Schild2011).

In addition to the previous three positions on the EU, a fourth, more recent position is that of new party actors that have recently appeared on the Italian political scene – such as the Movimento Cinque Stelle (Five Star Movement – M5S) – which we could classify as among those adopting the Euro-critical approach (Salvati, Reference Salvati2019a). From their point of view, European integration is pursued as an asset, a potentially positive constraint, but in order to do so, the political structure of the EU must be radically challenged, and the EU's decision-making models and its priorities require reforming.

In this fragmented scenario, Italian party-based Euro-scepticism has taken on a variety of different hues over the years, moving from being an ideological stance to a more strategic one, varying in relation to the public's Euro-scepticism (Quaglia, Reference Quaglia2011). Indeed, over the years Italian electors have displayed a relatively significant – but not majoritarian – degree of Euro-scepticism, as a result of strong concerns about the economic situation or about the direct impact of EU polices on domestic economic performance (Quaglia, Reference Quaglia2011; Conti and Memoli, Reference Conti and Memoli2015). This shows the important influence of the economic variable on people's positions regarding the EU.

The critical shift in the positions adopted by Italy's political elites, and the emergence of several different stances on the EU, can be accounted for by the need to provide a fresh response to citizens' changing attitudes towards the integration process (Conti, Reference Conti, Pasquinucci and Verzichelli2017). The decline in enthusiasm about the Euro among the Italian public appears to be above all the product of the changed economic context: the worsening of individual material conditions, as variously interpreted by Italy's governing/leading politicians, has contributed towards increasing the perceived gap between citizens and EU institutions, thus fostering greater hostility/distrust towards the EU (Quaglia, Reference Quaglia2011; Serricchio et al., Reference Serricchio, Tsakatika and Quaglia2013; Di Mauro, Reference Di Mauro2014; Conti and Memoli, Reference Conti and Memoli2015; Bellucci and Serricchio, Reference Bellucci, Serricchio, Pasquinucci and Verzichelli2017). This detachment has been increased by the perception of a political/institutional system such as that of the EU, which is too far removed from citizens, and above all is affected by a high degree of de-politicization, in virtue of a technocratic asset built around the dominance of non-majoritarian institutions (Van Spanje and de Vreese, Reference Van Spanje and de Vreese2011; Mair Reference Mair2013; Salvati, Reference Salvati2019b).

As soon as the economic crisis exacerbated this sense of detachment from the EU, populist and Eurosceptic parties were afforded the room they needed to propose ‘alternative’ political platforms to the pro-European narrative of the mainstream parties and elites that had governed over the previous 20 years, and that now found themselves vulnerable to the new electoral volatility (Cotta, Reference Cotta2018). This room for manoeuvre afforded to the right-wing, to radical left-wing parties, and to parties on the periphery of the party system has been amplified by the consequences of the economic recession, which has accelerated the destabilization of traditional party systems (Di Mauro, Reference Di Mauro2014; Hernández and Kriesi, Reference Hernández and Kriesi2016).

To this end, an analysis of PMs' speeches can further our understanding of the variations or continuity in question and, as Conti suggests (Reference Conti, Pasquinucci and Verzichelli2017), helps us ascertain whether a positive approach to European integration continues to characterize institutional public speeches or not.

Data analysis: general findings

The data in Table 2 offer a first interesting insight into the way in which different PMs have viewed the European theme: up to Letta's period in office, there was an overwhelming majority of positive symbols relating to EU topics; when Renzi was made PM, there was a sharp change in direction. At first glance, it would seem that the relationship is presented in a way independent of the EU positions expressed by the party majority sustaining the Government.

Indeed, if we take into account the ‘parliamentary majority’ variable, certain important observations may be made. For example, Giuseppe Conte – during his first Government (Lega Nord-Movimento Cinque Stelle) – is quite critical of EU institutions, but that Government was supported by the aforementioned two parties with their respective Euro-sceptic and Euro-critical positions, and so Conte's stance is e hardly surprising. Matteo Renzi, on the other hand, directly attacks the EU leadership and Euro policies, despite the fact that his Government was supported by a strongly pro-European parliamentary majority. The same incongruence can be found in the case of Berlusconi's third government (Berlusconi III 2008–2011): he effectively gave some of the most pro-European speeches of them all, despite the fact that his own parliamentary majority was composed of a Euro-sceptic party like LN, and that within his own party – Popolo delle Libertà (People of Freedom – PdL) – there were strong critics of the EU, such as the Minister of the Economy, Giulio Tremonti. This does not mean that the type of parliamentary majority does not affect a PM's own position, but rather that this variable does not appear to decisively influence the narrative of the relationship between Italy and the EU, as presented in the official parliamentary statements.

Table 2 shows the distribution of the symbols relating to the three macro-areas on which the codebook is based: polity, politics, and policy. The most important observation resulting from this table is that the politics symbols were marginal, or virtually absent, until the Prodi II government. This is very important, given that this category groups together those symbols closely linked to the procedural/conflictual dimensions of politics and to the interconnection between political parties and/or institutional actors. The almost total absence of these symbols in previous years seems to point to the argument sustaining the de-politicization of the EU arena (Mair, Reference Mair2013), that is, the decision to protect EU institutions from political conflict, by strengthening the non-majoritarian, techno-bureaucratic aspects of the integration process (Bartolini, Reference Bartolini2005; De Vries and Hobolt, Reference De Vries and Hobolt2012; Salvati, Reference Salvati2019b).

The fact that from the Berlusconi IV government onwards, we observe the greater relevance and frequency (partly preponderance) of politics symbols – regardless of whether they are positive or negative – confirms the fact that the crisis triggered a process of open politicization of the EU (Hutter et al., Reference Hutter, Grande and Kriesi2016; Salvati, Reference Salvati2019b), which is now one of the most prominent political issues capable of influencing contemporary political systems and the structure of inter-party competition (Milkin, Reference Milkin2014).

Moreover, the analysis reveals that the reference to a particular issue is influenced by the transition from the pre-crisis period to the post-crisis period: the reform and review of treaties – a polity indicator – which is a constant in the PMs' speeches up to the Berlusconi IV government, almost disappears in the years following the crisis. This means that the idea of an EU that can be incrementally changed through treaty reforms that are the result of the involvement of the EU institutions appears to disappear during this phase, thus offering increasingly greater room for intergovernmental negotiations (Fabbrini, Reference Fabbrini2016; Salvati, Reference Salvati2019b).

As far as politics is concerned, the only category that constantly emerges in all of the speeches (albeit less so than in those of the Berlusconi I Government) is that of the ‘Acceptance of the indication and respect of the commitments made at European level’. This observation is extremely interesting, since it confirms the close political link between the national and European arenas, and therefore the presence of the EU's ‘external constraint’ (Brunazzo and Della Sala, Reference Brunazzo, Della Sala, Magone, Laffan and Schwerger2016b), which is exercised through the implicit conditionality mechanism (Sacchi, Reference Sacchi2015). The concept of implicit conditionality refers to the implicit adherence to reforms and/or changes without the explicit threat of a sanction, in contrast to formal conditionality which, on the contrary, is based on the signing of official commitments and memoranda. This mechanism boasts a clear-cut effectiveness because it is based on a profound asymmetry of power, which allows a contracting actor to ‘impose’ reforms and supervise the compliance of the weaker partner to those required changes (including an evaluation of the results achieved). As Sacchi explains, this was the case of the Berlusconi and Monti governments and their relationship with EU institutions (Reference Sacchi2015).

The paramount presence of the external constraint – mainly exercised through the implicit conditionality mechanism – appears in almost all those discourses characterized by a totally positive tone, with the clear exception of the Renzi and Conte I governments, where the pressure exercised by the constraint is rejected and considered as extremely negative for Italy, as is clearly shown in the following statements:

(I think it is absolutely vital that we stop seeing Europe as checking our homework or scrutinising our every move (…). The package of measures that we present to the European Union is not presented to obtain its approval or disapproval, or its stamp of endorsement) (Author's own translation).

(Finally, we will explain that we have not accepted their recommendations on structural adjustments, because they are not compatible with the state of our economy or with our economic policy design) (Author's own translation).

Otherwise, the policy symbols (Table 2) recur in a homogeneous way over time in all of the speeches concerned. The constant re-proposal of the theme of immigration and border controls in this category is rather interesting. This is a topic that has gained prominence and has taken on a strictly political significance over the last 5 years, and has repeatedly called into question the role of the EU and of the European solidarity mechanism. The content analysis reveals that over the years, there has been a constant emphasis on the need to develop European, rather than national, borders, and to promote a deeper involvement of European institutions, requiring a supranational approach to the management of the incoming migratory flows.

Table 3 provides a synopsis of other important elements for the purpose of our discussion; for the sake of brevity, I decided to focus on the four most discussed topics in the parliamentary speeches of each single PM, thus offering a valid overview of the main tendencies seen in the case of each individual PM. For each area, the focus is on the percentage frequency with which those symbols recur, and an indication is given of the areas to which the categories belong, so as to identify any regularities and peculiarities in the recurrence of symbols for each PM.

Table 3.

Most recurring symbols

An analysis of the most often recurring categories confirms what we had previously indicated, namely that the politics category is used exclusively from the Prodi II Government onwards, and as such offers proof of a clear break in the time series. From the beginning of the economic crisis, the EU and European politics has become an area of heated political confrontation: a macro-issue characterized by a strong degree of conflict. In an almost mirror-like manner, references to the category of polity – that is, references to the European political system – dramatically decrease. In this regard, the record-holder is Giuliano Amato, in whose case all four categories belong to that area. With regard to the frequency with which certain categories are mentioned, the result is as follows: of the 52 categories considered in Table 3, the four that come up most frequently are: ‘public finance control rules’ and ‘support for European policies’, each with a share of 11.5%, and ‘governance of European political choices’ and ‘evaluation of the integration process’ each with a share of 10%.

Moving on now to the frequency with which certain categories are addressed, it is interesting to see the specific issues that PMs' speeches focus on. For example, during his first government, PM Prodi emphasized the fact that the reviewing and controlling of public spending, together with debt reduction, are unavoidable steps towards bringing the Italian economy into line with those of the future Eurozone (19.2%), and stressed the importance of joining the single currency and a stable monetary area (15.4%).

The Berlusconi IV government was also characterized by a very strong emphasis on the need to keep public spending under control (32.9%) in order to safeguard the Italian economy from on-going speculation. In this regard, it is remarkable how Berlusconi stresses the importance of new agreements such as the fiscal compact, in order to guarantee financial and economic stability, presenting them as necessary tools for the interests of the country (20%). Monti, on the other hand, focuses on the role of European policy governance (20.1%), by associating it with the agreements and treaties signed by the previous government (15%), pointing out that his government had not been responsible for certain political choices, and that it was mainly committed to respecting those agreements. Letta and Gentiloni, on the other hand, shift the focus of their speeches towards the question of values, by emphasizing the importance and the irrevocability of the integration process, and presenting it as ‘a yet unfinished challenge’ which Italy must have a leading role in, due to its strongly pro-European tradition (12.6% and 12.7%).

Once the general framework has been defined, what can be said about the PMs' specific considerations regarding these topics? How do they deal with the relationship with the EU after the onset of the economic crisis? Has that relationship evolved positively or negatively? In the next section, I shall be focusing more in depth on the PMs' speeches of the period beginning with the 2008 economic crisis, in order to establish whether the multiple European crises have also represented a turning point in the way that the relationship between Italian governments and the EU institutions is portrayed.

Data analysis: the speeches made by Italy's Prime Ministers following the onset of the economic crisis

In order to understand the pattern of Italy–EU relations after 2008 and to address the various issues presented in the previous section, I have decided to focus on Italy's governments starting with Berlusconi IV, and on the post-crisis period, in order to assess any critical features of this relationship. For the six PMs thus analysed, I focus on the four most significant and recurring categories. Berlusconi's speeches (Figure 1) are characterized by a substantial adherence to the dictates of Brussels, not only in the form of a positive assessment of the budget rules, but also through his constant reference to the absolute toned for rapid compliance with the instructions and guidelines issued by the European institutions and the EU partners.

Berlusconi: Questa manovra (economica) è stata concepita in coerenza con gli obiettivi fissati in sede europea ed è stata giudicata adeguata e sufficiente dall'Europa e da tutti gli osservatori internazionali anche relativamente alla tempistica (3 August 2011).

Figure 1.

Berlusconi IV government. Distribution of symbols.

(The (budgetary) manoeuvre was designed in line with the objectives set at European level and was judged adequate and sufficient by Europe and by all international observers, also in terms of the corresponding timing) (Author's own translation).

This means that the relationship with the EU is presented as extremely positive, and in clear keeping with the positions adopted by past Italian governments. This stance is particularly interesting, as the Berlusconi government was to be politically overwhelmed by the sovereign debt crisis and by the worsening of the economic situation throughout Europe (Sacchi, Reference Sacchi2015). The continuous reference to the goodness/necessity of meeting the requests of EU institutions can be accounted for by the fact that it was of instrumental importance for Berlusconi to legitimize the de facto external control exercised by the EU (Sacchi, Reference Sacchi2015). Finally, it is interesting to note how Berlusconi is the first and only PM to have made reference to the relationship with parties from the same European political family, in this case the European People's Party (EPP). This can be ascribed to Berlusconi's pursuit of a minimum of support from the major European governments, through his frequent reference to shared cultures/values in relation to membership of the EPP (at that time, almost all major European leaders were EPP members). This reference to the common European party family was part of the PM's ploy to ease the intense pressure from EU partners, to the result of the Italian government's inability to implement the required reforms.

The case of Mario Monti, who took over from Berlusconi in December 2011 as head of a large coalition government, is very different. While Monti, like his predecessor, underlined the added value for Italy of compliance with state budget control parameters (Figure 2), he did criticize the way EU institutions – and some governments within the Euro area – had handled the crisis. This criticism was aimed at two aspects of the latter: the lack of focus on economic growth, and the strict application of measures that could hinder economic recovery. Although the negative symbols are statistically marginal, a degree of reproach also emerges in regard to the package of new policies adopted by the EU (fiscal compact, Six Pack, etc.).

Monti: rispetto alle norme relative alla disciplina delle finanze pubbliche, è quello di evitare che si introducano vincoli più rigidi, limiti procedurali o ulteriori sanzioni rispetto a quelli già esistenti nell'ambito del Patto di stabilità e di crescita dopo le riforme approvate nel quadro del cosiddetto Six Pack, approvato dal Consiglio e dal Parlamento solo pochi mesi fa. (…) se l'obiettivo dichiarato è anche quello di dotare l'unione economica e monetaria di un più solido pilastro economico, è necessario bilanciare le norme relative alla disciplina delle finanze pubbliche con disposizioni volte a promuovere la crescita e le politiche per la competitività, in primo luogo rafforzando l'integrazione economica all'interno del mercato unico (16 January 2012).

Figure 2.

Monti government. Distribution of symbols.

(The aim of the new framework is to prevent the introduction of stricter constraints, procedural limits or additional sanctions to those already in place under the Stability and Growth Pact following the reforms approved under the so-called Six Pack, which was approved by the Council and Parliament only a few months ago. (…) if the stated objective is also to provide the economic and monetary union with a more solid economic basis, it is necessary to balance the rules on public finance governance with growth-enhancing provisions and competitiveness policies, primarily by strengthening economic integration within the single market) (Author's own translation).

Under the Letta Government, priorities changed and the level of criticism aimed at the EU was clearly different. First of all, Letta (Figure 3) decided to promote parliamentary communications emphasizing the value aspect of the European integration process, and therefore Italy's traditional participation in that process. In addition to repeatedly stressing the Europeanist style of his government, and the self-denial required in the name of integration, Letta was the first Italian PM since 1994 to explicitly and clearly request the strengthening of the EU's supranational sphere of influence, in an attempt to contain the intergovernmental model that had dominated the European decision-making process since 2008 (Fabbrini, Reference Fabbrini2016; Salvati, Reference Salvati2019b).

Figure 3.

Letta government. Distribution of symbols.

((…) among those who want an intergovernmental mechanism, in which each State can veto decisions relating to its national banks, and those who, including us, Italy, are calling for a supranational mechanism guaranteed by a backstop with European resources) (Author's own translation).

Even more important is the data for the symbols concerning the governance of the major European political decisions: in this regard, Monti's partial criticism is trumped by Letta's full-blown criticism of the major European governments and the EU institutions concerning the important decisions made over the previous 5 years. This was the first time that a strongly negative assessment had been made by an Italian PM in regard to an important area of community politics: a process of politicization taking on the tone of radical opposition.

(Europe should finally be able to offer an environment that broadens and supports the capacity for action of national policy, and does not result in a series of constraints, rules and procedures that (…) often end up hindering the action of all: families, citizens, small and large enterprises) (Author's own translation).

The Renzi Government (Figure 4) represented a substantial change in the way that Italy's government relate to the EU, as assessed through parliamentary discourse. Three of the four categories that Renzi's speeches concentrated on have an eminently negative connotation and therefore a clearly adversarial dimension with regard to the EU; this shows a typical trait of Renzi's leadership style developed over the years (Salvati, Reference Salvati2016). The fact that two categories belong to the politics area confirms his desire to instigate political conflict with Brussels.

Figure 4.

Renzi government. Distribution of symbols.

Renzi's parliamentary speeches diverge from the classic narrative established by Italy's elites in regard to the EU: his is an attempt to emphasize the need for Europe to change its present functioning and arrangements, and for a return to the original values of the European project (Brunazzo and Della Sala, Reference Brunazzo and Della Sala2016a; Reference Brunazzo, Della Sala, Magone, Laffan and Schwerger2016b). This last point is confirmed by the fact that the only positive category is that of references to the European identity and the need to rediscover the value of European community membership and its underlying rationale. Renzi strongly criticizes the governance of the policy decisions made by the EU during the years of the crisis; Brussels and the governments that support austerity are deemed responsible for the poor economic growth of the Euro area, and in particular for the non-solidarity and unequal management of the immigration question.

This criticism is exacerbated by the fact that Renzi identifies the EU's limitations and responsibilities as resulting from its domination by technocrats and bureaucrats, and thus he goes against the communitarian structure and encourages the true politicization of the EU and a change in the community process.

((…) to fight against a Europe that is simply an expression of technocracy and bureaucracy, and to restore that profoundly ideal outlook underlying the European Union project as conceived by its founding fathers and its founder members, including Italy) (Author's own translation).

It is particularly interesting to note the significant hostility towards acceptance of Community recommendations, with an Italian PM for the first time ever rejecting the idea that Italy must simply conform to the recommendations of the European institutions and/or of other governments within the Union. From this point of view, Renzi repeatedly underlines his belief that Italy has already played its part, and represents more a virtuous model than a cause for concern.

Gentiloni's approach differs only partially from that of Renzi (Figure 5); while his criticism and negativity is not as predominant as that of Renzi, his period in the office did not witness a return to the pre-crisis type of parliamentary speech. As for Letta, his positive evaluation is entirely based on the value categories, which were the same as those used by his former party colleague: a re-launch of the process of integration, and a rebalancing of the decision-making axis in favour of a supranational model. Gentiloni repeatedly pointed to the need for a model of differentiated integration for the EU in order to restart the integration process.

Figure 5.

Gentiloni government. Distribution of symbols.

The first Conte government (Figure 6) was of an ‘attention-grabbing’ nature, since it was the first European governmental coalition composed exclusively of populist parties, one of which – the LN – is openly Euro-sceptic (Chari et al., Reference Chari, Iltanen and Kritzinger2004; Quaglia, Reference Quaglia, Szczerbiak and Taggart2008), while the other – the M5S – has held fluctuating/uncertain stances on the question of European integration (Cremonesi and Salvati, Reference Cremonesi and Salvati2019; Salvati, Reference Salvati2019a; Reference Salvati2019b). The category that the majority of positive references focus on is that pertaining to the EU's role in the handling of the migration issue. Conte specifically called for the greater involvement of the EU in the management of migration flows, with express reference to European borders.

Figure 6.

Conte I government. Distribution of symbols.

(We propose a European multilevel strategy for migration, that is, an articulated and organic proposal based on the new approach, which allows Europe to move away from a logic of emergency management towards a logic of structural management, to be finally recognized as a priority (We need to) strengthen the external borders of the European Union) (Author's own translation).

This aspect is associated with a radical criticism of the governance of European economic policies and of how the issue of migrants' landings has been managed in previous years. Conte strongly criticizes past and present policy, leaving room for a call for ‘more Europe’ on this issue. However, it is interesting to observe that this request was accompanied by his insistence on defending national interests within Europe: he is the only PM to openly state that the Italian government will operate in Brussels mainly in defence of Italy's interests.

The other negative reference, in Conte's case, concerns the rules governing budget control, with his position clearly being influenced by the tug-of-war with the Commission over the budget manoeuvre for 2019. During his first experience in government, Conte repeatedly emphasized his belief that these constraints, combined with the EU's governance of the Eurozone and the budgetary and monetary sector (i.e. the reform of the European Stability Mechanism, the Fiscal Compact, etc.), should be considered as the main obstacle to economic growth. This embodies a straightforward refusal of conditionality, which is confirmed by his negative references – the first and only PM to do so – to the detrimental effects that the EU institutions and many of the political choices made at European level can have on the quality of Italy's democratic life.

(These risk-sharing mechanisms must not include conditions which, in order to reduce risk, would ultimately render on-going processes more intransigent. (…) We are against any tightening of the reform of the European Stability Mechanism, especially as new constraints on the debt restructuring process could contribute to financial instability rather than prevent it) (Author's own translation).

The current Conte II government, which emerged following the end of the coalition between LN and M5S, is actually supported by a more pro-European majority due to the presence of the Partito Democratico (Democratic Party – PD). This brand new coalition arrangement does not seem to have had any great impact on the main topics considered by Giuseppe Conte (Figure 7). As in his first experience as PM, Conte emphasizes the need for the EU to play a stronger role in managing the immigration issue, and makes know his strong disapproval of certain previous political positions adopted by EU institutions, in particular with regard to the financial and monetary sector. The main difference from his previous period as PM is represented by his direct reference to the need for stronger, renewed cooperation and solidarity among EU member states.

Figure 7.

Conte II government. Distribution of symbols.

This partial continuity in Conte's discourse confirms the absence of any clear, direct correlation between a parliamentary majority's position on the EU and the parliamentary discourse of its PM. As far as regards the Conte II Government, an important caveat applies: the analysis is based on one speech only, and so it is not possible to offer any clear-cut definition of Conte's (possible) new approach to the EU. It will be interesting to analyse the development of this relationship on the basis of a larger dataset of parliamentary speeches, which for the moment is not available.