One of the most influential texts in Asian studies in recent memory has been Kuan-Hsing Chen’s Asia as Method: Toward Deimperialization, which boldly claims that “Martin Heidegger was actually doing European studies, as were Michel Foucault, Pierre Bourdieu, and Jürgen Habermas.”Footnote ¹ Chen’s argument is not that East Asians must acknowledge the incommensurability between Western and non-Western political thought; rather, the emphasis is on the urgent need to renew our self-understanding in the era of globalization. In his view, this reconstruction of the “Eastern self” involves utilizing Western-origin conceptual categories and theories not as universal theoretical paradigms but as comparative vantage points. Confucian Constitutionalism does precisely this—it develops a normative theory of constitutional democracy that is comparative in both methodological orientation and content. This ambitious book deftly reconstructs Confucian constitutional thought through critical dialogue with Confucian meritocratic tradition, on the one hand, and contemporary constitutional theory, on the other hand. It proposes this reconstructed Confucianism as an alternative to Western liberal democracy, one that is most suitable for East Asian communities (2).

The book begins by demonstrating that the discourse of human dignity, which has served as the foundation of liberalism in the West, is not an asset exclusive to the intellectual tradition of “Greco-Roman philosophy and early Christian thought” (35). Kim discovers non-Western sources of human dignity in the canons of Confucian philosophy, particularly in the works of Mencius and Xunzi. Based on this revisionist reading of human dignity, the book presents what Kim calls Confucian democratic constitutionalism. What is admirable about this alternative theory of constitutional democracy is that it not only provides a normative defense of Confucian democracy but also proposes a practical institutional design suitable for East Asian societies.

Despite there being much to appreciate about Confucian Constitutionalism, I have two minor concerns. The first pertains to the applicability of Confucian democratic constitutionalism in “East Asian” societies. As Kim is well aware, Confucian democratic constitutionalism becomes a compelling proposal for East Asian societies only if they embody Confucian civic culture (27). The last section of the introduction (26–34) is allocated to discussing this issue from the outset, accompanied by a methodological justification of the book. Despite this supplementary discussion, the argument that Confucian democratic constitutionalism is applicable to East Asian societies remains not entirely convincing. Confucian democratic constitutionalism is arguably most relevant to East Asian societies shaped by their (a) Confucian heritage and (b) the fact of pluralism. These societies would face challenges in fully adopting Western liberalism insofar as the background cultures of their respective civil societies have been fundamentally influenced by Confucianism. Accordingly, Confucian democratic constitutionalism emerges as a viable alternative to Western liberal democracy for them.

My reservation regarding this thesis lies not in its internal validity but in its external validity. Kim’s list of East Asian societies includes China, Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, Vietnam, and Singapore (30, 197–99). In referring to several empirical studies to demonstrate that citizens in these societies embody (whether consciously or not) Confucian characteristics (30), he appears to assume that East Asians, writ large, are either currently witnessing the fact of pluralism or will likely do so in the course of their democratic transition. If the hypothesis that citizens in East Asian countries have inherited Confucian culture is to be tested and substantiated, both qualitatively and quantitatively, the same applies to whether they experience the fact of pluralism in civil society as they consciously subscribe to irreconcilable comprehensive doctrines.

Kim may point out that the fact of pluralism is not necessarily a modern condition specific to the case of democracies in the West, but to those in East Asia as well. However, to what extent is the fact of pluralism a given socio-cultural phenomenon in non-democracies in East Asia as well? Insofar as the likelihood of their democratization is difficult to predict, a possible conclusion to be drawn here might be that Confucian democratic constitutionalism as an institutional model is only applicable to East Asian democracies shaped by the fact of pluralism. If this reasoning is valid, Confucian democratic constitutionalism appears unlikely to take root as an alternative to liberal democracy in the near future, except in South Korea, Taiwan, or Japan.

My second concern pertains to the unsatisfying explanation of what Kim means by “Confucian civic culture” throughout his book. The introduction makes it clear that his philosophical reconstruction of Confucianism serves as a socially grounded alternative to democratic theories in the West (2). This is one of the reasons why he dedicates substantial portions of Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 to examining the conceptual distinction between Confucianism as a philosophy and as a civic culture (82). The cultural basis of Confucian democratic constitutionalism is not abstract Confucian philosophy but Confucian civic culture, one that has developed through the long process of mutual accommodation between Confucian heritage and democratization (82). Insofar as this culture is only partially comprehensive, it does not necessarily inhibit “the horizontal interactions between Confucianism and other comprehensive doctrines in civil society whose free exercise is constitutionally protected in terms of basic rights and freedoms” (124). As he clarifies, Confucian civic culture is not only descriptive but also aspirational in nature; it is a culture in flux (98, 120).

That said, what is the historical background of this distinctive civic culture in East Asian societies? It is conventional to base one’s normative argument on a historical reconstruction of the background culture, as evident in the works of many prominent scholars of liberal political theory.Footnote ² Of course not every normative democratic theory is required to provide a reconstructive narrative of its own. However, Kim promises that

More importantly, even if he were to elaborate on a historical narrative tailored to his philosophical reconstruction of Confucianism, I am not entirely sure it would be a compelling one. Consider the case of South Korea. To what extent did the Confucian culture of the Chosŏn dynasty survive the colonial era and military dictatorship, eventually evolving into a more democratic culture in the late 1900s? Would not this civic culture have inherited not only the cherished characteristics of Confucianism, such as the virtue of trust or trustworthiness (xin) (151), but also the elitism and paternalism of the past? As I have noted elsewhere, some of the founding figures of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea (Taehanmin’guk Imshijŏngbu) squarely rejected Confucian culture as the foundation of a new democracy.Footnote ³ They firmly believed that Confucian culture was the means through which the governing elites had dominated and oppressed the commoners throughout the previous dynastic era. My point is not that Confucianism and democracy are incompatible. Instead, I am suggesting that it seems necessary to demonstrate the compatibility of Confucian culture with democratic self-rule by presenting a historical narrative of their reconciliation, referred to as Confucian civic culture in the book. Without this, it remains unclear what Kim means by Confucian civic culture and the extent to which it has developed to be Confucian and democratic simultaneously.

Confucian Constitutionalism stands as a pioneering work in the field of political theory. Kim has not only successfully navigated the nuanced terrain of Confucian and democratic thought but has also opened avenues for future discussions and explorations at the intersection of these two rich traditions. This book is an indispensable resource for scholars, students, and anyone interested in the relevance of Confucianism in the discussion of constitutional democracy as well as the methodology of comparative political theory.