In Modern Slavery, the Constitutional Court of Ecuador (Constitutional Court) examined whether Furukawa Plantations S.A. (Furukawa) exploited the vulnerability of hundreds of Afro-Ecuadorian abacaleros Footnote ¹ by imposing a system of serfdom that violated the international and constitutional prohibitions of slavery.Footnote ² The Constitutional Court also examined whether the ministries of labor, health, social inclusion, and government breached their duty to prevent slavery in Furukawa’s camps and to ensure the protection of the abacaleros. In its 2024 judgment, the Constitutional Court found that: (1) Furukawa’s practices of making the abacaleros work the land without pay and without any real possibility of changing their status constituted a form of modern slavery known as serfdom; and (2) the Labor, Health, and Government Ministries failed in their obligations to prevent and remedy those conditions. Modern Slavery stands as a landmark judgment in contexts where mutual blame between states and corporations obscures accountability for systemic corporate abuses and state negligence. The judgment is also notable for its well-designed reparation measures for the victims and its recognition of the urgent need to prevent future violations.

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Furukawa, a company established in Ecuador in 1963 and primarily owned by Japanese shareholders, is engaged in the harvesting, processing, and export of abacá, a banana-like plant.Footnote ³ Its fiber, traded globally, serves as a key raw material for textiles, paper, and furniture. Grown mainly in developing countries with tropical climates, abacá harvesting and processing are labor-intensive and require constant exposure to harsh environmental conditions. Today, Furukawa stands among the leading exporters of abacá in the world (paras. H1–H6).

Furukawa operated extensive tracts of land divided into small camps where hundreds of families lived. All the family members, including children and the elderly, worked exclusively in all stages of abacá production in exchange for housing and small plots of land to cultivate. Many abacaleros were born on the plantations, spent their entire lives working there, formed families, suffered amputations due to the hazardous nature of the work, and eventually died in the camps. It was not until 2018 that the abacaleros publicly denounced the precarious living conditions they faced, staging demonstrations and filing formal complaints with the health and labor authorities (paras. H7–H27).

In 2019, a group of 123 abacaleros filed a lawsuit against Furukawa and the Ministries of Health, Labor, and Government (defendant authorities), arguing that the dangerous work they performed under conditions that put their health and lives at risk amounted to modern slavery in the form of serfdom (para. 9).Footnote ⁴ The Trial Court of Santo Domingo found Furukawa responsible for violating the prohibition of slavery and held the defendant authorities responsible for negligently failing to monitor and investigate the labor and health conditions of the abacaleros. On appeal, the Provincial Court of Santo Domingo partially reversed the ruling, finding that the defendant authorities had taken some measures to protect them and declaring that only Furukawa was responsible for the practices that amounted to serfdom (paras. 4–6). A second lawsuit was filed by the National Ombudsman Office on behalf of 216 abacaleros, arguing that they were subjected to serfdom by Furukawa and that the Ministry of Labor failed to monitor and investigate the inhumane labor and living conditions. The lawsuit was dismissed by both the trial and appellate courts of Santo Domingo on procedural grounds, with the courts holding that the case fell under the jurisdiction of the labor courts (paras. 10–11).

After these conflicting outcomes, the Constitutional Court granted certiorari in both cases and consolidated them to issue, for the first time in history, a judgment addressing serfdom, a practice analogous to slavery.Footnote ⁵ In Hacienda Brasil Verde Workers v. Brazil, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) defined serfdom as a modern form of slavery, subject to the same absolute prohibition as traditional slavery. The IACtHR explained that modern forms of slavery control people through physical or psychological coercion, leading to the loss of autonomy and forced exploitation—not limited to ownership of an individual but extending to the complete denial of the victims’ autonomy (para. 52).Footnote ⁶ This IACtHR ruling helped frame the Constitutional Court’s understanding of serfdom and provided the analytical foundation for its own reasoning.

The majority opinion in Modern Slavery, authored by Justice Daniela Salazar Marín, was structured in three parts: the first outlines the systematic pattern of racialized and class-based selection of abacaleros, the second qualifies the situation of the abacaleros as serfdom, and the third establishes the state’s subsequent responsibility for its failure to monitor, investigate, and sanction these practices. To frame its analysis, the Court lays out two systematic elements reflected in the abacaleros’ testimonies. Most abacaleros were Afro-Ecuadorians who were illiterate and either were born on the plantations or had migrated from other regions, showing intersecting forms of exclusion based on race, education, and class (para. 105).Footnote ⁷ Moreover, the abacaleros lived in conditions incompatible with human dignity, without access to education, health, or essential public services, such as water and electricity in Furukawa’s camps (paras. 108–109). Building on this systematic pattern, the Constitutional Court held that the state bears the primary duty to provide quality public services. Yet the Court also found that Furukawa’s inaction deepened the workers’ vulnerability, keeping them deliberately bound to abacá production for the company’s profit. Furukawa’s omission constituted a breach of the corporate duty of human rights due diligence, which requires companies to identify, prevent, mitigate, and remedy adverse impacts, particularly those that are severe or irreversible (para. 112).Footnote ⁸

With the racial and class-based pattern of the abacaleros established, the Court examined whether Furukawa’s practices constituted serfdom, relying on three elements set forth in the 1956 Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery: (1) being bound to live and work on land belonging to another person; (2) being required to render a determinate service to that person, whether for reward or not; and (3) lacking the freedom to change one’s status.Footnote ⁹

The first element is objective in nature and requires the Court to verify the existence of a legal obligation to live and work on land belonging to another (para. 53). The Court found that the abacaleros were bound by law and custom to live and work on Furukawa’s lands. Between 1963 and 2019, the company controlled them through successive arrangements: first under field leaders, then through third-party contractors, and later through land lease agreements requiring exclusive abacá cultivation. Even in the latter arrangement, Furukawa continued to benefit from and indirectly control the labor of the abacaleros (paras. H9–H10). Over time, these practices created a customary system in which abacaleros lived and labored on land they did not own, and successive generations came to see abacá cultivation as an inherited obligation (paras. 114–21).

The second element relates to economic exploitation and the perpetrator’s obtaining of a benefit (para. 53). The Court also found that the abacaleros were required to render a determinate service to Furukawa for the production and harvesting of abacá. Although Furukawa relied on various business arrangements, including third-party contractors and land leases, to appear less directly involved, the Court found that the company actually maintained full control over production. All labor ultimately benefited Furukawa, not the intermediaries (para. 123). Even under the lease system, the Court identified coercive conditions, since the abacaleros were required to sell their production to Furukawa only, meet strict production quotas, and accept deductions from their earnings for rent and equipment.

The third element involves a substantial restriction of personal freedom and requires verifying forms of coercion by the perpetrator that significantly limit the victim’s freedom, demonstrating the exercise of “the attributes of the right of ownership” (para. 53). In Modern Slavery, the Court found that the farms’ geographic isolation, Furukawa’s control over entry and exit through padlocks, and the extreme poverty caused by the lack of electricity, sanitation, clean water, and medical care created inhuman conditions that left abacaleros with no real choice but to remain in this work, as they knew no other way of life (paras. 128–36). The Court’s findings of violations necessarily entail corresponding reparations, whether by restoring the situation to its prior state, rehabilitating the victims, or preventing recurrence.Footnote ¹⁰ To repair the abacaleros for Furukawa’s imposed serfdom, the Court ordered equity-based compensation. The Constitutional Court awarded $40,000 for moral harm and $80,000 for material harm to each abacalero, reflecting years of unpaid labor under degrading conditions. An additional $5,000 was granted to victims facing intersecting vulnerabilities such as age, gender, or disability. Furukawa also had the option of transferring land to the victims as compensation and was required to issue a public apology (paras. 198–200).

The next legal issue concerns the state’s failure to monitor, investigate, and sanction Furukawa’s practices. To clarify accountability, the Court examined the actions and omissions of the ministries of health, labor, social inclusion, education, and government across two periods: before and after the abacaleros’ first public complaints in 2018 (para. 155). The Court found that, before 2018, both the Ministry of Labor and the Ministry of Health had a legal duty to supervise Furukawa. The Ministry of Labor, responsible for inspecting working conditions under its constitutional mandate, neglected this task for decades. The Ministry of Health, charged with monitoring workplace health, hygiene, and safety, also failed to intervene or sanction the company. The Court concluded that this prolonged neglect directly contributed to labor accidents and working conditions incompatible with human dignity (para. 163). After the violations became public in 2018, state institutions still failed to act effectively. The Ministry of Labor did not eliminate child labor in Furukawa and arbitrarily lifted sanctions for degrading conditions (para. 170). The Ministry of Education’s programs were too limited to reduce dependence on abacá labor (para. 171). The Ministry of Social Inclusion failed to provide humanitarian aid or register victims until 2021 (para. 172). The Ministry of Government limited its response to dialogue with the victims, offering no concrete action or follow-up (para. 176). Overall, the Court found that these failures reflected a continuing lack of prevention and protection against serfdom even after 2018.

Moreover, to repair this institutional failure, the Constitutional Court ordered all the ministries to design an inter-institutional policy to address structural neglect, ensure dignified living conditions, and prevent the recurrence of slavery-like practices (paras. 208–15). This long-term policy seeks to help current victims escape poverty, secure decent work and housing, and eliminate the structural causes of serfdom (para. 223). The Constitutional Court also established symbolic reparation measures, including a public apology by the President of the Republic of Ecuador, the production of a documentary and an artistic work, and the declaration of a National Day of Remembrance for the victims (para. 222). Finally, the Constitutional Court mandated legal reforms to strengthen corporate accountability in accordance with business and human rights standards and to eradicate servitude in the agricultural sector (para. 224).

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Modern Slavery offers a window into how modern slavery remains a structural element in the economic success of corporations.Footnote ¹¹ The Constitutional Court’s determination of responsibility and the reparations ordered represent a human rights victory for the victims and a precedent for pending and future cases involving modern slavery in Ecuador and the world.

The main significance of Modern Slavery lies in how it addresses the division of responsibilities between Furukawa and the state. This tension reflects a common pattern in business and human rights cases, where governments and corporations shift blame to avoid accountability.Footnote ¹² The Court relied on the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, particularly Pillar II, which establishes the corporate duty to respect human rights through due diligence.Footnote ¹³ The Constitutional Court found that the living conditions had been deliberately imposed to create poverty and keep workers in perpetual servitude with no real possibility of change. It also affirmed that companies are bound by a duty of human rights due diligence. At the same time, Modern Slavery reveals a deeper structural reality: Furukawa had, in practice, come to exercise control over nearly every aspect of the abacá workers’ lives, functioning as the highest authority within the camps and even surpassing the power of the state. This should not serve as an excuse for the Ecuadorian state’s repeated omissions but rather as a warning of its failure to fulfill its role as guarantor of rights.

One of the greatest challenges for any human rights judgment is to design reparation measures that help victims overcome violations once the harm has already occurred and to order realistic actions for the state that can genuinely prevent future abuses. In fact, a persistent difficulty for constitutional courts and the IACtHR has been ensuring the full compliance of these measures due to the lack of political will.Footnote ¹⁴ Against this backdrop, Modern Slavery makes a significant contribution to future business and human rights cases through its well-crafted set of reparation measures directed at both Furukawa and the state authorities. The economic reparations stand out for their substantial amounts and for applying aggravating criteria in cases involving children, the elderly, women, and persons with disabilities. This is an acknowledgment that no amount of money can truly compensate for years of suffering or for depriving the abacá workers of the opportunity to build their own lives.

Although often perceived as a mere formality, the public acknowledgment of responsibility or official apology by the president and Furukawa’s CEO carries significant weight. It constitutes a legal recognition that rights violations were committed over many years and expresses a formal commitment to correct those actions going forward, accompanied by a sense of remorse.Footnote ¹⁵ The same applies to the artistic expressions ordered by the Court, such as the production of a documentary about the abacá workers and the creation of a National Day of Remembrance for the victims. These measures play a fundamental role in raising public awareness that the stories of the abacá workers must never be repeated and that their struggle deserves to be honored.

However, in a more critical assessment, the Constitutional Court fell short in three respects.

First, although it is not explicitly stated, Modern Slavery is set within a broader Latin American context where governments, corporations, and trade partners have normalized the idea that protecting vulnerable groups must be sacrificed for the sake of national competitiveness and economic development.Footnote ¹⁶ In Ecuador and other countries in Latin America, this pattern was documented early in the natural resource industries, where the extraction of oil and minerals used to produce all kinds of final goods in developed countries has effectively given transnational corporations a blank check to dispossess Indigenous peoples of their lands and destroy their ancestral ways of life.Footnote ¹⁷ In Modern Slavery, the success of the abacá industry relied on the profitability of keeping people in deplorable working conditions rather than ensuring them decent work and the possibility of building a life project. A more assertive acknowledgment that this case is not an isolated occurrence but a structural feature of the global economic order would have strengthened the moral gravity of the Court’s findings. From a human rights perspective centered on freedom, work, and human dignity, that acknowledgment also needed to be linked to concrete measures capable of changing the incentives that allow such slavery practices to persist.

Second, it is not entirely appropriate that the Court’s reasoning for declaring the existence of serfdom rests primarily on the living conditions of the abacaleros and on the finding that their selection was determined by race and socio-educational status. Modern Slavery is indeed a powerful and structural representation of what contemporary slavery entails. Yet future applications of this reasoning may face difficulties, as not all situations will involve such evident group-based, intergenerational contexts or such manifest living conditions. There will be individual cases where racial or socioeconomic factors are less visible. To prevent the evidentiary bar from becoming unreasonably high, future tribunals could build on what the Court implicitly recognized by examining the degree of control exercised over a person to the point of suppressing their legal personality (para. 51).^{Footnote 18} Interpreted this way, the bar of proof would be balanced. But if it is raised so high that modern slavery must always appear as a collective, racialized, and extremely precarious condition, it becomes almost impossible to prove and risks producing impunity.

Third, one important gap in the reparations, though justified by the Constitutional Court, was the lack of deeper engagement with the full range of human rights violations beyond the prohibition of slavery and the individual experiences of victims.^{Footnote 19} The Court correctly described the enslavement of the abacaleros as “pluri-offensive,” meaning it violated several human rights at once (para. 185). However, the judgment treated the harm as a collective experience by granting one unified form of reparation to every abacalero instead of addressing each situation individually. While there were aggravating factors that justified higher compensation for some, the Court failed to recognize that not all victims endured the same type or degree of harm. By assuming uniformity, it silenced the diversity of experiences and left unexamined violations such as physical abuse, degrading treatment, and the denial of rights to education, health, and housing. From a practical standpoint, however, the Court’s decision to approach the victims’ experiences collectively was pragmatic. Individualized fact-finding would have made the litigation significantly longer and more burdensome, especially given the absence of employment records and official documentation.

The trauma endured by the abacaleros and inflicted by Furukawa was finally heard and examined with legal seriousness in Modern Slavery. The case exposed how Furukawa, a company long embedded in Ecuador’s economic landscape, built and sustained a system of slavery while trying to shield itself from responsibility, a defense that collapsed under the weight of consistent and overwhelming evidence. The state shares this responsibility, for it failed in its basic duty to protect and prevent abuses within its territory. The reparations imposed set a boundary that economic ambition cannot cross and send a message that such conduct will face sanction. These reparation measures cannot return the years taken from the victims, but they open a path toward recovering their freedom and show that the law, even when late, can still serve as a force against deeply rooted injustice.