2.1 The ‘transcendental method’, ethical frameworks, and historical progress

Cohen conceives of ethical activity as an ongoing cultural practice manifesting in normative judgements. Philosophy theorises about the ethical categories that underlie these judgements, providing frameworks to guide our moral deliberation. To capture this process, Cohen develops what he refers to as the ‘transcendental method’: This method aims not only to explore the logical categories that enable accurate ethical judgements but also operates under the assumption that methodically guided thinking – the correct application of ethical concepts – fosters cultural progress. The aim of this section is to demonstrate that, although Cohen’s ethics makes universal claims, these claims are also considered in their material manifestation (Widmer Reference Widmer2024). Similarly to the case of artefacts that are both objects resulting from method-guided activity and integral to the historical evolution of art, I will illustrate that Cohen’s ethics employs a dual approach: One perspective examines the correct way to engage in ethical deliberation, while the other assesses the effectiveness of ethical frameworks in the advancement of culture.

To understand Cohen’s view, it is helpful to explore the influences that shaped his thinking, leading him to conceptualise universal claims as deeply intertwined with our tangible experiences. Numerous scholars have emphasised the profound influence of Adolf Trendelenburg, Cohen’s teacher, on Cohen (see, e.g., Edgar Reference Edgar2021, Beiser Reference Beiser2018, Kinzel Reference Kinzel2023).Footnote ⁷ Trendelenburg’s conservative political views did not align with Cohen’s socialism. As a ‘loyal Prussian’, Trendelenburg believed that ‘the Hohenzollers’ (the ruling aristocracy) were the epitome of enlightened rule (Beiser Reference Beiser2013: 71). Nevertheless, Cohen found inspiration in Trendelenburg’s historically ‘embedded’ view of ethical rationality, which serves as the foundation for the normative constraints of natural law (Widmer Reference Widmer2023a). According to Trendelenburg, the Kantian notion of universality is evident in ‘concrete’ normative concepts that shape our ethical deliberation and, consequently, the norms that become realised in history (Brüllmann Reference Brüllmann, Hartung and King2019: 207).

With an origin in ideas tracing back to his Logical Treatises of 1840 (second edition 1870), Trendelenburg agrees with Hegel that rationality is a historical practice. However, in his Natural Law based on Ethics, he highlights what he considers a crucial oversight in Hegel’s dialectical logic: the absence of ‘spatial movement’ (Reference Trendelenburg1868: 42). The category of spatial movement would enable us to attribute two contradictory states to one and the same object. For example, Trendelenburg argues that while the sentence, ‘While the day is coming, it is already, and it is not yet’ (p. 38), would violate the law of non-contradiction, which states that A and not-A cannot both be true simultaneously, nevertheless, we would still be capable of perceiving an object in its transitional state. Our ‘receptive intuitions’ allow us to ascribe contradictory states to one and the same object (p. 56).

The ability to perceive an object in its transitional state is also a significant aspect of Trendelenburg’s practical philosophy. In Natural Law based on Ethics, Trendelenburg argues that historically developed norms can be understood in two seemingly contradictory ways: (i) in their spatial-temporal appearance, causally determined by natural laws, and (ii) concerning their underlying purpose, constituted by a free rational will. The latter perspective enables us to assess the rightness of the norms in question: ‘As the spirit opens its senses, … the a priori principle of freedom is found in its movement in physical objects and ethical norms’ (Reference Trendelenburg1868: 237). Freedom is not merely an abstract idea; it also manifests itself in appearances that shape our history. Just as we can intuitively ascribe both A and not-A to the same object, we can perceive historical facts as causally determined appearances while simultaneously considering them as originally caused by a free will.

Trendelenburg adopts a loosely Kantian perspective, emphasising an a priori understanding of the ideal purpose, which he considers the ‘ethical origin’ of consciousness (cf. Hartung Reference Hartung, Horn and Neschke-Hentsche2008: 297). However, he not only historicises and materialises moral norms more profoundly than Kant but also abandons the systematic separation of law and morality (Trendelenburg Reference Trendelenburg1868: 16). Trendelenburg argues that all norms, whether moral norms or positive laws, should be assessed with respect to one universal purpose. The aim is to identify legal norms in history established for universal ends, allowing for the distinction between moral developments and those exemplifying non-universalisable, immoral ends. The task of philosophy is to elucidate the underlying logic that permits an ethical interpretation of historical events, regardless of their material manifestation in history.

Resonating with Trendelenburg, Cohen employs the notion of concrete universality, considering ‘cultural facts’ both as part of the empirical realm subject to causal explanations and as expressions of ethical rationality orientated towards a moral purpose. As he conceives of philosophical ethics as the rational and ‘scientific’ endeavour to conceptualise this practice, Cohen encounters a novel problem: If ethical rationality inevitably manifests itself in the spatial-temporal realm, how are supposedly rational and atemporal ethical concepts such as ‘universality’, ‘humanity’, or the ‘end in itself’ to be addressed?

Cohen considers ethics not only as a discipline that promotes objective principles intended to be realised in practice. By regarding his own framework as a ‘method’ that guides moral thinking, he is also concerned with the effectiveness of ethical concepts and their potential to foster cultural progress (Reference Cohen2001: 33). To illustrate this dual perspective, consider a scenario in which a morally charged case is presented to a materialistic monist and an idealistic dualist. The materialistic monist denies the possibility of universal judgements on a priori grounds, asserting that our sense of morality is subjective, contingent, and entirely rooted in our experiences. Consequently, objectivity in ethics may only pertain to descriptive statements regarding what people consider to be right. On the other hand, the idealist maintains that, even though the content of our moral judgements varies, we can distinguish between right and wrong based on an implicit a priori principle. These two positions can be examined in two ways: first, in terms of the validity of their theories, and second, in terms of the effectiveness of these methodological frameworks within the context of cultural progression.

The first perspective aims to clarify who is deploying the right concepts. As we will see in more detail in section 2.2, Cohen rejects the prevailing materialist trend of the nineteenth century, as it carries the risk of moral relativism. With his goal of preserving ethics as a discipline dealing with objective judgements, Cohen, a self-proclaimed ‘Platonist’, conceives of ‘ethical reality’ as an arrangement of rationally constructed ideal principles (Reference Cohen2001: 36). He asserts that it is ‘not the stars in the sky that are the objects considered by the [transcendental] method as knowledge; rather, the transcendental gaze is directed towards astronomical calculations and the facts of scientific reality’ (pp. 27–8). Similarly, in the context of ethical judgements, we are not concerned with a descriptive analysis of actual moral practices, but with rationally constructed principles aimed at a unified purpose.Footnote ⁸ Thus, though mediated through historically embedded concepts in space and time, concepts such as ‘universality’, ‘humanity’, or ‘end in itself’ are perceived as revealing aspects of our moral consciousness. To signify the intermediacy of these concepts, Cohen translates them into ‘functional’ terms, as will be detailed in section 2.3.

The second perspective assesses the expected historical effects when these concepts are applied. Just as we evaluate an artist’s work based on its impact on the course of art history, moral theories are judged by their potential to promote progress. Though Cohen thinks of the materialistic monist as deploying categories that fail to reflect important aspects, these concepts can still effectively advance human history. As we later see in Cohen’s engagement with the history of monotheism and Marxism, it is this perspective that enables him to appreciate theories with which he philosophically disagrees. This teleological perspective on ethical concepts forms the basis for the first feature of Cohen’s neo-Kantian ethics:

Inspired by Trendelenburg’s account of embedded ethical rationality, which allows us to understand norms as substantive appearances established for an ethical end, Cohen employs an understanding of ethical rationality that is sensitive to both the evolving content of moral norms and the changing frameworks by which we evaluate them.

As we will explore in more detail, these two perspectives play an integral role in Cohen’s discussion of socialism. Socialism is regarded as a movement that constitutes a ‘fact of culture’. Marxism and Cohen’s neo-Kantianism represent two differing views for interpreting this development. Although the historical materialist framework is effective in promoting progress, it is limited by its relativist stance on ethical normativity. In contrast, the framework proposed by Cohen aims to offer more advanced concepts that facilitate rational progress through existing legal institutions and measures.

2.2 The ultimate end

We will now explore Cohen’s conceptual framework in greater depth. At this point, we are not yet concerned with the formal will that guides ethical deliberations or the principle that provides ethical content. Instead, we draw attention to Cohen’s aim to elucidate the notion of universality when we engage in moral deliberation more generally. His goal is to demonstrate that in every objective statement – whether in science or ethics – we presuppose the idea of a systematic unity. Objective judgements in ethics, according to Cohen, are possible only when we consider the social realm as regulated by laws consistent with the overarching purpose of non-contradictory ends. Throughout his works, Cohen refers to this concept interchangeably as the ‘ultimate purpose’, the ‘ideal of the idea of purpose’, the ‘idea of the unity of ends’, the ‘idea of God’, the ‘intellectus archetypus’, or – in Pure Will – ‘allness’ (Allheit):

According to Cohen, objective ethical judgements become possible when we presuppose the idea of an absolute unity of ends. Although the ultimate end as an ideal rational concept has manifested in various conceptual forms throughout human history, he distinctly separates this line of inquiry from an empirical-psychological approach. This latter approach is a descriptive discipline that reduces moral values to inductive inferences. While the strict separation of deductive and inductive psychological approaches might not appear ground-breaking to those familiar with Kant, it is important for Cohen. Cohen is confronted with the reduction of normative objectivity to empirical truths through his Marburg predecessor and friend, Friedrich Albert Lange. A revival of Kantian ethics at that time could only be successful if it addressed the concerns arising from the empiricist and scientific zeitgeist of the era.

The cultural climate against which Cohen is arguing is best depicted in Lange’s influential book, The History of Materialism (Reference Lange2015). In this work, Lange advocates for a psychologisation of the conditions of experience, which coincides with an aestheticisation of moral values. Lange argues that the conditions of experience are inductively based on empirical assessments of our psychological preconditions. Similarly to when we look through a telescope with a stained lens, where we can infer that the stain appears whenever we do so, Lange argues that judgements of necessity concerning the conditions of the possibility of experience are based on contingent features of our nature (Lange Reference Lange2015: 265; see also Widmer Reference Widmer2022: 260–1). In this vein, Lange argues that ethical ideals are merely products of our fictive imagination. What Kant would have regarded as the ‘general will’ simply reflects a fictive idea of a unified whole stemming from our aesthetic inclination to harmonise sensual input (Lange Reference Lange2015: 509; see also Russo Krauss Reference Russo Krauss2023). Just as our psychology drives us to seek symmetry in art, Lange argues that ethical deliberation arises from our aesthetic inclination to perceive the social world as a cohesive whole. The aesthetic ‘standpoint of the ideal’, as he calls it, is considered distinct from our rational pursuit of objectively true principles (Reference Lange2015: 509). Lange thus presents a critique of Kant’s ethical formalism that resonates with the Marxist tradition, suggesting that although Kant’s ethical theory aims to yield objective moral claims, it merely reflects the moral standards of that era. Progress, thus, can only be achieved through empirical insights into wrongs.

In contrast, Cohen argues – initially against Lange and subsequently against Marxists – that while acknowledging that moral cognition inevitably operates with concepts reflecting historically evolved moral standards, objective judgements in ethics depend on a notion of unity that is distinct in kind, requiring deductive inferences (Reference Cohen2001: 352). Cohen acknowledges that Kant himself introduces the notion of a focus imaginarius in the Critique of Pure Reason (p. 360; CPR, A644/B672). However, he stresses that the aspect of imagination does not refer to a fictive component of our cognition but to a rationally justified notion of the intellectual archetype, under which a normative viewpoint on our ‘ethical reality’ becomes possible (ibid.). In this vein, Cohen rejects Lange’s use of the term innere Stammesbegriffe to refer to the concept of the systematic unity of ends. Even though Kant himself uses this term, Cohen notes that the notion of Stamm – perhaps even suggesting the notion of innate ‘tribal’ concepts – carries a problematic naturalistic undertone that he seeks to avoid. In any case, neither epistemology nor ethics deals with inborn categories or, to use his own term referencing Kant, an ‘innate’ account of ‘apriority’ (p. 34). By insisting on this point, he seeks to show that a priori principles are not a reflection of our psychological nature or the economic mode of production but rather rational concepts that are necessarily presupposed when we seek to make the social realm intelligible. By regarding ethics as bearing on deliberation regarding means-ends relations under the ultimate purpose of the systematic unity of ends – whatever the empirical manifestation of this idea may be – Cohen emphasises that ethics is distinct from the psychological and physiological conditions of thinking. Instead of seeking causal explanations of norms, ethics focuses on judgements subsumed under right ends.

According to Cohen, what empiricists and materialists overlook is that with any objective statement, we presuppose the idea of a coherent unity. Recall the previously mentioned case of the materialistic monist and the idealistic dualist, each employing distinct frameworks of objectivity. Cohen holds the position that both materialists and idealists implicitly rely on the concept of absolute unity. The difference lies in the idealist’s ability to properly comprehend this epistemological presupposition. Cohen argues that without the idea of an absolute unity of ends, our social interactions would be incomprehensible to us on a rational level. In the theoretical sphere, the idea of unity grounds what Cohen calls the ‘axiom of cognizability’ (Axiom der Erkennbarkeit), which is the assumption that our natural world is governed by a coherent unity of causal laws (Reference Cohen2001: 47). To study the laws of nature, we need to perceive the world as if it consisted of logically coherent laws that can be discovered by us. Consequently, our scientific endeavour to seek objectivity is necessarily preceded by the idea of a ‘unity of reason of the unconditioned’, even though it never appears in experience (p. 80). Cohen criticises anti-idealist positions, as found in historical materialism, for insufficiently reflecting this ideal component. Even in inductive judgements, where we infer general principles from individual cases, he argues that we necessarily rely on the presupposition of the idea of absolute unity. Because we can never know all individual instances, generalisations in inductive judgements presuppose this idea, which transcends our empirical knowledge. In the normative sphere, the ‘axiom of cognizability’ is the idea of an absolute purpose where all purposes merge into a coherent system of ends. According to Cohen, the question is not ‘how and by what is freedom as a cause possible?’ but rather ‘to what end does it show itself effectively within the systematic unity of cognition?’ (p. 269, emphasis added).

Although Ernst Troeltsch and other historicists of that era criticised Cohen for interpreting history through an idealised telos (cf. Klubak Reference Klubak1987: 217), Cohen viewed his idealist stance as a counteraction against the value-free investigation of history that was prevalent in his time. He believed that it is only through this approach that we can achieve a rational perspective on social movements, one that emphasises ethical transformations over time. An illustration of this idea is to be found in Religion of Reason, where Cohen argues that the Jewish conception of God was the first emerging concept that allowed for an objective assessment of moral norms. The Talmud spread during a time when most people believed in polytheism, a relativistic moral belief system that did not yet possess the conceptual tools to differentiate objectively between right and wrong (Cohen Reference Cohen1966: 399). According to Cohen’s assessment, the ancient Greeks envisioned their gods as human-like entities, each with a different moral code. While the Greeks depicted their gods making inconsistent claims – one god demanding an act while another forbade it – the Jewish conception of a monotheistic God allowed for a logically coherent moral belief system. Cohen emphasises that the adoption of this framework had significant moral effects in overcoming cruel sacrificial practices that were deeply rooted in ‘mythical’ thinking (Reference Cohen1966: 32, see also Widmer Reference Widmer2023b, Reference Widmer2024).

In the modern period, the notion of a systematic unity of ends is regarded as a logical concept that provides us with the most accurate framework for an ‘ethical epistemology’ – as Cohen calls it at times. Although section 2.1 has shown that he acknowledges the possibility of evaluating materialist perspectives based on their potential to promote progress, we now see that, for Cohen, only a transcendental idealist position – one that considers the assumptions that render the social realm ethically intelligible to us – offers the appropriate evaluative framework. With his critical interpretation of the idea of a unified system of ends, Cohen not only aims to demonstrate, in contrast to the prevalent worldview, that Kantian deductive logic is the right method for evaluating historical movements. As we will see later, he also uses this argument to counter Marxist strands that refute the validity of idealism and ethical normativity. Thus, the second feature of Cohen’s neo-Kantian ethics can be put as follows:

The systematic view of ends also enables an objective evaluation of historically evolved practices. In this vein, Cohen argues that the objective reality of moral principles ‘is not real in experience’, but one that ‘becomes real through our actions’; it creates the ‘transcendent perspective’ or the ‘standpoint of the noumenon’ from which our ‘ethical reality’ is presented to us (Reference Cohen2001: 309).

2.3 The functional principle of humanity

We have seen that, in Cohen’s system, the systematicity of ends plays a crucial role. However, coherence on its own is not enough. If coherence were the only criterion, then the maxim ‘to lie if it serves my purpose’ could easily become a general rule if we do not simultaneously accept the contradicting principle that lying is wrong. Both Kant and Cohen would be dissatisfied with such logic. Ethical judgements are not solely concerned with a unified set of ends; the ends of practices must, at the same time, be coherent under the presupposition that everyone is viewed as a ‘member of humanity’ (Reference Cohen2001: 362). In this section, I aim to demonstrate that the concept of humanity, specifically the principle of never treating someone solely as a means but always also as an end in itself, serves as a hermeneutical guiding principle in Cohen’s neo-Kantian system for discerning moral content.

Neo-Kantian and contemporary scholars have approached the concept of humanity in various ways. James Furner interprets Cohen’s formula of humanity as a principle that establishes a perfect duty to condemn exploitative working practices under capitalism. This, he argues, arises from the logical inconsistency between the principle of ‘never treating humanity in a person merely as a means’ and the entailments of labour practices such as ‘menial machine labour’ (Furner Reference Furner2019: 17). A more accurate rendering of Cohen’s formula of humanity can be found in interpretations where the notion of the end in itself is viewed as an ‘interpretative concept’, constituting a ‘hermeneutical approach’ (Schmid Reference Schmid1995; see also in contemporary Kant scholarship (Wood Reference Wood2017: 65). According to this approach, the concept of humanity, by itself, does not yet establish a specific duty. Instead, it enables us to interpret human behaviour in a moral light, discerning whether an action is ‘respectful or disrespectful, caring or uncaring’, etc. (ibid.). As the subsequent paragraphs show, Cohen utilises the formula of humanity similarly as a hermeneutical principle in his own unique manner.

The hermeneutical aspect is expressed in Cohen’s ‘functional’ reading of humanity (Reference Cohen1981: 35–6, see also Widmer Reference Widmer2023b, Reference Widmer2024). While we repeatedly encounter the claim that ethical judgements should be considered with regard to their ‘function’, Cohen himself does not elaborate much on what he means by that. However, his student, Ernst Cassirer, wrote an in-depth treatise on how to deal with a priori principles in functionalist terms, arguing that while we cannot have any insights into the forms of principles without their content, we gain access to them through their symbolic appearance as they manifest in forms of life. It seems in order to interpret Cohen’s functional take on humanity through the lens of his student. As a first step, I will highlight the relevant aspects in Cassirer, which will provide us with a better understanding of how ethical concepts are considered in functional terms. Then I will demonstrate that Cohen’s notion of humanity is also to be understood as a functional concept, providing us with moral content created by the most advanced moral framework available at the time.

In 1910, two years after the publication of the second edition of Pure Will and the same year in which the second edition of Foundation of Ethics appears, Cassirer introduces a functional interpretation of the Kantian principles in Concept of Substance and Concept of Function (Cassirer Reference Cassirer1910). To illustrate what he considers an improvement over the original Kantian theory, he uses the following example: If we see an object, we can only notice some parts simultaneously, necessarily bound to a ‘perspective’ (p. 383). But despite our limited perceptual access to things as they are, we inevitably create an idea of an object, which allows us to recognise the object as a unified entity even as we look at it from a multiplicity of angles. This gives us an indication of how our consciousness follows universal laws that structure our experience. The ‘function of the law’, grounded in our ‘consciousness’, is to ‘produce the idea of an object’ as, without it, we would not be able to recognise an object as a unified entity (ibid.).

In the same vein, Cassirer interprets the ‘pure will’ in functional terms. He states that a scientific rendering of ethical judgements would leave us with a ‘functional’ interpretation of Kant’s ‘ethical basic concepts’ (Reference Cassirer1939: 83). These ethical concepts never appear in experience but are mediated through normative judgements in time and space. In Freedom and Form, Cassirer argues that the ‘function of the pure will cannot be considered without its relation to the object’ (Reference Cassirer and Recki in2001: 237). For example, the idea that sacrificial practices are morally wrong is not an immediate truth that is just given to us. Rather, we become gradually more and more aware of the pure functions of judgements through our changing moral frameworks and conceptions of rightness. What all moral judgements have in common is their ‘function’ to create morally better forms of life (ibid.). The formal requirements are thus presented in ethical judgements. They become apparent when we examine the purpose of these judgements in the course of history. Whereas the content and the conceptualisation of our ethical concepts change over time, their function to create a better society in the course of human history remains the same.

As Cassirer’s An Essay on Man shows, the empirical outlook provides the basis to track the evolution of ethical rationality. Cassirer argues that any symbolic form can function either as an instrument of oppression or a product of ethical rationality seeking progress. At the heart of evaluation of the matter lies the Kantian notion of autonomy, functionally perceived: it serves as the ideal criterion against which materialised moral frameworks are measured. Illustrative of this idea is Cassirer’s differentiation between ‘static religion’ and ‘dynamic religion’ (Reference Cassirer1944: 116). Static religion is a ‘product of social pressure.’ Dynamic religion, by contrast, breaks with ‘all the former social bonds’, seeking more autonomous forms of life and leading to cultural progress (p. 131).

Though Cohen is less explicit about his functional interpretation of Kantian concepts, his perspective on the concept of humanity is best understood in Cassirerian terms, namely as a moral concept that, even though the manifestation of the idea is subject to historical change, remains functionally the same.

As a functional concept, the notion of humanity grounds the ‘limiting condition’ that renders the content for duties and rights.

The idea of treating individuals according to their humanity serves the function of rendering social norms in an ethical light. It sets the boundaries of an ethical framework and the hermeneutical condition under which the ethical content is determined.

Passages from Religion of Reason are helpful in illustrating how Cohen applies this idea. Although the concept of humanity was introduced in modern times by Kant, Cohen argues that a similar expression of the law already appeared in ancient times. According to Cohen, the Jewish concept of ‘mizwa’ signifies both ‘law and duty’, without relying on the mythical idea of a transcendent soul existing beyond worldly existence (Reference Cohen1966: 401). However, Cohen notes that the Pauline conception of law reintroduced mythical elements back into our cultural consciousness, such as the belief in a ‘true self’ existing beyond death (p. 401). Similarly to Cassirer, with the Kantian notion of humanity in mind, Cohen compares different religious concepts functionally. In this vein, he seeks to show that the Pauline conception of law deviates drastically from an ethical understanding of law. Driven by the fear of punishment, it suppresses the individual’s free choice. This marks a step backward in the evolution of ethical rationality. By tying moral laws to the idea of a transcendent soul, Cohen asserts that a more advanced Jewish ethical understanding of the concept of law had been suffocated, only replaced much later in Lutheran Protestantism by ‘an epistemology of liberalism’ (Nahme Reference Nahme2019: 82). Though the concept of humanity emerged in its pure form much later, it had, according to Cohen, functionally already been introduced by the Jewish tradition.

Following the two-fold account of the transcendental method, Cohen thus employs the notion of humanity in two ways: (i) explicitly to gather the moral content of ongoing practices and (ii) implicitly to trace progressive movements in history. In both cases, the Kantian principle of humanity or its equivalent at a given time serves the purpose of interpreting normative practices in a moral light. This provides us with the third feature of Cohen’s neo-Kantian ethics:

2.4 Relational duties and rights

Having discussed the critical hermeneutical framework for regarding the social sphere, we will now look more closely at the types of duties and rights in Cohen’s work, which are understood relationally and serve as norms guiding our social interactions. The social component is apparent when Cohen introduces what he calls the ‘grounding principle of ethics’:

This passage refers to both the rational entailments of the ultimate end, as specified above in 2.2, and the moral content determined by the principle of humanity, as discussed in 2.3. However, in this section, we shall focus on the relational aspect of norms, as illustrated in Cohen’s reference to the ‘administration of the moral world’. Cohen’s ethics is not concerned with maxims guiding the action of individuals, but rather with rules that constitute our sociality: our legal frameworks.

To illustrate Cohen’s ethical concern with the legal institutionalisation of norms, it is instructive to take a closer look at his criticism of Kant’s ‘point of view’ in the well-known murderer-at-the-door case (Reference Cohen1981: 528–9). Cohen criticises Kant’s response for failing to treat this as a case dealing with a norm that could potentially become a guiding rule in a just society. The problem, according to Cohen, lies in the fact that Kant would argue that even a case of ‘unjust coercion’ would not justify a ‘good-natured lie’, making a lie morally reprehensible even if it prevents a murder (ibid.). The issue Cohen raises here is that Kant treats the maxim as that of an individual act and not as a relational rule, leading to problematic results that go against our moral intuition. Cohen seeks to resolve this issue by adopting a social viewpoint. Instead of describing the act in terms of the individual person answering the door, he assesses the action-guiding rule relationally. In Cohen’s view, the relevant act description in the murderer-at-the-door example is not the ‘lie’, but the ‘prevention of a murder’. If an act can be reconciled with the free community without contradiction, it is considered ethically justified. Just as the rule of ‘self-defence’ is not seen as ‘murder’ or ‘a murder in self-defence’, Cohen argues that the act description of the ‘lie’ in Kant’s example should be replaced with a description that takes into account the coercive nature of the situation and its potential to become a general rule in society (ibid.).

This shift towards the social realm leads to another consequence: the dissolution of the systematic separation between internal moral laws and external legal laws (see Gibbs Reference Gibbs and Munk2005). In Kant’s view similarly to Cassirer, the external realm is considered as systematically distinct from the internal realm, regulated by an account of freedom that states, ‘any action is considered right if it can coexist with everyone’s freedom in accordance with a universal law’ (Kant Reference Kant and Gregor1996: Ak. 6: 230). Cohen dismisses this approach with the argument that it would lead to a duty of ‘sanctifying the existing legal and state order’, which undermines a critical assessment thereof (Cohen Reference Cohen, Sandkühler and de la Vega1970: 79). Thus, for Cohen, concerned with moral progress, the pure will serves as the only rational principle imposing normative constraints on the social realm. In Cohen’s words: ‘The ethics of the pure will must become the principal doctrine of the philosophy of law and state’ (p. vii). Cohen’s social ethics intends to foster a critical attitude towards existing legal norms that regulate our interpersonal relations. Accordingly, ‘ethical logic’ is to be deployed in the ‘legal sciences’ (Rechtswissenschaften) (ibid.).

Systematically, this idea traces back to Cohen’s elaboration on the logic of ‘the Other’ in Pure Will, where he raises the question of how the ‘self-consciousness of pure will’ is possible (Reference Cohen1981: 282). According to Cohen, the reflective self is genuinely social, constituted in confrontations with others in our social interactions. ‘The I’, argues Cohen, ‘could not be defined or generated if it were not conditioned by the Other’ (p. 212). Albeit in a somewhat modified form, Cohen utilises Fichte’s concept of the ‘not-I’ in order to justify the relational ethical logic underlying juridical deliberation. The ‘A=A’ or the ‘I am I’ represents the reflecting subject in Fichte’s philosophy of scientific thinking (Fichte Reference Fichte1846: 95). According to Cohen, Fichte was the first to develop the concept of the ‘not-I’ as a concept of the ‘Other’ that is taken in a purely logical sense.Footnote ⁹ As Cohen understands this principle, the ‘first A’ refers to the non-reflective and heterogeneous subject. The ‘second A’ refers to the I that ‘makes itself the object of reflection’ (Reference Cohen1981: 208). Ethical reflection is initiated by the ‘not-I’. However, whereas the not-I in Fichte encompasses objects, Cohen’s usage refers to other persons only, thereby marking the realisation of the Other ‘in terms of the concept of humanity’ (p. 209). Ethical consciousness is only attainable through confrontation with the ‘consciousness of the Other’. This encounter fosters our deliberation as to how to treat others, acknowledging that they possess the same rational capacity as we do (p. 212).

It comes as no surprise that Cohen finds inspiration in Fichte’s embedded account of subjectivity. According to Fichte, the task of philosophy is to reflectively distance oneself from ideas shaped by history and replace them with rational ones. For two reasons, Cohen, who views philosophy as a continuous rational or ‘scientific’ endeavour to refine moral concepts, finds Fichte’s approach particularly appealing. First, Cohen’s adaptation of the recognition of ‘the Other’ acknowledges that laws regulating our interpersonal relationships evolve historically. Second, the rational aspect of ‘the Other’ – in Cohen’s interpretation, the notion that everyone should be viewed in their rational capacity to set ends – provides the logical foundation for rational renegotiation of the historically evolved concepts in question.

In legal discourse, this process most evidently reflects our ethical logic. ‘The logic of pure knowledge is founded on mathematics … In a similar manner, … ethics [is orientated] towards jurisprudence. Jurisprudence is the mathematics of the social sciences’ (Reference Cohen1981: vii). According to Cohen, jurisprudence, where persons are seen as entirely detached from their empirical and contingent characteristics, aims at justifying just rules regulating interpersonal actions. The focus lies here solely on the ‘objective’ side of the human agent (pp. 216, 223). Just as mathematics is taken to be the ‘logical method’ of the natural sciences, Cohen designates ‘ethics’ as the ‘logical method of the human sciences’ (Humanwissenschaften) (ibid.). In this vein, the ‘state’ is taken as the institution that ought to actualise moral principles (cf. p. 242). Rules of social and cultural practices are morally just only if their end is coherently rendered under a perspective where everyone is recognised and treated in accordance with their rational nature. Socialism, as we will see, is an expression of our rational inclination to renegotiate laws so that labourers are recognised as rational beings with intrinsic ends in the legal-economic sphere: a realm that has thus far been regulated by the end of accumulation of capital. The fourth feature of Cohen’s ethics is a further specification of the type of rules in question in regard to the ultimate purpose: