Previous studies have primarily advocated enhancing the deterrent effects of sanctions against offending firms to prevent organizational environmental violations. However, despite stricter regulatory environments, violations that cross the ‘red line’ remain pervasive. Limited research has delved into the factors that influence an organization’s ability to learn from environmental sanctions imposed on others. To address this gap, inspired by social learning theory, we examine whether environmental sanctions imposed on violating firms deter environmental governance among their industry and regional peers using a sample of Chinese-listed firms from 2008 to 2021. Our findings indicate that increasing the frequency and severity of penalties for offending firms – particularly those leading firms and state-owned-enterprises or those with close ties – can affect the environmental governance practices of their peers, both in terms of process and outcome, underscoring the critical role of peer influence in enforcing environmental regulations. Additionally, the current article also concludes that the general deterrence effect on peers is more pronounced in competitive industries and regions with underdeveloped legal frameworks.

既有研究普遍主张通过强化对违规企业制裁的威慑力来遏制环境违法行为,然而在监管趋严的背景下,触碰环保‘红线’的现象依然频发。探讨企业如何从其他受罚主体的环境处罚中汲取经验的研究十分有限。为了弥补这一不足,本研究基于社会学习理论,以2008–2021年中国A股上市公司为样本,实证检验对违规企业的环境处罚能否有效改善其行业与地域同伴的环境治理行为。研究表明,提高对违规企业的处罚频次与力度(尤其是当受罚主体为行业龙头、国有企业或与之存在密切关联的企业时),能够从治理过程与实施效果双重维度震慑同伴企业的环境治理实践,揭示了同伴影响在环境规制执行中的传导机制。进一步研究表明,在行业竞争程度较高、地区法治化水平较低的场域中,环境处罚对同伴企业的一般威慑效应更为明显。