Dans la foulée des différentes vagues de mobilisation et de contestation des années 2010, les théories de la démocratie radicale ont permis de réfléchir à nouveaux frais au rapport des mouvements sociaux à la démocratie en les associant à un idéal d’insurrection populaire. Or, il découle de cette association une conception particulière de la conflictualité politique qui est susceptible de renoncer aux promesses pratiques et normatives de la démocratie. S’agissant de dépasser cette conception de la conflictualité politique et de réaffirmer la spécificité de l’apport démocratique des mouvements sociaux, cet article entend étayer l’hypothèse d’une institution insurgeante de la démocratie en soutenant que les mouvements sociaux contribuent par leurs pratiques contestataires à produire et à transformer l’ordre démocratique.

I argue for a general conception of justice that aims to identify what is common to multiple complementary types of justice. John Rawls agrees that there are multiple types (or “levels” or “subjects”) of justice, each needing its own principles, but he opposes a general conception in favour of “unity by appropriate sequence.” I present my general conception — justice as environment-shaping responsibility — as a different path to theoretical unity in a multi-type view of justice. I show how my general conception of justice can be arrived at through a process of generalizing that starts with Rawls’s conception of domestic justice.

In Julia Maskivker’s recent “Justice and Contribution,” she argues that, under normal circumstances, the failure to guarantee that life-sustaining workers are above the non-struggle point is not merely disrespectful and a failure of beneficence, but a violation of the norms of fair play and, as such, a “low blow.” In this article, I offer a critical reply to Maskivker. I begin by explaining her reasoning. Then I turn to critique, focusing on two key weaknesses and, in so doing, drawing out two larger lessons.

This article addresses two objections by Samuel Kahn to my argument for a living wage for life-sustaining workers. First, it refutes the charge that my position is patronising for asserting that low wages impede a worker’s ability to thrive. Second, it responds to a challenge regarding the claim that individuals have a right to a monetary equivalent of their fair share of natural resources, and that this right can be used to determine the justice of a life-sustaining worker’s situation in modern society.

Dans cet article, je soutiens que les dynamiques de boys club peuvent être comprises comme des instances d’actions collectives, même en l’absence d’intentions partagées. Il n’est pas satisfaisant de penser ces phénomènes comme de simples accumulations d’actions individuelles isolées. Une théorie minimaliste de l’action collective nous permet de considérer qu’il s’agit bien d’un phénomène d’action collective : l’ordre social patriarcal offre un plan d’action, qui oriente et coordonne les comportements des agents. C’est en vertu de cette coordination qu’on peut parler d’action collective.

W. V. Quine suggests that meaning derives from the stimulus, the effects of the outside world on the subject’s nerve endings. However, the idiosyncrasy of the stimulus poses challenges to the intersubjectivity of meaning. Gary Kemp proposes the stimulus field approach as a solution. The stimulus field approach focuses on the forces affecting the subject, rather than the effects on the subject. In this article, I critique Kemp’s solution. Furthermore, I argue that the Quinean approach can be refined in a way that two agents may converge on the same meaning even without sharing the same stimuli or forces affecting them.

Philosophers have struggled to explain the mismatch of emotions and their objects across time, as when we stop grieving or feeling angry despite the persistence of the underlying cause. I argue for a sceptical approach that says that these emotional changes often lack rational fit. The key observation is that our emotions must periodically reset for purely functional reasons that have nothing to do with fit. I compare this account to David Hume’s sceptical approach in matters of belief, and conclude that resistance to it rests on a confusion similar to one that he identifies.

Alasdair MacIntyre’s moral approach is ranked among the very important formulations in contemporary philosophical ethics. Yet, MacIntyre and his commentators have overlooked basic requirements of teleological ethical theories (end- or goal-oriented ethical theories). In the article, we will see just where MacIntyre has erred in constructing his Aristotelian-Thomist teleological moral approach, the most fundamental error being his failure to pursue and develop ultimate ends. MacIntyre’s moral approach, which heroically attempts to combine basic ancient and medieval foundational elements while assigning social practices a prominent role in shaping moral thinking, fails to provide a determinate teleological justificatory foundation.

I defend a referential anti-realist solution to the problem of intentional identity. I develop Nathan Salmon's referential realist solution to the problem — according to which mythical objects exist and we can refer to them by using mythical-object names — and consider David Braun's objections to it. I argue that Salmon's solution yields the real identity, rather than the intentional identity, of the objects of multiple subjects’ thoughts. And I develop a referential anti-realist variant of Salmon's view — according to which mythical objects do not exist nor are they otherwise real but we can nevertheless refer to them — which avoids this worry.

Thomas Taylor's parody of Mary Wollstonecraft's support for rights of women and humans raises a question: does his satire unwittingly propose a defence of animal rights found in Wollstonecraft's arguments? While Wollstonecraft's later works do not mention animal rights, her early educational writings offer arguments on animal ethics. These works explore the value of animals from moral, theological, and consequentialist perspectives, emphasizing both their instrumental and inherent value. This article argues that Wollstonecraft's moral psychology and theology highlight a benevolent attitude towards animals, underscoring their value beyond their utility.

Alberto Voltolini advocates a syncretistic account of fictional entities, asserting that it satisfies all the desiderata for a suitable account of fictional entities. This article presents an alternative account of fictional characters that meets these criteria, while circumventing the problems with Voltolini's account. On my Leibnizian antirealist account, a fictional character can be identified by the collection of predicates attributed to its name. And this account offers the benefit of the bundle theory, avoiding the issue of bearers of fictional names, while also explaining why a fictional character is more than just a collection of predicates.