13.2.1 Climate Change Challenges

By EU standards, Spain has an extraordinarily high level of biodiversity. The country is ranked as the largest ecological reserve in Europe, with around 8,000 plant species, 540 bird species, 95 mammal species and 80 fish species. Spain has the largest terrestrial protected area in the EU – 138,000 square kilometres, which represents 27 per cent of the total area of the country (European Commission 2021). It also has a remarkable climatic variety, ranging from humid Atlantic conditions, with annual rainfall of more than 2,000 mm, to large semi-arid areas, with severe hydrological stress, and cold alpine climates in some isolated areas (AEMET 2018).

Spain is also one of the countries in the EU most vulnerable to climate change. In 2020, the average temperature in the country was 1.7 ºC higher than the average between 1850 and 1900, and the rate of warming has accelerated in the last few decades (AEMET 2021). According to the National Institute of Meteorology the years 2017 and 2020 were the hottest since the 1960s and summers are almost five weeks longer than at the beginning of the 1980s (Gobierno de España Reference de España2020a). The sea level in Spain has risen 13.5 cm since the 1990s (UNESCO, UN-Water 2020). Seven of the ten water basins with the greatest water stress in Europe are located in Spain, and almost 90 per cent of the extension of glaciers in Spain has disappeared since 1920 (Greenpeace 2018). It is estimated that 74 per cent of the Spanish surface is at risk of desertification (at different levels).

In the near future, key climate-related hazards are predicted to increase their effects and consequences. For example, heat waves, droughts, and extreme winds multiply the risk of wildfires. The area affected by wildfires in Spain in 2019 was 94 per cent higher than the average of the last decade (Greenpeace Reference Alberton2020). Several studies indicate that rising sea temperatures will lead to new and more extreme weather phenomena. Coastal flooding will become more extensive when the sea level rises, and heavy precipitation will increase the risk of landslides.

Over the period 1980–2019, Spain was the EU member state with the fifth highest economic losses in absolute terms caused by climate-related events. According to the NPACC 2021–30, the decrease in water resources due to changing precipitation patterns and longer droughts will have important implications for agriculture and livestock farming, urban supply, hydroelectric production, and ecosystems. Moreover, the spread of invasive species, as a secondary effect of climate change, could also have potential implications for human health (Gobierno de España Reference de España2020a). Although there are important national challenges, and the ACs share certain social and institutional characteristics, the ACs are affected quite differently by climate change risks because of their different geographical situations, environmental characteristics, and economic structures. For example, between 2050 and 2100 the risk of flooding could triple in the Basque Country, but Andalusia will suffer more frequent, longer, and more intense heat waves. In 2050, Murcia’s own water resources will be 40 per cent less. Most Mediterranean ACs will notice an increased torrential intensity (Gobierno de España Reference de España2020a).

13.2.2 Spain’s GHG Emission Profile

During recent years there have also been successful efforts to reduce carbon emissions. The emission rates are in line with the EU average (0.1)¹ and below the average of the OECD countries (0.2). The Spanish greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions inventory estimates gross emissions of 313.5 million tons of CO₂ equivalent for the year 2019. This means a reduction in emissions compared to the previous year of 6.2% + 8.3% compared to 1990 and −29.3% compared to 2005 (Table 13.1).

In 2019, the main greenhouse gases emissions sectors were: transport (29%), industry (20.6%), electricity generation (13.5%), agriculture (12.5%), LULUCF³ sector (12%), residential, commercial and institutional (RCI) (9%), waste (4.3%), off-road machinery (3.7%), refinery combustion (3.5%), and fluorinated gases (1.5%) (Gobierno de España, Reference de España2020b). Taking the year 1990 as a reference with 100%, the variations by sector have been in 2018: waste (138.9%), energy (118.9%), agriculture (107.0%), industrial processes and product use (93.7%).

13.2.3 Spanish International Commitment on Climate Change

The central government represents Spain at the international level as a subject of public international law and is entitled to conclude international treaties on all subject matters. Commitments derived from these international treaties become part of Spanish law and are binding for the ACs. The central government is committed to existing multilateral environmental protection regimes and has ratified all main international and European agreements, strategies, or programmes related to climate change. These include the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change; the Paris Agreement on Climate Change; the Convention on Biological Diversity; the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification; the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (2015–30); the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (UN GA 2015); and the Protocol to the Barcelona Convention on Integrated Coastal Zone Management of 1995.

The main EU Strategies represent a further framework of domestic climate policies – for example, the EU Strategy on adaptation to climate change (European Commission 2013); the European strategic long-term vision for a prosperous, modern, competitive, and climate neutral economy (European Commission 2018); the European Green Deal (European Commission 2019); and the Governance of the Energy Union and Climate Action.⁴

13.2.4 Climate Objectives in Climate Law and Policies in Spain

Spain’s policies regarding sustainability, protection of its exceptionally diverse natural habitats, or general environmental quality have been ineffective for decades. Since 2018 a number of new initiatives have been adopted. Complying with the obligations stated in the EU regulation on Governance of Energy and Climate action, in December 2020 Spain adopted the National Integrated Energy and Climate Plan (ENCP) 2021–30, which includes measures on both mitigation and adaptation. The long-term goal of the plan is to make Spain carbon neutral by 2050; achieve a 90 per cent reduction in GHG emissions from 1990 levels; and, also by 2050, base the electricity system exclusively on renewable sources of generation. Meanwhile, the National Plan for Adaptation to Climate Change (NPACC) for the period 2021–30 was approved in 2020 following a joint agreement with the ACs. The Plan establishes strategic objectives and defines a system of indicators for impacts and adaptation to climate change, as well as requiring the preparation of risk reports.

Following years of work, in 2021 the Climate Change and Energy Transition Law was passed (Law 7/2021, of 20 May). This establishes the following minimum national targets for the year 2030 (article 3.1):

• Reduction of greenhouse gases emission by at least 20% compared with 1990.

• Increase in renewable energy to at least 35% of final energy consumption.

• At least 70% of electricity produced from renewables.

• Improving energy efficiency by reducing primary energy consumption by at least 35% from the baseline in accordance with EU regulations.

13.3.1 The State of Autonomies and Climate Governance

The Constitution divides powers such that some are exclusive to the central government, while the ACs are able to assume in their Statutes of Autonomy all matters not allocated to the central government, as well as the legislative development of the (central government) framework legislation and the implementation of central government legislation (Tudela and Kölling Reference Alberton2020). In this regard power is shared between both layers of government. This enables the central government to define nationwide standards and the ACs to adjust, at least to some extent, those laws to their own preferences. Over the last forty years, ACs have adopted their own Statutes of Autonomy defining their institutions and powers and they have assumed responsibility for the provision of a wide range of public services of a regional or local nature. There is not a specific constitutional provision for ‘climate change’ issues, which are considered as ‘environmental’ matters. While environmental protection is a shared responsibility between the two orders of government, with the central government establishing the legislative framework in which the ACs can legislate according to their own preferences, ‘climate change’ issues also concern ‘electricity, energy market and the general coordination of the economy’ clauses, and these are exclusive powers of the central government.

Although article 149.1.1 SC reserves for the central government power in respect of ‘international relations’, the so-called international clause does not exclude the ACs acting at international or EU level if their own powers are affected. However, the Constitutional Court determined that the ACs’ activities at international or EU level have to be within the framework of the central government’s policies. According to general constitutional doctrine, either the central government or the ACs may assume responsibility for the implementation and transposition of EU Law. In this regard, responsibilities regarding the domestic implementation of international commitments, environmental issues, energy production, natural resources, public emergencies, or natural disasters are shared between the two orders of government.

Since 1978, the Spanish Constitution has been amended only twice, both times because of external pressure from the European Union. However, practically all seventeen Statutes of Autonomy have been modified and climate change clauses have been included in several statutes.⁵ In particular, the so-called Wave of Reforms taking place in 2007⁶ has been characterised as an example of emulation also regarding environmental matters, for example, the reformed Statues of Aragón and Castilla-Leon included powers over ‘policies that contribute to mitigating climate change’.⁷ Over the years, the Statutes have also included environmental powers by adding new categories such as ‘ecosystems’, ‘biological corridors’, or ‘soil pollution’.

Given the fact that Spain has evolved since the end of the 1970s from a unitary state with a long-standing centralist tradition to a highly decentralised state without constitutional reforms, the Constitution approved in 1978 can be characterised by a certain openness and flexibility. But the ‘openness and flexibility’ as regards the division of powers and relations between the central government and the ACs and between the ACs themselves have given rise to, and continues to generate, conflict – especially in economic policy, environmental protection, energy, water, and emergency planning (Alberton Reference Alberton2020, 36). As a consequence of this, together with the fact that climate governance involves different powers belonging to both the central government and the ACs, the Constitutional Court assumed a specific role in determining powers and responsibilities in climate governance. Since 1980, environmental issues have been among the most conflictual issues for the Court, reaching a total of 200 appeals. Constant sources of dispute were protected areas, biodiversity, and forests. Other matters, such as water, land planning, and energy, were also highly controversial (Alberton Reference Alberton2021). In the many conflicts over jurisdiction brought before the Constitutional Court, the constitutional provisions on energy and economy coordination have been insistently applied contrary to the environmental clauses invoked by the ACs (Galera Rodrigo Reference Galera Rodrigo, Galera and Gómez2018). Moreover, implementing EU environmental law, the central government tends to invade AC powers (Nogueira Reference Nogueira López and Santisteban2012). Based on recent case law, some scholars have thus pointed to a re-centralization of environmental powers (Casado Casado Reference Casado Casado2018).

13.3.2 The Institutional Framework and Intergovernmental Relations

The Constitution does not establish an institutional framework that would reduce the conflicts of jurisdictions and facilitate continuing dialogue and cooperation between the levels of government. There is neither a permanent institutionalised representation of regional interests at the national level, nor a framework for intergovernmental relations (Tudela and Kölling Reference Alberton2020). Intergovernmental cooperation was only acknowledged in the Spanish legislative framework in 1992. Although the Senate is defined in the Constitution as a chamber of territorial representation (Art. 69), not only does it have only limited legislative power, of its 266 members, 208 are elected by popular vote, and only 58 members are appointed by the regional legislatures. As a consequence, it does not fulfil its ostensible function and does not work as a forum for the participation of the ACs in central government legislation and they have no right of veto over decisions that affect them (Aja Reference Aja1999). Instead, the first chamber – the Congress of Deputies – has become the central forum for intergovernmental negotiations especially for Autonomous Communities with strong regional parties (Rodríguez López et al. 2018, 230). Since some of the nationalist parties (particularly from Catalonia and the Basque Country) had enough seats in the Congress of Deputies, they became important actors with considerable bargaining power in cases of minority government (Field Reference Galera Rodrigo2016). However, these parties are concerned overwhelmingly with regional interests, and their preferences for national-wide climate governance tend to be limited.

Nevertheless, the framework for cooperation and coordination between central and regional governments has developed over the past thirty years and vertical cooperation has improved. Since the beginning of the 1980s, cooperation between the central government and the governments of the ACs has been progressively assumed by sectoral conferences (Conferencias Sectoriales). These are multilateral cooperation bodies for specific policy sectors (e.g., the environment) and bring together central government and the ACs (Perez Medina Reference Alberton2020). Each sectoral conference has established a specific framework for cooperation at the administrative level, albeit with a very weak organisational structure. Whether sectoral conferences will be convoked, and which topics will be discussed, is a decision taken either by central government or if one-third of ACs convene a meeting (Colino Reference Colino and Colino2021). Horizontal relations between the ACs have traditionally been weak. However, between 2004 and 2020 there was a significant improvement in these relations, at least in terms of formalised mechanisms (Ramos and Alda Reference Ramos, Alda and Colino2021).

There is no specific Climate Change Sectoral Conference, and those most closely involved are the Environment Sectoral Conference and the Energy Sectoral Conference and, until certain extent, the ones relating to Local Issues and Infrastructure and Land Management. In 2001, an Advisory Council on Environmental Policy for EU Affairs was created within the Environment Conference and was given responsibility for matters concerning environmental issues in EU affairs. However, the number of agreements reached between the parties as a result of negotiations on draft legislation has been very limited compared to other Sectoral Conferences (Alberton Reference Alberton2020). The agreements reached have mainly concerned the distribution of federal subsidies to the ACs in relation to environmental matters, as well as agreements on the transfer of funds for the management or execution of EU environmental measures, plans, and actions. During the preparation of the National Climate and Energy Plan (2018, 2019) the Sectoral Conference on the Environment met only three times; the conference on Energy met just once (Ramos, Alda, and Cicuéndez Reference Ramos, Alda, Cicuéndez and Nieto2019); and neither the Conferences on Local Issues nor on the Conference on Infrastructure and Land Management was called at all. Meanwhile, Spain’s peak intergovernmental meeting, the Conference of Presidents, bringing together the heads of government, has not discussed climate governance so far (Alberton Reference Alberton2020).

Besides the formal cooperation within the Sectoral Conferences, the Ministry for Ecological Transition and Demographic Challenge maintains informal contacts at the technical level with the ACs and the other public administrations. There are two further administrative bodies at the central level which collaborate on an ad hoc basis with the ACs and local authorities. The Spanish Climate Change Office is in charge of drawing up regulatory proposals for climate policy that are consistent with international and European commitments. The Institute for Energy Diversification and Saving is in charge of the preparation and implementation of climate change measures regarding energy, particularly energy efficiency.

Due to the specific features of the decentralisation process, bilateral cooperation between the central and AC governments has been constant since the creation of the Statutes of Autonomy (Ridaura Martínez Reference Ridaura Martínez2007). Despite the progress made with regard to the multilateral cooperation mechanisms, bilateral cooperation is still preferred by several ACs. In light of this, the amendments to the Statutes of Autonomy during the last decade have institutionalised the bilateral commissions that are intended to enable permanent collaboration between individual ACs and the Spanish government. Only on rare occasions have the ACs and central government adopted regulations or agreements about environmental matters.

Over the past decades, several advisory or functional bodies have been established in order to facilitate collaboration and information sharing on climate change between the levels of government. However, their functions are not clearly defined, and their composition does not allow effective policymaking (Presicce Reference Pérsica2020). Consequently, the effectiveness of these organisations has been low. The ACs take part in the National Council of Climate which was created in 1998 and involves the different ministries of the central administration (twenty-four members); the ACs (one representative for each of seventeen ACs); the municipalities and provinces (three members); and research institutions and social actors (twenty members). The Council prepares proposals and recommendations on climate change policies alongside the reports which are legally required in specific cases. They also participate in the Coordination Commission of Climate Change Policies, which ensures the coordination of climate change and adaptation strategies, and the goals on the prevention and reduction of GHG emission within the central administration, ACs, and local authorities, as well as with the National Council of Climate.

Recently, a further framework for cooperation has been aimed by Law 7/2021 on Climate Change and Energy Transition which has created an ostensibly new governance system. Article 37 creates the Committee of Experts on Climate Change and Energy transition, an advisory body that will prepare an annual report to be submitted and discussed in the Parliament and whose membership and working rules are still pending. Meanwhile, under the ambitious title of Inter-Administrative Cooperation on Climate Change and Energy, article 38 requires that ACs provides yearly information on their Climate and Energy Plans to the Coordination Commission of Climate Change Policy. Even though these articles are qualified as ‘governance tools’, there is little evidence that they represent a significant improvement in multilevel coordination and governance. The Committee of Experts relates more to civil society participation and knowledge diffusion than to governance and inter-territorial relations; regarding the information to be provided by the ACs on their climate planning, it does not include the early phases of elaboration but the post-approval ones, when they can be found in the official journal and websites.

In general, the coordination and intergovernmental relation in Spain, and also for climate policies, are addressed traditionally through collective bodies where ACs are represented – such as the Coordination Commission of Climate Change or the Sectoral Conferences. These provide little scope for real input into policymaking.

13.3.3 Fiscal Federalism and Climate Governance

As a share of GDP, in 2014 Spain had the 14th-lowest environment-related tax revenue among the OECD countries. Environment-related tax revenues amounted to 1.8 per cent of GDP, compared with an average of 2.0 per cent among OECD countries. Recently, the central government has introduced several new environmental taxes, but the ACs had started introducing environmental taxes a decade ago.

The system of revenue assignment between the levels of government in Spain is rather complex because of the marked asymmetry between the financing regime of the two ‘charter’ (Foral) regime ACs and the fifteen Common Regime ACs, and because of the complex variety of sources from which Common Regime ACs draw their revenues (López‐Laborda et al. Reference López-Laborda, Martinez-Vazquez and Monasterio2023).⁸ The Common Regime is based on three pillars: (i) inter-governmental transfers and unconditional equalisation grants; (ii) shared taxes; and (iii) own-source tax revenues (Leon Reference León2015). Own-source taxes at the level of the ACs include environmental taxes such as those on large commercial establishments situated on the outskirts of cities. Four main regional categories of the ACs’ energy/environmental taxes can be distinguished: atmospheric emissions, installations and activities that affect the environment, wind energy taxes, and taxes on wastewater. However, these taxes are usually focused on facilities and technologies (infrastructure) and not on damage and consumption, so their capacity to achieve change in environmental behaviour is very limited (Gago et al. 2019, 6). Although revenues from environmental taxes are still very low, the environmental tax regulation allowed ACs to adapt their policies to the peculiarities of their different territories (Lago-Peñas Reference Lago-Peñas2019).

13.4.1 The Central Government

Most recent plans and strategies adopted by the central government have followed the timing and path set by the EU. In this regard, the central government could learn from other Member States’ successes and failures in designing and implementing policies. The EU multilevel governance provided opportunities for policy learning by enabling policymakers to meet, communicate, cooperate, and exchange ideas with one another through various forums and institutions. Especially since 2000, national strategies and policies have been adopted in Spain mainly driven by commitments at European and international level and, particularly, by specific obligations stated by the European Directives on emissions, renewable energy, and energy efficiency – for example the approval of Law 1/2005 on permits for emissions trading and the national plan for the allocation of greenhouse gas emission (2005–7) followed the EU Directive 2003/87/EC, and the National Action Plan on Renewable Energies (2011–20) adopted in 2009, followed the EU Directive 2009/28/EC. In 2021, after a decade of negotiations, Spain finally adopted its first Climate Change and Energy Transition Law. Although the law is more ambitious in certain areas than similar laws in other EU countries, the law has been requested by the EU for a long time.

13.4.2 The Autonomous Communities (ACs)

The involvement of ACs in the setting up and implementation of national strategies, plans, or laws on climate change has been minimal, but the ACs did not demand more participation and focused individually on designing and implementing their own regional climate change strategies.

The first NPACC adapted in 2006 was discussed at the Environment Sectoral Conference but the ACs were left aside in the decision-making process, since there are no legal or institutional provisions for them to play any role at all. Moreover, during the preparation of the ENCP, there were no specific meetings organised for the Sectoral Conferences on Environment and on Energy.

There has been further coordination through informal working groups of which we do not know their composition or their rules of operation. In this regard, the current NPACC 2021–30 foresees the participation of the ACs on the implementation phase in several coordination and advisory forums. Most of these working groups reinforce the inter-institutional coordination, both in its intersectoral dimension and its territorial dimension (with special attention paid to the connection between the Central Administration, ACs, and local administrations). For example, the Impact and Adaptation Working Group brings together departments of the Central Administration and the ACs with the general objective of coordinating and integrating the different strategies and adaptation plans. The current NPACC states that its aim is to provide for a high degree of transparency of these bodies by laying down their functioning rules.

But ACs introduced proactively their own policies. Some ACs were actively involved in climate change governance long before the central government (Table 13.2). The ACs of Andalusia and the Basque Country had already adopted climate/environmental strategies in 2002 and Galicia in 2005 long before the first National Plan for Adaptation was adopted in 2006. Five ACs adopted strategies against Climate Change in 2008 and four ACs adapted their strategies in 2009. In this regard, ACs’ governments could learn from one another’s successes and failures in designing and implementing policies. Over time, ACs with a longer tradition of action on environmental issues developed expertise and infrastructure to implement climate change strategies. These ACs were also better prepared to develop policies related to climate and energy.

Over the past decade all ACs have adopted strategic frameworks, action plans, and/or programmes both on mitigation and on adaptation to climate change (Table 13.2). This trend can be explained by competition in the adaptation of climate policies between the levels of government. However, such competition did not only relate to the aim of adapting the best strategies, but also to the possibility of getting EU funding for regional projects. This may also explain the similarities among the ACs’ strategies. Objectives, structures, and scopes of the frameworks have been emulated among ACs. For example, most strategies have common objectives regarding the reduction of GHG emission, but also different targets reflecting local realities such as geographical, economic, and environmental characteristics (Table 13.2). In addition to most strategies having a similar structure, there are also similarities with the structure of the national plans. The majority of ACs adopted plans instead of climate change laws in order to avoid constitutional conflict with central government. Regarding the institutional framework there is further evidence of emulation. Most ACs created similar specific regional agencies with the objective of coordinating energy and/or climate issues. The ACs also created inter-departmental bodies, or agencies, to coordinate actions relating to climate change within their own territory. Moreover, in line with efforts at the national level, the ACs built up consultative participation bodies that bring together different social, economic, and environmental organisations and scientific institutions.

There has also been a certain divergence between the climate objectives by ACs (Table 13.2) which can, to a certain extent, be explained by elements of partisanship. The presence of co-partisans in central government (vertical partisan congruence) may produce objections to the introduction of innovative climate objectives and/or strategies. Moreover, party ideology is a further factor in explaining the divergence, especially regarding the introduction of environmental taxes. There is a higher probability of environmental taxes being introduced by left-wing governments. In ACs where the conservative Popular Party has traditionally governed (Castilla y León, Galicia, Madrid) less ambitious targets have been set. However, most AC governments are coalitions of different parties which reduces the partisan effect on climate governance.

Only three ACs – Catalonia, the Balearic Islands, and Andalusia – have reinforced their legal framework by enacting their own climate change laws. These laws were enacted even before the central level adopted the general law on climate change in 2021 (Cocciolo Reference Cocciolo2020). Although these regional laws display different approaches to climate strategy, all of them have created similar administrative bodies for coordination purposes within the public administration and for communication with civil society and committees of experts. In this regard, an ‘emulation’ process can be identified among the ACs. Furthermore, the constitutional court judgment on the Catalan law of Climate Change determined discussion in the rest of ACs. In this regard, the ACs of Andalusia and the Balearic Islands could learn from Catalonia’s failures in designing and preparing climate change law, while other ACs didn’t start with the legislative process. Catalonia adopted the first Law of Climate Change. The law was challenged in the Constitutional Court which deactivated important parts of the law, since the law not only addressed environmental protection but also the energy and economic sectors – the exclusive powers of the central government.

By contrast, the Law of Measures Facing Climate Change and the Energy Transition adopted by the AC of Andalusia excluded from its scope the restrictions of emissions which are within the responsibilities of the central government. Finally, Law 10/2019 of Climate Change and Energy Transition adopted by the AC Balearic Islands includes also lessons learnt from the Catalan experience in setting up a framework for energy transition in such way that it does not affect the competences of the central government. In this regard the law was discussed ex ante in a bilateral commission between representatives of the central government and the AC in order to prevent a conflict before the Constitutional Court. Currently six others (Aragon, Asturias, the Canary Islands, Valencia, La Rioja, Navarre, and the Basque Country) are in the process of adapting their own climate change laws.

In short, we can state that, with or without specific regional legal frameworks on climate Change, all ACs have adopted climate policies through general and specific strategies, plans, and programmes. The ACs’ strategies can go beyond the national climate objectives if they are not interfering with the central government competence on ‘energy’ or on ‘general economic planning’, which prevents, for example, that the ACs increase the economic sectors which are submitted to the emission trading system.

13.4.3 The Local Level

The participation of local governments in climate policies can be distinguished in three different stages. First: limited participation of local entities in the decision-making process for climate decision and planning being carried out at state and AC level, mainly during the setting up of the state and ACs’ climate strategies. Second: sectoral policies and programmes that account for climate objectives are implemented at the local level, where, for example, urban regeneration programmes, housing policies, or waste management are within its competences. Third: the local level implements specific climate policies based on international agreements if they decide to join voluntarily. The Covenant of Mayors for Climate and Energy is an international agreement that provides common tools and methodological standards – as climate and energy planning templates – for local entities. Even the Covenant is based on a voluntary accession, and it has had high success among the Spanish municipal and provincial authorities.

In 2019, 29 per cent of the municipal and provincial governments in Spain (which account for around 62 per cent of the population) had concrete climate change adaptation plans. However, most large Spanish cities have adopted their own plans and strategies on environmental and climate issues. Some local entities have conducted specific local-scale vulnerability and impact analyses or developed adaptation plans, although the latter are still in the minority (FEMP 2019).

The Spanish Network of Cities for Climate is a thematic network created in 2009 by the Spanish Federation of Municipalities and Provinces and the Spanish Ministry for Ecological Transition for joint action on climate. As of 2019, the network included 316 Spanish local entities. According to Alda and Ramos (Reference Alda and Ramos2018), local authorities also participate in the main transnational networks of local governments on climate and energy policies, both at European and global levels (Table 13.3). These networks are examples of the dissemination of best practice in climate policy at the local level. For example, based on the Covenant of Mayors, several municipalities adopted harmonised Energy and Climate Change Plans. Some provinces joined the Covenant of Mayors as ‘coordinators’, also developing provincial climate policy on the basis of the setting up of the local plans. For example, the Province of Tarragona published public tenders for the adoption and implementation of Local Energy and Climate Plans. As a result, from 2013 to 2021, 184 out of 188 municipalities endorsed the Covenant of Mayors, and from 2015 to 2021, 144 municipalities adopted a Local Energy Plan. Similar to the AC level, the adaption of Local Energy and Climate Plans did not only relate to the aim of adapting the best strategies, but also to the possibility of getting funding for local projects. This may also explain the similarities among the municipal strategies.

Finally, the recent Law 7/2021 on Climate Change and Energy Transition requires urban mobility plans for municipalities above 50,000 inhabitants (article 14). Furthermore, in an indirect way it requires some other local policies aligned with Climate Change Strategies as the urban planning (article 21), fair transition (article 28), or public procurement (article 31).