Problematizing Motives for CSR

Scholars agree that CSR has many possible motives (Bansal & Roth, Reference Bansal and Roth2000), including moral (concerned with ethical standards and moral principles), relational (concerned with relationships among stakeholders), and instrumental (concerned with self-interest) ones (Aguilera et al., Reference Aguilera, Rupp, Williams and Ganapathi2007). Although instrumental motives related to the business case retain the most influence among practitioners and scholars, a controversy remains as to how these different motives relate to one another.

The appeal of the business case lies in its potential to complement moral and relational motives for CSR. The business case frames CSR as having self-evident efficiency (Bode et al., Reference Bode, Singh and Rogan2015; Carnahan et al., Reference Carnahan, Kryscynski and Olson2017) because the business case frames “doing good” by corporations as being in their own self-interest. Here the instrumental motives in pursuing profit are framed as supporting moral and relational motives, as in theories of “enlightened shareholder value” (Jensen, Reference Jensen2002) or “creating shared value” (Porter & Kramer, Reference Porter and Kramer2011). Even while CSR has an instrumental motive as a source of tangible benefits for the business itself (Berger, Cunningham, & Drumwright, Reference Berger, Cunningham and Drumwright2007; Kaplan, Reference Kaplan2020), advocates argue that it indirectly incorporates and serves the moral concerns or relational obligations surrounding other stakeholders.

A more critical view argues that instrumental motives more often compete with or even crowd out other motives. Critics stress that instrumental motives for CSR differ fundamentally from noneconomic rationales, including ethical principles, religious convictions, or moral values (e.g., Crane et al., Reference Crane, Palazzo, Spence and Matten2014; Garriga & Melé, Reference Garriga and Melé2004; Kaplan, Reference Kaplan2020; Vogel, Reference Vogel2008). For example, the instrumental pursuit of CSR makes business culpable for irresponsible actions, because the business case alone cannot act as a moral compass in situations where doing good does not actually bring self-interested benefits to the firm (Gond et al., Reference Gond, Palazzo and Basu2009). Similarly, the business case is often seen to be at odds with relational motives for CSR related to the rights of stakeholder groups (Barnett, Reference Barnett2019). For example, a business case might support responsibility to primary stakeholders, such as employees or shareholders, but frame secondary stakeholders’ concerns as detrimental to firm financial performance (Hillman & Keim, Reference Hillman and Keim2001). The business case for CSR remains limited by its purely instrumental logic, “because although they posit a win-win, the first win (financial performance) always trumps the second win (social good)” (Kaplan, Reference Kaplan2020: 3).

While CSR “involves coordination among multiple interest groups that have multi-faceted motives” (Crilly, Hansen, & Zollo, Reference Crilly, Hansen and Zollo2016: 725), a puzzle remains to examine how different stakeholder groups shape motives for CSR over time and whether complementary or competing relations exist between them. Extant literature tends to treat motives as either “under- or oversocialized” and, therefore, as relatively static. In this section, we introduce a sociological understanding of motives to better conceptualize the relational and dynamic aspects involved in order to explain the unexpected dominance of a single type of motive related to the business case.

One strand of literature focuses on the motives of individuals. This approach tends to reduce questions of motives for CSR to individual-level psychology. A large number of empirical studies focus on the single group of executives and CSR managers, analyzing how managers’ individual interpretations (Sharma, Reference Sharma2000), self-evaluations (Petrenko, Aime, Ridge, & Hill, Reference Petrenko, Aime, Ridge and Hill2016; Sonenshein, DeCelles, & Dutton, Reference Sonenshein, DeCelles and Dutton2014), values (Maak, Pless, & Voegtlin, Reference Maak, Pless and Voegtlin2016; Shepherd, Patzelt, & Baron, Reference Shepherd, Patzelt and Baron2013), or ideologies (Hafenbrädl & Waeger, Reference Hafenbrädl and Waeger2017) influence their tendency to engage in CSR. Here the concept of motive often remains “undersocialized,” meaning that motives are statically linked to assumed economic interests (e.g., Carnahan et al., Reference Carnahan, Kryscynski and Olson2017) or “needs” of individuals (Aguilera et al., Reference Aguilera, Rupp, Williams and Ganapathi2007). Motives are seen as coming from “inside” individuals or organizations while being relatively decontextualized from the wider organizational environment (Jackson, Helfen, Kaplan, Kirsch, & Lohmeyer, Reference Jackson, Helfen, Kaplan, Kirsch, Lohmeyer, Zilber, Amis and Mair2019).

Meanwhile, a second stream focuses on how motives are articulated in different ways across different macro-level contexts. Maignan and Ralston (Reference Maignan and Ralston2002), for instance, show that businesses justify CSR differently across countries. Likewise, Witt and Redding (Reference Witt and Redding2012) compare how the different values of top executives in different countries lead to different motives for their CSR activities. For example, strong cultural beliefs about the virtues of competition are associated with higher levels of greenwashing or purely symbolic commitments to CSR rather than deeper substantive changes in business practices (Roulet & Touboul, Reference Roulet and Touboul2015). In more general terms, macro-level comparative studies contrast explicit forms of CSR in more liberal market economies, presumably relying more on instrumental motives around the business case and more implicit forms of CSR in coordinated market economics, where CSR would be expected to be motivated by relational obligations or strong consensus around moral standards (Matten & Moon, Reference Matten and Moon2008; see also Höllerer, Reference Höllerer2013). However, motives tend to be treated in a static and “oversocialized” fashion, meaning that motives are assumed to be largely agreed upon consensually and remain fairly homogeneous within a particular context (e.g., Iatridis, Kuznetsov, & Whyman, Reference Iatridis, Kuznetsov and Whyman2016; Scott, Garza, Conlon, & Kim, Reference Scott, Garza, Conlon and Kim2014). Meanwhile, Hiss (Reference Hiss2009) shows that struggles over the meaning of CSR between different groups of actors led to a shift from more “implicit” to “explicit” understandings over time (see also Matten & Moon, Reference Matten and Moon2020). Others have stressed how business actors have promoted instrumental interpretations of CSR as an alternative to state regulation (Kinderman, Reference Kinderman2012; see also Marens, Reference Marens2012) and a response to the rise of neoliberal governance (Brandtner & Bromley, Reference Brandtner and Bromley2022). These studies, however, do not focus on motives for CSR or the emergence of the business case in particular.

To better understand how stakeholder groups shape the motives for CSR, we study the national-level discourse on CSR in Germany. In particular, we ask two interrelated questions: How have the motives for CSR articulated by business, state, and civil society actors changed over time? and Why did the business case become a dominant vocabulary of motive for CSR? We propose a framework to answer these questions by drawing on Mill’s concept of “vocabularies of motive” and the literature on discourse coalitions and coalition magnets in political science.

Vocabularies of Motive

Motives for CSR are often conceptualized as psychological-cognitive impulses or inherent organizational goals (e.g., Hafenbrädl & Waeger, Reference Hafenbrädl and Waeger2017; Hahn, Preuss, Pinkse, & Figge, Reference Hahn, Preuss, Pinkse and Figge2014; Petrenko et al., Reference Petrenko, Aime, Ridge and Hill2016; Scott et al., Reference Scott, Garza, Conlon and Kim2014). By contrast, we base our understanding of motives on the sociological work of C. Wright Mills (Reference Mills1940), who conceives of motives as intrinsically social rather than fixed elements “in” an individual, highlighting their relational and historically situated character conducive to studying how motives are shaped by different actors and might change over time. Mills defines motives as “vocabularies” that constitute “accepted justifications for present, future, or past programs or acts” (907). Motives are accepted answers to the question “why” with regard to certain conduct or a certain act (Tilly, Reference Tilly2008; cf. Boltanski & Thévenot, Reference Boltanski and Thévenot1999, Reference Boltanski and Thévenot2006; van Aaken, Splitter, & Seidl, Reference van Aaken, Splitter and Seidl2013). Thus motives constitute a socially accepted vocabulary to justify certain conduct in a certain group of actors at a certain time. Conceiving of motives as accepted vocabularies highlights their relational and dialogical character, where actors verbalize motives that anticipate and respond to motives articulated by others, that is, to what is accepted as a typical motive (Mills, Reference Mills1940). The accepted vocabulary of motive includes historical constructions or settlements (Boltanski & Thévenot, Reference Boltanski and Thévenot1999: 369; Mills, Reference Mills1940: 913).

Drawing on this sociological insight, we follow recent literatures in political science as seeing motives for CSR as part of a wider discourse, in which accepted vocabularies are negotiated and subject to change over time. Discourse suggests that motives have a relational character, not arising “within” actors but emerging through a process in which actors communicate and engage with other stakeholders. Motives not only drive such interactions but are an outcome of deliberations between different groups of actors (Schmidt, Reference Schmidt2008: 306; Reference Schmidt2011). An accepted vocabulary of motive thus reflects both a shared understanding within a group and also a more strategic engagement with or even struggle between different justifications articulated across a variety of stakeholder groups (Schmidt, Reference Schmidt2008).

To explore how motives for CSR are shaped by different stakeholder groups over time and why certain motives get accepted while others do not, we introduce the concepts of discourse coalitions and coalition magnets from political science, which so far have remained largely unexplored in CSR research.

Discourse Coalitions and Coalition Magnets

Although multiple motives can exist as accepted vocabularies, we propose that certain motives may become dominant as the result of a discourse coalition. Discourse coalitions are defined as ensembles of actors that jointly articulate and rearticulate a certain set of ideas or “story lines” (e.g., Hajer, Reference Hajer1995; Meyer & Höllerer, Reference Meyer and Höllerer2010). These groups do not necessarily share common interests but do share an “affinity” to and joint use of a certain idea or vocabulary where something important is at stake. For example, groups may refer to the same motive or to a common set of motives, such as the business case. A discourse coalition generally comprises actors from across different sectors, such as business and the state, the state and civil society, or all three together.

Not every idea or motive will attract a coalition of supporters. Béland and Cox (Reference Béland and Cox2016: 431) suggest, however, that certain ideas have the potential to function as coalition magnets, which are defined as “the capacity of an idea to appeal to a diversity of individuals and groups, and to be used strategically by policy entrepreneurs (i.e., individual or collective actors who promote certain policy solutions) to frame interests, mobilize supporters and build coalitions.” Coalition magnets have three specific features. First, the idea must be ambiguous or polysemic; that is, it must allow for different interpretations, to appeal to an otherwise diverse group of actors. Underlying here is the assumption that “broader—and vaguer—ideas are more likely to appeal to a greater number of constituencies that have heterogeneous preferences” (Béland & Cox, Reference Béland and Cox2016: 432). Notions of “interpretative viability” (Benders & van Bijsterveld, Reference Benders and van Bijsterveld2000; Benders & van Veen, Reference Benders and van Veen2001) or “interpretative flexibility” (Abrahamson, Reference Abrahamson1996) have been identified as crucial for the diffusion of ideas, including management ideas or fashions. Second, the idea must have strong valence or attractiveness to appeal to and mobilize actors (Béland & Cox, Reference Béland and Cox2016: 432). An idea appears attractive to actors if they see the potential to realize their own interests via a certain idea, for example, actors are more likely to support an idea if it is framed in a way that seems consistent with their own values or goals (Giroux, Reference Giroux2006). Importantly, because the ambiguity of an idea allows different actors to see different things in the idea and “‘recognize’ their own version of the concept” (Benders & van Veen, Reference Benders and van Veen2001: 38), polysemy often helps reinforce the valence of an idea, helping it appeal to a wide variety of actors with potentially diverse interests (Kieser, Reference Kieser1997). Finally, coalition magnets must receive support from policy entrepreneurs—individual (e.g., consultants, journalists, politicians) or collective actors (e.g., industry associations, NGOs, or political parties) that actively promote ideas as a policy solution—to spread (Béland & Cox, Reference Béland and Cox2016), meaning that ambiguous and attractive ideas need to be actively framed and communicated by actors with dedicated resources.

In the remainder of this article, we draw on these concepts to explain shifts in vocabularies of motive around CSR over time, as well as why the business case for CSR became dominant.

The Case of Germany

The national-level discourse on CSR in Germany is a theoretically interesting and empirically rich case through which to examine the changing vocabularies of motives different groups of stakeholders use to justify CSR. Germany has historically entrenched corporatist institutions in which coordination is strong between business and other stakeholders (Hall & Soskice, Reference Hall and Soskice2001). In the realm of CSR, institutional coordination has meant that government agencies, employer and industry associations, unions, and NGOs play an active role (Hiss, Reference Hiss2009; Kinderman, Reference Kinderman2008). Unlike in Anglo-American countries, CSR in Germany is argued to take the form of “institutionalized solidarity” (Höllerer, Reference Höllerer2013; Kinderman, Reference Kinderman2008) or “implicit CSR,” being inscribed in formal and informal institutions involving mandatory obligations for corporations as well as religious norms (Brammer et al., Reference Brammer, Jackson and Matten2012; Hiss, Reference Hiss2009; Matten & Moon, Reference Matten and Moon2008). Hence the strongly institutionalized involvement of stakeholders in Germany offers an excellent setting to examine how potentially different understandings of and motives for CSR are shaped by different groups of actors. Unlike the more business-led discourse in liberal economies like the United States (Kaplan, Reference Kaplan2015; Marens, Reference Marens2012) or the United Kingdom (Kinderman, Reference Kinderman2012), we would not expect the business sector to strongly dominate the discourse over CSR in Germany.

Previous studies show that Germany experienced a long and rich debate on CSR and the role of corporations in society more generally (Antal, Oppen, & Sobczak, Reference Antal, Oppen and Sobczak2010; Hiss, Reference Hiss2009). But some studies also suggest that CSR gained a more “libertarian” (Kinderman, Reference Kinderman2008) and “explicit” meaning (Matten & Moon, Reference Matten and Moon2008), with an increase in “German corporations’ voluntary CSR activities” becoming observable (Hiss, Reference Hiss2009: 438). How the motives for CSR developed within these broader historical developments remains to be understood. The extended history of the discourse on CSR in Germany also allows us to analyze how the business case emerged and grew in influence, as well as whether it was complementing or competing with other moral and relational motives.

Data Collection

Our data consist of CSR-related documents published by key actors in the German discourse on CSR. We focus on the institutionalized corporatist actors, which have been shown to actively take part in discussions around CSR (e.g., Hiss, Reference Hiss2009). We examine national-level actors categorized as business (companies, employer and industry associations, business-driven CSR associations), state (the federal government and ministries), and civil society actors (trade unions; the Confederation of German Trade Unions; and NGOs, as well as networks of NGOs, engaged in CSR). Although Germany has a complex web of sectoral business associations and state-level political actors, we focus only on peak associations with wide national representation to allow comparability of data across stakeholder groups and capture the evolution of mainstream political discourse in Germany, because peak associations tend to aggregate organized interests from their members.

We collected publicly available documents published by these actors that referred to CSR or its alternative signifiers. Historically, CSR has been discussed under different signifiers in Germany, including terms such as the social responsibilities of corporations (gesellschaftliche Verantwortung des Unternehmens), sustainability (Nachhaltigkeit), and—more recently—CSR (unternehmerische Verantwortung). While these terms entered the discourse at different points in time, today actors use them interchangeably. We therefore used all these terms as search terms when collecting data, but we refer to “CSR” in the text as the broad term established in literature. Using these search terms, we engaged in a systematic collection of publicly available documents via the actors’ websites; public libraries; and the EBSCO database, an online research archive allowing keyword-based searches for a wide range of documents. This search was complemented by examining additional documents cited in the reference lists of our initial documents.

We collected CSR-related documents published between 1970 and 2014. Although social engagement of business reaches back to German industrialization (e.g., Hiss, Reference Hiss2009), we start our analysis in the 1970s because this decade marks the emergence of a more pronounced discourse on the social responsibilities of corporations. This time was marked by, inter alia, the introduction of new social and environmental acts, revolving around issues like wastewater regulation and codetermination; the foundation of various bodies dealing with CSR, such as the Foundation for Business and Society (Stiftung Gesellschaft und Unternehmen) and a group of entrepreneurs engaging in the development of social and environmental accounting and reporting practices (Arbeitskreis Sozialpraxis); and the heightened engagement of leading German businesses with CSR (see also Antal et al., Reference Antal, Oppen and Sobczak2010). We complete our empirical analysis in 2014, which includes the founding of the National CSR Forum in 2009, the publication of the National CSR Action Plan in 2010, and the initial years of its implementation. These events represent a historical culmination of the national-level CSR discourse in Germany, because they both resulted in a common definition of CSR and outlined a strategy for developing CSR that was agreed upon by the stakeholder groups this study examined. This consensus suggested a temporary closure of the debate around CSR, justifying it as a cutoff point for our data collection.

After excluding redundant documents, the resulting collection included 272 documents (see Table 1), providing a comprehensive coverage of these groups’ publications. Our application of the coding scheme to these documents also suggests a point of theoretical saturation, that is, where the articulation of motives tends to repeat across documents within the same period.

Table 1:

Data—Number and Types of Documents of Relevant Actors According to Sector

Note. Total no. of documents = 272.

Our final collection of documents contains different types of material, including discussion papers (e.g., commentaries, standpoints, dialogue papers) and policy reports (e.g., action plans, political programs, practical guidelines) for all actor groups. The documents also include newsletters and press statements for civil society actor groups because especially NGOs used these types of documents to comment on current developments and promote their own standpoints (see Table 1). These documents provide fruitful data for understanding the discourse around CSR motives, because actors often comment on others’ proposals or discuss counterparties’ positions. Therefore, besides showing the actors’ own positions, these documents enable us to grasp how actors discursively refer to and accept certain vocabularies of motives of others. Furthermore, these documents are regularly published, updated, or adapted to suit the latest policy developments and therefore are a valuable source for studying how actors’ positions change over time.

The number of documents published per actor group varies over time, reflecting the varying degree of active discourse by different actors, as well as changes in the types of documents published (e.g., newsletters being published more frequently than policy reports and only in later years). Across the three periods (see later), the number of published documents increased for all actor groups, annually averaging 1.3 (business), 0 (state), and 1.3 (civil society) documents in period 1; 1.2 (business), 1.5 (state), and 1.9 (civil society) documents in period 2; and 5.3 (business), 4.0 (state), and 11.7 (civil society) documents in period 3. Actors in our sample sometimes referred to documents published outside Germany, mostly policy papers by the European Commission (EC). In such cases, we looked at these documents as relevant context information to better understand articulations of actors included in our analyses but did not include these documents in our systematic coding.

Data Analysis

Using qualitative data analysis software (MAXQDA), we systematically analyzed all documents in our data set in several stages. First, we organized documents chronologically for each actor group to identify when they “entered” the discourse and “who said what, and when” (Hardy & Maguire, Reference Hardy and Maguire2010: 1371). On the basis of this chronology, we built an event history catalog based on a first reading of all documents (van de Ven & Poole, Reference van de Ven and Poole1990), including, for instance, the establishment of new business associations or major policy initiatives related to CSR. This timeline was used as the basis for understanding overall development and to contextualize important turning points of the discourse. On the basis of this timeline, we structured our analysis using a “temporal bracketing” strategy (Langley, Reference Langley1999), organizing the data into three periods, where each period begins with relevant events, such as the formation of new organizations and policy initiatives (we describe these periods in the Findings section).

Second, reading through all documents again, we systematically coded the actors’ motives for CSR. Here we followed an abductive approach, connecting empirical observations with extant theoretical ideas to generate novel insights (van Maanen, Sørensen, & Mitchell, Reference van Maanen, Sørensen and Mitchell2007). Starting from our data, we identified vocabularies of motive for CSR based on those text passages involving justifications, such as reasons why businesses should engage in CSR or why CSR was important (cf. Bansal & Roth, Reference Bansal and Roth2000: 721), for instance, “We engage in CSR practices because we believe this to strengthen our reputation.” Such text passages, ranging from a single sentence to several sentences in length, were given initial codes close to the original text; for the preceding example, “strengthen reputation” was used. Next, similar codes were aggregated into more abstract categories, representing a family of meaningfully similar motives. For this example, the category “reputation insurance” covers a group of codes that express concerns about potentially negative consequences for the reputation of the firm related to the social consequences of business activities.

Following our abductive approach, we confronted our initial coding with prior theory in an iterative fashion, interpreting the coded categories of motives in relation to previous literature. Although various conceptual frameworks exist for understanding CSR motives (e.g., Garriga & Melé, Reference Garriga and Melé2004; Nyberg & Wright, Reference Nyberg and Wright2012), we found the distinction of Aguilera et al. (Reference Aguilera, Rupp, Williams and Ganapathi2007) between instrumental, relational, and moral motives to most adequately represent our categories. Though Aguilera et al. describe these three motives more broadly, our inductively derived categories of motive could be meaningfully subsumed under these groups and provide nuance to them. The concept of “instrumental motives” subsumes categories that justify CSR as a direct means to corporate financial ends, for example, to justify competitive advantage or risk reduction. Categories that justify CSR as reflecting an essential part of the social contract between the firm and its stakeholders were clustered as “relational motives.”Footnote ¹ Categories that motivated CSR through a feeling of moral obligation or as part of an intrinsic commitment or value system were assigned to the “moral motives” for CSR. Table 2 summarizes the three groups of instrumental, relational, and moral motives, showing the overall frequency of each of the seventeen categories within these three groups, and provides illustrative codes for each category.

Table 2:

Coding Scheme—Motives for CSR and Illustrative Quotes

As Table 2 shows, we interpret the business case as a vocabulary of motive synonymous with the seven instrumental motives identified in our coding scheme. All these instrumental motives justify CSR with financial “bottom line reasons” and tangible and direct benefits for the firm (Berger et al., Reference Berger, Cunningham and Drumwright2007; Carroll & Shabana, Reference Carroll and Shabana2010). The business case draws on different lines of reasoning: regulation prevention; competitive advantage; corporate reputation and risk management; taking an investment, strategic, or win-win approach to CSR; or making explicit reference to the general term “business case” for CSR. All these categories express a causal belief that CSR is a voluntary strategy for dealing with stakeholder expectations, is compatible with profit and shareholder-value maximization, and can be assessed in market-oriented terms of profitability and efficiency.

Finally, we conducted both a synchronic comparison of the motives articulated by different groups and a diachronic analysis of the respective changes in shared motives over time. Synchronically comparing motives articulated within and across groups allowed us to identify discourse coalitions. We identified discourse coalitions based on whether the motives used to justify CSR overlap among two or more stakeholder groups. To constitute a discourse coalition, we applied the following conditions: 1) a clear majority for one motive exists within a group of actors (e.g., instrumental motives accounting for more than 50 percent of the motives articulated by the group of state actors) and 2) the same motive was dominant across groups of actors (e.g., instrumental motives accounting for more than 50 percent of the motives articulated by groups of state and business actors). Thus discourse coalitions capture a threshold of overlaps between dominant motives across the groups of business, state, and civil society, not among particular members within these groups (e.g., business associations and businesses).

We then analyzed the formation of discourse coalitions around shared motives diachronically, that is, over time. To examine the emergence of these discourse coalitions, we drew on the concept of coalition magnet. We analyzed this process based on three steps. First, we identified the role of policy entrepreneurs by examining which stakeholder groups initially took up the business case vocabulary and actively promoted it in the context of new policy initiatives, such as those of the National CSR Forum or econsense. Second, we identified the growing valence of the business case by showing the growing quantity of engagement of actors within a group as well as across groups with this particular vocabulary and declining engagement with alternative vocabularies and by qualitatively analyzing the ways that stakeholder groups align the business case with their own interests and goals. Third, we explored the polysemy of the business case as a vocabulary, analyzing how it allows actors to thematize a wide range of otherwise ethical and relational issues while embedding these topics in a vocabulary with strong valence within the business community and active support by key policy entrepreneurs.

Shifting Motives in the German Discourse on CSR, 1970–2014

Figure 1 depicts the overall trajectory of CSR motives articulated by business, state, and civil society groups over the period 1970 to 2014. The figure contains the average number of documents coded per year to indicate the intensity of discourse (gray line) as well as the relative use of moral, relational, and instrumental motives by each group (bars). On the basis of external events in our timeline, we divided the discourse into three time periods.

Figure 1:

Changes in the Discourse for CSR—Average Number of Documents and Relative Importance of Instrumental, Relational, and Moral Motives across Time and Actor Groups, Germany, 1970–2014

Note. The bar charts show the relative importance of the three motives articulated by the three actor groups across the three time periods, with the percentages depicted on the scale on the left-hand side of the figure. The line represents the average number of documents published per year per actor group, with the numbers depicted on the scale on the right-hand side of the figure.

The first period, 1970–94, starts with the earliest discussion papers on CSR (back then, variously referred to in Germany) and is characterized by a relatively low intensity of discourse. In this first period, the vocabulary of motive was predominantly moral and consisted of relational motives only to a lesser extent. Notably, instrumental motives were far less prevalent, even among business groups. Most discourse on CSR took place within established corporatist channels, such as between employer associations and trade unions, and was related to issues of social peace in Germany. The state was markedly absent from this early discourse.

The second period, 1995–2007, marks a major shift, where the use of motives is reversed and instrumental motives were the single most common vocabulary of motive used by business and the state. Meanwhile, significantly fewer relational and even fewer moral motives were put forward to justify CSR, largely by civil society groups that only partially engaged with instrumental motives. This shift coincides with several wider political-economic transformations of the German market economy, such as the erosion of the social market economy and some of its key institutions (Beyer & Hoppner, Reference Beyer and Hoppner2003; Jackson & Sorge, Reference Jackson and Sorge2012) and the subsequent neoliberalization of the German political economy (Streeck, Reference Streeck2009), which are conducive to a shift in vocabulary toward economic freedom and business performance. In the discourse on CSR itself, this shift reflects the emergence of the English term CSR as a key reference point in the German discourse, indicating a wider international orientation of actors, including toward the CSR strategy introduced by the EC. In Germany, a number of new initiatives were introduced more explicitly using the banner of “CSR,” such as the business-led CSR associations econsense (short for “economic and ecological in consensus”) and Freedom and Responsibility and a civil society initiative called CorA (Corporate Accountability: Network for Corporate Responsibility). The federal government also became active, such as by developing internet platforms like “CSR Made in Germany,” commissioning reports, and organizing various events and fora.

Last, the third period, 2008–14, corresponds to the foundation of a national CSR forum, resulting in the definition of a national CSR strategy and a common understanding around CSR. The dominance of instrumental motives vis-à-vis relational and moral motives became even more pronounced in this third period, with civil society actors also shifting to instrumental motives as their single most dominant set of motives. For all three groups of actors, instrumental motives were the dominant motives in this third period, whereas relational and moral motives lost importance.

Next, we turn to each period in detail and explain the discursive mechanisms behind the rising dominance of the business case, in which this vocabulary acted as a coalition magnet for an emerging discourse coalition between business and state actors and, later, all three groups of actors, including civil society actors.

First Period: Moral Motives and the Contested Nature of the Business Case, 1970–1994

In this first period, the vocabulary of motives is clearly defined by moral and—to a slightly lesser extent—relational motives among business and civil society groups. Unions especially justify CSR predominantly in moral terms, with only a few relational and no instrumental motives. Moral justifications mostly revolve around ethical principles, such as human dignity—for instance, with regard to demands for “humane working conditions” (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund [DGB], Reference Pfromm1972, 1979). Such principles imply legal and moral rights, for instance, the moral entitlement of workers to decent working conditions (DGB, 1981) or participation in corporate decisions:

With the rising environmental movement toward the late 1970s, NGOs joined the discourse and justified CSR in moral and relational terms. Environmental NGOs, such as German Friends of the Earth (Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz; BUND), for instance, argued for a representation of the “interests of nature” in the supervisory board of corporations in the same way as unions do for employees, emphasizing the need to integrate the “natural environment as a ‘third factor’ in the management of large companies” (Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz [BUND], 1981: 327).

Business actors often shared these moral and relational motives to justify CSR, describing it as “morally obligatory behavior” (Weber, Reference Weber1984: 7) and a question of “complete moral commitment” (Tacke, Reference Tacke and Plesser1974: 72). They complemented moral motives with an almost equal number of relational motives and, for instance, emphasized the embeddedness of corporations in society and the need to legitimize the existing economic order through active engagement in social and environmental responsibilities. The Confederation of German Employers’ Associations (Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände [BDA], 1974: 19), for instance, saw the stability of the social-market economy to be reliant on firms’ “willingness to take responsibility for the common good … through active participation in the expansion of the free social order … and restrained short-term success.” Likewise, business discourse around the social market economy was heavily influenced by Catholic social teaching (Katholische Soziallehre). The Association of Catholic Entrepreneurs (Bund Katholischer Unternehmer [BKU], 1970: 11) argued,

The broader business community used such motives to justify CSR, and—as Figure 1 also shows—they were clearly part of the accepted vocabulary at that time.

Government was not explicitly engaged with the discourse on CSR but addressed such issues implicitly through regulating social and environmental issues. For example, discussions around the quality of life “led to a new understanding of corporate conduct. It is expected from businesses to not only fulfill material objectives but to also satisfy societal demands of a noneconomic nature” (Biedenkopf, Reference Biedenkopf and Gemper1973: 147–48). However, within the framework of the social market economy, a strong expectation existed for government to articulate the public interest and address such issues through regulation. Business acknowledged that “new value conceptions find increasing resonance among the public…. The economy and its achievements are measured by the responsibility for society” (Abs, Reference Abs and Plesser1974: 26; cf. Fertsch-Röver, Reference Fertsch-Röver and Plesser1974: 80–81). One entrepreneur stated that “it would be outright arrogance if the industry itself wanted to determine the degree of air pollution that is bearable for the neighbors of a factory or people driving in traffic. The state would thereby delegate the exercise of its duty to protect the general public to an interest group” (Zempelin, Reference Zempelin and Plesser1974: 104–5). CSR retained an implicit aspect, with existing government regulation being largely accepted and sometimes even called for by business actors.

Figure 1 also shows some instrumental motives being articulated among business actors. These motives stressed paternalistic benefits to employers of “humanized” work practices, such as encouraging higher productivity rates through “increased employee motivation” (BKU, 1974: 16–17; cf. BDA, 1973: 8; Mohn, Reference Mohn1974: 94). However, instrumental motives were also strongly contested. Some entrepreneurs regarded it as “outright inappropriate, if not immoral,” to profit from fulfilling their necessary corporate responsibilities (Fritz, Reference Fritz1976: 89) and questioned whether profitable actions could even count as “corporate responsibility.” CSR was often discussed as “noneconomic” (e.g., Biedenkopf, Reference Biedenkopf and Gemper1973: 147–48), that is, as a new corporate objective that needed to be weighed against profit objectives rather than integrated into “business as usual”—as is the case in today’s “win-win” accounts of corporate responsibility.

In sum, the first period is distinguished by the prominence of moral motives, especially among civil society actors. Business actors expressed a wide mix of mostly moral and relational, and some instrumental, motives. Thus, despite the overlapping concern with moral motives, no discourse coalition emerged between business and civil society actors, because no clear consensus around one motive existed within the business community. The unambiguous separation between economic/instrumental and noneconomic motives for CSR limited the potential to integrate different strands of argumentation into a wider polysemic understanding of CSR.

Second Period: The Increasing Role of the Business Case for CSR, 1995–2007

The second period shows a reversal (see Figure 1): instrumental motives became increasingly frequent for all three groups, whereas relational and moral motives became less important. Instrumental motives are dominant among business actors and, to a slightly lesser extent, the state. Meanwhile, civil society actors show a more heterogeneous set of motives with no clear consensus, whereby relational and moral motives together still outweigh instrumental motives.

We analyzed the stark rise of instrumental motives, arguing that the business case displayed three key characteristics typical of coalition magnets (summarized in Table 3): business and state actor groups became active policy entrepreneurs, promoting the instrumental vocabulary of motive for CSR. This intervention increased the valence of the business case for all three stakeholder groups, but each group engaged with the business case by emphasizing different aspects thereof, thereby expanding the polysemic character of the business case. In short, we show how these actors realigned their discourse around an increasingly salient but also polysemic understanding of the business case, first led by business and state actors and then, in period 3, joined by civil society actors promoting CSR with reference to instrumental motives, that is, forming a discourse coalition around the business case for CSR.

Table 3:

The Business Case as a Coalition Magnet in Periods 2 and 3

The introduction of the business case can be traced back to business actors acting as active policy entrepreneurs. Beginning in the late 1990s, concerns grew over the weakened competitiveness of the German economy and big business aligned with a growing agenda for market liberalization, especially from the Federation of German Industry (Bund Deutscher Industrie; BDI) and the Confederation of German Employers’ Associations (Bund Deutscher Arbeitgeberverbaende; BDA). These associations also founded a separate CSR association, econsense, which began to emphasize the need to align CSR with the market. Importantly, the new signifier of CSR was introduced from the Anglo-American business discourse. Businesses promoted this new English language signifier CSR to reframe corporate responsibilities almost without regard to the moral history of the concept in Germany. The term CSR gained importance following the EC’s multistakeholder dialogue and the publication of several policy papers requiring member countries to develop a national CSR strategy (European Commission [EC], 2001). Some German businesses were directly involved in the European Union Forum and used their influence to reframe the debate in Germany. The EC’s central idea was that CSR “should be treated as an investment, not a cost” (EC, 2001: 4), and that solid evidence for a business case would be “the best and most effective argument to encourage the uptake of CSR among enterprises” (EC, 2002: 9).

The business case motive proved highly attractive to German business actors in a time when they embarked on an agenda for deregulation and liberalization. The EC’s emphasis on voluntarism, in particular, allowed business actors to align their competitive interests to CSR, while avoiding state intervention. CSR based on “voluntarism and avoidance of mandatory rules by lawmakers will set free the innovative and creative powers in business,” thus warranting support through “deregulation and flexibilization wherever possible” (econsense, 2003: 3–4). In stark contrast to the first period, business actors strongly rejected government regulation:

Likewise, BDA (2005: 4–5) argued that “the diversity and complexity of CSR preclude the possibility of unified standards.” Rather, these actors agreed, voluntarism was needed to support other aspects of the business case—needed was “freedom for competing solutions, so that the best solutions can win” (econsense, 2003: 4; cf. Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie [BDI] & BDA, 2001: 4). The business case framing of CSR was thus highly attractive to businesses, as it allowed for promoting broader shifts toward liberalization and—with reference to CSR—fending off regulation.

The polysemy of the business case—its malleability in framing business actors’ interests in market liberalization as being aligned with the “common goal” of CSR—further legitimated CSR within the business community. Expressing the causal belief about a link between both more deregulation and more CSR, the business case discourse reconciled what—for a long time—had been perceived as contradicting goals. Whereas in the first period, moral motives for CSR framed responsibility as external to business objectives, now it is argued that

The business case, thus, is ambiguous in that it blurs the contradiction between competitiveness and profitability, on one hand, and responsibility, on the other. This alignment of responsibility and business performance is most acutely expressed in win-win motives to which business actors prominently referred. These motives stress that CSR “is to the benefit of both economic and social actors” (econsense, 2003, emphasis added) and often involve moral or relational motives (e.g., stressing a need to serve the common good), which had been articulated as stand-alone motives in the first period but now became included in win-win motives and, thus, dependent on businesses benefiting financially. For instance, “company volunteer programs benefit employees, companies and the common good” (Deutscher Industrie- und Handelskammer [DIHK], 2012: 10, emphasis added). Used in such a way, instrumental motives for CSR are compatible with market liberalism and integrate moral and relational responsibility into corporate strategy as a means to financial ends, rather than as something to be weighed against these goals.

State actors followed the lead of business as a policy entrepreneur by accepting that only voluntary approaches would “guarantee high acceptance within the business community” (Bundesregierung [BR], 2002a: 2). In a rather stark departure from earlier reliance on state regulation, the government now argued that CSR might “overburden” German businesses with an “additional load” (BR, 2002a: 6, 9). By acknowledging the business case as the accepted vocabulary of motive among business actors, state actors reframed their own role from regulating markets to enabling a market-based self-regulation of business, stressing that the “decision to engage in CSR will be made easier for corporations if, in addition to favorable conditions, strengthened social or environmental policy initiatives … lead to competitive or other market advantages and positive corporate balance sheets” (BR, 2002a: 3).

The business case was especially attractive for the red-green government under social democratic chancellor Gerhard Schröder, who, in an attempt to revive the German economy’s competitiveness, followed an agenda of liberalization but needed to keep this agenda at least rhetorically aligned with social democratic values around the social market economy. Within this broader agenda, the creation of a “German CSR profile” was seen as an important aspect, with the Council for Sustainable Development (Rat für Nachhaltige Entwicklung, 2006: 7), which advises the federal government, arguing that “advantages in location competition will not be realized as long as the German CSR profile remains vague and unclear.” Following “nation as brand” arguments, the government linked the idea of market-compatible CSR to the international promotion of the social market economy as a framework reconciling economic prosperity with societal concerns, arguing that CSR policy could play an “increasingly important role in the competitive advantage of Germany as a business location” (BR, 2007: 10).

The business case furthermore opened up opportunities for the government to depict corporations as the “key actors” of CSR (BR, 2002b: 1), serving government’s interest in promoting CSR while at the same time staying away from regulation. The role of the government was thereby reframed to “encourage” corporations to assume more social and environmental responsibility (BR, 2002b: 8–9), rather than to regulate by law. Promoting CSR “should not be about establishing a minimum level, but about promoting a competitive framework that rewards CSR with market advantages” (Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales [BMAS], 2008: 6). This voluntarist, market-driven understanding was later taken over by the Christian Democratic Party without any significant changes.

In line with the preceding developments, state actors mostly referred to motives for CSR around competitive advantage, win-win, and the voluntarism of CSR, capitalizing on the polysemy of the business case. Promoting these and other instrumental motives around the business case, state actors formed a coalition with business, with the business case serving as a coalition magnet binding various instrumental motives into a common discourse on CSR.

Instrumental motives were, however, not universally accepted. Though active in the first period, in the second period, civil society actors remained largely silent until 2005, reflecting skepticism toward this new discourse on “CSR” (e.g., World Economy, Ecology and Development [WEED], 2003). However, seeing the government embrace the concept and realizing that “the discussion around the social responsibilities of corporations (CSR) is increasingly gaining ground in the public debate” (DGB, 2005: 3), both NGOs and unions explicitly decided to become once again more actively engaged in the discourse. During a conference in 2005—joined by fifty representatives of unions, NGOs, academia, and media, discussing recent developments in the debate on CSR in Germany and developing strategies for their future engagement with the topic—unions and NGOs decided to build a “strategic alliance” (WEED, Terres des Hommes, Global Policy Forum, & DGB Bildungswerk, 2006: 4) with the intention of defeating its instrumental justifications:

By forming an oppositional voice, NGOs and unions argued for a mandatory and less market-oriented approach. For example, CorA was founded in 2006 as a network of several NGOs and unions. CorA’s aim is to “influence and strengthen the debate on corporate responsibilities” and foster “binding instruments which oblige these companies to respect human rights as well as internationally recognized social and environmental standards and norms” (Corporate Accountability: Network for Corporate Responsibility [CorA], 2006: 2). Civil society actors continued to articulate moral and relational motives for CSR that departed significantly from the emphasis on voluntarism and economic benefits stressed by the business case.

While the attractiveness of the business case remained limited to civil society actors, given their pro-regulatory stance and continued emphasis on moral and relational motives, unions especially began to oscillate between their critical standpoint and the instrumental vocabulary promoted by the business–state discourse coalition and to engage with instrumental motives alongside moral and relational ones. For instance, while unions continued to emphasize the need for binding regulation, they began to integrate voluntarism into their vocabulary, framing it as a “first step” toward more binding regulation as well as being “additional” to it. Although they continued to emphasize that “voluntary action is not enough” (WEED et al., 2006: 19), they also now argued that “as long as these ‘demands for binding regulation’ face political resistance,” more “pragmatic solutions and approaches to conduct” might be necessary (DGB, 2007: 4, emphasis added). Hence, although they tapped into some instrumental motives, they continued to articulate a sharp line in that CSR must not risk substituting for traditional forms of regulation.

In sum, the second period is distinguished by the promotion of the business case by policy entrepreneurs from the business sector and acted as a coalition magnet for business and state actors. The business case was yet to become dominant across all stakeholder groups.

Third Period: The Business Case for CSR as Dominant Vocabulary of Motive, 2008–2014

The third period was characterized by the expansion of the discourse coalition around the business case for CSR also to include civil society actors. Figure 1 shows the existence of this coalition, in which instrumental motives constituted the absolute majority within all three stakeholder groups as well as across all three groups for the first time. The discourse coalition, thus, now spanned all three sectors, involving also civil society actors articulating CSR in primarily instrumental terms. The business case thereby became the dominant vocabulary of motive. This dominance also involved marginalizing other types of motives, which lost acceptance in their own right and almost disappeared in the discourse.

Civil society actors’ growing use of the business case is remarkable, given their earlier opposition. Their shift toward the instrumental vocabulary reflects the increasing power of the business case as a coalition magnet and the accordant coalition of business and state actors. Given the stability of motives of business and state actors during the third period, we highlight here the changing motives among civil society actors.

The business case became particularly valent for civil society in response to the policy entrepreneurship of the federal government with the foundation of the National CSR Forum. This multistakeholder forum was initiated to develop a German CSR action plan and decide on a “common understanding of CSR in Germany” (BMAS, 2010), thus representing an important act of policy entrepreneurship by state actors. Here important aspects of the future CSR discourse—for instance, the renunciation of binding regulation and reliance on the market—were predetermined by the federal government. Given this predetermination, civil society actors were pushed to decide whether to join the forum and, therewith, consent to voluntarism or hold on to their earlier opposition to these elements of the business case and have a say in the development of a national CSR strategy.

The attractiveness of the forum for the unions and major NGOs deciding to take part reflected how the discussion around CSR “had gained remarkably in intensity in the last five years … and is likely to further increase in the future” (DGB, 2009a: 3, 6). These groups therefore feared being marginalized in case of nonparticipation.Footnote ² Despite the nonmandatory, market-oriented approach of the forum, union representatives especially saw participation as crucial, because they were also confronted with CSR directly in firms and felt that engaging in this discourse might alter power relations to their advantage, that is, in attaining “increasing involvement of employee representatives on the supervisory board, including in questions of strategic management” (DGB, 2009a: 5). Not least were issues traditionally negotiated by unions, such as working conditions, increasingly discussed under the signifier of “CSR.” Reference to the established vocabulary provided the opportunity for continued influence on such matters and put “union topics such as decent work and employee participation center stage of voluntary [CSR] commitments” (Hans Boeckler Foundation [HBS], 2009: 2). Engaging with the instrumental vocabulary was thus an attractive way to stabilize unions’ influence and expert role with regard to such issues.

This rather drastic discursive shift was possible because of the polysemy of the business case, which allowed civil society actors to retain some of their own interests while referring to the accepted vocabulary around the business case. On one hand, they began articulating particularly those instrumental motives that were conducive to being aligned with their own ideas. For example, business case motives related to reputational insurance and businesses’ “need for credibility and a good image” were interpreted as offering civil society a potential means to sanction businesses in cases of irresponsible behavior or violation of standards (HBS, 2008: 1; also BUND, 2008). “As a sanction for noncompliance, there is a risk of loss of reputation. An essential motive of corporate responsibility is thus the preservation or improvement of the reputation” (HBS, 2009: 1–2). Insurance motives were thus used as a means to keep up the pressure for businesses to take up responsibility, making the instrumental vocabulary compatible with civil society groups’ interests.

On the other hand, civil society actors began to articulate their moral and relational concerns in the frame of the business case, thus drawing on their “opponent’s” vocabulary and making use of the ambiguity of the business case to insert their own ideas. Moral motives around the rights of third parties, for instance, became ingrained into instrumental motives by arguing for the importance of codetermination as a legally secured right for employees but also as a success factor. “Codetermination … is based on clear legal regulations, often supplemented by collective agreements and company agreements of a binding nature” (DGB, 2009a: 3). “In addition, there is a positive influence of corporate codetermination on productivity in codetermined companies” (DGB, 2009b: 5). Civil society actors thus began to argue for issues in instrumental terms that, in earlier periods, were conceived of as a right or entitlement and thus independent of any “payoff” for business. Moral and relational motives were thus increasingly woven into the instrumental vocabulary of the business case and lost their stance as stand-alone justifications for CSR. Rather than fully buying in to the idea of the business case itself, the polysemy of the business case offered them a way to abide by the vocabulary of motive accepted by business and state actors while bringing in some of their own ideas.

The discursive shift of civil society actors was sealed through their participation in the National CSR Forum, which granted legitimacy to the forum’s instrumental vocabulary and strengthened its position as accepted discourse at a societal level. With the joint consent to the forum’s decisions, the cross-sectoral discourse coalition around the business case was fully established and not least inscribed in the “consensus” around the German CSR strategy, which promotes CSR as a voluntary, market-driven concept, conducive to businesses’ competitive advantage and reputational gain. At the same time, the discursive shift of civil society actors weakened the countercoalition that had so far argued for moral and relational motives.

The business case stabilized as the dominant justification for CSR, with alternatives being regularly rejected in the German discourse. For example, the EC has partially reversed its focus on the business case and acknowledges relational motives for CSR (see Kinderman, Reference Kinderman2013). The EC (2011: 5–6) refers to “the responsibility of enterprises for their impacts on society,” thus acknowledging obligations of business to other stakeholders, and abandoned voluntarism by arguing for “complementary regulation” and passing a directive on mandatory disclosure (EC, 2013). While acknowledging this “fundamental paradigm shift” (BDI, BDA, DIHK, & Zentralverband des Handwerks, 2011: 6), the German discourse remained “particularly resistant” (Bizzarri, Reference Bizzarri2013: 2), and business actors especially “decidedly opposed” the EC’s new course (BDA, 2013: 1; also BDI, 2013; BDI et al., 2011). The federal government also argued that turning away from the “basic principle of voluntarism” would imply “considerable bureaucratic effort” and “undermine motivation for self-regulation,” especially with regard to small and medium-sized enterprises (BR, 2011: 2–3).

While business and state actors rejected the relational motives acknowledged in the EC discourse, civil society actors remained potentially more supportive but failed to use this window of opportunity to renew their earlier critical standpoint. Instead, unions described their position toward CSR as “skeptical, but not dismissive” (Hexel, Reference Hexel, Ulshöfer and Feuchte2011; Thannisch, Reference Thannisch2012). Consequently, state and business actors were empowered to justify their opposition to the EC as threatening the “consensually agreed on common understanding of CSR” inscribed in the national CSR strategy (BDI et al., 2011: 6–7; also BDA, 2013: 2) and accused the EC of overriding “the consensus of all relevant stakeholders” (BDI et al., 2011: 5–6). The existence of the cross-sectoral discourse coalition helped alleviate pressures from the EC by drawing legitimacy from civil society actors, thereby sealing the dominant role of the business case even in the face of changing EC regulation.

In sum, the third period was marked by the extension of the discourse coalition around the business case for CSR to civil society actors, turning the business case for CSR into a dominant discourse all three groups of actors used. Moral and relational motives were marginalized, with fewer and fewer of these motives being articulated, either vanishing from the discourse or being embedded into instrumental motives.

Table 4 summarizes these shifts across all three periods using the detailed breakdown of instrumental, moral, and relational motives as percentages of overall motives per actor. Here we see both the broad shift from moral and relational motives to instrumental ones across all three groups, but also the polysemic character of the business case itself; that is, whereas by period 3, some business case motives are shared between actor groups, we also observe some difference in priorities among different aspects of the business case (e.g., win-win and voluntarism are stressed more prominently by business). This observation highlights the importance of polysemy in relation to the business case and its role as a coalition magnet. This pattern contrasts with the first period, in which business and civil society groups shared only a very narrow vocabulary of motive around two issues (the rights of third parties and preserving social order).

Table 4:

Overlap in Articulated Motives across Stakeholder Groups, Detailed Overview

Note. Percentages are shaded to highlight the most frequent motives used by each group during each period (use of 10 percent and higher), thereby indicating the overlap among motives between groups.

Limitations and Future Research

Our study has several limitations that suggest possibilities for future research. First, our focus was on the communicated motives for CSR, but we did not directly relate discourse to the behavior of the actors involved, that is, with regard to how CSR is practiced. Although prior research posits that shared understandings are antecedent to action (e.g., Loewenstein, Ocasio, & Jones, Reference Loewenstein, Ocasio and Jones2012; for the case of corporate environmental strategies, see Sharma, Reference Sharma2000), an interesting agenda for research might relate CSR motives to CSR practices (e.g., Bansal & Roth, Reference Bansal and Roth2000). For example, do motives matter for whether firms adopt more symbolic or substantive forms of CSR practices or engage in corporate irresponsibility or misconduct? Likewise, how does the stability of the business case discourse shape or limit responses to the growing salience of societal and ecological grand challenges in recent years?

Second, by explaining the emergence of the business case in terms of national-level discourse, we only briefly touched on the role of European and other transnational influences on the German discourse, including those of economic globalization and neoliberalization. Already in period 2, we observed a growing international influence through the use of the English term CSR and the agenda of the EC, such as its early stress on voluntarism. In this study, we assume that domestic political actors are capable of drawing on international developments selectively, rather than being externally determined. For example, German business drew positively on the EU definition of CSR in period 2 but opposed its revision in period 3. However, further research could extend this research to more explicitly theorize the transnational dimension of CSR discourse as well as the transnational forces that have likely played a role in diffusing CSR-related ideas and practices (Kaplan & Kinderman, Reference Kaplan and Kinderman2020).

Third, this article focuses on Germany as a country, with its corporatist institutions and strong coordination among stakeholders. Prior literature examining CSR in corporatist economies, such as Austria (Höllerer, Reference Höllerer2013; Meyer & Höllerer, Reference Meyer and Höllerer2010) or Scandinavia (Midttun, Gjølberg, Kourula, Sweet, & Vallentin, Reference Midttun, Gjølberg, Kourula, Sweet and Vallentin2015), suggests some similar trend toward liberalization as found in Germany. Likewise, the vocabulary of the business case was established earlier and with less powerful influence of the state and civil society in more liberal market economies, such as the United States (Abend, Reference Abend2014; Kaplan, Reference Kaplan2015; Marens, Reference Marens2012). Hence CSR is often part of a new spirit of capitalism, for which the business case provides key mechanisms that support capitalism’s ability to renew itself by incorporating critique (Boltanski & Chiapello, Reference Boltanski and Chiapello2007). Nonetheless, the political dynamics and actor coalitions driving these outcomes seem to differ. Although the business case has risen to prominence and may translate fairly easily across different contexts, national differences remain important, because the vocabularies of moral and relational motives tend to reflect very strongly their embeddedness in and legacies of historically specific politics of the corporation in different countries. For example, the German discussion on economic democracy has no direct counterpoint in the United States given the very different role of unions and entanglement of the corporation in politics (see also Jackson, Reference Jackson, Streeck and Yamamura2001). As a result, efforts to overcome the dominance of the business case are likely to draw from the legacies of moral and relational vocabularies in different political settings. Here comparative studies that theorize the political contingencies and institutional factors that have shaped the specific discourse coalitions and the role of specific stakeholder groups within them would play an important role.

Finally, our data allowed us to understand only what was publicly communicated and strategically brought into the debate by different stakeholder groups. Our data are less suited to providing insights into the political processes that go into formulating these positions as well as how these positions, once published, are negotiated between stakeholder groups. Our findings could thus be extended by studies focusing on the “politics in action” of specific contentious episodes relevant to the CSR discourse and casting light on more dialogical moments of discourse, such as parliamentary debates, shareholder meetings, or multistakeholder dialogues (e.g., Archel, Husillos, & Spence, Reference Archel, Husillos and Spence2011; Grimm, Reference Grimm2019). Such interactive moments could give further insights into how meanings are negotiated and what happens when actors follow different or even conflicting motivations.