Formal and informal institutions in hybrid regimes

In political systems, institutions establish the ‘rules of the game’, creating incentives that shape behaviour and ensure compliance. These incentives include both rewards for adherence and sanctions for non-compliance, influencing how actors align with the rules. By fostering shared expectations that others will also comply, institutions align actors' preferences, guide behaviour and bring order and predictability to interactions (March and Olsen Reference March, Olsen, Rhodes, Binder and Rockman2006; North Reference North1990). Consequently, the stability of any regime fundamentally depends on its institutions' ability to create an incentive structure that aligns behaviour with its core norms and objectives.

Earlier research explored optimal configurations of constitutions, executive powers, legislature structures, party organizations and electoral rules aiming for an institutional equilibrium to promote democratic stability (Lijphart Reference Lijphart1999; Linz Reference Linz1990; Mainwaring Reference Mainwaring1993; Stepan and Skach Reference Stepan and Skach1993). Subsequent studies examined the conditions under which these formal institutions effectively shape political behaviour to ensure representative, responsive and accountable governance (Cheibub Reference Cheibub2007; Figueiredo and Limongi Reference Figueiredo and Limongi2000; Mainwaring and Shugart Reference Mainwaring and Shugart1997; Power and Gasiorowski Reference Power and Gasiorowski1997; Shugart and Carey Reference Shugart and Carey1992). However, numerous political transformations in non-Western countries which adopted democratic institutions, but often deviated from anticipated outcomes, highlighted the importance of understanding the role of informal rules, influencing actors' expectations and guiding their behaviour. This recognition has shifted scholarly focus towards examining how informal institutions complement or counteract formal ones, aiming to provide a more comprehensive perspective on the political context.

In consolidated democracies, where constitutionalism and rule of law prevail, informal institutions often complement and coordinate with formal rules to reinforce their impact (Azari and Smith Reference Azari and Smith2012). In developing democracies, they may accommodate formal institutions lacking appropriate incentives to shape behaviour. For instance, the Concertación alliance in Chile utilized informal coalition mechanisms which effectively mitigated risks of gridlock within its strong presidential system by promoting interparty and interbranch cooperation (Siavelis Reference Siavelis, Helmke and Levitsky2006). Informal institutions may also subvert the intended functions of formal institutions. Practices such as patronage, clientelism and corruption prioritize narrow interests over public welfare, leading to particularistic outcomes that hinder representation and responsiveness and thereby undermining the effectiveness of democratic institutions (Helmke and Levitsky Reference Helmke and Levitsky2006). In autocracies, these competing informal institutions paradoxically produce complementary outcomes by filling the gaps left by weak or absent formal institutions (Lauth Reference Lauth, Gandhi and Ruiz-Rufino2015). They support regime stability by managing collective action and monitoring problems yet undermine prospects for democratic transitions and the rule of law (Köllner Reference Köllner2013).

In hybrid regimes, combining democratic and authoritarian elements, informal institutions are perceived as either filling gaps left by ineffective formal institutions or subverting them to ensure elite loyalty and consolidate power (Grzymala-Busse Reference Grzymala-Busse2010; Ledeneva Reference Ledeneva2006; O'Donnell Reference O'Donnell1996). The likelihood of democratization in such regimes largely diminishes with the prevalence of competing informal rules that actively undermine democratic processes. When formal rules fail to provide sufficient incentives for compliance, actors find incentives to explore and rely on informal alternatives outside officially sanctioned mechanisms. The influence of these informal rules intensifies as formal institutions become weakly enforced and unstable (Levitsky and Murillo Reference Levitsky and Murillo2009). If actors expect compliance with these informal rules from others, they are more likely to conform themselves. This adaptive behaviour reinforces them at the expense of formal institutions (Lauth Reference Lauth, Gandhi and Ruiz-Rufino2015).

Recent studies challenge the notion that informal institutions merely compensate for or subvert formal institutions. Rather than placing formal vis-à-vis informal institutions, they highlight the dynamic interplay between them to explain why hybrid regimes often diverge from expected democratic outcomes. Political elites often use formal institutions to engage in patronage politics and rent-seeking behaviour, aiming to secure political support and stabilize the regime (Benton Reference Benton2007; Figueiredo and Limongi Reference Figueiredo and Limongi2000; Kellam Reference Kellam2015). Executives leverage resource control and appointments to sustain legislative support in fragmented legislatures and reduce gridlock (Mello and Spektor Reference Mello and Spektor2018; Pereira and Mueller Reference Pereira and Mueller2004). In Honduras, the combination of fused elections and factionalized parties prompts elites to adopt caudillo politics, stabilizing their power at the cost of democratic consolidation (Taylor Reference Taylor1996). This pattern of behaviour stems not from ineffective formal institutions but from flawed institutional design, which disrupts the balance of power between government branches, prompting elites to use formal powers for personal or political gain and to build clientelistic networks (Hale Reference Hale2011; Mello and Spektor Reference Mello and Spektor2018). This flawed institutional design helps maintain stable coalitions by actively involving formal institutions to reinforce patronage politics and clientelistic networks at the expense of responsiveness and representation.

Moreover, in hybrid regimes, frequent changes to formal rules are often seen as contributing to institutional instability and weakening the enforcement of those rules (Levitsky and Murillo Reference Levitsky and Murillo2009). However, the weakness of formal institutions usually arises not from an inherent incapacity to enforce rules but from a lack of support by deeply embedded informal rules that offer incentives different from those of formal institutions. Formal institutions often become effective by adapting to entrenched informal rules that already shape actors' expectations and behaviours (Hale Reference Hale2011). When formal institutions evolve in response to entrenched informal rules that subvert democratic processes, they fail to produce democratic outcomes but become effective at generating particularistic outcomes that align with the expectations of clientelistic networks (Grzymala-Busse Reference Grzymala-Busse2010; Ledeneva Reference Ledeneva2006). Therefore, rather than simply declining, formal institutions in hybrid regimes are strategically repurposed to realign their incentive structures in support of informal rules. This adaptation not only legalizes these informal practices but also legitimizes them.

Overall, formal and informal institutions are deeply interconnected, transcending mere effectiveness and enforcement issues. Informal institutions are closely linked to formal institutional design, prompting critical questions about how they emerge, interact with formal institutions, shape actors' expectations and preferences, and influence behaviour, thereby affecting political outcomes. Their interplay is particularly evident in hybrid regimes, where the incentive structure of formal rules, sometimes strategically repurposed, reinforces entrenched informal rules and helps maintain power. Neopatrimonialism offers a valuable analytical lens for examining this interplay in hybrid regimes, highlighting how political elites leverage both formal and informal rules to maintain power. By embedding patronage and clientelism within formal institutions, they legitimize neopatrimonial authority but simultaneously undermine democratic governance. This perspective provides deeper insights into regime change beyond the decline of formal institutions or the rise of informal ones.

Institutional dynamics of neopatrimonialism

Max Weber (Reference Weber1978) describes patrimonialism as a traditional form of authority vested in an individual leader, legitimized by widely accepted norms and customs, and exercised through personal relationships based on loyalty and reciprocity. The ruler, driven by tradition, provides care, food and security in exchange for compliance and loyalty, creating an asymmetric yet mutually beneficial relationship between the ruler and the ruled. In contrast, bureaucratic authority is legitimized by strict adherence to codified rules and operates through an impersonal, legal-rational framework. While this legal-rational authority fosters predictable and fair governance where legality is widely respected, it is rarely observed in its purest form.

Neopatrimonialism blends personalized and legal-rational authority within modern institutional frameworks through three key elements: a strong executive, typically a president, whose authority is bolstered above the law by both formal and informal rules; the exercise of power through patron–client relationships binding the executive and supporters; and the discretionary distribution of public resources and offices in exchange for support to ensure political legitimacy and stability (Bratton and van de Walle Reference Bratton and van de Walle1997; Erdmann and Engel Reference Erdmann and Engel2007; Guliyev Reference Guliyev2011; Sigman and Lindberg Reference Sigman, Lindberg, Lynch and VonDoepp2019). Unlike patrimonialism, which relies solely on personal authority rooted in tradition, neopatrimonialism combines formal institutions with personalized rule, where political elites treat their formally defined powers as private property and engage in transactional interactions based on material exchanges rather than traditional customs and beliefs (Erdmann and Engel Reference Erdmann and Engel2007; Pitcher et al. Reference Pitcher, Moran and Johnston2009). Although informal institutions intertwine with formal ones, they do not completely override them but rather coexist and influence governance to varying degrees (Erdmann and Engel Reference Erdmann and Engel2007). Hence, neopatrimonial authority creates a hybrid form of governance, blurring the lines between public and private interests, making it difficult to discern whether political outcomes are driven primarily by formal or informal institutions.

When misconceived as a regime type, neopatrimonialism is often portrayed as predatory personalistic rule in non-Western contexts, disguised under a pseudo-Western façade of formal institutions (Erdmann and Engel Reference Erdmann and Engel2007). This portrayal explains the resilience of patriarchal, authoritarian and sultanistic regimes that rely on familial, kinship and religious ties, along with material benefits, suggesting the legitimization of authoritarian and potentially criminal behaviours through traditional loyalties (Bach Reference Bach2011; Bank and Richter Reference Bank and Richter2010). These mischaracterizations blur distinctions between regime type and forms of authority, as well as between patrimonial and neopatrimonial domination, by overemphasizing traditional norms, which are less prevalent at the national level today, and overstating informal practices without considering their interaction with formal institutions (Pitcher et al. Reference Pitcher, Moran and Johnston2009). Moreover, such interpretations reduce neopatrimonialism to a cultural artefact incompatible with Western standards of legal-rational authority and overlook its potential to foster developmental policies through a regulated interplay of private and public interests across Africa, the Middle East, Latin America and Asia (Bach Reference Bach2011; Isaacs Reference Isaacs2014; Mkandawire Reference Mkandawire2015; Pitcher et al. Reference Pitcher, Moran and Johnston2009).

Neopatrimonialism is a hybrid form of governance based on personalized authority within formal institutions, functioning through patron–client relationships and legitimized by patronage in exchange for support. This governance often disregards representation and responsiveness through programmatic policies, as political actors secure support by delivering goods and services to their loyal base while excluding those who do not align with them. While it can foster distributive and developmental policies when private and public interests converge, its focus on material exchanges and immediate rewards often undermines efforts to address broader societal issues with long-term policies. The persistence of patronage and clientelism, even within democratic formal institutions, raises important questions about democratic erosion. From an institutional perspective, these practices endure because of widely shared expectations about others' behaviour, which in turn shape individual actions. Strikingly, formal institutions can reinforce these practices by creating an incentive structure – comprising explicit mechanisms like legal provisions and informal mechanisms like social norms and expectations – that drives actors towards patronage and clientelism. This incentive structure operates by rewarding loyalty with access to resources, offices and political favours, while penalizing dissent. As more actors engage in these informal institutions, they expect others will comply as well, further entrenching these practices.

Concentrated power in a single authority, such as a president, fosters expectations of enduring political dominance, encouraging clientelistic networks to form around a dominant political machine led by the president (Hale Reference Hale2011: 582). The president's control over public resources and appointments strongly incentivizes acting as a patron, as it offers a more secure way to maintain power. By focusing on securing just enough backing from a select group, the president avoids the risks of competing against alternative candidates in elections through programmatic policies, which might not generate the same level of allegiance and could lead to losing office. Other formal institutions, such as party organization and electoral rules, may further reinforce the president's patron status by expanding control over key political processes including resources, policies, candidate selection and re-election. This concentration of power incentivizes various segments of society – including political elites, bureaucrats, voters and business groups – to become clients, reciprocating with political support and loyalty in exchange for access to patronage. Consequently, political patronage, whether through the exchange of public goods, services or appointments, creates a mutually beneficial yet asymmetric relationship between the patron and clients, further entrenching neopatrimonial rule (Eisenstadt and Roniger Reference Eisenstadt and Roniger1980; Erdmann and Engel Reference Erdmann and Engel2007; Guliyev Reference Guliyev2011).

The incentive structure perpetuates a cycle of mutual dependence that is deeply embedded in the strategic calculations of both patron and clients, making it difficult for either party to break away without jeopardizing their political and material gains. For clients – whether they are political elites, bureaucrats, voters or business groups – aligning with the patron offers immediate material rewards, while opposing the patron risks political, economic and social marginalization. This context makes loyalty the safer and more profitable strategy, particularly when access to resources and offices is tightly controlled by the patron. For the patron, sustaining a loyal base through patronage and clientelism is crucial for maintaining power. This dependence is carefully managed by ensuring that clients' continued loyalty is consistently rewarded, thereby minimizing the risk of defections that could threaten the stability and legitimacy of patron's authority. High-ranking clients, in particular, become subordinate due to their elevation based on loyalty in exchange for benefits, while lower levels may still operate on a merit-based system (Guliyev Reference Guliyev2011: 584). Over time, this system becomes self-perpetuating: as more actors entrench themselves within a patronage pyramid through clientelistic exchanges, they anticipate that others will do the same, embedding neopatrimonialism and making democratic governance through programmatic policies less viable.

In conclusion, formal institutions in hybrid regimes are not merely declining or ineffective; their incentive structures, sometimes strategically realigned, legitimize practices that perpetuate neopatrimonialism. In this hybrid governance model, formal institutions not only coexist with but actively support clientelistic networks and loyalty-based resource distribution, creating a cycle of mutual dependence between patrons and clients. These relationships, where actors depend on material exchanges, make breaking away from neopatrimonial authority difficult without jeopardizing their gains. As a result, democratic governance becomes elusive, as these structures prioritize particularistic policies over broader societal goals. The following sections examine Turkey as a case study, showing how the institutional incentive structure generated by presidentialism, party organization and electoral rules aligns actors' behaviour to entrench neopatrimonialism and undermine democratic governance.

The drivers of democratic breakdown in Turkey: Institutional erosion, patronage and corruption

Studies of democratic breakdown in Turkey largely mirror the broader literature, emphasizing the weakening of formal institutions, the expansion of patronage and pervasive corruption under the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and its leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, particularly since the 2010s. Erdoğan has maintained power as prime minister from 2003 to 2014, as the first directly elected president under the parliamentary system from 2014 to 2018, and has been president under the new presidential system since 2018. Turkey's regime under Erdoğan is characterized as a ‘delegative democracy’, marked by a strong executive, clientelism and weakened horizontal accountability (Taş Reference Taş2015). Others describe it as ‘competitive authoritarianism’, where the erosion of checks and balances and political and civil rights tilts the political playing field against the opposition (Esen and Gumuscu Reference Esen and Gumuscu2016; Özbudun Reference Özbudun2015). David White and Marc Herzog (Reference White and Herzog2016) emphasize Erdoğan's consolidation of power through control over the state's administrative, extractive and coercive capacities, referring to the regime as ‘electoral authoritarianism’. Ihsan Yilmaz and Galib Bashirov (Reference Yilmaz and Bashirov2018) describe ‘Erdoganism’ as a blend of electoral authoritarianism, political Islam, populism and patronage that entrenches Erdoğan's rule. These studies emphasize how the erosion of formal checks and balances has concentrated executive power, driving democratic breakdown. However, they often overlook the underlying institutional incentives that compel actors to align with this consolidation of power.

Patronage has historically defined party–voter linkage in Turkish politics, obstructing democratic governance by prioritizing particularistic goods and services over programmatic policies. Since the transition to multiparty system in the 1950s, political elites have exchanged public services for votes, especially in rural areas (Heper and Keyman Reference Heper and Keyman1998). By the 1980s and 1990s, this focus shifted to urban areas, where the growing urban poor became a key electoral base, and patronage was extended to include infrastructure projects, zoning permits and cash transfers to secure their support (Sayarı Reference Sayarı2014). Under the AKP, patronage expanded significantly, encompassing roads, coal, food, clothing, cash transfers and mass housing, distributed through a vast network of public institutions, municipalities and NGOs. For instance, strategic targeting of conditional cash-transfer programmes and public housing projects under the Housing Development Administration (TOKİ) indicates how resources are distributed primarily to enhance the AKP's electoral success rather than addressing needs-based criteria (Aytaç Reference Aytaç2014; Marschall et al. Reference Marschall, Aydogan and Bulut2016). This system strengthens the AKP's ties with voters, particularly in urban poor regions, where access to public services and goods is increasingly tied to political support, fostering voters' dependence on the party (Ark-Yıldırım Reference Ark-Yıldırım2017). This pervasive patronage sustains support for Erdoğan and the AKP, despite policy failures and economic challenges, though with slight decreases over the years.

The AKP's manipulation of privatization and public procurement, at unprecedented levels compared to previous governments, drives corruption in Turkey by enabling political actors to use office for private and political gain, such as distributing state resources to favoured business groups to forge powerful alliances. Legal changes, such as numerous amendments to the Public Procurement Law, enable the government to bypass competitive bidding or recognize exemptions, awarding lucrative contracts directly to politically connected businesses (Çeviker Gürakar Reference Çeviker Gürakar2016). This is especially prevalent in sectors such as construction, where rent creation is high and large infrastructure projects are used as vehicles for patronage. Similarly, these business groups also benefit from large-scale privatization by acquiring state assets at below-market prices in the energy, mining, tourism and health sectors (Buğra and Savaşkan Reference Buğra and Savaşkan2014). Profitable transfers of public funds and assets are reciprocated by these groups through media investments, creating pro-government media moguls who shape public opinion in favour of the AKP and Erdoğan (Esen and Gumuscu Reference Esen and Gumuscu2018). Their donations to the AKP's election campaigns, NGOs and municipalities are then redistributed as social assistance and services, further boosting voter support (Esen and Gumuscu Reference Esen and Gumuscu2021). Unlike previous periods, when corruption was more individualized, the AKP's selective application of legal instruments rewards supporters and puts sanctions on opponents, centralizing corruption through targeted legal reforms and amendments (Cengiz Reference Cengiz2020; Kimya Reference Kimya2019).

These political economy incentives, such as access to state resources, public contracts and privatization, inducing political actors to engage in corruption, are not merely an alternative to institutional incentives but are products of deliberative institutional restructuring. Legal changes in formal rules have entrenched corrupt practices within state–business relations, reinforcing the cycle of institutional repurposing and corruption (Çeviker Gürakar Reference Çeviker Gürakar2016). Moreover, these changes were made possible by members of the parliament, incentivized by party and electoral rules to align their behaviour with the agenda of their leader, who controls their political careers and holds the means to distribute resources within the party. The lack of transparent formal rules governing political party and electoral campaign finance also exacerbates informal and corrupt relationships, particularly as business groups increasingly rely on the state for economic opportunities (Kimya Reference Kimya2019). Consequently, the partisan distribution of resources to economic elites is facilitated also by institutional incentives, or the absence thereof, compelling actors to use their offices for private and political gain.

While these valuable contributions explain Turkey's democratic breakdown by detailing how it occurs, they often overlook the deeper question of why actors align with subversive informal institutions despite the presence of formal institutions. Addressing this requires a closer examination of the institutional incentives that shape actors' preferences and drive their behaviours towards supporting undemocratic practices. This study shifts the focus to these underlying institutional incentives, especially following the transition to presidentialism in 2017, inducing actors to perpetuate neopatrimonialism. According to the V-Dem Neopatrimonial Rule Index, Turkey's score rose steadily from 0.37 to 0.65 between 2010 and 2016, reflecting the growing personalization of power, clientelism and corruption under the parliamentary system.Footnote ¹ This rise in neopatrimonial practices correlates with significant constitutional and legal changes that expanded the AKP governments' executive power, altering institutional incentives and fostering the expectation that Erdoğan was becoming the primary authority in coordinating patronage distribution.

The 2010 constitutional referendum reorganized the high courts, curtailing their autonomy, which was further reinforced by radical legal changes in 2014 aiming to create a more cooperative and compliant judicial system (Özbudun Reference Özbudun2015). Erdoğan's direct election as president in 2014 concentrated his authority, as he exercised power akin to a semi-presidential system, despite the president's position being constitutionally designed as non-partisan. However, tensions arose within the AKP, as executive power still largely rested with the prime minister and cabinet, both of whom, along with the parliamentary majority, were from the AKP and accountable to parliament. This dual executive structure further weakened parliamentary checks and balances, which, though weak and partisan, still existed. The declaration of a state of emergency following the 2016 military coup attempt enabled the government to rule by executive decrees, bypassing both parliament and judiciary oversight for two years and ended shortly after the presidential system was implemented. Although these changes expanded Erdoğan's and his governments' reach, allowing clientelistic networks to coalesce around them, the consolidation of power was not without constraints. Many founding members of the AKP left the party, criticizing Erdoğan's increasing centralization of power, and the direction the party had taken, with some later forming or joining opposition parties. This internal dissent, coupled with the parliamentary system itself, limited the emergence of neopatrimonial rule. Unlike a presidential system, where power is concentrated in a single leader independent of parliament, the parliamentary system dispersed authority among the president, prime minister, cabinet and parliamentary majority. This division of power prevented the full centralization of authority around one figure and created competing interests within the government, leading to confusion over who held ultimate authority in patron–client relationships.

Institutionalization of neopatrimonial rule with presidentialism

The shift to presidentialism marks a decisive transformation characterized as ‘hyper-presidentialism’ (Boyunsuz Reference Boyunsuz2016) and ‘executive presidency’ (Akman and Akçalı Reference Akman and Akçalı2017), dismantling the previous dual executive structure and centralizing authority in a single figure. This new system enables Erdoğan, first elected president in 2018 and re-elected in 2023, to directly personalize state resources and offices, laying the groundwork for entrenched neopatrimonial rule. This entrenchment is reflected in Turkey's V-Dem Neopatrimonial Rule Index score, which rose to 0.89 and has remained steady since 2017. Presidential powers enable the president to dissolve parliament, unilaterally control appointments and restrict parliamentary oversight of the cabinet, budget and decrees. Coupled with centralized party leadership and a closed-list proportional electoral system, this system incentivizes the president, as head of state, executive and party leader, to act as a patron who ties political survival and access to resources and offices to loyalty, thereby personalizing governance.

Studies suggest that autocratic leaders often rewrite or amend constitutions to amass executive power, resulting in weakened formal institutions unable to provide effective checks and balances (Ginsburg and Huq Reference Ginsburg and Huq2018; Levitsky and Ziblatt Reference Levitsky and Ziblatt2018). However, this perspective overemphasizes the agency of the executive while portraying other actors as passive recipients of change, overlooking their active roles in shaping and adapting to evolving institutional dynamics. In Turkey, the shift to presidentialism has not simply weakened institutions but has established a new institutional equilibrium that strengthens the president's capacity to enforce authority directly. This new balance of power, rooted in stable and enforced rules, aligns actors' behaviour through incentives linking access to public resources and offices with loyalty. As actors anticipate mutual compliance, shared expectations foster conformity and bring institutional stability. Formal institutions, rather than being eroded, now legitimize and sustain patron–client relationships at the core of the state's functions, with loyalty-based distribution of resources and offices at the president's discretion, effectively perpetuating neopatrimonial rule.

Concluding remarks

This study demonstrates that neopatrimonial rule is not merely a symptom of institutional failure, but a product of the interaction between presidentialism and party and electoral institutions in hybrid regimes like Turkey. The analysis shows that formal institutions are not inherently weak, nor are informal institutions simply pervasive; rather, it is the institutional incentive structure created by the interplay of political institutions that fosters neopatrimonialism, potentially accelerating authoritarianism. In Turkey, the institutional design entrenches the president's status as a patron, concentrating control over the political system through building clientelistic networks and distributing patronage. For instance, this design discourages deputies from engaging in meaningful constituency representation, instead aligning them with the president's legislative agenda to distribute spoils to supporters in exchange for re-election prospects, career advancement and rewards. As a result, diverse interests are systematically excluded, and the enactment of programmatic policies becomes secondary to the distribution of patronage. This erodes voters' control over elected representatives and undermines the legitimacy and credibility of political institutions.

This political system severely limits Turkey's potential towards democratization, since neopatrimonialism thrives on an institutional incentive structure that encourages the expansion of patron–client relationships. For sustaining neopatrimonial authority, maintaining control over both the presidency and a legislative majority is crucial, as shown above. However, the proportional representation electoral system fostering a multiparty system increases the likelihood of parliamentary fragmentation. This fragmentation poses a threat to the president's ability to sustain the clientelistic networks that are necessary for consolidating power. To counteract this risk, major parties running for the presidency strategically form pre-electoral alliances with minor parties, co-opting them into the neopatrimonial system through the promise of patronage. By distributing resources and political favours, the president secures the loyalty of minor parties, preventing further fragmentation and consolidating his legislative majority. Minor parties, lacking independent access to state resources, find these alliances appealing as they provide opportunities to distribute spoils to their constituencies. This expansion of patron–client networks through patronage distribution co-opts more actors into the neopatrimonial system, thereby reinforcing it. As neopatrimonialism coopts more actors, the prospects for democratization in Turkey diminish. The incentives that encourage patronage-based coalitions reduce the likelihood of a shift towards policy-driven politics, where parties would compete on alternative policy agendas and legislature would be driven by programmatic policies addressing long-standing societal problems.

This study offers significant insights for countries facing democratic breakdown, pervasive patronage and clientelism. While it may be tempting to attribute the spread of subversive informal institutions to elite cohesion alone, particularly as Turkey's political regime becomes increasingly authoritarian under a presidential system with sweeping executive powers – paralleling trends in Latin America, Asia and Africa – this study moves beyond such assumptions by uncovering the institutional mechanisms driving particularistic outcomes. Without ‘appropriate’ institutional incentives that foster policy responsiveness and representation, political outcomes will continue to deviate from democratic governance. Beyond deepening the understanding of Turkey's political trajectory, this analysis provides a comparative framework for examining similar dynamics in other hybrid regimes. By transposing the concept of neopatrimonialism from area studies to comparative politics through the lens of new institutionalism, this study highlights the underlying institutional incentives that generate neopatrimonialism, offering broader insights into governance across the spectrum from democracies to fully authoritarian regimes.