Introduction
To what extent does European refugee protection depend on the ethno-religious and gender identity of asylum seekers? We address this question by examining the response of Germany to Yezidis, a historically marginalized community, following the genocidal attacks by the so-called Islamic State (IS) targeting the community in northern Iraq in August 2014. In the face of these atrocities, the German federal state of Baden-Württemberg initiated a special Humanitarian Admissions Program that provided refugee status to 1100 women and children. This unique program was the first time that being a victim of sexual violence was used as a criterion to identify potential refugees and bring them to a European country.
By offering an in-depth analysis of the experience of Yezidis in Europe, we argue that while asylum policies are theoretically distinct from migration policies, both systems increasingly operate under logics that create hierarchies of protection and exclusion. By utilizing the concept of “hierarchies of suffering,” we show that the treatment of Yezidis in Germany and France reveals three key dynamics in shaping access to protection: the securitization of certain groups, the growing influence of economic criteria even within asylum decision-making, and the logic of selective humanitarian exceptions. Building on Christie’s (Reference Christie and Fattah1986) concept of the “ideal victim,” we examine how certain forms of victimhood become privileged in humanitarian responses while others remain unrecognized.
Our analysis yields three key findings. First, unlike Muslim asylum seekers who face systematic securitization, that is, being portrayed as an existential threat justifying restrictive measures and coercive action (Huymans Reference Huysman2000), Yezidis have largely avoided being framed as security threats. Instead, they are predominantly portrayed as victims, with particular emphasis on women survivors of IS sexual violence. This gendered humanitarian framing enabled exceptional protection measures, most notably Baden-Württemberg’s Special Quota program — the first time sexual violence victimhood was used as a criterion for humanitarian admission to Europe. The establishment of the specialized humanitarian asylum quotas for Yezidis has been primarily influenced by gendered perceptions of victimhood, which garners public support. The dominant image of Yezidi migrants as victimized women from a persecuted religious group served to insulate the community from the securitization discourse typically applied to other migrant groups.
Second, while this gendered humanitarianism created pathways for protection, it remains highly selective. The focus on women survivors of sexual violence, while excluding male family members and other genocide victims, reveals how humanitarian exceptions operate within rather than challenge restrictive asylum policies. The program’s implementation — requiring economic self-sufficiency for family reunification rights — demonstrates how economic considerations increasingly influence even specialized humanitarian initiatives.
Third, the broader trajectory of German asylum policy shows that even recognized grounds for protection, like genocide (officially acknowledged by the German Bundestag), become secondary to questions of economic integration potential. This is evidenced by declining recognition rates for Yezidi asylum seekers after 2017. Many Yezidis, as migrants and refugees from a Global South country, now find themselves in administrative limbo under the Duldung status - their deportation suspended but lacking legal residence. Their struggle highlights how economic criteria increasingly shape asylum outcomes, even for groups facing documented persecution. Consequently, Yezidi liminality gains a new dimension. While free from religiously motivated persecution, members of the community continue to have a precarious existence characterized by status ambiguity and physical uncertainty.
In terms of empirics, we analyze contemporary documents in original languages (that is, media reporting, policy documents, press releases, reports by international associations) as well as dozens of face-to-face interviews conducted in Germany in 2019 with Yezidi migrants and refugees from different genders, ages, economic classes, and social castes. In terms of comparative design, we follow the logic of “shadow case” (Soifer Reference Soifer2020) as we use the Yezidi experience in France, another European country with a history of Yezidi migration, to argue that our findings travel well beyond Germany. After Germany, France emerges as one of the European countries hosting a substantial Yezidi population. Similar to Germany, France has undertaken a specialized humanitarian resettlement program specifically designed for the Yezidi survivors of the IS genocide.
Neoliberal convergence, securitization, and selective humanitarianism
In 2015, Chancellor Angela Merkel made a decisive move to admit approximately one million individuals into Germany as asylum seekers, circumventing the provisions of the Dublin Accord, which stipulates that the member state where an asylum seeker first enters the EU is responsible for examining their asylum claim. While countries like Hungary and Poland emphasized border security and cultural homogeneity, Germany initially adopted a relatively liberal approach that resulted in the admission of a large number of people into the country in a matter of months. However, by 2016, mounting public concerns about integration (Ilgit and Klotz Reference Ilgit and Klotz2018), rising support for the Alternative for Germany (AfD) — a far-right political party that campaigned heavily against immigration and refugee admissions - and anti-immigrant protests pushed Germany toward what Yurdakul and Korteweg (2021) term “selective inclusion.” This shift was particularly evident in the treatment of Muslim migrants. In this historical context, we suggest that contemporary migration control in Europe operates through three interrelated mechanisms: securitization of certain migrant groups, selective humanitarianism, and neoliberal selection criteria. While these might appear contradictory, we argue that these dynamics work together to create and maintain hierarchies of inclusion and exclusion.
Neoliberal convergence
A pivotal aspect of contemporary refugee policies is the adoption of the “refugees with good prospects vs. bad prospects” paradigm. This framework evaluated asylum seekers not just on protection needs but on their perceived potential for labor market integration. Those from countries with high recognition rates (over 50%), like Syria and Iraq, were fast-tracked into integration programs, while others, particularly from the Balkans and North Africa, faced likely deportation (Altenried et al. Reference Altenried, Bojadžijev, Höfler, Mezzadra and Wallis2018). This differential treatment extended to more recent crises — as Muller-Funk et al. (2023) show, Ukrainian refugees in 2022 received immediate protection and social benefits, while Syrians faced lengthy procedures and restrictions.
The neoliberal logic reshapes refugee management itself. Programs like Germany’s NEST (New Start in a Team) initiative transfer responsibility from the state to non-state actors, with local volunteers supporting refugee integration. This transformation extends beyond Germany, as countries increasingly prioritize economic criteria in migration policy. France pioneered aspects of selective migration under Sarkozy’s concept of “chosen immigration” (D’Amato and Lavizzari Reference D’Amato and Lavizzari2019), while even traditional settler societies like Canada and Australia are shifting from nation-building to economic selection (Boucher and Gest Reference Gest and Boucher2018).
These developments exemplify what Joppke (Reference Joppke2020, Reference Joppke2024) terms “neoliberal nationalism” — a fundamental transformation where economic criteria increasingly trump both humanitarian and ethno-religious considerations. Joppke argues that traditional distinctions between migration regimes have dissolved into a uniform landscape governed by neoliberal logic. This new framework prioritizes economic contribution and “earned citizenship” over ethnic or religious identity, creating what Costello and Mann (2020) identify as the “economization” of refugee protection. Germany’s recent “Spurwechsel” (track change) policy exemplifies this shift, breaking down even the traditionally strict separation between asylum and labor migration. While asylum policies are theoretically distinct from economic migration policies, both systems increasingly operate under neoliberal logics of selection. This convergence reflects both practical labor needs and the growing dominance of neoliberal performance criteria in migration governance. While Yezidis avoid the securitization typically applied to Muslim migrants, they must still navigate a system that increasingly privileges economic potential over humanitarian need — even in cases of recognized genocide.
Securitization of migration
As Cesari (2021) demonstrates, post-9/11 security concerns had already merged with questions of identity and values to frame Islam as a threat to Western societies. The 2015 New Year’s Eve events in Cologne accelerated this process, with media coverage increasingly portraying Muslim male refugees as security threats (De Hart Reference De Hart, Grutters, Mantu and Minderhoud2017). The role of ethno-religious identity in shaping asylum outcomes has been compellingly documented by Abdelaaty (2021), who demonstrates how states’ responses to refugees are systematically influenced by ethnic kinship ties and interstate relations. Building on these findings, policy reforms created what Banai and Kreide (Reference Banai and Kreide2017) describe as “mechanisms of exclusion,” primarily targeting Muslim men. This securitization discourse, which typically frames Muslim men as threats to social order and national security, creates the context for specific humanitarian exceptions. These exceptions focus on “saving” women from the Global South or welcoming Ukrainian refugees who fit what Enloe (2014) calls the “ideal victim” archetype of European “women and children.”
Humanitarian exceptions, like Germany’s special quota for Yezidi women survivors, operate within this context of neoliberalism and securitization. These programs remain limited in scope and often require demonstrations of economic “worthiness” for lasting protection. While family reunification policies persist, they’ve become more restrictive and subject to economic criteria. Recent trends show declining rates of full protection status and increasing use of temporary forms of protection, particularly for groups like Iraqis who face potential deportation (Hoffmeyer-Zlotnik and Stiller Reference Hoffmeyer-Zlotnik and Stiller2023).Footnote 1
Selective humanitarianism
The intersection of gender and asylum policies has been a crucial focus of feminist scholarship on forced migration. While feminist efforts have successfully highlighted the persecution of women and carved out space for gender-based asylum claims, these gains remain limited and problematic (Crawley Reference Crawley2022). First, the framework of vulnerability that dominates European asylum policies tends to essentialize and stereotype refugee women’s experiences. As Freedman (2019) argues, women are often categorized as inherently vulnerable without consideration of the structural and contextual causes of their vulnerability. This oversimplified categorization can lead to forms of symbolic violence that reduce women’s agency and autonomy, even as it enables certain protections.
Furthermore, humanitarian interventions often conceptualize violence against women as primarily rooted in the social and cultural norms of refugee communities, framing it as an expression of their “underdevelopment” or “backwardness” (Olivius Reference Olivius, Buckley-Zistel and Krause2017). This perspective not only oversimplifies the complex causes of gender-based violence but can also generate resistance from refugee communities when interventions are perceived as imposing external values. The focus on cultural explanations for violence also obscures the ways in which global political and economic structures contribute to forced displacement and vulnerability. This cultural framing of violence has particular implications for how different refugee groups are perceived and treated. In this regard, the humanitarian exceptions — such as Germany’s special quota for Yezidi women survivors - allow policymakers to demonstrate compassion through highly visible but limited interventions while maintaining broader restrictive policies. Yezidis, as a non-Muslim minority fleeing Islamic State violence, initially received favorable treatment in Germany, partly because their persecution fit within existing narratives about cultural violence.
Even recognized forms of suffering become subject to economic criteria, as humanitarian exceptions increasingly require demonstrations of economic “worthiness” to secure lasting protection. Their treatment reveals how contemporary migration regimes reconcile humanitarian impulses with neoliberal logic: while women survivors of sexual violence receive special consideration through humanitarian quotas, other Yezidi victims of genocide face increasing rejection rates. To fully understand how these humanitarian and neoliberal logics shape Yezidi experiences in Europe, we first examine the historical context that has made this community particularly vulnerable to both persecution and selective forms of protection. The Yezidis’ status as a liminal minority has deep historical roots that continue to influence their treatment in contemporary migration regimes.
Yezidis as a liminal minority
Yezidis constitute a monotheistic religious group indigenous to the border regions of Iraq, Syria, Iran, and Turkey. In contemporary times, the majority of Yezidis residing in the Middle East inhabit northern Iraq and speak the Kurmanji dialect of the Kurdish language, while a small group in the towns of Bahzani and Bashiqa speak a dialect of Arabic. Prior to the genocide in 2014, their population in Iraq was estimated to be approximately 400,000 to 500,000. The Sinjar region, located in the northwest corner of Iraq bordering Syria, was the main Yezidi population center. Sinjar has consistently ranked among the most underdeveloped regions in Iraq, (Savelsberg et al. Reference Savelsberg, Hajo and Dulz2010). It also bore the brunt of IS attacks in 2014.
While the historical evolution of Yezidism is subject to competing interpretations, it is widely accepted that a prominent Sufi religious leader, Sheikh Adi bin Musafir (d. 1162), reorganized the group as a separate entity with a clerical hierarchy in the 12th century (Kreyenbroek Reference Kreyenbroek1995; Allison Reference Allison2008). This hierarchy has crystallized across time as most Yezidis belong to one of the following categories: sheikhs, pirs, and murids — ordinary people. These caste-like statuses are inherited at birth, and the community tends to practice a rigid form of endogeneity where individuals are expected to marry members of their caste (Açıkyıldız Reference Açıkyıldız2014). Until very recently, Yezidi beliefs and rituals have been transmitted orally across generations. Historically speaking, the insular nature of the group and the lack of canonical texts make the group illegible in the eyes of other groups that develop a highly distorted and pejorative view of the group.
Following Tezcür (Reference Tezcür2024, 51), we define Yezidis as a liminal minority, a religious group “whose core religious beliefs and practices remain ambivalent, ill-defined, and stigmatized in the eyes of elite and ordinary members of a dominant group.” Historically, Yezidism has lacked official, popular, and theological recognition from both Sunni and Shiite Muslims, who directed a litany of stigmas against the followers of the faith who were perceived to engage in practices threatening Muslim moral order. The widespread epithet of “devil worshippers” is the conflation of Peacock Angel (Malak Ṭāʾūs), which is the central character of worship in the Yezid faith, with the devil who fell from God’s grace. Especially with the formation of Hanefi-Sunni orthodoxy in the Ottoman Empire by the 16th century, Yezidis occupied a peripheral position in the moral hierarchy and were left out of the millet system. While Yezidis managed to establish themselves as political actors capable of entering various forms of local alliances, they were also subject to periodic violent campaigns (Ayhan and Tezcür Reference Ayhan, Tezcür, Aafreedi and Singh2021). In the Yezidi oral tradition, Ottoman and Kurdish expeditions targeting Yezidis are labeled as “firmans,” motivated by religious goals and aimed to destroy the very existence of the community (Ali Reference Ali2019).
The stigmatization of Yezidis persisted well into modern times. Pejorative descriptions of the community and their beliefs and rituals continue to be prevalent in mainstream Muslim publications, both at popular and intellectual levels (Tezcür Reference Tezcür2024, 74–75). Meanwhile, Yezidis remained a marginalized community with little political power and socioeconomic clout in Iraq, both during and after the Saddam era in Iraq. The ferocity of IS attacks targeting Yezidis in August 2014 was unparalleled. As the Iraqi Kurdish forces, who were supposed to protect the region, fled, the attacks included mass executions, forced conversions, torture, and sexual enslavement. More than 3000 Yezidis lost their lives, and close to 7000 of them were captured (Cetorelli et al. Reference Cetorelli, Sasson, Shabila and Burnham2017).Footnote 2 Several hundred thousand Yezidis were displaced (Nicolaus and Yuce Reference Nicolaus and Yuce2017). Only the US military strikes and the human corridor opened up by the Kurdish forces from Syria prevented the complete destruction of the Yezidis of Sinjar.
The majority of Yezidis sought refuge in the Duhok Governorate controlled by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), where they were resettled in camps for displaced people. Some also crossed into Turkey, and in 2015, numerous Yezidi families in Turkey sought asylum through the UNHCR. Many attempted to reach Germany via irregular migration routes that traversed Turkey, Greece, and other countries. Often, they had to bear significant financial burdens, paying between 6000 and 8000 US dollars per person for these perilous journeys (Six-Hohenbalken Reference Six-Hohenbalken, Schiocchet, Bauer and Six-Hohenbalken2022, 132).
During the 2014 attacks, when the Yezidi community found themselves stranded on Mount Sinjar, facing dire conditions with limited access to essentials like food and water, public demonstrations in support of their plight emerged in both Paris and various German cities. These demonstrations were orchestrated by Yezidi organizations but garnered substantial backing from the wider public. This period witnessed a notable shift in French politics, with the attacks on and the precarious situation of the Yezidis assuming a prominent position on the national agenda. Eminent figures such as Bernard Kouchner, the former Foreign Minister of France, articulated the imperative of supporting the Yezidis in Iraq in 2014 (Kouchner and Chailand Reference Kouchner and Chailand2014). Dominique de Villepin, the former Prime Minister of France, called for UN intervention in Iraq during the same year (de Villepin Reference de Villepin2014). Laurent Fabius, who held the position of Foreign Minister at the time, affirmed that France would not engage in military intervention but unequivocally condemned the acts of genocide (Yézidis En Irak: Laurent Fabius Dénonce Un “Génocide,” 2014). President Emmanuel Macron underscored the critical necessity of extending aid to the Yezidis, particularly in terms of medical assistance, differentiating his stance from that of François Hollande, who primarily emphasized support for Middle Eastern Christians (Berdah Reference Berdah2019). Ultimately, both countries extended asylum to Yezidi women who had endured capture, enslavement, and subsequent liberation from IS. Of particular note, Germany implemented a pioneering and distinct humanitarian asylum admissions program specifically tailored to the needs of these women.
Amid the horrors of the genocidal campaign waged by ISIS, one outcome was the unprecedented global attention drawn to the plight of the Yezidi community. A number of powerful entities, including the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the European Parliament, the United States Department of State and House of Representatives, the British Parliament and German Parliament, and the French Senate and National Assembly, recognized the IS violence against Yezidis as genocide. Nadia Murad, a survivor of IS captivity, received the Nobel Peace Prize in 2018 and became the most prominent voice representing the Yezidi community on many international platforms. Members of the Yezidi diaspora formed alliances with various non-governmental associations, adopted liberal transitional justice frames, and aimed to mobilize public support for various initiatives ranging from efforts to punish the perpetrators of genocidal violence to memorialization (Omarkhali Reference Omarkhali2016). Nonetheless, Yezidis continue to have a precarious existence in the wake of genocide. The fact that Sinjar remains a highly insecure and contested region among various powers makes it infeasible for displaced Yezidis to return to their homelands. Consequently, many Yezidis remain in limbo. Many of them continue to live in camps in the KRG under desperate conditions or found refuge in Western countries, especially in Germany (Ayhan Reference Ayhan2021). The fate of children born from rape and forced marriages involving Yezidi women continues to be a deeply sensitive issue for the community. As argued below, Yezidi liminality has gained new forms in the post-genocidal period. While religious aspects of Yezidi liminality become less pronounced, the community is now subject to legal and administrative forms of liminality.
Yezidi migration to Europe
The irregular migration of Yezidis to Germany coincided with what later became known as the “refugee/migration crisis” in Europe. As mentioned above, Angela Merkel’s 2015 decision to open German borders to refugees marked a critical juncture in European migration policy. Chancellor Merkel justified this “risky” decision on the basis of a commitment to human rights and a sense of responsibility toward the victims of a significant refugee crisis (Banai and Kreide Reference Banai and Kreide2017). While her policy garnered support from certain segments of the German population and politicians, it also faced substantial opposition and criticism, both domestically and from other EU member states. As posited by Greenhill (Reference Greenhill2016), Merkel’s unilateral action was anticipated to serve as a source of inspiration for other nations to adopt a similar stance, thereby fostering a broader initiative aimed at enhancing European unity and equitable burden-sharing. However, contrary to expectations of solidarity, numerous EU countries demonstrated a predominant inclination to shift responsibilities and implement emergency exemptions to the Schengen Agreement (Greenhill Reference Greenhill2016, 326).
During 2015 and 2016, the peak years of the “migration crisis,” a significant number of Yezidi asylum seekers and refugees managed to reach Germany as borders remained open. To date, an estimated 100000 Yezidis have departed Iraq since 2014. The majority of them have resettled in Western countries, primarily Germany, but also in Canada, Australia, the Netherlands, Belgium, and France. Although the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has observed returns of groups of displaced people and refugees to their areas of origin following the cessation of the conflict with IS, the rate of return for Yezidis remains notably low. According to data from the International Organization for Migration (IOM 2022), Sinjar exhibits the lowest rate of return in the country, with only 36% of the original population having returned, inclusive of the Sunni population in the region, many of whom participated in the anti-Yezidi atrocities. Over 200000 Yezidis continue to reside in various conditions, such as camps, informal displacement sites, out-of-camp settlements, and host communities, grappling with the challenges of prolonged displacement.
By 2015, Germany already boasted a significant Yezidi diaspora community. The genesis of this community can be traced back to the initial wave of Yezidi immigrants who arrived in Germany as a consequence of the “Guest Worker Agreement” in effect between Turkey and Germany from 1961 to 1973. Among the approximately 867000 workers recruited under this accord, approximately 2000 Yezidis, primarily men, chose to settle in Germany. Distinguishing them from many subsequent migrant arrivals, these early Yezidi settlers were afforded legal residence rights within the country. However, the dynamics shifted in 1980, following a military coup in Turkey, which precipitated a significant influx of Yezidis into Germany. Initially, each asylum request underwent individual assessment by German authorities. It was not until 1982 that official recognition was accorded to Yezidis as a systematically persecuted group in Turkey deserving of protection.Footnote 3 Consequently, almost the entire Turkish Yezidi community departed for Germany after 1982, resulting in a substantial increase in the German Yezidi diaspora, growing from 2000 in 1973 to 10000 by 1990. The Gulf War subsequently swelled the ranks of Yezidi asylum-seekers arriving from Iraq. By the late 1990s, approximately 30000 Yezidis were residing in Germany (Wettich Reference Wettich, Omarkhali and Kreyenbroek2021). During the 1980s and 90s, the Yezidi community originating from Turkey in Germany saw an influx of co-religionists from Syria and Iraq, in addition to a smaller number arriving from Armenia and Georgia, thereby diversifying the community further. Today, Germany stands as the primary host to the largest Yezidi population outside of Iraq, with post-2015 estimates ranging between 100000 and 150000 individuals. Notable Yezidi communities can be found in cities such as Bielefeld, Bremen, Celle, Cologne, Emmerich, Hannover, and Oldenburg (Kreyenbroek Reference Kreyenbroek2009, 42).Footnote 4
Germany’s reception of Yezidi asylum seekers
As an increasing number of Yezidi women were being liberated from IS and relocated to camps in Duhok, the German federal state of Baden-Württemberg embarked on a pioneering initiative known as the “Special Quota” Humanitarian Admissions Program. Under this program, the state committed to welcoming one thousand vulnerable women and children from northern Iraq. As noted by McGee (Reference McGee2018), this initiative involved several noteworthy innovations in the realm of humanitarian admissions programs. First, it prioritized the assistance of internally displaced people rather than exclusively focusing on officially recognized refugees. Second, it operated at the subnational level, diverging from the conventional central oversight of such programs by the federal German government (although the project did necessitate the ultimate approval of the federal government). Hence, the program empowered state-level authorities to express their solidarity and provide tangible support for persecuted communities. At the same time, the German response to Yezidi migrants and asylum seekers is characterized not so much by the propagation of securitization discourse but by selective humanitarianism, centering on Yezidi women and children as the primary victims of IS and sexual violence.
It is noteworthy that countries such as Canada and Australia have subsequently adopted the German model, launching their own initiatives to resettle internally displaced people from Iraq, with a particular emphasis on aiding Yezidi women and children. Dr Jan Kizilhan, a Yezidi-German expert in psychotraumatology, has been actively engaged in the project since its inception, personally conducting interviews with approximately 1400 Yezidi women residing in the camps (Personal Interview, May 15, 2019). Subsequent to these interviews, a total of 1100 women and children were selected, with a pronounced emphasis on those facing the most severe clinical vulnerabilities. These women often arrived in Germany accompanied by their children under the age of 18 or, in some instances, alongside their mothers and sisters. They were provided with both accommodation and therapeutic support. As explained by Dr Blume, the program director, the selection criteria leaned towards women whose husbands were no longer alive.
In our interview with a representative from the state of Baden-Württemberg, who played an integral role in the program, they informed us of their efforts to gauge the willingness of several cities within the state, and even some from other states, to accommodate the Yezidi women (Personal Interview, October 14, 2019). The allocation of funding was contingent upon the responses received in these inquiries.Footnote 5 As our respondent conveyed, “these cities had prior experience accommodating single men, so they were enthusiastic about hosting women and children for the first time.” Drawing from interviews conducted with individuals providing independent consultancy and expertise to the program, it could be inferred that the German public’s reception of the resettled Yezidi women and children was remarkably positive. In Stuttgart and other cities, numerous residents volunteered their support to assist the women and children, and a collective effort spanning across Germany was observed, with donations pouring in for essentials such as clothing, toys, and various other items.
Despite the innovative and inclusive aspects of the program, the experiences of Yezidi women had been more ambivalent. While some reported positive outcomes and deemed their relocation to Germany advantageous, others encountered circumstances where little appeared to have changed. In cases where therapy was initiated, it often failed to yield the expected results, leading some women to discontinue the treatment (McGee Reference McGee2018). Notably, one of the most challenging aspects of the program revolves around the exclusion of adult Yezidi men from traveling to Germany. By contrast, Australia and Canada admitted women and their families. Some women participating in the program were unable to have their husbands, who survived the atrocities, join them in Germany. Besides, Yezidis in the diaspora became unable to perform rituals in sacred sites that have been central to the practice of their faith and collective solidarity (Wettich and Raßbach Reference Wettich and Raßbach2022).
The sole avenue available to them is through a highly demanding family reunification process. To facilitate the reunion with their family members, these women are obliged to possess legal status and secure gainful employment. Simultaneously, their family members aspiring to join them in Germany must demonstrate a certain level of proficiency in the German language. Paradoxically, this situation can undermine the resilience and healing that the program seeks to promote. For some women, the separation from their husbands represents a form of punishment, as articulated in interviews where they express feelings of discomfort and a sense of insecurity and unease in the absence of their families by their side (McGee Reference McGee2018).
The German asylum policy concerning Yezidis became less inclusive over the years. In 2015, during the peak of the “refugee crisis” in Europe and the IS ascendancy in northern Iraq and Syria, acceptance rates for Yezidi asylum seekers were high.Footnote 6 However, there has been a notable shift in policy concerning the treatment of Yezidi asylum seekers following the demise of the IS in 2017. Consequently, the recognition rate by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, BAMF) has significantly declined. More specifically, data from a recent BAMF report indicates that the recognition rate for Yezidis seeking protection dwindled from 91.8% in 2017 to 48.6% by 2022. In 2022, fewer than half of the Iraqi Yezidi asylum seekers were granted protection by BAMF, while the majority of Yezidis residing in neighboring Syria continue to be classified by BAMF as individuals still in need of protection (Sanderson Reference Sanderson2023). Ironically, the German Bundestag recognized the IS crimes against Yezidis as genocide in January 2023.
In 2015 and 2017, significant changes were introduced to the application processing system at BAMF. Initially, BAMF adopted a strategy of prioritizing applications from specific nationalities in response to the substantial influx of asylum requests in Germany during 2015 and 2016. However, this prioritization of applications from particular countries came to an end by the second quarter of 2016. Subsequently, a system involving the “clustering” of applications was partially implemented to prioritize caseloads from origin countries with varying protection rates, encompassing both high and low rates. By the first half of 2017, the clustering system was also abandoned. Since then, BAMF branch offices and arrival centers have autonomously determined whether to establish any form of priority in handling caseloads. These determinations often hinge on the availability of staff members with the requisite country-specific expertise and interpreters (Hoffmeyer-Zlotnik and Stiller Reference Hoffmeyer-Zlotnik and Stiller2023). This situation leaves the matter a bit more to chance for all asylum seekers, including Yezidis.
Germany justifies its rejection of Yezidi asylum applications by asserting that it deems both the camps in the KRG and Sinjar as safe and capable of sustaining livelihoods. That assessment overlooks the fact that these camps have experienced substantial reductions in support over the years, with funding dwindling from a significant $1.8 billion in 2016 to a meager 63 percent allocation for the 2021 Humanitarian Response Plan, ultimately receiving only $381 million. The current financial resources are inadequate to address the existing gaps in public services and maintain essential services within the camps.Footnote 7 Moreover, there is a notable shift in how the UN provides assistance within Iraq. While many camps continue to operate within the KRG, a significant development is the Iraqi government’s closure of nearly all displacement camps. As reported by Travers (Reference Travers2023), the UN believes it is now the responsibility of Iraqi and Kurdish officials to take charge of the aid response. Nevertheless, some aid organizations express concerns about the speed of the UN’s transition, which could leave vulnerable groups without adequate support. According to the UN’s 2022 Humanitarian Response Plan, there are still 2.5 million people in Iraq in need of humanitarian aid, including 1.1 million children, with 991000 of them classified as “deeply vulnerable.” Meanwhile, the ongoing disputes between the Iraqi government and Kurdistan further exacerbate the challenge of determining who should assume responsibility for aid in a country that consistently ranks high on global corruption indices (Travers Reference Travers2023).
In Sinjar, the main site of IS atrocities against Yezidis in 2014, the prevailing situation is characterized by severely compromised infrastructure and a lack of access to vital necessities, including water, electricity, hospitals, and schools. Returning Yezidis face the daunting challenges of confronting properties reduced to ruins, limited employment opportunities, and towns and villages still contaminated by unexploded ordnance. The pressing need for assistance is evident, particularly among farmers who have returned to their fields but grapple with the obstacles hindering their agricultural endeavors. Likewise, former agricultural laborers from Sinjar, many of whom now reside in urban areas and camps within the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, regard their previous rural livelihoods as unsustainable (Amnesty International 2018). Furthermore, the lingering presence of local Sunnis implicated in the attacks against Yezidis during the IS assaults continues to be a major source of insecurity. Besides, sporadic bombings by Turkey targeting Kurdish militants result in civilian casualties, further compounding the region’s predicament. Sinjar remains ensnared in a political quagmire, embroiled in a struggle for control between the central Iraqi government and the Kurdish regional government (Ali Reference Ali2022). The highly contested nature of political authority in the region significantly impedes reconstruction efforts and hampers the prospects of people returning to their homes and rebuilding their lives.
Notwithstanding these complexities, German officials and courts assert that Sinjar qualifies as a safe destination for return. Moreover, they contend that Yezidis, who have suffered profound losses during the genocide, can viably establish sustainable livelihoods in the KRG, despite the region grappling with exceptionally high unemployment rates. Consequently, the majority of Yezidis seeking asylum do not fulfill either of the two criteria outlined by BAMF for rejection, namely, safety or the capacity to establish a livelihood in their country of origin. Yet BAMF increasingly inclines toward issuing rejections in response to their applications.
Selective humanitarianism
The concept of “hierarchy of suffering” helps explain how certain migrants become subjects of securitization while others receive humanitarian protection. Germany does not subject Yezidis to the level of securitization often observed in the case of Muslim migrant communities (Banai and Kreide Reference Banai and Kreide2017; Greenhill Reference Greenhill2016). In contrast to many Muslim migrant groups, Yezidis do not occupy a prominent position in securitization narratives within the media or the political discourse of Germany and other European countries. Analogous to the situation in American media (Taylor Stuewe Reference Taylor Stuewe, Omarkhali and Kreyenbroek2021), news coverage in Germany predominantly centers on the challenges faced by Yezidi women and children, with a particular emphasis on the sexual violence endured by these individuals. Notably, Yezidi men are typically underrepresented in visual representations and news narratives. News reports frequently depict Yezidi migrants as victims in need of assistance, highlighting their vulnerability as a minority group originating from the Middle East (Foster and Minwalla Reference Foster and Minwalla2018)
In this context, Yezidi female survivors are often cast within the framework of the “ideal refugee” (Szczepanik Reference Szczepanik2016). This archetype typically portrays them as vulnerable, deeply traumatized women from the Third World who have fallen victim to sexual violence at the hands of an uncivilized Islamist group. They are perceived as being submissive, dependent, and possessing qualities that align with traditional femininity, making them appear in need of protection from the Western world. As articulated by Dr Blume, the director of the Special Quota program in Germany, “those currently arriving in Europe are predominantly young men or those with sufficient funds to pay human traffickers. Our primary duty is to assist those in the greatest need. The physically strong and healthy can undertake the journey, while those who are weaker or women alone with children cannot do so. This is why our mission is deemed crucial.”
This policy also carries significant appeal for voters. Reports of extensive sexual violence in conflict situations tend to attract international attention and intervention, regardless of the overall intensity of the conflict (Agerberg and Kreft Reference Agerberg and Kreft2023). A recent study reveals that individuals are more likely to endorse military intervention in conflicts characterized by widespread sexual violence, as opposed to other types of violence. Moreover, it is worth noting that “respondents consistently underestimate the victimization of men, perceive civilian male victims as less innocent, and exhibit biases against males when it comes to accepting refugees and providing humanitarian aid.” (Kreft and Agerberg Reference Kreft and Agerberg2024, 274).
Although Germany did not engage in direct intervention in Sinjar, the public’s receptiveness to immigration policies designed to address the aftermath of conflicts, driven by perceptions of gender-based victimization and a humanitarian imperative to protect vulnerable groups, has led to the formation of a humanitarian initiative specifically targeting Yezidi female survivors. Given the prevailing skepticism surrounding young, non-white males in migration discourse, policymakers responsible for shaping and executing these refugee quota programs have likely found it relatively more manageable to secure the requisite political and public backing for a program exclusively focused on “women and children.”
Duldung: Reconfiguration of liminality
As highlighted by Nadje Al-Ali (Reference Al-Ali2018), the rhetoric of “placing Iraqi women at the forefront” does not necessarily lead to an enhancement in their overall well-being. A parallel observation can be drawn concerning Yezidi women who have historically been subject to a complex form of honor norms (Omarkhali Reference Omarkhali, Omarkhali and Kreyenbroek2021). The hyper-visibility of the Yezidi woman’s suffering (Buffon and Allison Reference Buffon and Allison2016) tends to obscure the experiences of Yezidi men who are also survivors, rendering them largely invisible. This hierarchical approach to Yezidi victimhood neglects how the interaction of religion, ethnicity, and gender shapes the experiences of the community. It devalues the suffering of individuals who may not have endured captivity under IS but still require protection as survivors of the genocide. Furthermore, this hierarchy of suffering does not adequately recognize the agency of women who have been granted asylum. The program in Germany, designed to aid in the recovery of these women, operates by excluding their family members, with the exception of their minor children and occasionally sisters and mothers. This exclusion leaves only official channels for family reunification, which, in many cases, proves nearly impossible. Ironically, this policy can have adverse effects on the resilience of these women by separating them from their families.
In Germany, Yezidis who have received asylum rejections face deportation orders, a fate akin to that of other denied migrants. When confronted with this situation, some fall into a category of individuals who cannot be deported, encompassing those lacking proper documents, individuals suffering from illness, and those without a recognized home country. These individuals are placed under the Duldung status, legally defined as a “temporary suspension of deportation.” This status can be perceived as a form of legal ambiguity, as it decriminalizes the mere presence of individuals who cannot be deported. However, it does not grant them legal residence, consequently rendering their stay still considered illegal according to the law (Ellermann Reference Ellermann2014).
Schütze (Reference Schütze2023) elucidates that the Duldung status serves a dual purpose of accommodating the state’s economic interests while simultaneously acting as a deterrent. Over time, a sizable group of individuals with the Duldung status has emerged. Within this group, individuals may gain access to certain rights based on their perceived economic usefulness or remain in a state of relative rightlessness and disintegration. Neoliberalization, rather than ameliorating the situation for all Duldung holders, has led to differentiation within the group and a state rationale of “cherry-picking.” Thus, Duldung represents a state of waiting and uncertainty, where individuals remain accessible to the state and can be placed in various positions of opportunity. This status neither expedites deportation nor fosters inclusion, except for limited labor market integration, and it offers no prospect of “legal certainty” (Ellermann Reference Ellermann2014).
In this regard, Yezidi liminality has taken on a new form in Germany. Those with the Duldung status remain in a prolonged state of uncertainty and precariousness, lacking clearly defined prospects for legal integration. While they avoid deportation, their future remains in limbo (Schütze Reference Schütze2023). This situation reflects their ongoing state of liminality, transitioning from being a persecuted minority in the Middle East to experiencing another form of liminality in Europe, where refuge has been sought but not fully realized, and where their fate is shaped by neoliberal selection criteria.
The convergence: A comparison of Germany and France in the light of Yezidi experiences
It is also worth summarizing the experiences of Yezidis in France to offer a more comparative analysis of how migration policies in Europe have evolved in recent years. France’s admission of refugees from Iraq is contingent upon annual quotas established through collaboration with UNHCR. The allocation of these quota slots to individual countries is subject to fluctuation on a year-to-year basis. Over the course of the so-called migration crisis, France consistently adhered to a more regulated and discerning approach when compared to Germany. Accordingly, France implemented a distinct admission program for Iraqi nationals from 2014 to 2017. This initiative encompassed individuals sponsored by French citizens and the resettlement of approximately 500 Yezidis, primarily survivor women and their families. The relatively limited size of the Yezidi population in France, particularly among those originating from Iraq, Syria, and Turkey, has contributed to the small number of Yezidis who have resettled in the country.
A notable illustration of selective humanitarianism occurred in October 2014, when the French Prime Ministry announced the admission of a specified number of Syrian refugees annually from 2014 to 2017. This admission took place either as part of resettlement efforts in collaboration with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) or through humanitarian channels. Concurrently, there was a decision to admit Iraqi nationals who were deemed to be “persecuted, threatened, or displaced due to their affiliation with a religious minority, their ties to France, or their extreme vulnerability.” Over the course of these three years, approximately 7000 Iraqi nationals entered France by obtaining long-stay visas through French consular authorities, a group that included several hundred Yezidi, Eastern Christian, and Shiite families (Guardiola Reference Guardiola2018).
An instruction issued by OFPRA (Office Français de Protection des Réfugiés et Apatrides), the office tasked with registering asylum applications and recognizing refugee status, on August 4, 2014, allowed individuals residing in France to offer accommodation to Iraqi nationals. This accommodation was coupled with the necessary forms for obtaining D visas. Subsequently, consular personnel at French embassies assumed the role of evaluating these applications, with the final decision resting within the purview of OFPRA, an entity operating under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior. Those individuals possessing a certificate of accommodation were accorded priority, and upon their arrival in France, they were guaranteed an expedited procedure for the review of their requests at the prefecture. (Guardiola Reference Guardiola2018).
At the subnational level, discernible patterns of discrimination based on religious affiliation among certain mayors come to the fore. For instance, in the small municipality of Roanne, a right-wing mayor articulated a preference for admitting exclusively Christian refugees, expressing concerns regarding the potential presence of “disguised terrorists among refugees.” In the case of Yezidis and Kurds, he emphasized the need for stringent precautions to ascertain that these individuals were not motivated solely by economic considerations (Le Monde Reference Le2015). Conversely, left-wing political figures in France have predominantly advocated for the inclusive reception of refugees and asylum seekers, encompassing Yezidis, without introducing distinctions grounded in religion. An illustrative instance transpired when Anne Hidalgo, the left-wing mayor of Paris, declared the city’s willingness to welcome refugees, an announcement that elicited backlash from France’s far-right movement. The far-right movement contended that only Christians and Yezidis should be admitted, albeit with the expectation of their eventual return (de Boni Reference de Boni2016).
In May 2019, France followed in the footsteps of Germany by initiating a collaborative effort between the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the IOM. The objective of this joint effort was to extend political refugee status to Yezidi women and their children originating from Sinjar, Iraq. This initiative, officially designated as the Humanitarian Admission Program, was set into motion by President Emmanuel Macron in May 2019, several months after his meeting with Nadia Murad, the co-recipient of the 2018 Nobel Prize. France committed to providing sanctuary to a total of 100 Yezidi women who had endured the brutalities of IS and were confronting a lack of access to essential healthcare within the camps in Iraqi Kurdistan. Within this cohort, twenty were scheduled to arrive before the conclusion of 2018, with the remainder arriving in 2019 (Guardiola Reference Guardiola2018)
In contrast to the program in Germany, the program in France, while ostensibly targeted solely at women, has, in practice, encompassed not only these women but also their children, and in certain instances, their husbands who survived. This collective relocation amounted to approximately 500 individuals. The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs explicitly conveyed that these Yezidi refugees would be dispersed across various departments as part of a national directive. Numerous organizations dedicated to the welfare of migrants, including those specifically focused on aiding Yezidis, have played a pivotal role in facilitating their integration into these departments. Several of these families have found accommodation in various municipalities within Haute-Vienne and Tarn-et-Garonne, notably in locations such as Septfonds. Upon their arrival, these refugees embark on a comprehensive process aimed at securing residence permits, a crucial step that renders them eligible for public housing and educational opportunities. In response to an article published on social media by La Dépêche du Midi, a regional newspaper, which reported on the arrival of approximately ten Yezidi families at the community hall in Septfonds, one internet user proposed “going to the town hall of Septfonds today during the welcome demonstration and kicking them out…. Then why not burn the mayor on the way.” Jacques Tabarly, the mayor of the village with a population of 2240 for the past 19 years, stated that he filed a complaint but emphasized that no threat could shake his “determination to see this through” in fulfilling his commitment to welcoming these Yezidi families, emphasizing that the reception from the local community has, for the most part, been “very positive” (Dupuy, Reference Dupuy2019). Notwithstanding isolated comments and reactions, it is evident that in both Germany and France, Yezidis have to some extent benefited from selective humanitarianism and have largely not been subjected to securitization by the state, the media, or even right-wing and far-right political actors. This stands in marked contrast to the treatment of Muslim immigrants and refugees, who have often been framed as security threats in public and political discourse.
Conclusion
As a liminal community par excellence, Yezidis have a long history of displacement and persecution. In this historical context, we analyze the experiences of Yezidis who seek refuge in Europe while reflecting on migration and asylum policies in Western Europe. Their encounters with European asylum systems reveal the interaction between securitization, selective humanitarianism, and economic selection in migration governance.
Yezidis, unlike many Muslim migrant communities, have not been prominently securitized in the media or political discourse of Germany and France. Instead, these countries have predominantly portrayed Yezidi migrants as victims, emphasizing the suffering of women and children, particularly the sexual violence endured by Yezidi women. At the same time, their experience confirms Joppke’s (2024b) observation that the traditional binary between humanitarian protection and economic migration is breaking down: even recognized victims of genocide must demonstrate economic potential to secure lasting protection. This convergence of asylum and labor migration criteria, while potentially creating new opportunities for some migrants, risks undermining the fundamental purpose of humanitarian protection. Struggling to fit into the narrative of economically contributing migrants, Yezidis face a new form of liminality, caught within the confines of administrative uncertainty, notably characterized by the term “duldung” in Germany.
Looking forward, several challenges and opportunities emerge. First, the growing prevalence of temporary protection statuses like Duldung suggests a troubling trend toward what might be termed “permanent temporariness” in asylum policy. This administrative limbo creates new forms of vulnerability that may persist across generations, even as it allows states to avoid both mass deportations and full integration. Second, the intersection of gender and economic criteria in humanitarian programs requires urgent attention. While specialized programs for women survivors represent important innovations in protection mechanisms, their economic conditions often undermine their humanitarian aims. Future policy initiatives must better balance protection needs with integration goals, perhaps by providing more robust support for economic inclusion rather than making it a prerequisite for family reunification. Finally, the Yezidi experience suggests the need to reconceptualize how we understand persecution and protection in an era of increasing displacement. Their transformation from a religiously persecuted minority to a population facing economic barriers to protection highlights how traditional asylum frameworks may be insufficient for addressing contemporary forms of vulnerability.
Disclosure
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