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The Horizontal Effect of the Charter: Towards an Understanding of Horizontality as a Structural Constitutional Principle

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 November 2020

Eleni FRANTZIOU
Eleni FRANTZIOU*
Affiliation:
Durham University
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Abstract

This article analyses the main debates over the application of the Charter to disputes between private parties and assesses the ways in which the case law over the last ten years has responded to them. The article goes on to propose an alternative schema, whereby horizontality can be understood as a structural principle of EU fundamental rights adjudication on its own terms, rather than as an extension of the direct effect doctrine. It is argued that a self-standing principle of horizontality with equally valuable—yet operationally distinct—direct, indirect, and state-mediated manifestations, could respond more coherently to the conceptual, procedural, and remedial challenges displayed in the case law.

Keywords

Charterfundamental rightshorizontal effectdirect effectconsistent interpretationstate liabilityDrittwirkung

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Type
Articles
Information
Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies , Volume 22 , December 2020 , pp. 208 - 232
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Centre for European Legal Studies, Faculty of Law, University of Cambridge

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Footnotes

*

Assistant Professor in Public Law and Human Rights, Durham University. I am grateful to the CYELS editors and the anonymous reviewers for thoughtful comments on earlier drafts. Any errors are mine alone.

References

1 Egenberger, C-414/16, EU:C:2018:257; Bauer, C-569/16 and C-570/16, EU:C:2018:871; IR, C-68/17, EU:C:2018:696; Cresco, C-684/16, EU:C:2019:43. Max-Planck, C-684/16, EU:C:2018:874; CCOO, C-55/18, EU:C:2019:402. For a detailed account of the case law see also Muir, E, ‘The Horizontal Effects of Charter Rights Given Expression to in EU Legislation, from Mangold to Bauer’ (2019) 12(2) REAL 185Google Scholar.

2 Mangold, C-144/04, EU:C:2005:709.

3 Case law last revised 1 May 2020.

4 Kücükdeveci, C-555/07, EU:C:2010:21; Egenberger, note 1 above; IR; Cresco, note 1 above.

5 Bauer, note 1 above; Max-Planck, note 1 above; CCOO, note 1 above.

6 Egenberger, note 1 above; IR, note 1 above.

7 Glatzel, C-356/12, EU:C:2014:350, para 78. Glatzel is a vertical case, but it is clear from the CJEU's reasoning in this paragraph that the provision is uninvocable altogether (ie in both vertical and horizontal situations).

8 Association de Médiation Sociale (‘AMS’), C-176/12, EU:C:2014:2, paras 45–49.

9 Smith, C-122/17, EU:C:2018:631, para 49. See also the Opinion of Advocate General Bot in this case, EU:C:2018:223.

10 See eg Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi in Laval un partneri, C-341/05, EU:C:2007:291, paras 76, 191; Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón in Prigge, C-447/09, EU:C:2011:321, paras 41–46; cf Opinion of Advocate General Trstenjak in Rosenbladt, C-45/09, EU:C:2010:227, para 27.

11 Defrenne, C-43/75, EU:C:1976:56, para 39.

12 C Ladenburger, ‘FIDE Conference 2012 Institutional Report’ (2012) XXV FIDE Congress, Tallinn, 30 May–2 June 2012, pp 34–35; Opinion of Advocate General Trstenjak in Dominguez, C-282/10, EU:C:2011:559, paras 80–83; De Mol, M, ‘Kücükdeveci: Mangold Revisited – Horizontal Direct Effect of a General Principle of EU Law’ (2010) 6 EuConst 302Google Scholar; Lenaerts, K, ‘Exploring the Limits of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (2012) 8 EuConst 375Google Scholar, para 11; Bailleux, A, ‘La Cour de justice, la Charte des droits fondamentaux et l'intensité normative des droits sociaux’ (2014) 3 Revue de droit social 283, p 305Google Scholar. For an overview, see Opinion of AG Bot in Bauer, C-569/16, EU:C:2018:337, para 77.

13 Defrenne, note 11 above, paras 31–39.

14 Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón in Association de médiation sociale, C-176/12, EU:C:2013:491, paras 34–35.

15 See eg Alston, P ‘The “Not-a-Cat” Syndrome: Can the International Human Rights Regime Accommodate Non-State Actors?’ in Alston, P (ed), Non-State Actors and Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2005), p 3Google Scholar; Clapham, A, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (Oxford University Press, 2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Knox, JH, ‘Horizontal Human Rights Law’ (2008) 102(1) American Journal of International Law 1CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Dagan, H and Dorfman, A, ‘Interpersonal Human Rights’ (2018) 51 Cornell International Law Journal 361Google Scholar.

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17 See eg the history of the draft treaty on business and human rights, recently culminating in the ‘Revised Draft of a Legally Binding Instrument to Regulate, in International Human Rights Law, the Activities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises’, 16/07/2019, https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/WGTransCorp/OEIGWG_RevisedDraft_LBI.pdf; Ruggie, J, ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business And Human Rights’ (2008) 3 Innovations: Technology, Governance Globalization 189Google Scholar.

18 On regional systems, see eg: Spielmann, D, L'effet Potentiel de la Convention Européenne des Droits de l'Homme entre Personnes Privées (Bruylant, 1995)Google Scholar; Coomans, F, ‘The Ogoni Case Before the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (2003) 52 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 749CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Antkowiak, TM, ‘Remedial Approaches to Human Rights Violations: The Inter-American Court of Human Rights and Beyond’ (2008) 46 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 351Google Scholar. For comparative analyses of national laws, see eg: Brüggemeier, G, Ciacchi, A Colombi, and Comandé, G (eds), Fundamental Rights and Private Law in the European Union (Cambridge University Press, 2010)Google Scholar; Gardbaum, S, ‘The “Horizontal Effect” of Constitutional Rights’ (2003) 102(3) Michigan Law Review 387CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The horizontal effect of the UK Human Rights Act 1998 in particular coincided with the Charter. For a restatement and analysis of this debate, see: Phillipson, G and Williams, A, ‘Horizontal Effect and the Constitutional Constraint’ (2011) 74(6) The Modern Law Review 878CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

19 Goldsmith, L, ‘A Charter of Rights, Freedoms, and Principles’ (2001) 38 Common Market Law Review 1201, pp 1209–13CrossRefGoogle Scholar, where only Council of Europe instruments are discussed.

20 The broader competence limits enshrined in Article 52(1) of the Charter and the distinction between rights and principles made in Article 52(5) would also fall within this category of overarching ‘scope’ objections.

21 I borrow the term from Möller, K, ‘Proportionality and Rights Inflation’ in Huscroft, G, Miller, B, and Webber, G (eds), Proportionality and the Rule of Law: Rights, Justification, Reasoning (Cambridge University Press, 2014), p 155CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

22 Kumm, M, ‘Who Is Afraid of the Total Constitution? Constitutional Rights as Principles and the Constitutionalization of Private Law’ (2006) 7(4) German Law Journal 341, pp 350–69CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Kumm explains the critique, before rebuking it.

23 Gardbaum, note 18 above, pp 387–410.

24 Lueth – BverfGE 7, 198 (1958), 205.

25 E W Böckenförde, ‘Grundrechte als Grundsatznormen’ in Böckenförde, E W (ed), Staat, Verfassung, Demokratie (Suhrkamp, 1991), p 185Google Scholar; See further Van Der Walt, J, The Horizontal Effect Revolution and the Question of Sovereignty (De Greuter, 2014), pp 361–62Google Scholar.

26 M Künkler and T Stein, ‘An Obituary for Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde (1930–2019)’ (International Journal of Constitutional Law Blog, May 11 2019), http://www.iconnectblog.com/2019/05/an-obituary-for-ernst-wolfgang-bockenforde-1930–2019.

27 See note 2 above.

28 R Herzog and L Gerken, ‘Stop the European Court of Justice’ (EU Observer, 10 September 2008), https://euobserver.com/opinion/26714.

29 Dougan, M ‘In Defence of Mangold?’ in Arnull, A et al. (eds), A Constitutional Order of States: Essays in EU Law in Honour of Alan Dashwood (Hart Publishing 2011), p 219Google Scholar; Editorial comments, ‘Horizontal Direct Effect – A Law of Diminishing Coherence?’ (2006) 43(1) Common Market Law Review 1.

30 Craig, PP, ‘The Legal Effect of Directives: Policy, Rules and Exceptions’ (2009) 34 European Law Review 349, p 355Google Scholar. See also Craig, PP, ‘The ECJ and Ultra Vires Action: A Conceptual Analysis’ (2011) 48(2) Common Market Law Review 395Google Scholar.

31 See eg Matthews, J, Extending Rights’ Reach: Constitutions, Private Law, and Judicial Power (Oxford University Press, 2018)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

32 Nolan, A, ‘Holding Non-State Actors to Account for Constitutional Economic and Social Rights Violations: Experiences and Lessons from South Africa and Ireland’ (2014) 12(1) International Journal of Constitutional Law 61, p 64CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

33 Ibid.

34 Ibid.

35 Letsas, G, A Theory of Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2007), p 129CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Nickel, JW, ‘Rethinking Indivisibility: Towards A Theory of Supporting Relations between Human Rights’ (2008) 30(4) Human Rights Quarterly 984, pp 991ffCrossRefGoogle Scholar.

36 See further Möller, note 21 above, for a detailed account and rebuttal.

37 Besson, S, ‘Comment Humaniser le Droit Privé sans Commodifier les Droits de l'Homme’ in Werro, F (ed), Convention Européenne des Droits de l'Homme et le Droit Privé (Stämpfli, 2006), p 30Google Scholar; Thomas, J, Public Rights, Private Relations (Oxford University Press, 2015), pp 5–7, ch 5CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

38 Opinion of Advocate General Trstenjak in Dominguez, C-282/10, EU:C:2011:559, paras 128–35.

39 Opinion of AG Jääskinen in Google Spain, C-131/12, EU:C:2013:424, paras 133–34.

40 Albeit that the facts pre-dated it.

41 Kücükdeveci, note 4 above, para 21.

42 Peers, S, ‘Supremacy, Equality and Human Rights: Comment on Kücükdeveci (C-555/07)’ (2010) 35(6) European Law Review 849, pp 855–56Google Scholar.

43 On general principles, see further Emily Hancox's contribution in this volume. pp 251ff below.

44 See note 8 above.

45 Ibid, para 49.

46 See eg E Uría Gavilán, ‘¿Los principios de la Carta de Derechos Fundamentales de la Unión Europea pueden ser invocados en litigios entre particulares?: Comentario a la Sentencia del Tribunal de Justicia (gran sala) de 15 de enero de 2014 en el Asunto C-176/12 Association de médiation sociale’ (2014) 34 Revista General de Derecho Europeo; Frantziou, E, ‘Case C-176/12 Association de Médiation Sociale: Some Reflections on the Horizontal Effect of the Charter and the Reach of Fundamental Employment Rights in the European Union’ (2014) 10 European Constitutional Law Review 332CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Lazzerini, N, ‘Case C-176/12, Association de médiation sociale v Union locale des syndicats CGT and Others, Judgment of the Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) of 15 January 2014’ (2014) 51 Common Market Law Review 907Google Scholar; Murphy, C, ‘Using the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights Against Private Parties after Association De Médiation Sociale’ (2014) European Human Rights Law Review 170Google Scholar; S Platon, ‘L'Invocabilité Horizontale des Normes de Droit de l'Union Européenne: Un Pas sur Place, Un Pas en Avant, Deux Pas en Arrière - (CJE, grande chambre, 15 janv. 2014, aff. C-176/12)’ (2015) 584 Revue du marché commun [online version].

47 As Ward rightly points out, references to the Charter have been routinely omitted even in respect of non-discrimination. See eg the ruling in Dansk Industri (DI), C-441/14, EU:C:2016:278. Tellingly, even Article 23 on equal pay has not been mentioned, with Article 157 TFEU continuing to be used instead: A Ward, ‘The Impact of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights on Anti-Discrimination Law: More a Whimper than a Bang?’ (2018) Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 32, p 42.

48 See note 1 above.

49 Pfeiffer, C-397/01 to C-403/01, EU:C:2004:584, para 115.

50 Drake, S, ‘Twenty Years After Von Colson: The Impact of “Indirect Effect” on the Protection of the Individual's Community Rights’ (2005) 30(3) European Law Review 329Google Scholar; Engle, E, ‘Third Party Effect of Fundamental Rights (Drittwirkung)’ (2009) 5(2) Hanse Law Review 165, pp 169–70Google Scholar.

51 Opinion of Advocate General Bot in Bauer, note 12 above, para 95, citing Tinière, R, ‘L'invocabilité des principes de la Charte des droits fondamentaux dans les litiges horizontaux’ (2014) 14 Revue des droits et libertés fondamentauxGoogle Scholar.

52 Opinion of Advocate General Bot in Bauer, note 12 above, paras 74–76.

53 Ibid.

54 Bauer, note 12 above, paras 84–86.

55 Article 52(5) provides that principles ‘may be implemented by legislative and executive acts taken by institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union, and by acts of Member States when they are implementing Union law, in the exercise of their respective powers. They shall be judicially cognisable only in the interpretation of such acts and in the ruling on their legality’. Glatzel, note 7 above, paras 74–78 and AMS, note 8 above, paras 45–47, had suggested that principles and conditional rights could be invoked if implemented in further legislation, but seemed to set a particularly high threshold for this to happen (not met in either case).

56 See eg IR, note 1 above, where the right to marry was involved, even though the CJEU only dealt with the case via Article 21 of the Charter.

57 See further on this the pending cases in MH Müller Handel, C-341/19, and Bosolar, C-366/19, which concern the application of 16 of the Charter.

58 Eg Egenberger, note 1 above, para 77; Max Planck, note 1 above, para 77; Bauer, note 12 above, para 87.

59 Van Gend en Loos, C-26/62, EU:C:1963:1.

60 Google Spain, note 39 above, para 38.

61 Ibid, para 81.

62 I borrow the terminology of the German Constitutional Court in Lueth, note 25 above. See further Helleringer, G and Garcia, K, ‘Le rayonnement des droits de l'Homme et des droits fondamentaux en droit privé’ (2014) 66(2) Revue Internationale de Droit Comparé 283CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

63 Eg Connolly, C-274/99P, EU:C:2001:127; Österreichischer Rundfunk, C-465/00, EU:C:2003:294.

64 Bougnaoui, C-188/15, EU:C:2016:553; Achbita, C-157/15, EU:C:2017:203; Jehovan todistajat, C-25/17, ECLI:EU:C:2018:551.

65 Bougnaoui, note 64 above; Achbita, note 64 above; Alemo-Herron, C-426/11, EU:C:2013:521.

66 See further Muir, E, ‘The Horizontal Effects of Charter Rights Given Expression to in EU Legislation, from Mangold to Bauer’ (2019) 12(2) REAL 185, p 200ffGoogle Scholar.

67 Ibid.

68 Achbita, note 64 above, paras 37–38.

69 Weatherill, S, ‘Use and Abuse of the EU's Charter of Fundamental Rights: On the Improper Veneration of “Freedom of Contract”’ (2014) 10 European Review of Contract Law 157CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

70 For example, in Alemo-Herron, note 65 above, para 31, a purposive interpretation of Article 16 resulted in the invalidation of a collective agreement concluded between a group of employees and their previous employer, for the benefit of a new employer.

71 See note 57 above.

72 Lenaerts, K, ‘Limits on Limitations: The Essence of Fundamental Rights in the EU’ (2019) 20 German Law Journal 779, pp 788–92CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

73 Nolan, A, ‘Holding Non-state Actors to Account for Constitutional Economic and Social Rights Violations: Experiences and Lessons from South Africa and Ireland’ (2014) 12(1) International Journal of Constitutional Law 61, p 88CrossRefGoogle Scholar; see also Pieterse, M, ‘Indirect Horizontal Application of the Right to Have Access to Health Care Services’ (2007) 1 South African Journal on Human Rights 157, 162–63Google Scholar.

74 See note 72 above.

75 Leeuwen, B van and Condon, R, ‘Bottom Up or Rock Bottom Harmonization? Francovich State Liability in National Courts’ (2016) 35(1) Yearbook of European Law 229, p 231Google Scholar.

76 Thomas, J, Public Rights, Private Relations (Oxford University Press, 2015), pp 5–7, ch 5CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

77 Opinion of AG Bobek in Cresco, C-193/17, EU:C:2018:614; see also A Ward, ‘The Impact of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights on Anti-discrimination Law: More a Whimper than a Bang?’ (2018) Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 32, pp 55–56 and Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón in AMS, note 14 above, para 79, where a parallel argument is made.

78 Opinion of AG Bobek in Cresco, note 77 above, paras 173–85.

79 Ibid, para 196.

80 See note 47 above.

81 See note 57 above.

82 Reich, N, ‘The Interrelation between Rights and Duties in EU Law: Reflections on the State of Liability Law in the Multilevel Governance System of the Union: Is There a Need for a More Coherent Approach in European Private Law?’ (2010) 29(1) Yearbook of European Law 112, p 113CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

83 Airey v Ireland (Application no 6289/73) (1979) 2 E.H.R.R. 305, para 24.

84 Rewe-Zentralfinanz, C-33/76, EU:C:1976:188.

85 Opinion of Advocate General Tanchev in Egenberger, note 1 above, para 54.

86 Egenberger, note 1 above, para 49.

87 Ibid, para 78.

88 Ibid, paras 59, 81.

89 M Safjan and D Düsterhaus, ‘A Union of Effective Judicial Protection: Addressing a Multi-level Challenge through the Lens of Article 47 CFREU?’ (2014) 33(1) Yearbook of European Law 3, p 17.

90 Klass and Others v Germany (Application no 5029/71) (1978), 2 E.H.R.R. 14, para 69; Kudla v Poland (Application no 30210/96) (2000) 35 E.H.R.R. 198, para 151.

91 Benkharbouche [2015] EWCA Civ 3, [2015] 3 WLR 301, at 80ff.

92 Smith, note 9 above, para 56.

93 Opinion of Advocate General Bot in Smith, note 9 above, paras 48ff.

94 S Prechal ‘EC Requirements for an Effective Remedy’ in J Lonbay and A Biondi (eds), Remedies for Breach of EC Law (Wiley, 1997), p 11.

95 AMS, note 8 above, para 50. State liability is set up in Francovich, C-6/90, EU:C:1991:428, paras 31–35,40; Brasserie du Pecheur, C-46/93, EU:C:1996:79, para 4. Some of these drawbacks of state liability have already been identified in B van Leeuwen, ‘An Illusion of Protection and an Assumption of Responsibility: The Possibility of Swedish State Liability after Laval’ (2012) Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 453.

96 Platon, S, ‘L'invocabilité Horizontale des Normes de Droit de l'Union Européenne: Un Pas sur Place, Un Pas en Avant, Deux Pas en Arrière - (CJE, grande chambre, 15 janv. 2014, aff. C-176/12)’ (2015) 584 Revue du marché commun [online version], p 7Google Scholar; Tinière, R, ‘L'invocabilité des principes de la Charte des droits fondamentaux dans les litiges horizontaux’ (2014) 14 Revue des droits et libertés fondamentaux.Google Scholar

97 B van Leeuwen and R Condon, note 75 above, pp 239–44.

98 Opinion of AG Tanchev in OTP Bank and OTP Faktoring, C-51/18, EU:C:2018:750, para 64.

99 Opinion of AG Bobek in TÜV, C-581/18, EU:C:2020:77, para 106.

100 Alexy, R, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (tr J Rivers, Oxford University Press, 2002), pp 358–65Google Scholar.

101 Ibid, p 358.

102 Ibid, p 485.

103 AL Young ‘Horizontality and the Human Rights Act 1998’ in K Ziegler (ed), Human Rights and Private Law: Privacy as Autonomy (Hart, 2007), p 35.

104 See eg Reich, N, General Principles of Civil Liability (Intersentia, 2013)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, albeit primarily from the angle of market freedoms and associated provisions of the Charter.

105 Cf Lenaerts, note 72 above.

106 CIA Security, C-194/94, EU:C:1996:172; Unilever Italia, C-443/98, EU:C:2000:496.

107 See further Frantziou, E, The Horizontal Effect of Fundamental Rights in the EU: A Constitutional Analysis (Oxford University Press, 2019), ch 6Google Scholar, for an argument from political equality. For a sophisticated account from legal theory, see Thomas, J, Public Rights, Private Relations (Oxford University Press, 2015), ch 7CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

108 Meskell [1973] IR 121.

109 O'Cinneide, C, ‘Irish Constitutional Law and Direct Horizontal Effect: A Successful Experiment?’ in Oliver, D and Fedtke, J (eds), Human Rights and the Private Sphere: A Comparative Study (Routledge, 2007), pp 234–35Google Scholar.

110 Viking Line, C-438/05, EU:C:2007:772; see also Terveys- ja sosiaalialan neuvottelujärjestö (‘TSN’), Joined Cases C-609/17 and C-610/17, EU:C:2018:223.

111 Nolan, A, ‘Holding Non-state Actors to Account for Constitutional Economic and Social Rights Violations: Experiences and Lessons from South Africa and Ireland’ (2014) 12(1) International Journal of Constitutional Law 61, p 64CrossRefGoogle Scholar.