Do you think that compliance with international law can help build confidence between the parties to an armed conflict and thus contribute to mediation efforts?

Compliance with IHL can function as a direct enabler of mediation. This is a point that deserves greater attention in both mediation practice and scholarship.

One of the most persistent obstacles in protracted armed conflicts is the absence of trust between parties. Years of violence, broken commitments and perceived bad faith create an environment in which even modest agreements become difficult to reach. In such contexts, demonstrated compliance with IHL, or concrete steps toward it, can serve as a confidence-building mechanism. When a party to a conflict shows that it is capable of restraint, that it can honour commitments regarding the treatment of civilians or detainees, or that it will facilitate humanitarian access, it sends a signal that broader political commitments may also be honoured.

Considering the logic of humanitarian pauses and ceasefires, these arrangements typically involve specific commitments that correspond to issues regulated under IHL: the cessation of hostilities in defined areas, the facilitation of humanitarian aid, the evacuation of the wounded, or arrangements related to detainees. When such commitments are implemented – however imperfectly – they create a baseline of demonstrated compliance that can inform more ambitious negotiations. Each instance of honouring an arrangement generates a degree of confidence, however tentative, that underpins the next step.

Conversely, when parties commit serious violations of IHL and act with a sense of impunity, the political space for negotiation contracts dramatically. Public opinion hardens, domestic constituencies become less willing to accept compromise, and the human costs of the conflict generate demands for accountability that can complicate peace processes. Serious violations of IHL, in addition to often leading to humanitarian catastrophes, can complicate mediation and the implementation of interim agreements.

There is also a temporal dimension worth highlighting. IHL compliance can build confidence at different stages of a conflict. In the early phases, when violence is intense and trust is minimal, even small acts of compliance, such as allowing a humanitarian corridor, facilitating a medical evacuation or permitting the International Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC] to access detainees, can create openings for dialogue. In middle phases, when mediation is under way but fragile, compliance with interim arrangements demonstrates good faith and sustains political momentum. In later phases, when agreements are being implemented, continued compliance reassures parties that have taken political risks by agreeing to compromise. At each stage, the mediator’s task is to identify where compliance can do the most work and to create the conditions for it.

Underpinning this is a broader insight about humanitarian diplomacy. Integrating humanitarian considerations from the outset of mediation, rather than treating them as peripheral concerns to be addressed after political settlements are reached, establishes trust between parties who may have no other basis for engagement. Conflicts do not pause for humanitarian corridors to be negotiated separately from political settlements. The protection of civilians, the delivery of aid, the evacuation of the wounded and the release of detainees create tangible outcomes that sustain momentum when political progress stalls. When respect for IHL is woven into the fabric of the mediation process from the beginning, it becomes a confidence-building mechanism. Likewise, it demonstrates that negotiation can deliver results.

I would add an important note here, which is that compliance with IHL alone does not produce peace, and insisting on full legal accountability as a precondition for negotiation can itself become an obstacle to reaching agreements that save lives in the near term. This does not mean that accountability and mediation are mutually exclusive: in several post-conflict transitions, including Colombia’s peace process, which culminated in the signing of the 2016 Colombian peace accord, accountability mechanisms were sequenced alongside the negotiated settlements rather than demanded as a prior condition. Rather, it demonstrates that the question is more often on when and how to introduce accountability without foreclosing the political space needed for an agreement. The challenge for mediators is to encourage adherence to humanitarian norms as a means of building the trust necessary for political progress, without allowing legal questions to paralyze the negotiation process. This requires considerable diplomatic skill and contextual sensitivity. There is no formula for guaranteed success in this domain; the negotiation process demands action informed by deep understanding of the specific conflict dynamics at play.

How can a State mediating in armed conflict encourage parties to translate their IHL obligations into concrete practical commitments?

This is where the practice of mediation meets the substance of IHL, and it is an area in which considerable innovation is still needed. It is worth noting that the effectiveness of any mediation effort is shaped in part by what exists before negotiations begin. Preparedness plays a significant role: national legal frameworks, military doctrine and training, and institutional arrangements for detention management, humanitarian access or the protection of civilians can significantly shape the ability of parties to translate humanitarian commitments into practice, and where such systems already exist, mediators may find it easier to anchor humanitarian provisions in existing structures rather than negotiating them from scratch.

With that in mind, I would highlight several mechanisms that demonstrate potential for enhancing practice across a range of mediation contexts. The first is the use of phased agreements that incorporate specific, verifiable humanitarian commitments. Rather than attempting comprehensive peace settlements that address all issues simultaneously – an approach that frequently fails in protracted conflicts – mediators can structure negotiations around sequential phases, each of which includes concrete humanitarian deliverables. This may encompass provisions with defined timelines on measures to reduce hostilities in densely populated areas, arrangements relating to detainees (including their release or exchange), the return of displaced persons, the facilitation of humanitarian aid at scale, or the rehabilitation of essential civilian infrastructure such as hospitals. While these provisions are related to issues governed by IHL, they are typically formulated as practical commitments with operational specificity rather than as abstract legal requirements. The shift from legal to operational language is important because parties are more likely to implement commitments that they understand as actionable steps than those framed as legal duties.

The second mechanism is the establishment of operational monitoring arrangements during implementation. Mediators who invest in operational infrastructure, such as operations rooms, direct communication channels with all parties and key intermediaries, and real-time verification mechanisms, can transform paper commitments into monitored arrangements. When disputes arise over the interpretation or implementation of humanitarian provisions, these channels enable rapid resolution before violations escalate into crises that threaten the entire agreement.

Third, mediators can frame IHL compliance in terms that resonate with each party’s strategic interests rather than relying exclusively on legal or moral argumentation. NSAGs and State militaries are more likely to honour humanitarian commitments when they perceive them as serving their own objectives or the objectives of people they represent – whether that means demonstrating legitimacy to domestic or international audiences, securing reciprocal commitments from opponents, or creating conditions for external support and recognition. A mediator who understands the incentive structures of each party can present humanitarian compliance as strategically advantageous.

Finally, mediators should invest in building the institutional capacity of parties to implement their commitments. This is particularly important for NSAGs, which may lack the command structures, training or operational procedures necessary to translate good-faith commitments into practice on the ground. Mediators can facilitate technical assistance, support the development of internal codes of conduct, and encourage engagement with organizations such as the ICRC and Geneva Call that have expertise in helping parties to operationalize their commitments.

Do you see differences between mediating with State armed forces and with non-State armed groups, particularly when it comes to promoting respect for IHL and reaching humanitarian agreements?

The differences are significant and shape mediation practice in fundamental ways. Yet, not to draw overly simplistic distinctions, I would say that both State armed forces and NSAGs present challenges to IHL compliance, and both can demonstrate willingness to engage constructively on humanitarian issues under the right conditions.

The most obvious difference is one of institutional architecture. State armed forces operate within established legal frameworks, with defined chains of command, military justice systems and, at least in principle, IHL training and doctrine. When a mediator negotiates humanitarian commitments with a State, there is a reasonable assumption that the State has the institutional capacity to implement those commitments through its existing structures. The challenge with State actors is more often one of political will than institutional capacity. States may have sophisticated legal frameworks and well-trained armed forces yet still engage in systematic violations of IHL when political leaders calculate that the costs of compliance outweigh the benefits. The mediator’s task with State parties is therefore primarily political. It implies creating conditions in which compliance becomes the rational choice.

NSAGs present a different constellation of challenges. Many lack formal legal training, have decentralized command structures and may not recognize themselves as bound by treaties to which they were not party – though key IHL rules apply to all parties to an armed conflict, including NSAGs, notably through Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 [common Article 3]Footnote ⁴ and through customary IHL.Footnote ⁵ Some groups reject international law on ideological or political grounds, while others are willing to engage but lack the organizational infrastructure to ensure compliance across their forces.

An important but often overlooked point is that the legitimacy question cuts both ways. States frequently resist humanitarian agreements with NSAGs because they fear conferring legitimacy onto those groups. NSAGs, for their part, may be more willing to make humanitarian commitments precisely because doing so can enhance their legitimacy and demonstrate their capacity for governance and restraint. Mechanisms such as Geneva Call’s Deeds of Commitment,Footnote ⁶ through which armed groups pledge to respect specific humanitarian norms, have shown that non-State actors can make meaningful and verifiable commitments when given appropriate frameworks. The ICRC’s long-standing engagement with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia on IHL compliance is another example of how meaningful humanitarian commitments by non-State actors can be achieved through sustained engagement.Footnote ⁷ Common Article 3 provides an essential foundation here, establishing that “[t]he application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict”. Mediators should consistently emphasize this principle to overcome the reluctance of both State and non-State parties to engage on humanitarian issues.

I would also note that the traditional distinction between State and non-State actors is becoming increasingly blurred in contemporary conflicts. Proxy warfare, the fragmentation of armed groups, the involvement of private military and security companies, and the complex affiliations between State sponsors and armed factions all complicate the categories. In Sudan, Yemen, Libya and elsewhere, mediators confront hybrid arrangements in which the line between State forces and non-State groups is unclear, and where chains of influence extend across borders. Instead of relying on neat distinctions that no longer reflect operational realities, mediators must chart actual patterns of command, financing and political loyalty rather than assuming that formal designations capture who holds power, who can deliver compliance, and who must ultimately be brought to the table if any agreement is to hold.

One further point on NSAGs specifically is that there is sometimes an assumption that these groups are inherently less willing to comply with IHL than States, but the evidence does not straightforwardly support this assumption. While some armed groups certainly reject humanitarian norms, others have demonstrated “overwhelmingly positive attitudes towards IHL”,Footnote ⁸ choosing compliance when it serves their self-image, their political project or their strategic interests.Footnote ⁹ In certain contexts, armed groups have even exceeded the compliance record of opposing State forces whose own institutional legitimacy is weak. This has been documented in the case of the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front in El Salvador, where the UN Truth Commission found that the vast majority of civil war abuses were committed by the Salvadoran military rather than the rebel groups.Footnote ¹⁰

What often matters more than the State/non-State distinction is whether a group has a political project that depends on legitimacy, whether it exercises effective control over its forces, and whether external actors have created incentive structures that reward compliance. Mediators who approach NSAGs with scepticism about their willingness to comply with IHL risk missing opportunities for meaningful humanitarian engagement.

How do you view the potential role of humanitarian neutral intermediaries, such as the ICRC, in supporting mediation processes?

The ICRC’s mandate, under the Geneva Conventions, their Additional Protocols, and the Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, authorizes it to act as a neutral intermediary and to offer its services in situations of armed conflict. This mandate, combined with its operational presence in over ninety countriesFootnote ¹¹ and its relationships with both State and non-State parties to conflicts, gives the ICRC access and credibility that few other organizations possess. Critically, the ICRC’s commitment to the principles of neutrality and impartiality, as well as its widespread use of bilateral and confidential dialogue as a working modality, enables it to maintain channels of communication with all parties.

The ICRC can support mediation processes in several ways. First, it can provide operational support through the facilitation of the physical transfer of detainees and hostages, verification of compliance with exchange arrangements, and maintenance of communication with parties on the ground during the implementation of agreements. Mediation agreements are only as credible as the mechanisms that ensure their implementation, and the ICRC’s presence on the ground provides a level of verification and trust that political mediators cannot achieve alone.

This operational role has proven critical in multiple contexts, such as detainee release and transfer in Yemen, where the ICRC co-chaired the Supervisory Committee established under the 2018 Stockholm Agreement and facilitated two major operations, involving over 1,900 detainees, in 2020 and 2023.Footnote ¹² Similarly, in the absence of diplomatic relations between Lebanon and Israel, the ICRC functioned as a neutral intermediary for the repatriation of civilian and human remains.Footnote ¹³ In the Israeli–Palestinian context, the ICRC’s role was confined to overseeing the physical handover of individuals and the transfer of released persons.Footnote ¹⁴ During the 2023–25 war on Gaza, the ICRC supported the return of hostages and detainees, along with the transfer of deceased Palestinians to Gaza.Footnote ¹⁵ These are but a few examples.

Second, in a normative way, the ICRC’s promotion and dissemination of IHL builds awareness among both State and non-State parties of their humanitarian obligations, creating a baseline that mediators can draw upon during negotiations. Its dialogue with armed forces and armed groups on the practical application of IHL strengthens the capacity of parties to honour humanitarian commitments that emerge from mediation.

Third, the ICRC can serve as a bridge between humanitarian action and political processes. The ICRC’s experience in facilitating detainee releases, supporting family reunification and addressing the fate of missing persons creates entry points for broader political engagement. These humanitarian actions, conducted under the principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence, can foster trust between conflict parties and generate momentum toward political negotiations that State mediators can then build upon.

There are also essential boundaries to maintain. The ICRC’s effectiveness depends on its perceived neutrality, impartiality and independence, which means that it cannot and should not become a political actor within mediation processes. State mediators – as well as parties to the conflict – should view the ICRC as an indispensable operational and normative partner. Respecting this distinction is a source of strength: when mediators and neutral intermediaries operate in their respective spheres with mutual understanding and coordination, the overall architecture of conflict resolution is stronger than either could achieve alone.

Looking ahead, the Global Initiative to Galvanize Political Commitment to International Humanitarian Law [Global IHL Initiative], launched in September 2024 by Brazil, China, France, Jordan, Kazakhstan and South Africa together with the ICRC, represents a promising framework.Footnote ¹⁶ Its workstream on IHL and peace – co-chaired by Qatar, notably one of the world’s most active mediation practitioners – explores how respect for IHL can contribute to de-escalation, mediation and peace negotiation, and could help to systematize the operational links between humanitarian intermediaries and State-led mediation. As of March 2026, 103 states have officially joined the Global IHL initiative, with a High-Level Meeting to Uphold Humanity in War planned for 2026 to produce concrete and actionable recommendations.Footnote ¹⁷ These developments suggest a more structured, principled architecture for mediation in which IHL becomes foundational. This is an area that would benefit from sustained investment and research.

Given that IHL obligations extend well beyond the conduct of hostilities, how can mediation processes more systematically address the humanitarian consequences of war, especially regarding the missing, the dead and detainees?

This is an area where mediation practice has historically fallen short. The humanitarian consequences of armed conflict – particularly those related to the fate of missing persons, the dignified treatment of the dead and the conditions of detention – are among the most deeply felt issues for affected populations, yet they are often treated, in my view, as secondary concerns in mediation processes that prioritize ceasefire arrangements and political settlements. This is both a moral failure and a strategic error.

The reality is that these issues go to the heart of what communities experience during and after armed conflict, and they carry enormous significance for the prospects of sustainable peace. Families of missing persons live in a state of perpetual uncertainty that compounds the trauma of conflict and prevents communities from moving forward. The mistreatment of the dead – including the failure to return remains, the denial of dignified burial and the absence of identification processes – violates fundamental norms of humanity across cultures and legal traditions and generates grievances that can fuel future cycles of violence. The treatment of detainees shapes perceptions of the legitimacy and good faith of conflict parties, and abuses in detention can undermine support for peace agreements among populations whose trust is essential to their sustainability.

From a mediation perspective, there are several ways to address these issues more systematically. First, mediators should ensure that these humanitarian consequences are included as substantive agenda items from the outset of negotiations, not relegated to implementation phases or side discussions. When ceasefire agreements include specific provisions on the exchange of human remains, the return of displaced persons, the facilitation of medical evacuations and the rehabilitation of health infrastructure – integrated alongside security and political commitments in the initial phases – it signals that humanitarian issues are core components, not afterthoughts. Affected populations, and in particular families of the missing and communities living with the consequences of detention and disappearance, hold critical knowledge and priorities that should inform the design of mechanisms addressing these issues – engaging them from the outset in mediation processes is consistent with widely recognized victim-centred approaches to peace and is more likely to produce mechanisms that communities will trust and support over the long term.

Second, mediators should work with specialized actors – principally the ICRC, but also National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and relevant forensic and legal organizations – to develop detailed technical frameworks for addressing these issues. Forensic identification, family tracing, monitoring of detention conditions, and the legal frameworks governing detainee treatment require expertise that political mediators typically do not possess. Building these technical dimensions into mediation processes from the beginning ensures that commitments are operationally feasible.

Third, mediation processes should create dedicated mechanisms for ongoing engagement on these issues beyond the initial agreement. The fate of missing persons and the conditions of detention are rarely resolved at the point of ceasefire; they require sustained attention, continued access and ongoing negotiation. Establishing standing committees, monitoring bodies or liaison mechanisms specifically focused on these humanitarian consequences can help to ensure that they remain on the agenda as political processes unfold. The experience of post-conflict societies from the Balkans to Latin America demonstrates that failing to address these issues early creates wounds that fester for decades and complicate long-term reconciliation.

Fourth, and perhaps most fundamentally, mediators need to understand that these issues are not merely humanitarian – they are deeply political. The release of detainees, the return of human remains, and accounting for the missing carry profound political significance for the parties and their constituencies. Ignoring these dimensions or treating them as purely technical matters misreads their importance and risks overlooking powerful leverage points for building momentum toward broader agreements. The exchange of prisoners and detainees, for example, is often among the first tangible outcomes that parties can deliver to their domestic audiences, demonstrating that negotiation produces results.

There is also a normative dimension that deserves emphasis. The ICRC’s 2024 report on International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts Footnote ¹⁸ and the November 2025 issue of the Review on “Protection of the Dead”Footnote ¹⁹ both mention the obligations relating to missing persons and the treatment of the dead as areas requiring greater attention. Parties to armed conflicts have duties under IHL to search for missing persons, to facilitate the return of human remains, and to ensure proper identification and burial of the dead. These obligations persist after the cessation of hostilities and long into the post-conflict period; mediation processes should reflect this temporal scope, incorporating provisions that establish frameworks for the long-term work of tracing, identification and memorialization that communities will require for years or decades after an agreement is signed.

Finally, I would note that technological advances are creating new possibilities in this space. DNA identification, digital databases, satellite imagery and other forensic tools are making it increasingly feasible to identify remains and trace missing persons even years after a conflict. Mediation agreements that establish the legal and institutional frameworks for deploying these capabilities, including provisions on access to sites, the sharing of information and the establishment of dedicated commissions, can significantly strengthen the humanitarian dimensions of peace processes.

How do you see the role of humanitarian agreements, such as on detainee release, as part of pathways to peace?

Humanitarian agreements, particularly those involving the release and exchange of detainees, occupy a distinctive position in the spectrum of conflict resolution. They are simultaneously humanitarian acts that alleviate suffering and political instruments that can generate momentum toward broader peace.

Detainee exchanges and prisoner swaps serve multiple functions beyond their immediate humanitarian purpose. They demonstrate that parties can reach and implement an agreement under pressure, that monitoring mechanisms can function and that mediators can manage the inevitable complications of implementation. This creates a foundation of demonstrated feasibility that informs more ambitious negotiations. In contexts where broader political engagement has stalled, humanitarian agreements can keep the possibility of engagement alive. Prisoner exchanges between States with no formal diplomatic relations, for instance, have historically served as bridges – limited, practical arrangements that maintain channels of communication and create precedents for cooperation.

The facilitation of family reunification in wartime contexts follows a similar logic. When mediators broker arrangements for the return of separated children or family members, they create frameworks for sustained engagement between hostile parties which imply ongoing communication, information exchange and operational mechanisms. Such a process constitutes habits of cooperation with potential to contribute to broader conflict resolution.

Several features make humanitarian agreements particularly valuable as pathways to peace. They are often achievable, because they address issues that both parties have an immediate interest in resolving. They produce visible, tangible results that demonstrate the value of negotiation to domestic audiences and to sceptics on all sides. They create communication channels, monitoring mechanisms and implementation procedures that can be scaled up for more ambitious agreements. Additionally, it’s worth noting that they generate goodwill and trust, however limited, between parties that may have no other positive basis for engagement.

Nevertheless, I would not advocate for humanitarian agreements becoming substitutes for political solutions. There is a real risk that parties to a conflict – and the international community – will become satisfied with managing humanitarian consequences without addressing the underlying political causes of violence. Detainee releases and humanitarian pauses are valuable in themselves, but they are most effective when understood as steps within a broader trajectory toward sustainable peace. Mediators have a responsibility to maintain this longer-term perspective, using humanitarian agreements as building blocks.

The treatment of detainees during and after armed conflict also raises important questions about accountability and transitional justice. While the immediate priority is often to secure the release and humane treatment of those detained, the conditions of their detention and any abuses they have suffered carry implications for post-conflict reconciliation. Mediators should be attentive to these longer-term dynamics even as they focus on the immediate humanitarian imperative. Building provisions for documentation, monitoring and future accountability into humanitarian agreements can help to bridge the tension between the urgency of the present and the demands of a just and durable peace.

There is also a broader strategic point about sequencing. In many protracted conflicts, the question is not whether to pursue a comprehensive political settlement or humanitarian agreements, but how to use humanitarian agreements to work towards political progress. A well-designed humanitarian agreement can create political space by demonstrating that negotiation works by shifting domestic opinion and building operational trust between parties. Conversely, a poorly designed or prematurely announced humanitarian agreement can raise expectations that are then dashed or can be exploited by spoilers seeking to undermine the broader process. Mediators must think carefully about how each humanitarian agreement fits within the larger trajectory of the conflict and the peace process.

This points to a final observation: the importance of mediator credibility in humanitarian agreements. Parties will only take risks on detainee exchanges and other humanitarian arrangements if they trust that the mediator can manage the process, resolve disputes during implementation and hold both sides to their commitments. This credibility is built through sustained engagement, operational competence and a demonstrated track record. States and institutions that aspire to mediation roles and are committed to peace should invest in building this capacity before seeking to exercise such roles.

Is there anything else you would like to share with the readers of the Review regarding the links between mediation, IHL, and the search for pathways to peace?

I would like to offer several broader reflections on the relationship between mediation, IHL and the pursuit of peace in the current global context.

First, we are at an inflection point in global mediation practice. The traditional model of a single lead mediator driving a comprehensive peace agreement is increasingly giving way to more fluid, multi-level processes involving multiple mediators, sequential agreements, and hybrid arrangements that blend ceasefire management with humanitarian action and political negotiation. For instance, in 2024 alone, 230 distinct mediation events and over 900 mediation-related events were recorded across just six conflict contexts, involving actors ranging from the African Union and the United Nations to regional States and local intermediaries.Footnote ²⁰ The current scale and intensity of mediation fragmentation is fundamentally altering the peace-making landscape; this is illustrated by Sudan alone, which has seen at least seventeen mediated agreements in five years, involving more than ten separate third-party actors.Footnote ²¹ In a landscape of multiple overlapping mediation tracks, the coherence that IHL provides becomes even more valuable. IHL can serve as a common reference point across different processes, ensuring that humanitarian standards are maintained regardless of which actor is leading a particular track or what political compromises are being explored.

Second, the crisis of IHL compliance that we are witnessing globally is not separate from the challenges facing mediation. When parties to conflicts act with impunity and when the most fundamental norms of humanitarian conduct are treated as optional, the foundations of mediation are eroded. Mediation depends on a minimum expectation that agreements will be honoured, and that expectation is undermined when the most basic legal commitments are routinely violated. As per the ICRC’s Annual Report 2024, more than 130 armed conflicts are currently recorded worldwide, with many stretching on for decades.Footnote ²² The Global IHL Initiative is therefore also an investment in the viability of mediation as an instrument of peace. Without a functioning normative floor, there is nothing for mediators to build upon.

Third, I want to emphasize the importance of defending and supporting the space for mediation itself. Mediation that genuinely strives for peace requires a willingness to engage with unpopular parties, to maintain relationships with actors that others might prefer to isolate, and to operate under conditions of extreme political pressure. Mediators who engage with NSAGs, who maintain relationships with parties designated by some as terrorists, or who facilitate agreements that involve difficult compromises serve the humanitarian interests of affected populations. They perform an essential function in international relations. When mediators are attacked – politically or otherwise – for doing this work, the message sent to others who might play similar roles is deeply corrosive. The international community has a collective stake in protecting the diplomatic space within which mediation operates, recognizing that the willingness to talk to all parties is a diplomatic necessity and, ultimately, a humanitarian imperative.

Finally, I would observe that respect for IHL can support peace efforts, while credible peace processes can strengthen incentives for compliance. When parties to a conflict believe that a political solution is possible, they have stronger reasons to demonstrate restraint and to invest in the kind of compliance that builds trust. When they believe that conflict will continue indefinitely, those incentives diminish. This creates a potentially virtuous cycle in which mediation, IHL compliance and political progress reinforce one another. Realizing that potential is among the most important challenges of our time, and it requires sustained collaboration between mediators, humanitarian actors, legal experts and the affected communities whose futures are at stake.

I would add one practical suggestion for the Review’s readership. There is a significant gap in the literature and practice guidance on how mediators should operationalize IHL within mediation processes. We have extensive scholarship on IHL itself, and a growing literature on mediation practice, but the interface between the two remains under-developed. Mediators are rarely trained in IHL, and IHL experts are rarely trained in mediation. Bridging this gap through joint training programmes, practice guidance for mediators on humanitarian issues, and greater involvement of IHL specialists in mediation support teams would strengthen both fields. The ICRC’s existing work on developing guidelines for mediators on humanitarian issues is a valuable step,Footnote ²³ but it deserves to be scaled up and institutionalized across the mediation community.

Mediation remains an essential instrument for reducing harm, preserving space for political solutions, preventing humanitarian collapse and safeguarding the rights, dignity and identity of peoples. In a world where the lines between war and peace are not always clear, and where the limited certainties of international order are also fading, the capacity to mediate – and to do so in ways that respect and reinforce IHL – matters more than ever. At the Center for Conflict and Humanitarian Studies,Footnote ²⁴ we are committed to contributing to this agenda through our research and engagement with mediation processes, and we welcome further dialogue with the ICRC and the broader humanitarian and mediation communities on these critical questions.