1. For concise overviews of the main substantive and normative issues concerning the direct-democracy debate, see Smith, Daniel A., “Direct Democracy and Its Critics,” in Woolley, Peter and Papa, Albert, eds., American Politics: Core Argument/Current Controversy, 2d ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 2002)Google Scholar; Donovan, Todd and Bowler, Shaun, “An Overview of Direct Democracy in the American States,” in Bowler, Shaun, Donovan, Todd, and Tolbert, Caroline, eds., Citizens as Legislators (Columbus, Ohio, 1998)Google Scholar; Schmidt, David, Citizen Lawmakers: The Ballot Initiative Revolution (Philadelphia, 1989)Google Scholar; and Magleby, David, Direct Legislation: Voting on Ballot Propositions in the United States (Baltimore, 1984), chap. 10Google Scholar.

2. Direct democracy (often referred to as direct legislation)—which includes the plebiscitary devices of initiative, popular referendum, and recall—is the political process whereby citizens participate directly in the making of public policy by casting their votes on ballot measures. With the initiative, citizens collect a specified number of valid signatures in order to place either a statutory measure or a constitutional amendment on the ballot for fellow voters to adopt or reject. With the popular referendum, citizens petition their legislatures to place a disputed legislative action on the ballot for the voters to reconsider. The recall enables citizens to collect signatures to force a retention vote of an elected official.

3. For an overview of many of the ballot measures adopted during the Progressive Era, see Schmidt, Citizen Lawmakers, 25–26.

4. Wilcox, Delos, Government by All the People (New York, 1912), 3–10Google Scholar.

5. Broder, David, “Ballot Initiatives Subvert Election Process,” Denver Post, 14 05 2000, K1Google Scholar; idem, Democracy Derailed: Initiative Campaigns and the Power of Money (New York, 2000).

6. Schrag, Peter, Paradise Lost: California's Experience, America's Future (New York, 1998), 195Google Scholar. In passing, Schrag does allude to “that very same Southern Pacific Railroad” in his list of “interests,” but his point of reference is not the Progressive Era, but a successful June 1990 railway bond project (Proposition 116), which Southern Pacific supported with $500,000 in contributions. Schrag, Paradise Lost, 219. In fact, Southern Pacific (now Union Pacific Railroad) was involved in numerous California ballot campaigns, from an unsuccessful 1911 legislative referendum that would have allowed public officials to ride for free on trains, to a successful 1948 statutory initiative that required the public Utilities Commission to specify the number of brakemen on trains. See Allswang, John, The Initiative and Referendum in California, 1898–1998 (Stanford, 2000), 83Google Scholar. There are numerous other journalistic accounts critical of direct democracy. See especially Chavez, Lydia, The Color Bind: California's Battle to End Affirmative Action (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1998)Google Scholar, and Mahtesian, Charles, “Grassroots Charade,” Governing (11 1998): 38–42Google Scholar.

7. Schmidt, Citizen Lawmakers, 25–26.

8. Zimmerman, Joseph, The Initiative: Citizen Law-Making (Westport, Conn., 1999), 94–95Google Scholar.

9. Gerber, Elisabeth, The Populist Paradox: Interest Group Influence and the Promise of Direct Legislation (Princeton, 1999), 5Google Scholar.

10. See, for instance, Oberholtzer, Ellis, The Referendum in America (New York, 1900)Google Scholar; Beard, Charles and Shultz, Birl, Documents on the State-wide Initiative, Referendum and Recall (New York, 1912)Google Scholar; Munro, William, ed., The Initiative, Referendum, and Recall (New York, 1912)Google Scholar; Haynes, George, “People's Rule on Trial,” Political Science Quarterly 28 (1913): 18–33CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Lowell, Lawrence, Public Opinion and Popular Government (New York, 1913)Google Scholar; Barnett, James, The Operation of the Initiative, Referendum, and Recall in Oregon (New York, 1915)Google Scholar; Cushman, Robert, “Recent Experience with the Initiative and Referendum,” American Political Science Review 10 (1916): 532–539CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hall, Arnold, Popular Government (New York, 1921)Google Scholar. Not all eyewitness accounts during the Progressive Era, however, were sanguine about the process. For an overview, see Bowler, Shaun and Donovan, Todd, Demanding Choices (Ann Arbor, 1998), 7–20Google Scholar.

11. For example, Link and McCormick write, “Two new formal mechanisms of public opinion,” the initiative and referendum, “permitted voters themselves to propose and enact legislation even against the will of the legislature,” and “seemingly gave everyone an equal opportunity to change the laws, but in practice they were used most effectively by well-organized interest groups, such as labor unions, prohibitionists, and woman suffragists.” Link and McCormick make no mention of how corporate interests also used the mechanisms. Link, Arthur and McCormick, Richard, Progressivism (Arlington Heights, Ill., 1983)Google Scholar.

12. The term “mythic narrative” is borrowed from Ellis, Richard, Democratic Delusions: The Initiative Process in America (Lawrence, Kan., 2002), 177Google Scholar.

13. Schmidt erroneously reports that Colorado also adopted the recall in 1910. In fact, Coloradoans approved a constitutional amendment ballot initiative (Measure 9) in 1912 that permitted the recall of public officials. See Schmidt, Citizen Lawmakers, 226. There are several other inaccuracies in works concerning the adoption of public policies in Colorado via the initiative. For instance, Cronin reports incorrectly that “after several failed attempts, initiative petition in Colorado… granted the vote to women.” Cronin, Thomas, Direct Democracy: The Politics of Initiative, Referendum, and Recall (Cambridge, Mass., 1989), 97CrossRefGoogle Scholar. In actuality, women in Colorado gained the right to vote after male voters in November 1893 passed a constitutional amendment referendum placed on the ballot by the state legislature.

14. For brief histories of the adoption of initiative and referendum in Colorado, see Martin, Curtis and Gomez, Rudolph, Colorado Government and Politics, 4th ed. (Boulder, 1976), 205Google Scholar; Schmidt, Citizen Lawmakers, 15–20. For especially good accounts of the campaigns to adopt initiative and referendum mechanisms in other states, see Goebel, Thomas, “‘A Case of Democratic Contagion”: Direct Democracy in the American West, 1890–1920,” Pacific Historical Review (05 1997): 213–230Google Scholar; Piott, Steven, “The Origins of the Initiative and Referendum in America,” Hayes Historical Journal 11 (Spring 1992): 5–17Google Scholar; and in the case of California, Allswang, The Initiative and Referendum in California, 8–18.

15. Huber, Francis Anne, “The Progressive Career of Ben B. Lindsey, 1900–1920” (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1963), 332–334Google Scholar.

16. Shafroth was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives as a Republican in 1894 and then as a Silver Republican for two more terms (1896 and 1898). He was reelected to a fourth term in 1900 as a Democrat. In 1902, Shafroth was reelected as a Democrat, but he resigned his seat in 1903 after allegations of fraud were made by his opponent. He was unsuccessful in another bid for Congress in 1904. Following his two terms as governor, Shafroth was elected to the U.S. Senate as a Democrat in 1912. He served only one term, defeated by Republican Lawrence Phipps in 1918. Colorado State Archives, “The Governor John F. Shafroth Collection.” <www.archives.state.co.us/govs/shafroth.html>.

17. Huber, “The Progressive Career of Ben B. Lindsey,” 332–34.

18. California, Oregon, and several other states had parallel partisan experiences during this period. See Allswang, The Initiative and Referendum in California, 8–18; Ellis, Democratic Delusions, 26–30. For the reemergence of party involvement in ballot campaigns, see Smith, Daniel A. and Tolbert, Caroline, “The Initiative to Party: Partisanship and Ballot Initiatives in California,” Party Politics 7 (Winter 2001): 781–799CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

19. Speer and Evans had another reason to be allies. In 1911, the state legislature was called upon to choose a new United States Senator. Although Speer's Democrats controlled both chambers of the legislature, the Progressives were a prevalent enough force in both parties to ensure that neither establishment could have a majority. As such, Speer allied himself with his party adversary in the hopes of getting enough votes to be chosen as senator. However, the alliance was publicly revealed in the Rocky Mountain News, owned by former U.S. Senator Thomas Patterson, a civic reformer. Once the scheme was disclosed publicly, enough legislators refused to endorse it; Speer never won his coveted U.S. Senate seat. See “Citizens' League Petitions Are Filed with Supervisors,” Rocky Mountain News, 13 April 1910; “Evans-Speer Gangs Vote Bosses' Will at Primaries,” Rocky Mountain News, 22 April 1910; “Senator Patterson Asks W. G. Evans for Definite Statement of Moffat Road's Future,” Rocky Mountain News, 12 April 1911.

20. Interpretations of Roosevelt's speech at the special session vary. Musselman claims that Roosevelt was “equivocal,” at best, in his support of the direct legislation measure. See Musselman, Lloyd, “Govern John F. Shafroth and the Colorado Progressives: Their Fight for Direct Legislation, 1909–1910” (M.A. thesis, University of Denver, 1961), 86–89Google Scholar. Roosevelt did exclaim that the legislators should “BE PROGRESSIVE. A great democracy has got to be progressive or it will soon cease to be either great or a democracy.” See Senate, Colorado, Senate Journal of the Seventeenth General Assembly of the State of Colorado. Extraordinary Session (Denver, 1910), 138–139Google Scholar. After visiting with Roosevelt, Judge Lindsey stated that he thought Roosevelt was “radical—just as radical as we want him,” and that he supported the initiative, referendum, and recall, much to the chagrin of conservatives. Quoted in Huber, “The Progressive Career of Ben B. Lindsey,” 254–55. Schmidt, who does not mention his 1910 visit to Colorado, cites Roosevelt's 1912 “Charter of Democracy” speech as his first explicit advocacy of direct-democracy reforms. See Schmidt, Citizen Lawmakers, 9.

21. Colorado Senate, Senate Journal, 152–58. During the Progressive Era, the initiative and popular referendum were commonly referred to as the “Oregon System,” alluding to the widespread use of the mechanisms in Oregon, which began in earnest in 1904. Although South Dakota (1898) and Utah (1900) had established direct-democracy mechanisms before Oregon (1902), citizens in Oregon were the first to use the statewide plebiscitary reforms. See Barnett, The Operation of The Initiative, Referendum, and Recall in Oregon, 75–85; Ellis, Democratic Delusions, 30–35.

22. The Denver Post and The Denver Times took no official stance on the merits of direct democracy. At the time, the Denver Post was being sued for libel, so it understandably kept its editorializing to a minimum. See Knautz, Harlan, The Colorado Progressive Party of 1912 (M.A. thesis, University of Denver, 1964)Google Scholar.

23. The final vote tally was 88,948 votes (75.4 percent) in favor of the constitutional amendment and 29,098 votes (24.6 percent) against the referendum. Colorado Secretary of State, State of Colorado: Roster of Elected Officers and Tabulated Statement of the Votes Cast for the Several Candidates, Tuesday, November 8, A.D. 1910 (Denver, 1911)Google Scholar.

24. Immediately following the 1910 popular vote, opponents challenged the measure in court, arguing that the special session bill had not been submitted properly to the people under Colorado's constitution. In August 1912, a Denver district judge, Harry Riddle, agreed with the plaintiffs, and it looked as though Coloradoans would still be without the initiative and referendum. On appeal, however, the Colorado Supreme Court overturned the decision by Riddle and allowed the popular vote on the measure to stand. See “Initiative and Referendum Held Valid,” Denver Post, 24 September 1912. Opponents of direct democracy then tried to convince Secretary of State James Pearce, a Democrat, that the vast majority of the signatures on the various petitions circulating for the 1912 election were forgeries. William Malone, a member of the DLL and secretary to Governor Shafroth responded by saying, “Corporation influence is being brought to bear to prevent the submission of the public utilities court bill and the headless ballot initiated by the Direct Legislation League.” See “Corporations Lend Influence to Kill Initiative Bills,” Rocky Mountain News, 10 July 1912. Although Pearce agreed that many of the signatures were indeed forgeries, he insisted that he was powerless to do anything because the 1910 law gave no remedy for fake signatures on petitions.

25. Despite opposition by the influential Denver Republican newspaper and many public officials from both major parties, voters reelected Governor Shafroth in 1910 with 54 percent of the vote. Lamm, Richard and Smith, Duane, Pioneers and Politicians: 10 Colorado Governors in Profile (Boulder, 1984), 99Google Scholar.

26. It should be noted that there are many vote discrepancies in the public record concerning the actual vote totals for and against the thirty-two measures. In several cases, the vote totals on the actual county returns do not match the entries on the state abstract of the vote; in other cases, there are vote totals in parentheses on the county returns that are slightly different from the official typed count. In reporting the figures, we have done our best to cross-reference the official results of all thirty-two measures.

27. As in other states, when a popular referendum in Colorado receives a majority “yes” vote, it means that the legislation in question is approvingly retained by the voters. Hence, when a measure “passes” with a majority vote, the proponents of the popular referendum actually lose. In Colorado, the five 1912 popular referendums (Measures 22–26) that received less than 50 percent of the vote were removed from the Colorado statute books in 1913. For an excellent explanation (and frank admission of the inherent confusion) of the popular referendum in California, see Allswang, The Initiative and Referendum in California, 18–19.

28. These early results contradict the established finding that compulsory referendums placed on the ballot by state legislatures are historically much more likely to pass than initiatives and popular referendums. See Magleby, David, “Direct Legislation in the American States,” in Butler, David and Ranney, Austin, eds., Referendums around the World (Washington, D.C., 1994), 230–231Google Scholar. Among the factual errors found in Schmidt's work, which other scholars have unquestionably praised as an “excellent history of the initiative in the United States” (DuBois, Philip and Feeney, Floyd, Lawmaking by Initiative: Issues, Options, and Comparisons [New York, 1998], 20Google Scholar), is his account of Colorado's development of the initiative. Schmidt wrongly states that there were “22 Initiatives on the ballot, of which nine passed.” Schmidt, Citizen Legislators, 226. Despite the tireless efforts of M. Dane Waters and the Initiative and Referendum Institute, much work remains simply to provide a full and accurate account of the ballot titles and texts of all the measures approved and rejected by citizens during the Progressive Era.

29. No official records on turnout are available for the 1912 election. For estimates of voter turnout in Colorado during the Progressive Era, see Spencer, R. C., “Activities of the Colorado Electorate,” American Political Science Review 17 (1923): 101–108CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

30. On average, 38 percent of those who cast votes for President voted on the twenty initiatives on the ballot; 33 percent voted on the six compulsory referendums; and only 30 percent voted on the six popular referendums. Colorado Secretary of State, State of Colorado: Roster of Elected Officers and Tabulated Statement of the Votes Cast for the Several Candidates, Tuesday, November 5, A.D. 1912 (Denver, 1913)Google Scholar. While in line with recent studies showing that voter fatigue is more prevalent among legislative referendums than initiatives, the average ballot roll-off on the thirty-two measures in the 1912 election was nevertheless quite striking. For initiative and referendum passage rates in the states, see Magleby, Direct Legislation, 90–95.

31. Unfortunately, most of the DLL's records from Colorado are not available. Although the DLL stayed active in 1913 and tried to get several progressive measures through the legislature, in 1914 Lindsey incorporated the Colorado Social Service League and the DLL floundered in his absence. Huber, “The Progressive Career of Ben B. Lindsey,” 345–46. In his remarkable career as a Denver judge and social reformer, Lindsey was harassed by the Ku Klux Klan, disbarred in Colorado in 1929 (and later reinstated in 1935), and eventually moved to California to practice law.

32. Ironically, Judge Lindsey, the principal author of the initiative calling for the recall of elected officials, was himself nearly recalled in one of the measure's first applications. Huber, “The Progressive Career of Ben B. Lindsey,” 343.

33. Citing federal law, the Colorado courts struck down as unconstitutional the provision of Measure 16 that allowed voters to overturn the decisions of the Colorado Supreme Court by declaring laws unconstitutional.

34. The Denver Republican called the leaders of the DLL a bunch of “professional reformers and agitators.” The Colorado Stock Growers Association and the Humane Society separately assailed Lindsey and his “pet” initiative, the successful mother's compensation act. “Mothers' Compensation Bill Menace to Children's Home,” Denver Republican, 26 October 1912. Several newspapers, along with a coalition of public school teachers, strongly condemned Lindsey's amendment that would have opened public schools to wider popular control. See “League Preparing Reply to Foes of School Measure,” Denver Times, 18 October 1912; “Teachers Outline Attitude Toward New School Law,” Denver Times, 19 October 1912; “Judge Lindsey Is Answered,” Rocky Mountain News, 24 October 1912; and “Two Initiated Measures Which School Well Wishers Condemn,” Denver Republican, 3 November 1912. In 1913, the DLL, as well as some Democratic members of the House, circulated a petition for an initiative on the 1914 ballot that would have dissolved the state Senate. Although it never made it on the ballot, during the circulation phase proponents of the measure claimed it was the upper chamber of the legislature that had become corrupted by corporate influences, and that the only cure was to abolish the Senate. “Bill to Abolish State Senate as Corporation Tool and Bar to Progress to be Initiated,” Rocky Mountain News, 8 January 1913; “House Democrats Plan to Head Petitions for Abolition of State Senate,” Rocky Mountain News, 9 January 1913.

35. Although Measure 1, which sought to make Colorado a “dry” state, lost handily, garnering slightly more than 39 percent of the vote, Coloradoans would narrowly pass a similar prohibition initiative in 1914. Unfortunately, few accounts exist concerning the electioneering of these and other measures.

36. See Garrett, Elizabeth, “Perspective on Direct Democracy: Who Directs Direct Democracy?” University of Chicago Law School Roundtable 4 (1997): 17–36Google Scholar; Smith, Daniel A., Tax Crusaders and the Politics of Direct Democracy (New York, 1998)Google Scholar; idem, “Reevaluating the Causes of Proposition 13,” Social Science History 23:2 (Summer 1999): 173–210; idem, “Campaign Financing of Ballot Initiatives in the American States,” in Larry Sabato, Bruce Larson, and Howard Ernst, eds., Dangerous Democracy? The Battle Over Ballot Initiatives in America (Lanham, Md., 2001); idem, “Special Interests and Direct Democracy: An Historical Glance,” in M. Dane Waters, ed., The Battle Over Citizen Lawmaking (Durham, N.C., 2001).

37. Colorado Bar Association, Analysis of Thirty-Two Measures Submitted to the Electors of Colorado Under the Initiative and Referendum Amendment and by the 18th General Assembly (Denver, 1912), 26Google Scholar.

38. Ibid.

39. Measure 22, the livestock referendum, proposed to transfer control of branding from the Secretary of State to a new board, in whom all authority would be vested. As the Colorado Bar observed, “There will by this law be concentrated with the said commissioners full control and authority.” Colorado Bar Association, Analysis of Thirty-Two Measures, 73. This authority arguably conflicted with Measure 23, which vested custody over all public funds in the state treasurer. There were, naturally, strong interests looking for control over the branding of livestock in the state and in keeping state funds decentralized. Finally, Measure 26 sought to restrict the rights of reservoir owners to impound water in their reservoirs. While some such restrictions had always applied, the scope of the new law was much more broad. See Colorado Bar Association, Analysis of Thirty-Two Measures, 73, 75, 83–84; “Vote for Eighteen of the Proposed Measures, Cast Your Vote Against Fourteen of the Bills,” Denver Post, 30 October 1912.

40. Scamehorn, Lee, Mill & Mine: The C.F. & I. in the Twentieth Century (Lincoln, 1992), 21Google Scholar.

41. Lonsdale, David, “The Movement for an Eight-Hour Law in Colorado, 1893–1913” (Ph.D. diss., University of Colorado at Boulder, 1963), 274–277Google Scholar.

42. Looking at the total votes cast in the election, even Measure 31, which had the most votes of the five legislatively referred measures, was voted upon by less than half of the people who voted on the prohibition initiative. Election-goers cast 192,651 votes on the prohibition question (Measure 1), compared to only 89,963 votes cast upon Measure 31, which authorized bonded indebtedness for the construction of state highways.

43. In its nonpartisan analysis of the thirty-two ballot measures, the Colorado Bar Association minced no words: “The purpose of the proposed law is to give state aid to The Denver, Northwestern, and Pacific Railway Company, in the construction of its line from Denver to Salt Lake City.” Colorado Bar Association, Analysis of Thirty-Two Measures, 97.

44. See Griswold, P. R., David Moffat's Denver, Northwestern and Pacific: “The Moffat Road” (Denver, 1995)Google Scholar, and McMechen, Edgar, The Moffat Tunnel of Colorado: An Epic of Empire (Denver, 1927)Google Scholar. Griswold's history of the Moffat Road, written sixty-eight years after McMechen's 1927 study, draws heavily from his predecessor's work. Unfortunately, both works have numerous inaccuracies concerning the 1912 election. For example, McMechen and Griswold both misinterpret the way in which the bill became a compulsory statutory referendum. Both incorrectly report that the bill went to the people by legislative default. According to their reading of events, Governor John Shafroth neither signed nor vetoed the bill, which caused the measure to be referred automatically to a vote of the people as per the Constitution. There are two problems with this analysis. First, the House of Representatives amended the bill to make it a referendum and thus send it to the people. Once the amended bill had passed through both chambers of the legislature, it went directly to the ballot for November, bypassing the governor's desk all together. The governor did not have the opportunity either to endorse or veto the measure. Second, there is no provision in the Colorado constitution that refers bills to the people that are left unsigned by the governor.

45. In order of adoption, the states that adopted public utilities commissions were: New York and Wisconsin, 1907; Vermont, 1908; Maryland, 1910; Washington, New Hampshire, Kansas, Nevada, New Jersey, Connecticut, and Ohio, 1911; California and Rhode Island, 1912. See Lapp, John, “Public Utilities,” American Political Science Review 6 (1912): 576–578CrossRefGoogle Scholar. It should be noted that the Oregon legislature had passed a law creating a public utilities commission in 1911, but it was challenged (and thereby temporarily suspended) by a popular referendum that was placed on the ballot in 1912. The referendum, Measure 8, was approved by the voters, thereby reinstating the legislation. See Oregon Blue Book, “Initiative, Referendum and Recall 1912–1914.” <http://bluebook.state.or.us/state/elections/elections12.htm>.

46. Newspapers of the day rarely referred to the specific corporate holdings of Evans. When they did, it was usually limited to his involvement with the Denver Tramway or prior holdings in the railroad. For instance, in 1914 the Denver Post opposed a plan to make newspapers a public utility. In voicing its opposition, the paper read, “This amendment was gotten up by William G. Evans and the corrupt corporations which he represents and controls, and which he destroyed and ruined.” “So the People May Know,” Denver Post, 2 November 1914 (emphasis added).

47. Colorado Bar Association, Analysis of Thirty-Two Measures, 46.

48. The 1914 initiative, Measure 8, sought to put the “public press” under the control of the Public Utilities Commission. Not surprisingly, the proposal was roundly condemned by area newspapers. See “So the People May Know,” Denver Post, 2 November 1914.

49. “Business Men in Public War over Utilities Bill,” Denver Post, 10 October 1912.

50. “Utilities Bill Is Drawn by Phone Heads, Is Charge,” Denver Republican, 25 October 1912.

51. “The Two ‘Utilities’ Bills,” Rocky Mountain News, 17 October 1912.

52. Colorado Bar Association, Analysis of Thirty-Two Measures, 8–25.

53. “The Two ‘Utilities’ Bills,” Rocky Mountain News, 17 October 1912.

54. Colorado Secretary of State, State of Colorado: Roster of Elected Officers and Tabulated Statement of the Votes Cast for the Several Candidates, 1913Google Scholar.

55. Since the Progressive Era, many scholars have expressed deep reservations over the ability of citizens to vote on ballot measures that support their core beliefs and attitudes. In 1907, for example, political scientist George Haynes wrote how “[i]t is commonly assumed that, in a heated campaign, the average voter will ‘keep in touch]—a very fitting phrase—with the questions of the day. But in every state there are thousands of voters who read no newspapers regularly, whose circumstances and associations are such that they have little opportunity to read or hear any informing discussion, and who come to the polls with but the haziest notions as to what the election is all about.” Haynes, George, “The Education of Voters,” Political Science Quarterly 22:3 (1907): 484–497, 485CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Indeed, while the Colorado electorate summarily rejected both public utility measures in 1912, a county-level analysis of the two votes reveals that voters in the state's sixty-two counties did not vote at the aggregate level as consistently on the two measures as might be expected. Notwithstanding the possibility of committing an ecological fallacy, one might expect the county-level vote on the two measures to be inversely related. For example, voters in counties that broadly supported the DLL's Measure 13 would be expected not to support the utility companies' sham initiative, Measure 4. Yet the bivariate Pearson product moment correlation between the percentage of the county “yes” vote for both measures is positively related (r= .600) and significant (p<.01, 2-tailed, n = 62), indicating that there may have been considerable voter confusion about the two initiatives. Despite serious concerns about voter competence during the Progressive Era, political scientists today generally concur that voters are capable “of meeting minimal requirements for decision making in direct-democracy elections.” Bowler and Donovan, Demanding Choices, 20. See also Arthur Lupia, “Dumber than Chimps? An Assessment of Direct Democracy Voters,” in Sabato, Ernst, and Larson, eds., Dangerous Democracy? The Battle Over Ballot Initiatives in America; Lupia, Arthur, “Shortcuts versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in California Insurance Reform Elections,” American Political Science Review 88 (1994): 63–76CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

56. Only 94,485 voters (out of the more than 263,000 who voted for President) cast ballots on Measure 13, and just 79,354 voted on Measure 4; in contrast, 192,651 voters cast ballots on Measure 1—which received the highest tally of any ballot measure—calling for statewide prohibition. Colorado Secretary of State, State of Colorado: Roster of Elected Officers and Tabulated Statement of the Votes Cast for the Several Candidates, 1913Google Scholar. For the keen interest of voters regarding prohibition measures in other states during the Progressive Era, see Shippee, Lester, “Washington's First Experiment in Direct Legislation,” Political Science Quarterly 30 (1915), 235–253CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Barnett, , The Operation of the Initiative, Referendum, and Recall in Oregon, 1915Google Scholar; Allswang, The Initiative and Referendum in California, 1898–1998; Beard, and Shultz, , Documents on the State-wide Initiative, Referendum and Recall, 1912Google Scholar.

57. Burris's bill was opposed by the public utility corporations. Corporate opposition to the law was evidenced by the three popular referendum petitions that were circulated immediately following the bill's passage. Of the three popular referendums, two (Measure 9 and Measure 13) were successfully placed on the 1914 ballot. Measure 9 sought to excise two sections from the 1913 law, while Measure 13 sought to repeal three sections, effectively repealing the entire law. On the actual 1914 ballot, however, only the proposed sections of the law to be repealed were listed. Voters had no way of knowing, from their ballot, what those sections contained. See the sample ballot published in the Denver Post, 2 November 1914.

58. Like Shafroth, Ammons switched party allegiances in 1896, joining the Democratic party after serving in the state legislature as a Republican during the early 1890s. In addition to strengthening the regulation of the public utilities commission, Ammons continued Shafroth's progressive vision by creating new public institutions of higher education, bolstering civil service requirements, establishing a more equitable tax system, and expanding public highways and state parks. Ammons's administration was blemished, however, by his handling of the September 1913 strike by coal miners around Trinidad and the subsequent “Ludlow Massacre” in April 1914 carried out by the Colorado state militia after the mine owners convinced Ammons to send in the National Guard to keep the mines in operation. See Gitelman, Howard, Legacy of the Ludlow Massacre: A Chapter in American Industrial Relations (Philadelphia, 1988)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Colorado State Archives, “The Governor Elias M. Ammons Collection at the Colorado State Archives.” <www.archives.state.co.us/govs/eammons.html>.

59. See Dubofsky, Melvyn, We Shall Be All: A History of the Industrial Workers of the World (Chicago, 1969)Google Scholar; Foner, Philip, History of the Labor Movement in the United States, vol. 4 (New York, 1965)Google Scholar; Wiebe, Robert, The Search for Order, 1877–1920 (New York, 1967)Google Scholar; Brody, David, ed., The American Labor Movement (New York, 1971)Google Scholar; Hanford, Benjamin, The Labor War in Colorado (New York, 1904)Google Scholar.

60. Walter Wellman, “Walter Wellman's Indictment of Moyer, Haywood and the Western Federation of Miners,” unpublished manuscript, Denver Public Library, Western History and Genealogy, 1910, 10.

61. Originally, Hurd's bill was set to include all underground workers, but as Knight points out, “Colorado Fuel & Iron and the smelter lobby were able to restrict it to miners and smelters. In effect, the law only covered one-fifth of all underground workers. See Knight, Harold, Working in Colorado: A Brief History of the Colorado Labor Movement (Boulder, 1971), 49Google Scholar.

62. Lonsdale, “The Movement for an Eight-Hour Law in Colorado,” 271.

63. Miners' Magazine, vol. 12, no. 487, 24 10 1912, 3Google Scholar.

64. Denver Post, 2 August 1911; Rocky Mountain News, 2 August 1911.

65. Schnader, W. A., “Proper Safeguards for the Initiative and Referendum,” American Political Science Review 10 (1916): 515–531, 519CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

66. As Lonsdale writes: “The Federation obtained affidavits from many whose names appeared on the petition stating that they had never seen the petition. These affidavits were given to the Secretary of State.” Lonsdale, “The Movement for an Eight-Hour Law in Colorado,” 274.

67. Again, the only way for a voter to know these details would be to look at a supplement, such as the one published by the Colorado Bar. See Colorado Bar Association, Analysis of Thirty-Two Measures, 66.

68. Western Federation of Miners, Official Proceedings of the Annual Convention of the Western Federation of Miners of America, August 2, 1910–July 29, 1916 (Denver, 1916), 409Google Scholar. The indictment of the Guggenheims alongside Rockefeller's C.F. & I was not surprising. The Guggenheim family operated the American Smelting and Refining Company (ASARCO) in Pueblo as well as several large mines in Colorado. See Lomask, Milton, Seed Money: The Guggenheim Story (New York, 1964)Google Scholar.

69. Colorado Bar Association, Analysis of Thirty-Two Measures, 66; “The Eight-Hour Laws.” Rocky Mountain News, 24 10 1912Google Scholar.

70. The adoption of the two counterpropositions that so patently conflicted with each other indicates that voters may not have understood the substantive implications of the initiative and popular referendum. The ballot titles did little to clarify the intent of the two measures. (At the time in Colorado, the sponsors of initiatives and popular referendums—and not a state agency—composed the ballot title and actual text of the measures.) The ballot title of Measure 19 stated: “AN ACT TO REGULATE AND LIMIT THE HOURS OF EMPLOYMENT IN UNDERGROUND MINES, SMELTERS, MILLS AND COKE OVENS; TO DECLARE CERTAIN EMPLOYMENT INJURIOUS TO THE HEALTH AND DANGEROUS TO LIFE AND LIMB.” Even more cryptically, the popular referendum, Measure 21, read: HOUSE BILL NO. 46, LAWS 1911, EIGHT HOUR LAW FOR MINERS. How voters on election day interpreted the intent of these measures, much less understood what a “yes” or “no” vote meant on the aforesaid popular referendum, is impossible to determine. An examination of the county-level votes on the two measures is perhaps indicative of the confusion many voters had in determining what their vote actually meant. Again, one might expect the county-level vote on the two measures to be inversely related, as a “yes” vote on the initiative, which would reinstate the language of the 1905 legislation, would have the same effect as voting “no” on the popular referendum. Yet the bivariate Pearson product moment correlation between the percentage of the county “yes” vote for both measures is positively related (r = .474) and significant (p < .01, 2-tailed, n = 62), indicating again, as in the case of the competing regulation of public utilities measures, that there may have been considerable voter confusion. Finally, it should be noted that the occasional adoption of conflicting ballot measures occurred in other states. In Oregon, for instance, voters approved two initiatives in June 1908, which were placed on the ballot by upstream and downstream fisherman, that effectively eradicated the other's right to fish for salmon on the Columbia River. At the time, the adoption by voters of these two competing measures was interpreted alternatively as both an irrational and a rational decision. For a discussion of the debate over salmon fishing in Oregon, see Bowler and Donovan, Demanding Choices, 118–28.

71. The court's exact language on this matter is as follows: “It provides that the power reserved designated the ‘referendum,’ ‘may be ordered, except as to laws necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety.’” Colorado Senate, 1913. In Re Senate Resolution, No. 4. 54 Colo. 262 (Denver, 1913)Google Scholar.

72. The evidence is mixed that public policies come closer to citizen preferences in initiative states than in noninitiative states. See Matsusaka, John, “Fiscal Effects of the Voter Initiative: Evidence from the Last 30 Years,” Journal of Political Economy 103 (1995): 587–623CrossRefGoogle Scholar; idem, “Problems with a Methodology Used to Evaluate the Voter Initiative,” Journal of Politics 63 (2001): 1250–56; Gerber, Elisabeth, “Legislative Response to the Threat of Popular Initiatives,” American Journal of Political Science 40 (1996): 99–128CrossRefGoogle Scholar; but see Lascher, Edward, Hagen, Michael, and Rochlin, Steven, “Gun Behind the Door? Ballot Initiatives, State Policies, and Public Opinion,” Journal of Politics 58 (1996): 760–775CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Camobreco, John, “Preferences, Fiscal Policies, and the Initiative Process,” Journal of Politics 60 (1998): 819–829CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hagen, Michael, Lascher, Edward, and Camobreco, John, “Response to Matsusaka: Estimating the Effect of Ballot Initiatives on Policy Responsiveness,” Journal of Politics 63 (2001): 1257–1263CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Irrespective of whether public policy in states permitting the initiative is more consistent with the median voter than in noninitiative states, individual legislators in initiative states seem to interpret initiative results from a rational, selfish perspective, which includes noting how their own constituents voted on ballot measures. See Smith, Daniel A., “Homeward Bound? Micro-Level Legislative Responsiveness to Ballot Initiatives,” State Politics and Policy Quarterly 1 (2001): 50–61CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

73. Ellis, Democratic Delusions, 203.

74. Western Federation of Miners, Official Proceedings, 409–10.

75. Hofstadter, Richard, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R. (New York, 1955), 261Google Scholar.

76. McCuan, David, “California's Political Warriors: Campaign Professionals and the Initiative Process,” in Bowler, Shaun, Donovan, Todd, and Tolbert, Caroline, eds., Citizens as Legislators (Columbus, Ohio, 1998), 55–56Google Scholar.