Introduction
It may come as a surprise to many in the West, and equally within the Arab region, that the peoples of the Arabian Gulf organised mass mobilisation movements in the late 1940s and 1950s against British rule. These movements had the aim of securing a broad range of constitutional freedoms. At that time social movements were scarce, including in Europe. In the Western popular imagination, the Gulf is often portrayed as a monolithic and historically static region, in which vast oil and gas reserves have forged a specific social contract with ruling elites − one that foregrounds extensive economic rights at the expense of constitutional claims in respect of political rights. By extension, it is often unthinkable that people in the region may have ever coalesced against oppressive rule or that the current constitutional arrangements of these sheikhdoms could have emerged as the direct result of such struggle. Indeed, despite the monarchical structure of modern Gulf states, this article shows that the political philosophy of Arab nationalism was the driving force underlying mass mobilisation in the Gulf. This not only culminated in independence from British colonial rule, but also the forging of constitutional claims, some of which found recognition in the newly independent sheikdoms, kingdoms and emirates. These claims are increasingly echoed in modern times in the form of amendments in national constitutions, such as that of Qatar in 2024 and recent constitutional developments in Kuwait.Footnote 1
As a political ideology, Arab nationalism was certainly not a newcomer to Arab struggles to achieve independence, self-determination and unity among Arab peoples.Footnote 2 Arab nationalism is hardly a unitary ideology. It developed through a series of modifications from a nascent and very much anti-Ottoman notion in the late nineteenth century to its heyday in the 1950s, including its application by the Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser (1954−1970).Footnote 3 In fact, had it not been for Nasser, Arab nationalism might have remained a popular narrative with no practical application. Nasser is generally credited with putting the ideals of Arab nationalism into practice through the nationalisation of the Suez Canal in 1956, which was then under British and French control. Nasser did not hesitate to link the nationalisation of the Suez Canal to the colonial humiliation suffered by the Egyptian people.Footnote 4 In an unparalleled move for a developing country at that time, Nasser broke ranks with the powerful Western alliance and forged military and financial ties with the Eastern, Communist bloc of states, while still remaining part of the capitalist global domain. He further opposed the so-called Baghdad Pact as an imperial device.Footnote 5 Given the long oppression of Arabs, whether in the Gulf or North Africa, these political manoeuvres were met with significant enthusiasm. This marked the first time that an Arab leader had stood firmly on behalf of ordinary Arabs while openly challenging the colonial rule of France and Britain.Footnote 6 As a result, Nasser was famously depicted by the masses as embodying the very core of Arab nationalism.Footnote 7
The greatest endeavour underlying the pursuit of Arab nationalism had always been the unification of the Arab world under a single entity. Nationhood is no easy matter, but Nasser somehow managed to carve a new state entity by fusing Syria and Egypt, ultimately creating the United Arab Republic (UAR) in 1958. Although this entity was swiftly broken up into discrete parts, revealing the complexities of pan-Arab unity, it marked the climax of Arab nationalist ambition and offered a paradigmatic (if imperfect) model of how pan-Arab union could operate, and provided the necessary impetus for self-determination struggles in other parts of the Middle East. Chief among these was the ousting of the British-controlled monarch of Iraq, which by the late 1950s had become a major source of crude oil, by Abdul Kareem Qasim, who advocated Arab nationalist ideas and was quick to hail the spirit of Nasserite politics.Footnote 8 The sweeping tide of Nasserite ideals and the spread of Arab nationalism certainly ignited more than just a spark in several Gulf territories, particularly Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, and the Trucial States (now United Arab Emirates (UAE).Footnote 9 Local Arab populations began to believe that self-determination was within their grasp, which in turn gave rise to a new set of institutions seeking independence from the British on the basis of the ideology propagated by Nasser. Their end game was not always apparent, albeit self-determination was viewed as a way of pan-Arab unity, irrespective of the eventual constitutional order that might emerge.
One of the challenges was determining the practical form that resistance should take. There was nothing equivalent to a local parliament, or a Shura Council, in which local populations could express their collective views. All matters were decided by Westminster on behalf of the local population. It is no wonder that a large number of entities, in the form of literary and cultural organisations (as well as sports clubs) were set up in the 1950s in order to advance political demands predicated on Arab nationalism. No doubt, these entities could not outwardly exhibit their true aims.Footnote 10 Unlike the guarantees of democracy, the rule of law and freedom of expression in the British mainland, none of these civil liberties were available to the local population in the Arabian GulfFootnote 11 − a practice typical of colonial powers in Asia and Africa.
This article is organised as follows. It first examines the process towards purposeful alliances, subjugation and later self-determination of the Arab territories in the Gulf. It then explores the political and ideological contribution of Arab nationalism, on the basis of which a pan-Arabist political conscience was nurtured in the Gulf. This is followed by an examination of the rise of social movements in Qatar and similar movements in Bahrain. The article then analyses the Kuwaiti experience and its embrace of the so-called Cairo Charter before taking a brief look at the limited existence of social movements in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. While references to the UAE are scattered throughout the paper, there is no section specifically devoted to developments there.
Gulf territories and their progress towards purposeful self-determination
Britain did not invade the Gulf territories directly. Its policy in the Middle East was calculated and patient. It consistently conveyed to local rulers that its presence was not intended to be permanent, while strategically taking advantage of Arab animosity toward Ottoman rule. Although they were sharing the same religion, the Ottomans had managed to alienate Gulf Arabs, resulting in long-standing resistance. This resistance differed across regions, while the Ottomans fought to protect Libya from Italian invasion, their governance of other Arab territories was frequently perceived as oppressive, fuelling the struggle for independence against Ottoman rule and hegemony.Footnote 12 Britain seized the opportunity and created alliances with Arabs, who effectively supplied their own military forces to fight British wars against the Ottomans. These alliances were naturally followed by a number of discreet and politically meticulous maritime defence treaties, collectively known as the Maritime Truce, entered into with the rulers of the Trucial States in 1835, Bahrain in 1861, Kuwait in 1899 (de facto), and Qatar in 1916.Footnote 13 Local rulers had little option but to consent to these agreements under the assumption that they would free them from Ottoman interference, and that, at some point, the British would grant them independence.Footnote 14 In addition, the Gulf rulers signed further treaties with the British Governments of Bombay and India, including the so-called Exclusive Agreements, binding them into exclusive treaty relations with, and ceding control of their external affairs to, the British Crown. These agreements were signed by the Ruler of Bahrain in 1880 and 1892, the Rulers of the Trucial States in 1888 and 1892, the Ruler of Kuwait in 1899, the Saudi Ruler of Najd and Hasa in 1915 (annulled in 1927),Footnote 15 and finally the Ruler of Qatar in 1916.Footnote 16 This was a peculiar arrangement, which entailed that while the kingdoms’ rulers retained their (hereditary) status as heads of state, they were part of the constitutional arrangements (as protected overseas territories) of both the British Indian Empire and the Crown itself.Footnote 17
Before the Gulf entities gained statehood in the early 1970s, there existed a tapestry of sheikhdoms. While Saudi Arabia was the most politically coherent and unified among all these – and hence gained independence relatively early – all other entities remained under British rule well until the late 1960s and early 1970s. Having originally served as maritime outposts for the British, the discovery of oil in Iran (1908), Bahrain (1932), Kuwait (1938), Qatar (1940), Abu Dhabi (1958), and Oman (1964), altered the British perception of the utility of the Gulf. These territories quickly became a prized possession that was not to be given any sort of independence without something in return. Britain also reinforced its military position in the Gulf. In equal measure, the British created a (general concession) treaty that included all the Gulf regions, which allowed them, in addition to security arrangements, to retain a sovereign presence in the Gulf for a period of one hundred and fifty years.Footnote 18 General sentiment in the Gulf regions was against these agreements, but there was a clear understanding that the British were prepared to use force to establish a firm presence in the Gulf.
Going a few years back, in 1916, the ruler of Qatar, Sheikh Abdullah bin Jassim Al Thani, signed a protection treaty with Britain that initially included eleven clauses. However, in order to safeguard the sovereignty of the state, Sheikh Abdullah rejected three clauses put forward by the British, namely: the seventh clause that allowed British nationals to compete with the local population in pearl trade; the eighth clause that provided for the appointment of a British resident commissioner in Qatar; and finally, the ninth clause that allowed Britain to establish a post and telegraph office in the country. Sheikh Abdulla considered these clauses to threaten the sovereignty of the country, and so only eight of the original eleven clauses remained. This agreement was in place for a period of about twenty years, and in 1935 it was extended with a set of new provisions. The very fact that an agreement was negotiated and signed is evidence that the rulers of Qatar succeeded, at least in parts, to avert political subjugation by the British. The road to complete independence was a short distance away in 1971. This was a victory for Arab nationalism because the various agreements with Britain prevented the placement of Gulf territories under the League of Nations mandate system, whose outcome was uncertain as the Palestine situation demonstrated.Footnote 19 These protectorate agreements, unlike the secret agreements between the Great Powers that emerged from World War I, allowed the Gulf states to remain well clear from the perils of colonialism in the early part of the twentieth century and prevented them from becoming the subject of a global bargain between the colonial powers.Footnote 20
The contribution of Arab nationalism to social movements resisting foreign hegemony in the Gulf
While Britain was plotting to cement its power base in the Gulf and capitalise on the oil wealth there, it could not have been oblivious to the rising fever associated with the rise of Arab nationalism. Nasser was already hugely popular throughout the Arab world, and it would be only a matter of time until there was a general revolt in the Gulf. Britain attempted to create a new regional alliance in the Arabian Gulf by making Gulf sheikhdoms partners to the Baghdad Pact, but this initiative was doomed to fail because independence, as it turned out, was not far away.Footnote 21 Radio, and particularly Egypt’s Voice of Arabs, was a potent tool that warned Arabs of the perils of the Baghdad Pact. The huge impact of this Egyptian radio programme in the Arab world was recognised by the British colonial forces from the very beginning, as evidenced by a British agent stationed in Kuwait, who wrote in 1935 that
The new method [i.e., radio] of receiving the news of the world in Arabic, with Egyptian comments thrown in, is not only significant but contains very great possibilities for both good and harm. Let us hope that the Egyptian broadcasting service is under proper control.Footnote 22
Therefore, it was no surprise that the British colonial powers sought to stifle Arab media and curtailed the right to freedom of expression as a means of clinging on to their treasured possessions.Footnote 23 A 1958 report by the Joint Intelligence Committee acknowledged that Egyptian radio broadcasts had adversely impacted British interests, noting their role in influencing every major crisis in recent years.Footnote 24 The Voice of Arabs had already managed to enter most Arab homes. In Oman, by way of illustration, it played a defining role in the country’s struggle for independence and self-determination.Footnote 25 The same is true of the entire Middle East.Footnote 26
In 1958, Sheikh Abdullah Al-Sabah demanded that Kuwait join the Arab League, but the response was negative because the British feared this would turn out to be the first step towards pan-Arab domination in the Arab world.Footnote 27 No doubt, when news of this rejection reached the Arab public, hostility towards the British became even higher.Footnote 28 The British rightly feared that the rising popularity of Arabism had culminated in a popular and robust desire for a sovereign united Arab state. Reports at the time suggested that Iraq would be the first to depart from British influence and control.Footnote 29 Indeed, the Iraqi revolution of 1958 is considered the peak of Arab nationalism.Footnote 30 According to Dawisha, Arabs at that time believed that all the enemies of Arab nationalism were defeated.Footnote 31 The period following Abdulkareem Qasim’s toppling of the pro-Western King in Iraq marked the zenith of Arab nationalism’s ascent.Footnote 32 Following the Iraqi revolution, the ecstatic and energised masses adamantly believed that they had witnessed the final and humiliating defeat of those they considered enemies of Arab nationalism.Footnote 33 With the 1958 revolution, the Iraqi authorities announced the establishment of the republic and the formation of a Sovereignty Council exercising presidential powers.Footnote 34 It is with the Sovereignty Council’s approval that the Council of Ministers was to assume legislative authority.Footnote 35
Iraq underwent a series of coups d’état, but this was the most significant, culminating in the cementing of Arab nationalism and anti-colonialism. In the new interim constitution, article 1 stated that the Iraqi state was an independent republic with full sovereignty. Article 2 declared Iraq as part of the Arab nation.Footnote 36 This is a significant transformation to the advantage of Arab nationalists, as the constitution that preceded it, the 1925 Iraqi constitution, did not mention Arab or Arabism except in article 17, which stipulated that ‘Arabic is the official language, except for what is stipulated by a special law.’Footnote 37
By laying the groundwork for Arab nationalism, Egypt had become the flag bearer of ideological nationalism in the Gulf.Footnote 38 It went on to speak on behalf of all Arabs.Footnote 39 Through the important role played by Nasser in African and Asian organisations as well as in the Non-Aligned Movement forum, the Gulf cause had gained wide support.Footnote 40 Asian, African and the non-aligned countries declared their support to the Gulf countries in the United Nations and other international organisations.Footnote 41 Egypt was also able to achieve the support of public opinion in the continents of Asia and Africa through a series of public conferences.Footnote 42 The Asian-African Peoples Solidarity Conference on 27 December 1957 in Cairo affirmed the right of Gulf states to obtain independence, and denounced acts of oppression and brutality committed by the British occupation forces against the national movements in the Gulf emirates.Footnote 43
A month after this conference, the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization (AAPSO), a non-governmental pluralist and democratic alliance, was formed.Footnote 44 According to article 2(1) of its Constitution, AAPSO fully adhered to the principles of the Non-Aligned Movement and the UN Charter. The first and sixth paragraphs of article 2 highlighted the rights of the people that AAPSO defended. The first paragraph stipulated that the objective of the organisation was:
to unite, consolidate and accelerate actions of solidarity with the struggle against all forms of aggression, racism, and to provide all-out moral, political and material support to the protection of freedom, and national independence.
Article 6(2)(b) of the AAPSO Constitution set forth yet another objective, namely:
to propagate the Charter of Universal Declaration of Human Rights including implementation of all the statutes, conventions, treaties and covenants passed and accepted by the United Nations Organization over the years.
In addition to these international organisations, Nasser continued supporting the Gulf under the banner of Arabism through regional organisations. Bahrain, as a small island vulnerable to foreign attacks, received the attention of Nasser slightly more than its neighbours. In 1954, through the Arab League, Egypt rebutted Persian (now Iranian) claims that Bahrain was part of its territory, and that the landing of aircrafts at Bahrain’s airport was not permitted without prior permission from Iran. Through the declarations of its foreign minister, Nasser’s government asserted Bahrain’s Arabism and rejected all Persian allegations that Bahrain was subservient to Persia.Footnote 45 This political intervention allowed Bahrain to showcase its own foreign affairs concerns in international forums.
Egypt further adopted the cause of the Gulf and the people of Bahrain at the national level.Footnote 46 The Egyptian government presented the Gulf cause to Arab summit conferences, and demanded the need for joint Arab action to develop these countries and resist British ambitions in the region.Footnote 47 A treaty signed in May 1966 by the British government and the Bahraini Minister of Finance, Sheikh Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa, caused unrest among Arab nationalists.Footnote 48 The treaty allowed for the expansion of Britain’s military bases, and granted British soldiers the right of residence along with judicial and customs privileges.Footnote 49 All this was in return for an increase in financial subsidies provided by the British government to Bahrain.Footnote 50 Egypt firmly opposed the continuation of colonial policy in Bahrain.Footnote 51 It launched its campaign against Bahrain’s rogue rulers on the basis that they were acting against the people’s desires and national aspirations.Footnote 52 Egypt requested Arab countries to quickly provide aid and financial and technical assistance to these countries to meet their Arab nationalist goals.Footnote 53 This financial and technical aid was specifically focused on the Trucial States and Oman due to their relative progressiveness. Egypt believed that these two countries required effective aid from their Arab brethren.Footnote 54 Nasser believed that they were in need of doctors, engineers and teachers, and that if they were left alone, they would have to accept the help of Britain and perhaps Iran. He saw that the foreign immigration that would ensue as a result would threaten Arab identity of the region.Footnote 55 Therefore, Nasser initiated a project in December 1964 to send a delegation of Egyptian and Arab experts to develop a joint Arab plan to support and develop the Trucial States and Oman and preserve their Arab identity.Footnote 56 The delegates of the mission reported from their trip that the two countries were in need of cultural, medical and social support from Arab countries.Footnote 57
Another factor that played a role in promulgating Nasserist Arab nationalism among the people in the Gulf was Kuwait’s Arabist-oriented education system. This was facilitated by the relatively liberal and progressive conditions in Kuwait compared to other Gulf countries, as explained in more detail in the section dealing with Kuwait below. Many civil society organisations, such as schools, charities, and political and cultural organisations, received financial assistance from Kuwait’s Educational Department.Footnote 58 The Department’s foreign aid was connected to its increasing participation in the Arab world starting in 1950. This allowed the Kuwaiti Department of Foreign Aid to develop its regional networks while fostering inter-Arab collaboration in areas including education, culture, social work, and sports.Footnote 59 By 1958, Kuwait started to organise these regional gatherings on its own.Footnote 60
Between the start of Kuwait’s scholarship programme in 1953 and the year of the nation’s independence in 1961, the Kuwaiti Education Department was heavily influenced by Arab nationalism.Footnote 61 Talal Al-Rashoud contends that Kuwait’s ‘Arab Scholarships’, which were inspired by pan-Arab ideas, also benefited from social networks connecting Kuwaiti educators and authorities to nationalist activists across the region.Footnote 62 Along with other governments, the Department also provided scholarships to a number of anti-colonial political organisations. By expanding into new endeavours, these groups were able to capitalise on the presence of their student missions in the affluent and rather liberal Gulf states.
Another post-World War II anti-colonial instrument that arose in the context of Arab nationalism was the Charter of Arab Cultural Unity of 1964.Footnote 63 According to the constitution of the organisation, Arab states agreed to the Charter of Arab Cultural Unity in response to the feeling of natural unity among the sons of the Arab nation and the belief that the unity of thought and culture was the mainstay on which Arab unity was based.Footnote 64 It was also ratified as a follow-up to the achievements of the adoption of the Charter of the Arab League.Footnote 65 Another purpose of the ratification of this Charter was the deposition of colonialism, as the Charter states
this is a proud gesture of the accession of parts of the Arab world to the League of Arab States after the liberation of these parts from the bondage of colonialism and we are looking forward to the Arabs regaining their sacred usurped lands and completing their freedom in all parts of their homeland.Footnote 66
A further purpose of the Charter was to enhance cooperation in the fields of education and culture.Footnote 67 For Arab society, this cooperation culminated in guaranteeing human rights to education, freedom, dignity and well-being.Footnote 68 As for Arab nationalism, this cooperation led to ‘accentuating the Arab personality in the global sphere and its ability to stand up to the global forces of evil represented by colonialism and Zionism’Footnote 69, which defined the goals of Arab nationalism. Article 1 of the Charter explicitly stated that the goal of education was to raise a conscious and enlightened Arab generation that understood its national and humanitarian purpose. Education would enable the right of Arab society to freedom, security and a decent life.Footnote 70 The Charter’s constitution suggested that freedom from colonialism led to security and decent life.Footnote 71
The following sections explore the formation of these social movements, in whatever manifestation they appeared, starting with Qatar, which is otherwise viewed as the sleepy backdrop of the Arabian Gulf.
Social movements in Qatar
The reason why the Gulf governments tolerated nationalist activities to a certain extent is due to the sheer difficulty of sustaining the rising popularity of Arab nationalism. This popularity was evident in all Gulf countries, as Gulf societies experienced multiple demonstrations in support of the Arab nationalist tide during the 1950s and 1960s. For instance, several Gulf societies, such as Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar, witnessed public demonstrations in support of the Egyptian president and Arab nationalist leader Gamal Abdul Nasser during the 1956 Suez Crisis.
This popularity, along with the illegality of what it effectively promoted, led to the creation of cultural groups with a political hue. In Qatar, the cultural arena was a lively and vibrant place for Nasserists to operate. Many young people established sports clubs and gave them revolutionary names in line with what Abdel Nasser was proposing, such as the Al-Ahrar (free people) and Tahrir (freedom), Al-Jumhuriya (republic), Al-Uruba (Arabism), Al-Wahda (Unity), Al-Kifah (Struggle), Al-Nasr (victory) and others. All these names were a clear reflection of Arab nationalist fervent and adoration for Nasserite ideology.
In addition to these sports clubs, a number of literary clubs were established in the same period, which served to convey the nationalist values that swept Qataris at the time. Two names were pioneers in establishing literary clubs in Qatar: Abdulla Hussein Al-Naema and Ali Khalifa Al-Kuwari. Both Al-Naema and Al-Kuwari studied together in Cairo during Nasser’s tenure.Footnote 72 In Qatar, Al-Naema established the Islamic Library Club in 1953, which included a number of fervent young Qataris influenced by Nasser’s revolution in Egypt. This club did not last long, as it was shut down by the Qatari and British authorities only a year later.Footnote 73
As for Al-Kuwari, he established the Al-Talia (Vanguard) Club in 1959. Most of its members were Nasserists and focused on perpetuating their ideology among the Qatari youth. According to Al-Kuwari, the activities of the club can be categorised in a threefold way: cultural (members issued articles and gave lectures on the Arab struggles), theatrical (they also performed theatrical plays that raised national and social issues) and excursions to all parts of Qatar.Footnote 74 Just like Al-Naema’s Islamic Library Club, Al-Kuwari’s Al-Talia was raided by authorities and shut down in 1961. British and Qatari police forces entered the club by force, broke its furniture and arrested its members for a period of twenty-one days. Al-Kuwari and another Al-Talia member formally requested from the deputy ruler Sheikh Khalifa to reopen the club, but the request was rejected.Footnote 75 The government kept an eye on these clubs and severely opposed them whenever their Nasserist activities increased. The authorities were aware of the implications and long-term effects of the ideas that were spread through these clubs, even if they did not present themselves as an overt political group.
While most Gulf countries established cultural groups expressing Arab nationalist principles, the local governments allowed their operations only to a certain degree. When these cultural manifestations of Arab nationalism turned into mass protests, they were quelled. This was the case in Qatar. According to Ibrahim Shahdad, a history professor at Qatar University, one of the main factors that played a role in the popular uprisings in Qatar in the 1950s and 1960 were the ideas of Arab nationalism sponsored by Nasser.Footnote 76 Nasserism bears an anti-colonialist revolutionary character, and at the same time, encourages Arabs to oppose the ‘oppressive’ regimes they are subjected to. Qataris were influenced by Nasserism to the extent that in 1956, they filled the streets of Doha in protest against the various policies followed by the government. Among this Arab nationalist spirit, Qatari protesters waved Egyptian flags and chanted anti-British slogans.Footnote 77 However, the most popular series of protests and subsequent government repressions in Qatar would take place in 1963.
1963 was a milestone in the history of Arab nationalism. In February, the fall of the Abdul Karim Qasim regime in Iraq by Baathist and pan-Arab officers ignited celebrations across the Arab world, and Qatar was no exception. Jubilant expatriates and nationals took to the streets to celebrate and express their support for the regime change in Iraq. Although Arab nationalists, including those in Qatar, initially had high hopes for Qasim after overthrowing the pro-Western monarchy in 1958, over time he distanced himself from the Arab nationalist movement. Instead, he pursued an isolationist, Iraq-first policy. He cracked down on Baathists and Nasserists and aligned himself with Iraq’s Communist Party, whereupon he frustrated those who had once seen him as a champion of Arab unity. By 1963, his growing detachment from the Arab nationalist cause made his downfall at the hands of Baathist officers a major victory for the movement, igniting celebrations across the Arab masses, including those in Qatar. The Baathists, who rallied around the slogans ‘Ummah Arabiyya Wahida That Risala Khalida’ (‘One Arab Nation with an Eternal Message’), promised to steer Iraq back toward Arab nationalist goals. Just two months later, their commitment to unity was put into action through negotiations with Egypt and Syria for a potential union, reinforcing the belief that Qasim’s removal was a necessary step toward a stronger, more unified Arab world.
The 1963 Unity Talks with Syria and Egypt culminated in a similar pattern of mass demonstrations and celebrations among Qataris.Footnote 78 Britain’s growing concerns over Arab nationalism and Nasserist influence in Qatar were evident in a confidential annex to Qatar Diary No. 2 of 1963, prepared by the British Political Agency in Doha. The report noted that protesters openly chanted slogans in support of Nasser and Arab unity, which British officials saw as a clear sign that the nationalist sentiment from Cairo had begun to take root in Qatar.Footnote 79
During the mass demonstrations and celebrations among Qataris, a dispute between a member of the ruling family and the demonstrators broke out an hour after the Arab nationalist demonstration was due to begin, resulting in several serious injuries. This changed the course of events from celebrations to a popular uprising.Footnote 80 A pan-Arab organisation called the Qatar National Unity Front was instantly formed, and its members prepared a reform-demanding petition signed by thousands of Qataris.
The petition was presented to the government and demanded the eradication of royal privilege,Footnote 81 the Arabisation of labour, the legalisation of trade unions and the creation of municipal councils composed of elected members. They also pushed for more transparency and accountability in the state’s financial matters as well as greater political participation for the general public. As a response, the Qatari government, with the advice of British authorities, crushed the protest by arresting the dissidents and forcing them to migrate to Kuwait, Egypt, and Lebanon. In addition, Arab teachers who spread revolutionary Arab nationalist ideas were deported.
As the unrest escalated in April 1963, British officials in London and their representatives in the Gulf exchanged telegrams discussing how to manage the situation in Qatar. A Foreign Office cable dated 21 April 1963, which was sent just a day after demonstrators were shot in Doha, reveals Britain’s direct role in coordinating the suppression of the protests.Footnote 82 To contain the situation, British officials advised the Ruler of Qatar to issue a public statement prohibiting further demonstrations while also promising to investigate and hold accountable the royal family members responsible for firing at protesters.Footnote 83 This was a crucial step taken by British colonial forces to maintain their rule and interests in the region.
The Qatari government issued a statement of reform that is widely believed to be a measure of ‘extinguishing the flames’ of Arab nationalism.Footnote 84 The statement stipulated that: ‘The time has come to begin the organizational steps for a comprehensive work plan to establish the foundation of that noble society − a society of justice, equality, order, and production.’Footnote 85
While administrative and economic reforms were indeed implemented, the statement responded to some of the demands indirectly without mentioning the petition and promised reform. For instance, a municipal council was established as a response to demand number fifteen on the petition, which asked for ‘the election of a municipal council representing all segments of society’.Footnote 86 However, the council was ultimately extremely ineffective and fruitless.
Despite these announcements, the Qatari authorities continued to repress dissidents, in line with the advice of British colonial forces.Footnote 87 Five Qataris studying in Cairo (who signed a student statement supporting the Qatari National Unity Front) were dismissed from their scholarships and ultimately lost their opportunity to study.Footnote 88 This move was part of a broader effort to suppress anti-colonial nationalist ideologies and eliminate their influence.Footnote 89 Throughout Nasser’s tenure, no overt protests like this would occur again in Qatar.
The case of Qatar is emblematic of a civil rights movement within a British protectorate in the Arabian Gulf. Although these movements were suppressed, they left a lasting imprint on Qatar, shaping an enduring commitment to Arab solidarity and self-determination that later influenced its foreign policy. Over time, Qatar absorbed this legacy and positioned itself as a mediator in regional disputes, working to bridge internal Arab divisions and prevent wider conflicts.Footnote 90 Palestine, long at the heart of Arab nationalist ideology and a symbol of resistance to foreign domination, has remained central to Qatari diplomatic efforts. This was evident in the 2012 Doha Agreement, where Qatar played a key role in brokering reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas to form a unity government. A similar approach emerged in 2008, when Qatar mediated the Doha Accord, a power-sharing agreement that resolved Lebanon’s eighteenth-month political crisis and prevented an escalation into civil war. These diplomatic efforts have continued into 2024, further reinforcing Qatar’s status as an Arab mediator. In response to the 2023 Gaza war, Qatar facilitated indirect negotiations between Hamas and Israel, securing temporary ceasefires, coordinating humanitarian corridors, and negotiating prisoner exchanges.Footnote 91 At the same time, Qatar has been engaged in Lebanon’s ongoing political deadlock, attempting to mediate between Hezbollah-aligned and opposition factions to prevent further destabilisation. These initiatives reflect the enduring influence of Arab nationalist ideals on Qatar’s foreign policy, particularly the commitment to Palestinian liberation and intra-Arab unity. While the methods have shifted from revolutionary activism to diplomatic negotiation, the underlying principle remains unchanged: the belief in Arab agency, regional solidarity, and the responsibility to uphold the Palestinian cause.Footnote 92
The conditions for fostering social movements in Bahrain
Bahrain, in addition to Kuwait, has distinct economic and social structures from other Gulf states.Footnote 93 These structures allowed Bahrain and Kuwait to modernise earlier than their Gulf neighbours. Arab nationalist movements in Bahrain were more robust, and repression against them was less severe. Early modernisation in Bahrain and Kuwait was a turning point in the advancement of socio-political movements. The concomitants that came with modernisation, such as quality education and the rise of civil society, created greater political opposition, eventually rendering Arab nationalist organisations during Nasser’s tenure more robust. Quality education in Bahrain and Kuwait, as a result of modernisation, reinvigorated the social and political awareness of societies. The early discovery of oil gave governments the financial ability to develop education domestically, and to send its citizens to study abroad in more developed countries. Through education, students engaged with revolutionary ideas such as nationalism and anti-imperialism.
Therefore, it was primarily quality education that gave rise to civil society in Bahrain and Kuwait. As Steven Fish argues, if the resources of society are in the hands of just a few people (ie, the state), instead of other political movements, authoritarianism will naturally prevail.Footnote 94 Weaker civil society institutions in other Gulf countries hindered engagement with revolutionary ideas.Footnote 95 These other Gulf states had not yet benefited from the discovery of oil and gas, and with people living in relative poverty, they were unable to immerse themselves in any movement or respond to any political movements.Footnote 96 As a result of these factors, Bahrain and Kuwait have a longer history of mass mobilisation and political opposition. The long-standing political opposition created a more democratic society in these two countries.Footnote 97 Furthermore, the robustness of the opposition movements made it more difficult for the government to repress these.
Just like the Qataris, the Bahrainis opposed their government based on Arab nationalist principles. In 1954, the Bahraini Supreme Executive Committee was established. The Committee played an instrumental role in furthering the mass movement that took place in the political arena in Bahrain, which lasted for three years, after which the authorities were able to undermine this movement.Footnote 98 The Supreme Executive Committee consisted of one hundred members selected by Bahrainis.Footnote 99 The Committee took the form of an organised political party. It held its first meeting in 1954, when it conferred authority on certain leaders to submit national demands to the ruling authorities, namely Sheikh Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa and the British political resident.Footnote 100 These demands called for the establishment of a legislative council by election. The task of this council would be to promulgate and enforce laws, reform the courts, allow the creation of trade unions for workers, and end foreign migration to Bahrain.Footnote 101 Members of the National Movement also called for the equal sharing of profits from oil revenues.
As a result of the work the Committee put in, a number of nationalist organisations emerged in Bahrain. They were secret political organisations such as the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party and the Arab Nationalist Movement.Footnote 102 These organisations represented the main political opposition to the regime in Bahrain.Footnote 103 Another opposition group that existed in Bahrain since the late 1940s was the Sunni religious movement the ‘Muslim Brotherhood’.Footnote 104 However, this religious movement was weakened as a result of the emerging robust Arab nationalist movement, which would override all socio-political movements in the region.Footnote 105
The British authorities attempted to deactivate the national movement that led the popular uprisings in Bahrain.Footnote 106 They accused the national movement of igniting sectarianism among society, and made redundant the workers that supported the protesters.Footnote 107 The colonial authorities also took hold of Berber groups with the aim of terrorising nationalist figures.Footnote 108 All this was done out of fear of snowball effects. The possibility that the neighbouring Gulf societies would be motivated to emulate the Bahraini movement was high. The policy of violence and repression pursued by the British authorities in Bahrain led to the departure of some nationalist figures to neighbouring Arab countries. The same repressive pattern occurred two years later when Britain, France and Israel declared war on Egypt. The 1956 ‘Tripartite Aggression’Footnote 109 summoned Bahraini public opinion towards Arab nationalism. The opposition leadership played a pivotal role in shaping public opinion to confront the situation, most notably by issuing leaflet No. (78), which urged citizens to boycott British and French goods, refuse to load or unload ships from the two countries, and deny fuel to their aircraft.Footnote 110 The leaflet also called on Bahraini workers to withdraw from providing services to British colonial forces.Footnote 111 Bahrain’s national movement declared its condemnation and anger at the war, and demonstrations spread throughout the country.
As a response to the opposition by the Bahraini public, the British authorities thwarted Bahraini opposition movements and expelled some of the leading figures outside Bahrain. The expulsion of Bahraini opposition leaders in 1956 was a coordinated effort between local British colonial authorities and the British government in London. Although the initial crackdown on nationalist protests, triggered by the Suez Crisis, was carried out by the Ruler of Bahrain with British advisors on the ground, London was fully briefed and implicitly approved the suppression.Footnote 112 The British Government swiftly paved the way for the deportations by issuing Orders in Council on 19 December 1956,Footnote 113 before the Bahraini court had even delivered its verdict, which enabled the legal exile of key opposition figures to St. Helena.Footnote 114 The first Order applied the Colonial Prisoners Removal Act 1869 to Bahrain, which is ‘an Act for authorizing the Removal of Prisoners from one Colony to another for the purposes of Punishment’.Footnote 115 The second Order, officially known as the Prisoners Removal (Bahrain and St. Helena) Order 1956, was deemed as ‘urgently required’ to grant Bahrain’s ruler the power to transfer prisoners to St. Helena ‘if sentenced to imprisonment’.Footnote 116
Although British officials portrayed the expulsions as a decision made solely by Bahrain’s leadership, declassified Foreign Office records reveal that London not only approved the move but also provided legal justification and logistical assistance, including the deployment of a Royal Navy frigate to carry out the deportations.Footnote 117 Criticism in the House of Commons was directed against the British government for its part in orchestrating the exile behind the scenes, as Member of Parliament William Warbey argued that the entire trial was ‘cooked up in advance’ with British approval.Footnote 118 Moreover, reports indicate that Bahrain’s British Advisor, Sir Charles Belgrave,Footnote 119 had drafted deportation plans even before the trial began, reinforcing the notion that the entire procedure was prearranged.Footnote 120 Ultimately, the repression and forced exile were part of Britain’s broader strategy to deactivate the national movement in Bahrain, suppress freedom of expression and maintain its rule, proving that the expulsions were not merely a local initiative but an operation sanctioned at the highest levels in London.Footnote 121
These 1950s repressive measures ignited a more focused uprising in the next decade. Known as the 1965 intifada (uprising), the Arab nationalists in Bahrain announced a list of political and legislative demands. These were: to begin talks with the British aimed at gaining independence and closing their military installations; to establish a National Assembly; to liberate political prisoners imprisoned since 1956; to enable political exiles to return; to restore all those made redundant; to authorise trade union activity; and to ensure press freedom.Footnote 122
The intifada began when the Bahrain Petroleum Company (which was American owned but controlled by British local colonial authorities),Footnote 123 decided to make redundant 450 Bahraini employees.Footnote 124 These workers were the first batch out of the 1,500 workers in total the company decided to lay off to replace them with modern machines capable of enhanced productivity.Footnote 125 This decision was purely of an administrative nature and was certainly dictated by the fervent political atmosphere prevailing in Bahrain at the time. This political atmosphere ignited a populist uprising that became a major milestone in Bahrain’s political movements. The uprising occurred against all odds, as the country was subjected to strict security control from the British authorities, who sought to stifle local nationalists in order to maintain influence. British security forces responded with unprecedented brutality, using extreme measures to crush the movement. The crackdown resulted in numerous injuries and around thirteen deaths.Footnote 126 Among those killed were two individuals from Sitra belonging to the Sarhan family, as well as two from Muharraq, Abdullah Al-Ghanem and Abdullah BuNudah.Footnote 127 Faisal Al-Qassab also lost his life in Manama.Footnote 128 The fact that the uprising persisted in the face of such harsh suppression serves as testament to the robustness of the Arab nationalist movement in Bahrain. This argument is also underpinned by the remarks made by Ali Rabia, a Bahraini activist who witnessed the 1965 intifada:
I can clearly remember the loud demonstrations that filled the streets of Muharraq, Manama, and most of the villages of Bahrain. They were led by political forces with the participation of students. In this regard, we do not forget that the Bahraini street was a national street influenced by Nasserism as a result of the strong Nasserist nationalist tide. Despite the absence of a trade union in Bapco, the trade union awareness was strongly present among the workers, and this created a state of determination among them to force the company to accept the demands they put forward.Footnote 129
Just like their Qatari counterparts, the Bahraini social movements drew inspiration from Arab nationalist scholarship and ideology. Although relatively short-lived, they were hardly static. Their claims at the time were radical in their content and to some degree were more progressive than social claims in Europe. It should also be remembered that unlike other Gulf states, Bahrain is home to a large Shi’ite population. The next section explores another prominent social movement, perhaps the best structured, that of Kuwait.
Kuwait’s enchantment with Nasserite pan-Arabism and its growth of social movements
Just like their Qatari counterparts, the Kuwaitis established Arab nationalist cultural groups underpinned by surreptitious nationalist goals. In an attempt to conceal their political activities, the honorary presidency of each club was assigned to a member of the ruling family. By 1956, there were about seventeen clubs, the most prominent of which were the Teachers’ Club, the Graduates’ Club, the Al-Jazeera Club, the Al-Sahel Cultural Club, and the National Cultural Club headed by Doctor Ahmed Al-Khatib.Footnote 130 The membership of the National Cultural Club, which was founded in 1953, was not only available to Kuwaitis but also to Arabs in general. Two years later, the club established the Aleman (Echo of Faith) magazine that published the ideas of the Arab nationalist movement.Footnote 131 Some members of these clubs supported the idea of Kuwait uniting with Iraq, seeing it as part of the broader Arab nationalist movement and drawing parallels to the union between Egypt and Syria under the United Arab Republic.
To facilitate the cooperation between these various clubs, Kuwaiti Arab nationalists formed the Kuwaiti Clubs Committee. This Committee organised demonstrations against the Tripartite Aggression against Egypt in 1956 (also known as the Suez Crisis). On 2 November 1956, the Committee distributed leaflets condemning the British conduct, calling for strikes and a mass meeting.Footnote 132 However, the police responded with distributing notices banning the proposed demonstrations, making it clear that authorities intended to suppress nationalist activities.
Despite the ban, several hundred Kuwaiti demonstrators attempted to assemble at the Grand Souk Mosque, leading to violent clashes with British security forces that lasted nearly two hours in the heart of Kuwait City.Footnote 133 British police officers resorted to force to disperse the protestors, while groups of young demonstrators roamed the streets, throwing stones indiscriminately, at one point even threatening to invade the British Political Agency building.Footnote 134 The ruler of Kuwait, Abdullah Al-Mubarak, was a known supporter of the British, and reassured the British Political Agent that British interests in Kuwait would be safeguarded.Footnote 135
Due to their economic and social structure, Bahrain and Kuwait naturally had more ‘cultural’ organisations to support the Arab nationalist movement. A chart produced by Mufid Alzaidi, a scholar who wrote a book about the various ideologies in the Gulf, illustrates this point.Footnote 136 In his book, he presents statistics of cultural associations in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia from the 1920s until the 1970s. The table shows that Bahrain had a total of nineteen associations, and Kuwait seventeen. In Saudi Arabia, by contrast, only five associations appeared in the span of five decades.Footnote 137 According to Alzaidi, Bahrain was a pioneer in establishing these clubs.Footnote 138 He also observes that in Kuwait and Bahrain the activity of feminist groups increased in the 1960s, which is consistent with Arab nationalism’s progressive agenda.Footnote 139 This was a result of the increased number of women joining feminist groups, the spread of modern education among girls, and the promotion of women’s rights and liberation through Arab intellectual channels. The following subsection explores the so-called Cairo Charter, which constitutes a significant attempt by Arab leaders to put in motion the ideals and claims of social movements at the time.
From the Cairo Charter to social movements with a parliamentary role
The first act of Arab nationalism in the Kuwaiti National Assembly is a testament to its robustness. In 1963, following three rounds of discussions held by Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, the Cairo Charter was adopted.Footnote 140 The Cairo Charter declared the determination to form a federal union with the same name as the defunct Egyptian-Syrian union of 1958: the United Arab Republic.Footnote 141 The 1963 Unity Talks resulted in Arab nationalist candidates raising demands in the Kuwaiti National Assembly only a few weeks after its opening.Footnote 142 On 8 April 1963, the twelve-man entity affiliated with the Kuwaiti Arab Nationalist Movement bloc submitted a parliamentary petition endorsing the recently declared United Arab Republic (UAR) of Egypt, Syria, and Iraq and asking Kuwait to express its intention to join a federation of all four nations as soon as possible.Footnote 143 From the Arab Nationalists’ perspective, the participation of Kuwait in the Union required the termination of the mutual assistance agreement with Britain concluded at the time of the declaration of independence.Footnote 144 The termination of this legal instrument and the accession of Kuwait to the Arab Union represented the first activities of Arab nationalist members in the Kuwaiti National Assembly.
The series of events that followed this episode are no less thorny. A year later, the 1964/65 cabinet crisis would count as a victory for Arab nationalists. Wealthy merchants in Kuwait felt that their interests were being undermined through the affiliation of twelve members of parliament with the organised and outspoken Kuwaiti Arab Nationalist Movement. They believed that such affiliation impacted on how the government articulated its foreign policy. These twelve members of parliament promoted the Nasserist type of Arab nationalism, which was viewed by the wealthy merchants as detrimental to their commercial interests. As a response, Thunayan Al-Ghanim, who represented the affluent merchants unwilling to offer support to Nasserist Arab nationalism, and four other business confidantes were convinced to join the Parliament by the prominent merchant and speaker of the Assembly, Abdul-Aziz Al-Sagr.Footnote 145 This was engineered as a way of undermining the influence of Arab nationalists, and outnumbering them, in the National Assembly. The majority of Arab nationalists in the Assembly saw this as political and commercial cronyism, and they opposed the senior merchants’ candidacy by using the constitutional ban of pursuing business interests while in parliament.Footnote 146 This initiative by Abdul-Aziz Al-Sagr gave birth to the 1964/65 cabinet crisis, in which the less wealthy merchants in the parliament mobilised against a proposed cabinet that contained a number of senior merchants keen to counteract the power of Kuwaiti Arab nationalists.Footnote 147
For more than a month, members of the national assembly stood in the way of the formation of a new cabinet in the government. As a result, Sheikh Abdullah Al-Salim came under pressure from the ruling family to dissolve the Assembly or, at the very least, exercise his constitutional right to suspend it until new elections were scheduled.Footnote 148 Abdullah Salim, however, recognised the need to ensure that the various political and ideological viewpoints should, to the greatest extent possible, be managed by consensus rather than totalitarianism.Footnote 149 The way Sheikh Abdulla responded to this crisis demonstrates how the Kuwaiti government followed a less aggressive and less repressive approach to Arab nationalists. The eventual triumph of the less influential merchants and Arab nationalists at the expense of the wealthy merchants highlights the robustness of Arab nationalist mobilisation in Kuwait.Footnote 150 Al-Sagr, who plotted against the Arab nationalists, was forced to resign as the speaker of parliament. He was replaced by pro-Arab nationalists and the prominent advocate of the ‘lesser merchants’, Saoud Abdul-Razzaq.Footnote 151 In short, the cabinet crisis resulted in the wealthy merchants’ growing isolation from official political activity.
Sheikh Abdulla’s brother, Sheikh Sabah, assumed power in Kuwait in November 1965. Compared to his predecessor, the new ruler, along with his cousin and deputy ruler Sheikh Jaber, followed a more restrictive policy to Arab nationalists in the legislative branch. The laws he passed a year after assuming power caused unrest among Arab nationalist candidates in the National Assembly. On 7 December 1965, National Assembly representatives Ahmed Al-Khatib, Abdul Razzaq Al-Khalid, Sami Ahmed Al-Manis, Ali Al-Omar, Rashid Saleh Al-Tawhid, Yaqoub Al-Humaidhi, Jassim Al-Qutami and Suleiman Al-Mutawa submitted their resignations due to the government passing laws that restricted freedoms.Footnote 152
In another incident, Sheikh Sabah had begun his era by trying to mediate between Saudi Arabia and Egypt in the conflict over Yemen, as a continuation of Kuwait’s mediation policies.Footnote 153 During the mediation, Sheikh Sabah visited Egypt, Saudi Arabia and some Gulf countries. He returned with the belief that if the Arab nationalists in Kuwait forced him to choose a side (ie, Egypt or Saudi Arabia), then it would be in his interest to choose the side of Saudi Arabia.Footnote 154 As Sheikh Sabah saw that the pressure to choose Egypt increased from the Arab nationalists’ representatives in the Assembly, he implemented various repressive measures against them. The main measure occurred insidiously with the National Assembly’s second round of elections in January 1967. Despite the wide resonance of Arab nationalism among Kuwaiti nationals − which suggested that they would have voted for Arab nationalist representatives − the election results shocked observers and candidates alike. Most Arab nationalist candidates in the National Assembly lost their positions, including Al-Khatib.Footnote 155 As a result, Arab nationalist supporters accused the government of rigging the election. This unrest culminated in the resignation of some deputies in protest of these allegations.Footnote 156
The Al-Tali’ah newspaper,Footnote 157 the journal of Kuwaiti Arab nationalists,Footnote 158 exposed the violations of the 1967 elections.Footnote 159 They wrote articles claiming fraud in the voting procedure to undermine Arab nationalists.Footnote 160 This prompted Sheikh Sabah to implement his second measure of repression, which was to terminate the Al-Tali’ah newspaper. At the same time, Sheikh Sabah supported the Al-Rai Al-A’am newspaper, which was owned by the conservative opponent of Arab nationalists, Abdul Aziz Al-Masaeed, who supported Saudi Arabia against Egypt.Footnote 161 Moreover, all Arab nationalist clubs were shut down.Footnote 162 These clubs and the press had all been important parts of Kuwaiti public life and formed part of what distinguished Kuwait from other Gulf nations.Footnote 163
In addition to these domestic measures, specific international circumstances made it easier for the Kuwaiti government to repress Arab nationalism. The Yemeni civil war, the conflict over Palestine,Footnote 164 and to some extent the Arab nationalist uprising in Bahrain, all served to highlight how fragmented the Arab world had become. As a result, Kuwait had more control over local Arab nationalists and felt less need to continuously draw attention to pan-Arab concerns.Footnote 165 The Deputy Emir, Sheikh Jaber, initiated a ‘Kuwait First’ campaign in 1966, partly as a reaction to Baghdad’s aspirations over Kuwait, and to protect Kuwaiti interests domestically and internationally, as mentioned in the formal Amiri speech.Footnote 166 Senior members in the ruling family supported this initiative as they believed that Arab nationalists had ‘gone too far’.Footnote 167
It is important to note that these government repressions were not easy to implement. The Kuwaiti government relied on a certain set of circumstances that legitimised or concealed their repressive actions, particularly voting fraud as well as state-nationalist campaigns like ‘Kuwait First’. In addition to these domestic circumstances, international factors, as mentioned above, assisted the authorities in repressing the Arab nationalist activities. The Kuwaiti government wanted to ‘assert greater authority’ following the growing influence of Arab nationalist in the National Assembly.Footnote 168 With the results of the second round of elections in 1967, the Arab nationalist group in the National Assembly suffered a major defeat. The undermining of Arab nationalists in the Parliament made it easier for the authorities to introduce a series of restrictions to expel Egyptian and Palestinian Nasserists from the country and clamp down the relative freedom of the press and Arab nationalist ‘cultural’ organisations.Footnote 169
It is clear that social movements in Bahrain, Qatar and Kuwait were the most vociferous and demanding in the Arabian Gulf. This is in contrast to their Saudi counterparts, albeit this is easily explained as the latter were not under British or another foreign rule. Naturally, the Saudi monarchy was keen to quell any such movement, irrespective of its demands and claims. The following section provides a snapshot of social movements in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in order to highlight their differences with those in their Gulf neighbours.
The limited Saudi experimentation with social movements
Just like in Bahrain, several segments of the Saudi society engaged with Nasserist ideology. Unlike in Bahrain (and Kuwait), very few organisations operated in Saudi Arabia, partly because it was not under direct British rule.Footnote 170 However, the broader wave of anti-British nationalist resistance in the Gulf likely shaped the perspectives of Saudi dissidents. While nationalist movements in Bahrain and Kuwait actively resisted British rule, Saudi activists framed their opposition to the monarchy as part of the larger anti-colonial struggle, drawing on the ideological influence from their neighbours.
It may well be argued that most Saudi Arab nationalist organisations functioned abroad because they were persecuted by the highly authoritarian and repressive Saudi regime. In addition to the country’s autocratic leadership, the lack of precedence for political opposition in the country weakened all Arab nationalist movements. While political opposition existed since the beginning of the twentieth century in Kuwait and Bahrain, political opposition was a recent phenomenon in Saudi Arabia during Nasser’s tenure. And when opposition occurred, repression was severe.Footnote 171 The Saudi government’s harsh response to Arab nationalist demonstrators in 1956 echoed the British-supported crackdowns in Bahrain, strengthening the belief among opposition groups that the Al-Saud monarchy was actively aiding the suppression of nationalist aspirations. The repressive measures encouraged many opposition groups to operate outside of the Kingdom.Footnote 172 The remaining activists, and some of those who were freed after the persecution of 1956, acted covertly or in exile.Footnote 173 Because of the intense repression there was little likelihood of immediate success.Footnote 174
Furthermore, the Saudi government’s repressive and totalitarian direction made it difficult for illegal opposition organisations to survive, while the Kingdom’s organised opposition was unable to achieve any victories.Footnote 175 Forty young officers were detained in December 1962 for plotting a coup.Footnote 176 Many similar instances of dissent occurred, but they did not create a threat to the Al-Saud legitimacy in the Kingdom.Footnote 177 As Alexei Vassiliev puts it,
until 1967, the Saudi regime faced no serious danger from the illegal opposition… Among the opposition organizations, only the Union of the People of the Arabian Peninsula and the National Liberation Front remained viable in 1966-67.Footnote 178
However, the influence of nationalist uprisings in British-controlled Gulf states can also be seen in the ideological framing of Saudi opposition movements. While the Union of the People of the Arabian Peninsula was founded in Egypt, it later moved from Cairo to Sanaa after the Yemeni revolution as the geographical proximity would give them an advantage.Footnote 179 With Nasir Al-Said’s assistance, they established a supreme command for effective operations in Saudi Arabia.Footnote 180 Another Saudi opposition organisation that operated in Egypt was the Federation of the Sons of the Arabian Peninsula.Footnote 181 Presenting itself as an Arab nationalist organisation, members of the Federation spoke on the Voice of Arabs, and demanded that the Saudi monarchy be abolished and that a national assembly be established to represent all segments of society.Footnote 182
The second opposition organisation that Alexei Vassiliev mentioned, the Arab National Liberation Front, operated in Lebanon.Footnote 183 They presented their opinions in a column named ‘The Voice of the Front’ in the Lebanese newspaper al-Kifah.Footnote 184 Its demands included:
a constitutional, democratic form of government and elected organs of government; freedom of thought, speech and assembly; the right to set up political organizations and trade unions; the right to strike and hold demonstrations; a radical restructuring of the government machinery; the development of education, the elimination of illiteracy and the introduction of education for girls, based on equality with males…Footnote 185
The influence of British-backed repression in the Gulf is evident in the varying strength of nationalist movements across the region. In British-controlled states like Bahrain, opposition groups united around a common anti-colonial cause, directing their resistance against an external authority. This provided Bahraini and Kuwaiti nationalists with a strong ideological foundation and a clearly defined enemy: British rule. In contrast, Saudi dissidents did not share this dynamic, as their struggle was not directed against a foreign occupier but their own monarchy. Talal Al-Saud, the general secretary of the Arab National Liberation Front, initially championed pan-Arabist ideals but abandoned the movement after a dispute with Nasser. After the disagreement, Talal Al-Saud, and some of his adherents, left the Arab National Liberation Front in August 1963.Footnote 186 Talal, who was a prominent member of the opposition’s Free Princes movement, changed his political direction.Footnote 187 His shift illustrates the fragility of Saudi opposition efforts, particularly in contrast to the more established nationalist movements in British-controlled Gulf states. While Bahraini activists could rally around anti-colonial sentiment to strengthen their cause and retain their commitment even under British repression, Saudi dissidents were more vulnerable to ideological shifts and political realignments.
After the ideological shift, Talal and The Free Princes’ relationship with Nasser deteriorated.Footnote 188 In a statement made in Beirut, his usual place of operations, Talal said that he and other princes would try to reach a deal with King Saud and Crown Prince Faisal. Talal hinted at his dissatisfaction with Egypt in February 1964, whereupon he declared that his criticism of the Saudi government’s domestic and international policies was ‘entirely wrong’.Footnote 189 He expressed his admiration for Faisal’s political and constitutional reforms and pledged to ‘behave properly’ in the future.Footnote 190 In late February of that year, Talal went back to Riyadh; his brothers had already moved there a month earlier.Footnote 191 The Free Princes movement came to an end, and it was no longer spoken about their political endeavours.
The development of Saudi nationalist movements reflects how opposition in the Gulf was shaped by reference to the experience of direct colonial rule. In British-controlled Bahrain and Kuwait, nationalist resistance remained robust, while in Saudi Arabia, the absence of a colonial enemy meant dissidents lacked a common cause to unite them. Many operated from exile and were more vulnerable to internal divisions. The Saudi monarchy effectively dismantled opposition groups and relied on domestic repression rather than foreign intervention to maintain control. Unlike Bahrain, where nationalist activism remained active well into the 1970s, Saudi opposition never grew into a lasting threat. This approach of suppression and co-optation continued to define how the Saudi state handled political dissent in the years that followed.
Conclusion
There is little doubt that Arab nationalism played a dominant role in fostering and achieving the impetus for self-determination in the Arabian Gulf. Arab nationalism dominated the popular movements of Gulf territories, chiefly from the mid-1930s onwards, and following the victorious rise of Nasser. The creation of social and cultural movements through which Arab nationalism was able to flourish represents the peak of this ideology, at least in the Gulf. However, one must take account of the delicate balance Gulf local leaders had to tread with the British, initially in order to remain free from Ottoman subjugation, and later to avoid their enclosure within the League of Nations mandate system.Footnote 192 Even after the end of World War II, small sheikhdoms had to survive in a largely hostile global landscape determined by the colonial powers’ violent struggle to retain their influence. In the 1950s and 1960s, at a time when Empires were disintegrating, Arab social movements in the Gulf put forward with force the right of Arab people to dignity and self-determination under the banner of Arab nationalism. Demand for free and fair elections, some degree of local and popular representation in parliamentary-style assemblies, and worker rights might seem to Western audiences as being out of place in contemporary Gulf politics and their constitutional arrangements. However, they are inextricably linked to the social contract prevalent in the Middle East, and particularly the Gulf, whereby enlightened monarchs go hand-in-hand with civil liberties that are particular to the region.Footnote 193
The legacy of Arab nationalism is manifest in all Gulf constitutions.Footnote 194 There was little doubt that this would be case, despite their current form of government, given the catalytic nature of this ideology in shaping a pan-Arab political ideology. Moreover, the people of the Gulf owe their political existence and self-determination to this unique force that shaped their region and ultimately contributed to the demise of British rule. It is no wonder, therefore, that article 5(b) of the Qatari Constitution of 1972 states in emphatic terms that:
The State believes that the union of Arab countries in the region is a fateful need dictated by the common higher Arab interests in the region in special, and in the grand Arab homeland in general. The State shall devote all possible efforts to support such union and work to achieve it in the most appropriate image gathering between it and those sister countries which has strongest ties, most powerful and most originality with them.Footnote 195
In equal measure, the Kuwaiti Constitution reserves specific reverence for ‘Arab nationalism’ in the following terms:
In the Name of God the Compassionate, the Merciful; We, Abdallah Al Salem Al Sabah, Amir of the State of Kuwait, Desirous of fulfilling all of the exigencies of democratic rule in our beloved homeland; Confident in the role this Nation can play in the wake of Arab nationalism, of service to world peace and of civilization.Footnote 196
The first article of the Kuwaiti constitution conveys the Arabist character of the state, as it stipulates that
‘Kuwait is an Arab, independent, fully sovereign State. There shall be no surrender of its sovereignty nor cession of any part of its territories. The people of Kuwait are part of the Arab Nation’.
As discussed in this article, the fact that Gulf peoples during the era that led to independence laid claim to their Arab identity, should not be viewed as a form of nationalism that is, or was, antithetical to established tenets of international law such as the right to self-determination. Even today, let alone fifty to seventy years ago, it is legitimate for self-determination claims to be predicated on national and ethnic origin, not only as a basis for the external dimension of self-determination, but also internally.Footnote 197 Arab nationalism was a coalescing force, far above religious claims,Footnote 198 that was meant to challenge colonial rule which prevented Arabs from exercising self-rule and from enjoying the sort of civil and political rights which they viewed as inherent in their societies. This is a revolutionary idea because the West has generally perceived Arabs as oppressed people with no demands that encompass civil and political rights, and has often claimed that their best political periods were those under foreign control. The literature is generally silent on Arab (and particularly in the Arabian Gulf) struggles for self-determination and constitutional rights.Footnote 199 No doubt, it has always been in the interest of colonisers to mute such demands and portray themselves as the only force guaranteeing unity and order. The reality on the ground, as this article has hopefully demonstrated, was different. The constitutional credentials of people in the Gulf have always been very vociferous, and, despite their newly found oil wealth and entrenched social contracts, there is no shortage of civil and political rights claims in the present day.Footnote 200
Self-determination struggles are not monolithic, and the content of the claims depends on the history and nature of oppression, as well as its duration. In the European context, such struggles were violent, precisely because people had been oppressed by elites for centuries and the pertinent claims were radical and certainly revolutionary in nature. In the particular context of the Gulf, the concept of long-standing statehood, and the identities associated with it, was itself a recent phenomenon. Thus, by the 1950s, the perception of an Arab consciousness was only just beginning to mature into claims for self-determination. Until then, Arab nationalism had been brewing as a political ideal that had not yet fully formed into a concrete claim for a single statehood, at least universally among Arabs. The struggle against British rule and dominion was the beginning of a broader struggle in the entire Arab world. It certainly demonstrated that Arabs in the Gulf were just beginning to realise their own particular identities as peoples of micro-states − and to have a vision of their polities. What started as a political and ideological movement in the late nineteenth century, ultimately offered the spark that ignited vociferous calls for independence in the aftermath of World War II. It is hoped that this article will assist to some degree in dispelling one of the last Orientalist myths,Footnote 201 according to which Arabs are devoid of political aspirations and have no interest in civil and political rights, whether because of their backwardness or their wealth (at least in the Gulf). These depictions not only helped to justify, and reinforce, colonial policies but also forged a myth that lives to the present day.
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