Causes and consequences of ethno-regional protests in authoritarian regimes

The last two decades have experienced an increase in the number of public protests unfolding in the closed contexts of consolidated authoritarian regimes (Carothers and Press Reference Carothers and Press2020). This trend could be observed in both Central Asia (e.g. Achilov Reference Achilov and O’Brien2017; Libman and Davidzon Reference Libman and Davidzon2023; Radnitz Reference Radnitz2012; Sullivan Reference Sullivan2019; Williams 2015) and beyond (e.g. Leuschner and Hellmeier Reference Leuschner and Hellmeier2024; Sadeghi-Boroujerdi Reference Sadeghi-Boroujerdi2023; Stapnes, Carlquist, and Horst Reference Stapnes, Carlquist and Horst2022). In most cases, however, the protests originated in the state’s central areas and aimed at regime’s democratic reforms in general. Peripheral protests against authoritarian centre, organized by politically marginalized ethnic minority communities, were a markedly rarer event (Fumagalli Reference Fumagalli2007; Yeh Reference Yeh2009), even though the peripheral position and exclusion in democratic states increases the likelihood of protest emergence (Brown Reference Brown2009; Cederman et al. Reference Cederman, Gleditsch and Julian Wucherpfennig2018). In the scholarly literature, protests are conceptualized as a continuum of political mobilization strategies and declarations of disagreement, ranging from a contentious rhetoric to peaceful gatherings and eventually a violent insurrection and rebellion (Cebotari and Vink Reference Cebotari, Maarten and Vink2013). Yet in closed-context autocracies, protests are usually not an early indicator of instability (Yiftachel Reference Yiftachel1997). They are eventual outbursts of accumulated anger and frustration (Olzak Reference Olzak1998; Ong and Han Reference Ong and Han2019). As such, the events combine gatherings, unrest, and rebellion activities (see Gurr Reference Gurr1993). The causes and conditions under which protests in peripheral regions of authoritarian states take place may thus markedly differ from other occasions.

That being said, the generally high cost of ethno-regional protests in autocracies led scholars to assume that engaging in these activities results not only from long-term resentment but also solid national identification and the appreciation of separatism. Proponents of separatism, in this way of theorization, exploit the opportunity given by the existence of regional autonomy (Horowitz Reference Horowitz2001; Johnson Reference Johnson2022) and by an upheaval to the constitutional structure of the state, such as (de)centralization or regime change. Building on his research in the Caucasus, Cornell (Reference Cornell2002; Reference Cornell2005) proposed the theory that the existence of autonomy from the Soviet era indicates a separatist problem. This assumption has been documented in the case of the Mountainous Badakhshan Autonomous Region (GBAO), an autonomous entity in today’s Tajikistan (Rivals for Authority in Tajikistan’s Gorno-Badakhshan 2018). But Karakalpakstan has not evidenced similar developments (as well as Georgia’s Ajara). Instead, we elaborate on several conditions that hindered separatism in this case – internal division and isolation of sporadic activists within a regional population, co-optation of regional political elite and economic dependence, and lack of external support for separatism.

First, as indicated by Benson and Saxton (Reference Benson and Saxton2010), regional autonomy per se is not a sufficient condition for the development of separatism and rebellion, as it lacks the aspect of political agency. Similarly, the link between a sense of ethno-regional identity (that the autonomy may help to consolidate) and separatism is not perennial and should not be taken for granted (e.g. Sorens Reference Sorens2005). Groups are not homogeneous in their preferences (Brubaker Reference Brubaker1995; Giuliano Reference Giuliano2000; Lluch Reference Lluch2012). The idea of homogeneity is an ideological construct and often also instrumental calculation by political actors (Conversi Reference Conversi2014). Even in the cases of regional nationalism with a developed secessionist movement, not all ascribed members of the nation support the secessionist agenda (Lepič Reference Lepič2017), nor do all of them even identify as nationals in ethnic terms (Lowrance Reference Lowrance2006). This results from the heterogeneous nature of region’s ethnic geography as well as from fractionalization of the regionalist movement. In Karakalpakstan, the autochthonous Karakalpaks cohabit the region with people of Kazakh and Uzbek ethnic identities, which Uzbekistan uses as a source of containment (Dzhumashev and Loy Reference Dzhumashev and Loy2012). The long-term effort of the regime is also to isolate sporadic pro-independence activists and obscure the anti-regime diaspora groups.

In terms of the regional political elite’s intention, two scenarios with regard to separatism and protests may be distinguished (Benson and Saxton Reference Benson and Saxton2010; Saxton and Benson Reference Saxton and Benson2008; Siroky et al. Reference Siroky, Warner, Filip-Crawford, Berlin and Neuberg2020). In regions where autonomous powers for governing the territory are controlled by nationalists, the resources for the group’s political mobilization are often exploited against the state. In this scenario, the underlying grievances are activated and instrumentally diffused in society using the region’s institutions (Shaykhutdinov and Bragg Reference Shaykhutdinov and Bragg2011). Nevertheless, if not appropriated ideologically, the autonomy in a democratic political entity reduces the group’s motivation for channelling its institutional resources for the pursuit of independence. Second scenario is particularly frequent in authoritarian regimes; ethno-regional autonomies serve the centralized state to demonstrate its willingness to provide an ethnic group with “autonomy”. The regime does not let the co-opted political elite grow any autonomous powers, let alone thoughts of secessionism, and establishes strict control over the (nominally) autonomous region. Although unlikely that an organized pursuit of secession develops in the region under this scenario, it is not to say that grassroot separatism does not exist. We argue, however, that it does not result in a coordinated instrumental utilization of opportunities provided by the autonomy due to the lack of its organizational capacity and resources for collective action.

This precisely characterizes our understanding of the July 2022 protests in Karakalpakstan. We do not deny that a segment of society tends towards separatism, but it is simply too disaggregated and weak to instigate and coordinate a large-scale outbreak of protests. Separatist activists are isolated from Karakalpakstan’s population as well as from political elite, which is essentially tied to, and cooperative with, the central government. The region is, in this regard, dependent on the centre in political and also economic terms.

The availability of support for region’s intentions from external state actors may also instigate separatism and bring ethno-political conflict (Lindemann and Wimmer Reference Lindemann and Wimmer2018; Tolstrup Reference Tolstrup2015). Conversely, the lack of external support contains the movement’s prospects for achieving its secessionist goals (Nelson Reference Nelson2023). Previous research on Karakalpakstan (Horák Reference Horák2014; Reference Horák2018; Sadykov Reference Sadykov2014; Schaefer and Whitney Reference Schaefer and Whitney2015) assumed that the Karakalpak question might indeed come to an explosive point due to the influence of external forces. Notably, Russia was mentioned as an eventual player holding the Karakalpak card against Uzbekistan, especially after the Crimea and Donbas events in 2014 (Biersack and O’Lear Reference Biersack and O’Lear2014) and the activation of the Karakalpak diaspora in Russia and Kazakhstan. Nevertheless, after several months, the topic has faded from discourse, although the diaspora organisations have remained active (Lewis Reference Lewis2015). The July 2022 events in Karakalpakstan became another explosion of instability in Central Asia after the January 2022 protests in Kazakhstan (Kudaibergenova and Laruelle Reference Kudaibergenova and Laruelle2022) and the Tajik-Kyrgyz war later that year. The long-term image of regional stability was seriously challenged during that year, and no external player intended to shatter it further.

In the previous discussion, we attempted to show that conditions that saturate the unfolding of separatism are not present in Karakalpakstan, indicating that the July 2022 protests were not caused by it. Instead, we propose that a direct connection between grassroots grievances and protests took place and that its underlying cause has been an outburst of proximate resentment brought mainly by the loss of the region’s nominal autonomy and the repression against local activists.

Many scholars and policy-makers see autonomy as a tool for accommodating regional nationalist and separatist demands (e.g. Hechter Reference Hechter2000). In this regard, Gurr (Reference Gurr1993), Siroky and Cuffe (Reference Siroky and Cuffe2015), Ahram (Reference Ahram2020) and Germann and Sambanis (Reference Germann and Sambanis2021) argued that losing regional autonomy instigates growing minority discontent, which may result in protests. However, Karakalpakstan only have a nominal autonomy, a mere symbolic expression of region’s peculiarity, while the central state institutions have co-opted regional political cadres and control most of the region’s essential functions (for autonomy of Karakalpak regional political elite, see Kłyszcz Reference Kłyszcz2023). It can be argued that the loss of such “autonomy” cannot cause large-scale ethno-regional protests since genuine autonomy has not materialized. Contrary to this assumption, we hold that it is not the actual loss of autonomous powers but the symbolic and perceptual act of state re-centralisation that generates in-group resentment, grassroots mobilization, and ethnic protest. The argument rests on the importance of relative (i.e. perceptual) deprivation for the emergence of minority grievances (Siroky et al. Reference Siroky, Warner, Filip-Crawford, Berlin and Neuberg2020) as well as symbolic recognition as a key to minority accommodation (Schulte Reference Schulte2018). As the case of Karakalpakstan shows, the existence of autonomy plays an important symbolic role capable of mobilising the population despite the authoritarian character of the regime. Although we agree with the understanding of autonomy as a spatial fix used by states to mitigate centre-periphery issues, it is clear that the appropriation of autonomy by the regional population is decisive and limits the range of top-down actions by the state.

Furthermore, a public expression of discontent in authoritarian regimes is regularly followed by repression, as autocrats tend to employ intimidation, large-scale detentions, and the killing of participants to supress the dissenting minority. Such repression may in turn escalate protest behaviour, intensify ethnic conflict, and eventually even ignite separatism (Lindemann and Wimmer Reference Lindemann and Wimmer2018; Saxton Reference Saxton2005). Arslanalp and Erkmen (Reference Arslanalp and Erkmen2023) describe how Turkey’s repression against pro-Kurdish protests led to increasingly tight spatial control and the state’s involvement in everyday life, which then intensified anti-state grievances and incited further protest behaviour, with the outcome of socio-spatial securitisation and state autocratization. Likewise, in the democratic context of Northern Ireland, state repression against the civil-rights movement resulted in the deadly spiral of the Troubles (e.g. De Fazio Reference De Fazio2009). In Karakalpakstan, Yılmaz (Reference Yılmaz, Özkan and Tüysüzoǧlu2022) considered the emergence of separatist movements in early post-Soviet period precisely as a reaction to the repressive character of Uzbekistan’s regime. Separatist movements that unfolded in Karakalpak society were established during the harshest oppression of Islom Karimov in the 2000s and 2010s. The death of Karimov and the slight easing of the oppressive atmosphere in Uzbekistan resulted in a significant decline in separatist moods in Karakalpakstan up to 2022.

In addition, there are more everyday and local manifestations of state-restrictive behaviour. Yiftachel (Reference Yiftachel1997) hints at the gradual reconstruction of minority region’s endogenous space, or symbolic spatial nationalization (e.g. Björkdahl Reference Björkdahl2018), which triggers the state’s engagement in discriminatory planning policies, politics of dependence, but also eventually the minority’s ethnopolitical mobilization and hardening of its anti-state identity. To divide the ethnic group internally, the response can also include a soft strategy, partly meeting the demands of some protesters, particularly those that do not threaten the regime in general. In the Karakalpak case, the protests led to both harsh (and targeted) repression and conceding to the protester’s principal demands. This evidence further distinguishes the cases of developed secessionist (or irredentist) movements and Karakalpakstan, as the partial satisfaction of the demands within the sticks and carrots theory (Svolik Reference Svolik2012) led to the abrupt in the classic protest-repression spiral. The long-term consequences are, however, not yet clear, as separatism may result from the experience of the protest and the interpersonal identity dynamics it brought.

Data and methods

To answer our research questions above, we analysed data obtained through 12 in-depth semi-structured in-person expert interviews with activists, academicians, and politicians in several localities throughout Karakalpakstan during a several weeks’ stay in January and February 2023 followed by further interviews, engaged observation and informal talks in February 2024. Although the interviews were focused on a broader range of Karakalpak ethnicity- and identity-related topics, the July 2022 protests resonated among the interlocutors as an important formative event.

Standard sampling method using gatekeepers and snowball procedures was used under the condition of strict anonymity. To make the interlocutors feel more comfortable talking about potentially sensitive issues, the handwritten notes were used exclusively. It means that due to the security reasons, we not only provide no details about interlocutors to maintain confidentiality and not endanger those living under the authoritarian regime in Uzbekistan (for research in closed context, see Gentile Reference Gentile2013; Koch Reference Koch2013). We also limit the display of direct quotations in the analysis, as these could contribute to identifying the (institutional affiliation of) interlocutors. In addition to these data, we conducted about 20 non-structured interviews in the cities of Nukus and Kungrat with a more random, and likewise strictly anonymized, sample of the population in bazaars, taxis, and other places, providing a bottom-up perspective of and reflection on the events. These reflections were less structured, albeit more straightforward and unforced. Most quotations used in the text come from these interviews to illustrate and liven up the arguments provided by rather scientific information coming from the expert interviews. The increasing cyclicity and repetitiveness of the responses after several interviews made us conclude that the space for further information within the selected sample was rather exhausted. All talks were held in the Russian language, still a wide-spread language in Karakalpakstan and, generally, in Uzbekistan.

We are fully aware that the field research in the closed authoritarian setting could partially distort the interlocutor’s answers due to their self-censorship and subjectivity in order not to create any trouble with the state system. Nevertheless, the readiness to share the information within the interviews seemed to be more open compared to the written texts (including the academic ones), in which the topic of the 2022 events is mostly missing or, if mentioned, is presented in a way that reflects the official interpretations. Interconnected with the methodological framework of the research and informed by the theory, the interviews were coded using a deductive approach within which we focused on the context of the protest emergence, its fundamental and immediate causes, appropriation of the events and its mitigation by interlocutors, and the implications. Despite a possible level of censorship and self-censorship, this fieldwork provides an original and unique angle provided by experts, direct participants, and general public on interpreting the events in the region. In order to triangulate the evidences and mitigate the confirmation bias, data collection also included a thorough study of reports and articles on the topic in Uzbek, Russian, and Western analytical sources and media, including the opposition ones.

National identity and autonomy. Is there real separatism in Karakalpakstan?

Karakalpakstan is a vast and remote area at the western edge of Uzbekistan. In the 19^th century, most of the area stretched between the historical region of Khorezm – including the almost deserted Ust-Yurt plateau – and the Aral Sea (now mostly dried up and turned into the Aralkum desert).

Challenging living conditions and scarce resources did not enable agriculture except for some parts irrigated by channels from the Amudarya River and the fishing industry from the river and the Aral Sea. The traditional life of most of the Karakalpak population was nomadic or semi-nomadic. Unlike the settled societies, where the vertical hierarchy of society became crucial and vertical pyramids of power were established, the nomadic societies did not create strict and firm hierarchies. Their societies were based on horizontal ties between decentralized ethnic and sub-ethnic groups. The verticality of power within the nomadic societies remained shallow, often temporary, and volatile (Masanov, Abylkhozhin, and Erofeeva Reference Edigeevich, Abylkhozhin and Erofeeva2007). Such a feeble verticality of power ensues from persisting tribal elements and identity in Karakalpak society. It has delayed and limited the top-down process of nation-building and, as a consequence, weakened the construction and diffusion of supra-local national identity (Lemercier-Quelquejay Reference Lemercier-Quelquejay1984; Hanks Reference Hanks2000; Schlyter Reference Schlyter and Schlyter2005).

Despite the significance of tribality in Karakalpak society, the influence of pre-Russian settled agricultural societies, such as the Uzbeks in the Khorezm oasis (Bregel Reference Bregel1978; Sartori and Abdurasulov Reference Sartori and Abdurasulov2017) and later the Soviet systems of collectivization, forced local people to settle and create the Soviet political hierarchy typical for newly emerged entities (Martin Reference Martin2001). This combination of Russian and Soviet settlement processes forced most Karakalpaks to cease their nomadic lifestyle, and many of them urbanized in major cities such as Nukus, Khojeili, Kungrat, and Chymbay.

In the 1920s and 1930s, Karakalpaks were considered by the Soviet state as one of the state-forming nations (Martin Reference Martin2001, 461), hence receiving autonomy for the region. Although they did not get to the position to be proclaimed a fully-fledged Soviet Socialist Republic up to the 1980s-1990s, the autonomous status created one of the necessary conditions for the top-down nation-building and the gradual consolidation of Karakalpak identity. The region became an autonomous part of the Kazakh ASSR in 1924-1932, while its status as a political and national entity was upscaled to the ASSR level within the entire Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR). However, when the Kazakh entity was upgraded to a level of the Soviet Republic, Karakalpakstan became an isolated part of RSFSR, a position that was rather uncomfortable for Soviet authorities to manage. For this reason, the Karakalpak entity was moved under the Uzbek SSR in 1936. This step determined the position of Karakalpak identity together with the Uzbek one (Pianciola Reference Pianciola2020, Dzhumashev Reference Dzhumashev2021).

Perestroika raised the question of increasing the status for Karakalpakstan. Similarly to other Soviet republics and other Soviet administrative entities (Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics, Autonomous Republics, Autonomous Regions), the local elite, feeling a sense of culture-related resentment, appealed to the increasing status of the Karakalpak language and culture. Several organized groups, such as Halyk Mypy (The Will of Nation), were established within the perestroika process, cautiously promoting the idea of Karakalpakstan as another Soviet Socialist Republic in the context of Uzbekistan’s proclamation of sovereignty. Based on this context, the Supreme Soviet of the Karakalpak ASSR adopted the declaration of sovereignty of the region in December 1990, creating the Karakalpakstan Soviet Socialist Republic. As in the cases of other Soviet Republics, Karakalpakstan elected a new head of state, Dauletbay Shamshetov, initially as the head of the Supreme Soviet and later, in November 1991, he became the first (and the only) president of Karakalpakstan. Theoretically, by proclaiming sovereignty, the region ceased to exist within the Uzbekistan territory, although the connection with the “maternal” country persisted. The final dissolution of the USSR left the region formally independent, abolishing the “Soviet” and “Socialist” from its name, although no country recognized its independent status. This short-lived de facto state with unclear legal status lasted until 1993 when the “agreed reunification” pact was signed between Karakalpakstan and Uzbekistan, reunifying the two territories for the following 20 years.

Unlike other autonomous regions throughout the former Soviet Union that emerged into de facto states in the early 1990s (Nagorno Karabakh, Transnistria, Abkhazia or South Ossetia), the demands for a complete separation from Uzbekistan were never strong enough in Karakalpakstan to replicate these entities. Moreover, there was no external power in whose interest the Karakalpakstan’s independence proclamation and development would benefit. The lack of a clear majority of one ethnic group in the region, the internal heterogeneity of Karakalpak society and the deep integration of Karakalpaks into Uzbekistan’s social and economic life have served to prevent the outbreak of pro-independence riots, even if several groups inside Karakalpakstan and within the diaspora would support such actionsFootnote ². The absence of more unyielding and ambitious “national leaders” in Karakalpakstan enabled Tashkent to push the then-political elites under its control and accomplish the reunification process. As a result, a low level of parliamentary political culture in the republic led to the subordination of the regional administration to the central state powers. In other words, Jo’qorg’i Kengesi (parliament) members are ready to vote for anything from other state organs to the parliament (Kłyszcz Reference Kłyszcz2023, 504).

At least some Karakalpak representatives, such as the leaders of the Halyk Mypy organization Marat Nurmukhamedov and Marat Aralbayev, pushed through the idea of Karakalpakstan’s sovereignty. These provisions pertaining to the right of secession were set in the agreement between Karakalpakstan and Uzbekistan and eventually in Uzbekistan’s and Karakalpakstan’s constitutions. Despite these initial activities, Halyk Mypy members were not strong enough to counterweight the pressure from Tashkent in the situation of the Karakalpak political elites co-opted to the central institutions and the diaspora and local activists isolated from the ordinary people.

Karakalpakstan’s statute of autonomy

According to the latter documents, the region holds the right to split from Uzbekistan based on a referendum (Article 74 of the Uzbekistan constitution and Article 1 of the Karakalpakstan constitution). Such provision is a unique case within all autonomies and de facto states of the former Soviet Union (ICELDS 2018). However, this right is challenged by another constitutional provision based on Article 3 of the Uzbekistan constitution, which proclaims Uzbekistan’s territory as indivisible. Article 70 declares the sovereignty of Karakalpakstan, and Article 75 regulates the relations between Uzbekistan and Karakalpakstan based on the agreements and treaties between the two entities. In this way, the autonomous status of Karakalpakstan was formally settled (Kłyszcz Reference Kłyszcz2023, 510), though the procedure is intentionally ambiguous with regard to the pursuit of independence. Despite its formality and nominal character, no amendments to Uzbekistan’s constitution in the post-Soviet period attempted nor even proposed withdrawing these provisions from the document.

Such an institutional setting fulfilled most requirements to maintain the Karakalpakstan entity. Marginal voices that continued to demand the region’s independence went to illegal dissent, left the country, or were suppressed in the 1990s. Tens of thousands of other Karakalpaks moved abroad too, escaping the region’s deteriorated economic and ecological conditions. The newly established diasporas in Kazakhstan, Moscow and Europe continued to promote Karakalpakstan’s independence or, at least, the real fulfilment of the autonomy. Although many activists abroad have since resigned to achieving independence or even real autonomy (Pannier Reference Pannier2015), the issue re-emerged around 2013 when the Karakalpak-Uzbek reunification agreement expired. This movement also coincided with the Russian-backed separatism of Crimea and Donbas from Ukraine, though a causal connection is difficult to prove (Horák Reference Horák2014).

The events mentioned above effectively divided and demeaned the opposition. Using increasingly repressive measures against the remainders of dissent as well as the ordinary population, gradually replacing the Karakalpak’s regional representatives with people loyal to Tashkent and taking control over the region through the instalment of a loyal elite sent directly from Tashkent, Karimov’s regime effectively swept away most of the calls for real and more extensive autonomy. This process created a regional political elite loyal to the centre, a decisive factor for containing separatism. The agreement between Karakalpakstan and Uzbekistan disappeared from the public discourse, and Tashkent did not allow any reference to it upon its expiration in 2013. It is a symptomatic fact that the document could not be found in any legal databases of Uzbekistan. The Karakalpak case represents, in this regard, a rare example of the relatively peaceful resolution of ethnic separatist tendencies in autonomous region of the former Soviet Union in the context of an authoritarian system. It is important to note that the actions of the Uzbekistan regime resulted in a significant number of casualties, but Karakalpakstan was spared the outbreak of a pernicious conflict. Other cases that similarly did not result in a full-scale violent conflict include Gagauzia in Moldova and partially Tatarstan in the Russian Federation.

President Shavkat Mirziyoyev ordered the general changes to the Constitution of Uzbekistan in the late 2021 and the beginning of 2022 to cement the concept of “New Uzbekistan”, which allowed him to ballot after exhausting two subsequent presidential terms. The constitutional commission presented the results of its work in late June 2022, proposing a multitude of controversial changes and formulations (Tolipov Reference Tolipov2022). The commission also modified the articles on Karakalpakstan’s autonomous status. Article 70 newly abolished the nominal autonomy of Karakalpakstan, while Article 74 voided the right to secession from Uzbekistan. In addition, the new constitution did not mention the resolution of potential problems between Karakalpakstan and Uzbekistan based on the conciliation proceedings (Article 75). The changes also envisaged the full integration of Karakalpak laws into the Uzbek legal system (Article 72) (Gazeta.uz 2022).

The outbreak of protests. Reasons and interpretations

The mostly spontaneous mass demonstrations filled the central streets of Nukus (mainly around the bazaar) with the appearance of several activists on July 1st, 2022. The protests emerged after the publication of about 200 changes and amendments in the Uzbekistan’s constitution, including the articles on Karakalpakstan (for a complete chronology of events, see Atadzhanov Reference Atadzhanov2022).

We start with the question of why these changes and amendments were announced. Based on our insight interviews and secondary sources from Uzbekistan and from abroad, we can find several interpretations of the step. According to one political scientist and analyst in Tashkent, the commission’s work was intended to prove its high-level activity to legitimize its existence and indispensability and show the loyalty of its members to the president. Other interpretations emphasized that the changes dealing with Karakalpakstan were included directly by the Administration of President Mirziyoyev. Some analysts presumed that the changes were intended to prevent any potential separatism supported instrumentally from outside, as in the Donbas region in Ukraine (Baranovskaya, Ivanova, and Dik Reference Baranovskaya, Ivanova and Dik2022). Regardless of the reason, the opening of the Karakalpak case became an apparent miscalculation of the Uzbek establishment. Such a legalistic and instrumental approach of the regime, on the contrary, turned out to be just the starting point of the protests outbreak. It raised a problem that had not existed in Karakalpakstan after the settlement of the issue in the 1990s (Sarukhanyan Reference Sarukhanyan2022).

In regard to the protest emergence, most of our interlocutors in Karakalpakstan considered the publication of constitutional changes as the principal reason for the outbreak of protests. At least part of the Karakalpak society became sensitive about the region’s formal statute changes, considering it the principal achievement for Karakalpak national issue despite its formality. This notion occurred despite the years of humiliation of Karakalpak activists inside Uzbekistan and abroad (most of them became unknown to the local population, including those who participated in the protests) as well as the constant and long-term subordination of Karakalpak political elites to Tashkent and the formality of Karakalpak autonomy. For most interlocutors, the symbolic power of the Karakalpak autonomy status as well as the aspects of cultural autonomy – the usage of Karakalpak language at schools of all types, preserving the Karakalpak language for mutual communication and the written documents (despite numerous changes of the script system in the decades after the Uzbekistan independence) – in the way it had existed before the events were found as sufficient. Obviously, any downgrade of this statute could quickly become a reason for another wave of instability.

Most of the interlocutors, particularly from the intellectual elite, did not and even today after the events do not think about going beyond this point and demanding further (real) autonomy or even separation.

The state reaction to the protest emergence became the standard for authoritarian regimes threatened by any challenge. Suppressing any eventual sign of riots was the first reaction from both the Karakalpak and central powers. The internet connection was cut, prominent leaders were detained, and repressive forces dispersed the demonstration with several deaths and many wounded. Particularly, direct participants in the events also did not think about eventual separation and, as claimed in the interviews, keeping the formal statute of the region towards Uzbekistan was the principal push factor of their presence in the streets in July 2022. In addition, initial arrests of several activists considered “those from our nation” were mentioned by interlocutors as another reason for going out for demonstrations. At the same time, several reflections showed a post-protest increase in the level of national consciousness and politicization of the issue. One respondent, a young taxi driver from Nukus, who was involved in events, remarked:

Within several interviews in the academic field, the interlocutors pointed to the growing popularity of Karakalpak language after 2022 at the expense of Uzbek or Russian. However, this evidence is quite hard to measure without any proper opinion poll as the usage of the vernacular language is already widespread throughout the region among Karakalpaks and even other nations. As manifested in the follow-up interviews conducted in February 2024, the situation seems to be much less tense than the year before (and half year after the events).

The last group of interviewed voices, demanding real autonomy for Karakalpakstan up to the secession, was the least numerous, just in one out of 20 cases of unstructured interviews. As the interlocutors’ sample was rather qualitative than quantitative, it does not mean the percentage of separatism supporters is not in fact much higher than the sample could embrace. However, when asked about the sources of their separatist mood, the person presented it precisely as a consequence of direct participation in the 2022 events. Interestingly, most of the interlocutors did not mention the opposition leaders living in diaspora abroad and calling for Karakalpakstan’s independence as the source of their eventual separatist moods. It does show the low level of diaspora influence on the country in this particular issue.

Conflict resolution. Creating the presidential image?

Based on most interviews in Karakalpakstan, the augmenting conflict was moderated by the state using a combination of repressive and soft measures, corresponding to the sticks and carrots theory of an authoritarian regime’s approach to the opposition (Svolik Reference Svolik2012, 9-10).

Soft measures (the carrots) consisted of the constitutional amendments’ abolition and the centre’s quick reaction, including President Mirziyoyev’s arrival in the region. Although some Karakalpak activists criticized the genuine intentions of the Uzbekistan leadership, the region eventually preserved its formal autonomy, and the president even raised his authority within the Karakalpak population (as acknowledged by major part of our interlocutors). Hard measures (the sticks) included the detention of several prominent activists and suppression of demonstrations by force, though the regime carefully distinguished in its rhetoric and (partially) actions between “ordinary Karakalpaks” and “villainous activists”.

President Mirziyoyev landed in Nukus to help calm down the situation on July 3rd, when the regional capital was mostly back under the control of state powers (Atadzhanov Reference Atadzhanov2022). The closer context of the harsh response of his predecessor in Andijon 2005, or the more recent reaction of the Tajik powers to the riots in Gorno-Badakhshan (Pamir), could serve as a bad example for him (Kari Reference Kari2022). Becoming scared of the situation that could escalate into a more severe conflict should the mass protests (and their subsequent mass suppression) continue, he identified the principal root causes for the riots and quickly made concessions to the constitutional changes. As a result, the work on constitutional changes was interrupted, and the Karakalpak issue was erased. The transformation of Karakalpakstan’s status was marginal compared to the main aim of the constitutional changes – securing his position from a long-term perspective. The concession on this issue did not harm this main goal. On the contrary, presenting himself as a peace broker, he gained popularity in Karakalpakstan and the rest of Uzbekistan, as acknowledged in the interview with a political analyst from Tashkent (February 8, 2023).

Blaming the local deputies for non-communication with the population, the president made these people (often very unpopular and considered corrupt) responsible for the events (BBC O’zbek 2022). Consequently, he withdrew Murat Kamalov, the head of Jo’qorg’i Kengesi and the formal leader of Karakalpakstan, and other prominent people from the loyal autonomy leadership. In this way, Mirziyoyev could keep paternalistic face of a “good king surrounded by bad boyars on the ground”. This image was reflected in most interviews, even among those directly involved in the protests.

After calming the protests down, Karakalpakstan’s independence disappeared from the public’s demands, and most interlocutors labelled this option as “hypothetical” or “improbable”, often praising the president (even if subjectively) for his involvement in the issue. Although no reliable and independent-of-the-state opinion polls were conducted, the increased popularity of the president emerged from both the expert and random talks. “The president comes more often to the region opening new enterprises and raising new project”, as some of the interlocutors claimed repeatedly, although it is difficult to assess the extent of sincerity and self-censorship in their answers. Several voices promoting an independent Karakalpakstan are dispersed throughout the region, both inside and outside of Uzbekistan, and do not possess enough power to raise mass movements and accomplish this eventual goal. The protests did not connect the regional population with either the activists or the exiled pro-independence diaspora, and it was precisely this connection that the regime sought to prevent in its response to the events. In addition, the political, economic and humanitarian ties with Uzbekistan, the involvement of regional political elites into the Uzbekistan’s central establishment as well as the presence of large Uzbek and Kazakh communities that downgrade the share of the Karakalpak population in the region, are among the factors that contributed to the unpopularity of separatist ideas in the critical part of society.

The regime actively exploited and intensified these societal gaps by targeting repression against occasional activists and diaspora groups. The state narrative immediately introduced the interpretation that maligned the events to justify the repression. The official discourse spoke about “the criminal group of people” and attempted to downgrade the number of protesters (Jo’qorg’i Kengesi 2022). Labelling the leaders and protesters as “criminals” or “hooligans” was used to delegitimize, criminalize and marginalize the crowds and their goals. At the same time, official Uzbek and Karakalpak journals and newspapers praised the state care in developing and investing in Karakalpakstan (Narodnoe Slovo 2022a). Such news raises and underlines the intended idea of Karakalpakstan being an inseparable part of Uzbekistan.

Using the rhetoric of “the influence of foreign subversive forces influencing a naïve part of young people”, the regime tried to erase the notion of local population guilt (Iugai Reference Iugai2022; Narodnoe Slovo 2022b). Mirziyoyev directly admitted foreign influence in his statement on the event (Prezident.uz 2022). This “foreign footprint” was also reflected in the Russian media that hinted at the rhetoric of the “colour revolution fomenting” (Panfilova Reference Panfilova2022). Such discourses explaining rather spontaneous events as ‘foreign-based’ became a “standard” part of authoritarian regime’s reactions as observed in other recent cases in authoritarian regimes such as Russia 2012, Belarus 2020, Kazakhstan 2022 and others (Koesel and Bunce Reference Koesel and Bunce2012). In addition, the regime’s search for foreign organizers turned from pure rhetoric to adopted practical steps. Several diaspora leaders and representatives were put on the wanted list, mocked and finally sentenced in absence (Makhmudov Reference Makhmudov2022; Abidov Reference Abidov2023). The Karakalpak diaspora in Russia also came under threat of arrest and eventual extradition to Uzbekistan based on an “attempt to the constitutional order”. This accusation became another “standard tool” for discrediting opposition and challengers of power in authoritarian regimes (Narodnoe Slovo 2022b). The government applied the “sticks approach” to these outside figures.

In order to contextualize the response to the Karakalpak protests within the universe of cases from other authoritarian regimes, it is necessary to consider several specifics in the reaction of Uzbekistan. First of all, president Mirziyoyev was imagined as a man who quickly came to the region to inspect and solve the issue on the spot. He was labelled (in official press) as a supporter of democracy and dialogue, at least within the loyal population (Iugai Reference Iugai2022). Later, the president was portrayed as forgiving, pointing out that “Karakalpaks have a clear conscience” (Narodnoe Slovo 2022c). He has also been portrayed as an enthusiastic supporter of Karakalpakstan, boosting its social and economic development and demonstrating his personal interest in the region (Kun.uz, March 30, 2023).

At the same time, unlike, for example, the 2020 Belarus events (Green Reference Green2022; Rosenfeld Reference Rosenfeld2022), the media coverage was limited in the initial part of protests, with detentions and threats to independent journalists, newspapers and web portals (Lillis Reference Lillis2022). Nevertheless, most journalists were quickly released, and several independent Uzbek newspapers and portals (especially Gazeta.uz) thoroughly investigated the events and even published their accounts without a ban or limits (Atadzhanov Reference Atadzhanov2022).

Despite the state’s authoritarian nature and classical ideologization of the presidential role, the president’s imagined involvement helped calm the situation in Karakalpakstan, at least from the power’s in Uzbekistan point of view. We could speculate about the level of analysis in the presidential administration and to what extent the personal character of Mirziyoyev was involved. The example of his predecessor’s approach to, among others, the 2005 Andijon events served him as an analogue to the current events. Mirziyoyev did not want to use such a terrible example of solving the situation inside the country and creating an image of another bloody dictator for the outside world.

On the other hand, several leaders or alleged leaders of the demonstrations were arrested and entered court that was moved to Bukhara, officially due to the reconstruction of the Nukus facilities. However, the intention was to move it far away from Karakalpakstan. Although the trial was surprisingly openly (in the Uzbekistan context) translated online and covered extensively by the Uzbek media, its primary intention became preventing any other riots. Severe sentences for the alleged main organizers (such as the activist Dauletmurat Tajimuratov) were balanced by conditional sentences for other activists and people involved in the riots (such as the journalist Lolagul Qallixanova), although those who were released or received conditional sentences were threatened by the local organs and are already in the Uzbekistani databases (Eraliev Reference Eraliev2023) As a consequence, the result of trials did not resonate strongly in Karakalpakstan society and did not provoke another wave of demonstrations demanding the eventual release of the leaders and claims for Karakalpak independence. As expressed by a local man in the Nukus’ bazaar:

On the contrary, the detention of several policemen involved in suppressing the demonstrations satisfied even those who could be radicalized (Gazeta.uz, 2023). Though, in this case, the punishments were incomparable with those sentenced for participation in protests, their names (unlike the protesters) were not released, and these policemen became a part of the show trials, demonstrating the ability of the system to punish both sides and calm the situation.

The interviews in Nukus and, selectively, in other parts of Karakalpakstan did not unveil a substantial mood of separatism in the country. Most interlocutors accepted Karakalpakstan’s status as a nominally autonomous part of Uzbekistan. The withdrawal of constitutional changes, including those crucial articles on Karakalpakstan, met most requirements, calmed down the situation, and did not let the violence and mutual accusations escalate. Most interlocutors, including those who directly participated in the protests, reflected on this issue. Although we might accept a particular role of self-censorship in their answers, another wave of separatism in Karakalpakstan is hardly expected (at least as of now) despite the existence of some groups favouring such a solution and possible increase in national identity fomentation and awareness of the independence option. Otherwise, even those opposing the regime in Uzbekistan claimed their satisfaction with the formal status of Karakalpakstan.

The opposition exponents abroad pointed to the insufficient autonomy of Karakalpaks (both formal and informal) a long-time before the events broke out. The Alga Karakalpakstan (Forward Karakalpakstan!) movement is considered one of the loudest advocates of Karakalpak sovereignty or even independence (Yakubov Reference Yakubov2022). Therefore, their view on the topic is more radical than inside the country, demanding the transformation of the status of Karakalpakstan to complete independence, and their leaders underwent the “sticks” of the Uzbekistan system being sentenced to long jails in their absence (Abidov Reference Abidov2023).

Comparing other attempts to suppress the public riots in the post-Soviet area by the authoritarian regimes, the Uzbekistan authorities applied an ambiguous reaction (“sticks and carrots” approach). The former was used against the most visible showcases in the trials, including those representatives from the diaspora who were also dehumanized. In the latter case (the carrots), many detainees were finally released and the president himself was presented as a benign father of Karakalpakstan. Such an approach became unique as authoritarian regimes usually apply stronger and harsher measures in these cases. Moreover, it implicitly demonstrates that Uzbekistan is partially aware that there is no significant separatist movement in Karakalpakstan, and that a combination of isolation and defamation of several activists and diaspora organizations with the “carrot approach” for the rest of the population will suffice to achieve its main goal. The little resonance within the Karakalpak society after the events (trials, president coming to visit the region) demonstrates the unwillingness of the significant part of the population in the region to go against Tashkent. One respondent (author’s interview with the shop owner in Nukus, February 2023) expressed this process of reluctance towards separatism in a metaphorical way:

Another interlocutor from the Karakalpak academic circle (interview with the author, January 2023) also pointed out the unpreparedness of Karakalpakstan’s separatism, claiming about the deep connections with Uzbekistan: